Five: The Naked Ascetic Chapter 41. Should any bhikkhu give staple or non-staple food with his own hand to a naked ascetic, a male wanderer or a female wanderer, it is to be confessed. There are two origin stories here, the first being the more entertaining of the two: "Now at that time the Community had received a lot of non-staple food. Ven. Ananda told this matter to the Blessed One, who said, "In that case, give the cakes to those who eat scraps.'" "'As you say, sir,' Ven. Ananda answered the Blessed One. Then, having had those who eat scraps sit down in a line, and giving a cake to each, he gave two cakes to a certain female wanderer, thinking they were one. The female wanderers around her said, "That contemplative is your lover.' "'No, he's not. He just gave me two cakes thinking they were one.' "A second time...A third time, Ven. Ananda, giving a cake to each, gave two cakes to that female wanderer, thinking they were one. The female wanderers around her said, "That contemplative is your lover.' "'No, he's not. He just gave me two cakes thinking they were one.' "So--'Lover!' 'Not a lover!'--they kept squabbling." The second story, though, gives a better idea of the reason for the rule: "Then a certain naked ascetic went to a distribution of food. A certain bhikkhu, having mixed rice with a great deal of ghee, gave a large helping to the naked ascetic. So the naked ascetic, having received his alms, left. Another naked ascetic asked him, 'Where, friend, did you get your alms?' "'At a distribution of food by that shaveling householder, the contemplative Gotama.'" This training rule is corollary to the preceding one. Apparently other sects at the Buddha's time observed the formalities of receiving food from their lay followers just as the Buddhist bhikkhus did, and thus a bhikkhu who gave food in such a way to a mendicant ordained in another sect would be placing himself in the position of a lay follower of that sect, as the second origin story shows. An interesting point about this rule is that the Buddha formulated it at the request of Buddhist lay followers. Having overheard the naked ascetics' con-versation, they said to him, "Sire, these adherents of other sects enjoy criticizing the Buddha...Dhamma...and Sangha. It would be good if the masters did not give to adherents of other sects with their own hands." Object. The terms naked ascetic and male or female wanderer are meant to cover all mendicants ordained in religions outside of Buddhism. Since Brahmins, which were a non-mendicant priestly caste at the Buddha's time, are not included in this definition, we may infer at present that this rule does not refer to people ordained in other religions--e.g, Catholic priests, Protestant ministers, Jewish rabbis, Muslim mullahs, etc.--who do not obtain their food by going for alms. Effort. Staple and non-staple food here cover all edibles: juice drinks, tonics and medicines as well as food, but not water and tooth-cleaning sticks. Staple and non-staple foods are grounds for a pacittiya; water and tooth-cleaning sticks, grounds for a dukkata. To give is defined as giving with the body, with something in con-tact with the body, or by means of letting go, as in the preceding rule. Non-offenses. To get someone else to give edible things, to give edible things by depositing them near (as in NP 18), or to give ointments for external use--and, by extension, other inedible things--entails no offense. Summary: Giving food or medicines with one's own hand to a mendicant ordained outside of Buddhism is a pacittiya offense. *** 42. Should any bhikkhu say to a bhikkhu, "Come, my friend, let's enter the village or town for alms," and then--whether or not he has had (food) given to him--should dismiss him, saying, "Go away, my friend. I don't like sitting or talking with you. I prefer sitting or talking alone," if doing it for that reason and no other, it is to be confessed. The factors for the full offense here are four: 1) Object: another bhikkhu. 2) Intention: One wants to indulge in misconduct and does not want him to see it. 3) Effort: One dismisses him. 4) Result: He leaves one's range of hearing and sight (six meters, according to the Commentary). Object. A bhikkhu is grounds for a pacittiya here. An unordained person, grounds for a dukkata. Intention. The Vibhanga defines misconduct as laughing, playing or sitting in private with a woman, or any other misbehavior--breaking the minor rules--of any sort. To dismiss the other person--ordained or not--for reasons other than a desire to hide one's own misconduct entails no offense. Examples from the Vibhanga are listed in the non-offenses section below. Effort & result. To dismiss the other person means either to say outright for him/her to go away, or else to make remarks that will make him/her want to leave. The Commentary gives an example here--"Look at how this guy stands, sits and looks around. He stands like a stump, sits like a dog and looks about like a monkey"--but this would more likely come under Pacittiya 2. The offenses here are as follows: a dukkata for speaking the words of dismissal; a dukkata when the other bhikkhu is leaving the range of hearing and sight; and a pacittiya when he has left. Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense in: dismissing one's companion with the thought that two bhikkhus going together won't obtain enough food; dismissing him after seeing costly goods ahead, so that he won't develop a feeling of greed; dismissing him after seeing a beautiful woman ahead, so that he won't develop a feeling of dissatisfaction with the chaste life; sending him back with food for a sick bhikkhu or lay worker at the monastery; or dismissing him for any other proper reason, as long as one is not planning to indulge in misconduct. Summary: When, on almsround with another bhikkhu, one sends him back so that he won't witness any misconduct one is planning to indulge in, it is a pacittiya offense. *** 43. Should a bhikkhu sit intruding on a family "with its meal", it is to be confessed. The origin story here, briefly, is this: Ven. Upananda visits a woman in her private quarters. Her husband approaches him respectfully, has his wife give him alms, and then asks him to leave. The wife senses that her husband wants to have sexual intercourse with her, and so--as a game, apparently--keeps detaining Ven. Upananda until the husband gets exasperated and goes to complain to the bhikkhus: "Sires, this master Upananda is sitting in the bedroom with my wife. I have dismissed him, but he isn't willing to go. We are very busy and have much work to do." Object: A family "with its meal". The Vinaya Mukha tries to take this phrase literally, but the Vibhanga explains it as a euphemism meaning "a man and woman together, both not having gone out (of their bedroom), both not without lust"--in other words, a man and woman together in their private quarters, with at least one of them desiring sexual intercourse with the other. Although the Commentary tries to justify the Vibhanga's explanation etymologically (bhoga, the root form of meal, has other forms which mean enjoyment, indul-gence and use), there is no need to turn to etymology. Since ancient times in all cultures, eating has been commonly used as a metaphor for sex. Effort. To sit intruding means to sit down in the bedroom--in a house which is large enough to have a separate bedroom--or in the back half of a house which is not (the Sub-commentary explains this as a house about five meters from front to back). The texts seem to expect a bhikkhu to be quick to realize what is going on in situations like this, for they make no mention of the case in which he doesn't perceive that either the man or woman is sexually aroused. Instead, their discussions of perception center around the bedroom, and the question of intention, though mentioned in passing in the Commentary, is explained only in the Sub-commentary, which applies it solely to the act of intruding and sitting: One is subject to an offense only if one wants to sit there. Thus, to be perfectly safe from an offense in cases like this, a bhikkhu should not sit intruding on a couple unless they both make him 100% certain that he is welcome: a wise policy in any case, whether or not one is a bhikkhu. Cases of sitting with a woman alone in her bedroom--or any other private place--are covered by the following rule. Non-offenses. There is no offense: if both the man and woman have left the bedroom/private area; if neither of them is sexually aroused; if the bhikkhu is not in the bedroom/private area; or if he has a second bhikkhu as his companion. Summary: To sit down intruding on a man and a woman in their private quarters-- when one or both are sexually aroused, and when another bhikkhu is not present--is a pacittiya offense. *** 44. Should any bhikkhu sit in private on a secluded seat with a woman, it is to be confessed. There are three factors for the offense here: 1) Object: a female human being, "even one born that very day, all the more an older one." 2) Effort: One sits with her in a private, secluded seat, without another man present. 3) Intention: One is aiming at privacy. Object. Woman here includes women as well. In other words, even if one is sitting with many women in the secluded area, one is not exempt from this factor. A female human being is grounds for a pacittiya. A pandaka (basically, a male homosexual or eunuch--see Sanghadisesa 2 for details), a female peta, and an animal in the form of a woman are all grounds for a dukkata. Perception is not a factor here. If one is sitting with a woman, even if one thinks she is a man or something else, this factor is fulfilled. Effort. To sit also includes lying down. Whether the bhikkhu sits near the woman when she is already seated, or the woman sits near him when he is already seated, or both sit down at the same time, makes no difference. Private means private to the eye and private to the ear. Two people sitting in a place private to the eye means that no one else can see if they wink, raise their eyebrows or nod. If they are in a place private to the ear, no one else can hear what they say in an normal voice. A secluded seat is one behind a wall, a closed door, a large bush or anything at all that would afford them enough privacy to commit the sexual act. According to the Commentary, private to the eye is the essential factor here. Even if a man is within hearing, but not sight--i.e., he is sitting just outside the door to the private place--that does not exempt one from the offense here. The Commentary states further that the presence of a man within sight absolves one from this factor only if he is knowledgeable enough to know what is and is not lewd, if he is awake, and if he is not blind or deaf. Even a crazy or drowsy man, though, if he meets these criteria, would absolve one from this factor. Intention. The Commentary explains "aiming at privacy" as being motivated by any defilement related to sex, but this explana-tion opens as many questions as it tries to resolve. Does it refer solely to the desire for intercourse, or to other more subtle sexually-related desires? Unfortunately, neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary say. A passage in the Anguttara Nikaya (A.VII.47), though, offers a clue here: It refers to a priest or contemplative who observes the chaste life by not engaging in intercourse, but whose chastity is "broken, cracked, spotted and blemished" by the joy he finds in any one of the following activities: 1) He consents to being rubbed down, bathed and massaged by a woman. 2) He jokes, plays and amuses himself with a woman. 3) He stares into a woman's eyes. 4) He listens to the voices of women outside his wall as they laugh, speak, sing or cry. 5) He recollects how he used to laugh, converse and play with a woman. 6) He sees a householder or householder's son enjoying himself endowed with the five sensual pleasures. 7) He practices the chaste life intent on being born in one or another of the heavenly hosts, (thinking) "By this virtue or practice or abstinence or chaste life I will be a god of one sort or another. The joy a person finds in any of this things is termed a sexual fetter (methuna-sanyoga) which prevents him from gaining release from birth, ageing and death, and from the entire round of suffering. If the Commentary is indeed referring to this sort of thing when it mentions "defilements related to sex" (methuna-nissita-kilesa), then the factor of intention under this rule would be fulfilled by such things as wanting to joke with the woman, to stare into her eyes, or to enjoy hearing her voice as she talks or laughs. Although a bhikkhu may be convinced that he has no such motives in sitting in private with a particular woman, he should remember that this is one of the training rules where public opinion makes its claims. Aniyata 1 requires that if an outside witness is suspicious of a bhikkhu's sitting alone with a woman--and unless he is sitting with his mother or other elderly relative, it's rare that outsiders won't be suspicious--the Community must meet to investigate the issue. Even though they may find him innocent of any wrong-doing, the fact that they have had to investigate his behavior is usually enough to keep suspicions alive among the laity, and to create resentment among his fellow bhikkhus over the waste of their time due to his indiscretion. The Vinaya Mukha avoids these problems by taking an entirely different approach to the factor of intention here. It defines "not aiming at privacy" with the following illustration: A bhikkhu is sitting in a secluded place with a man and woman present, but the man gets up and leaves before the bhikkhu can stop him. In other words, the bhikkhu is not intending to sit alone in private with the woman at all, but circumstances beyond his control force him to. There is nothing in the Vibhanga to decide conclusively between these two interpretations. However, both the Canon and the Commen-tary give frequent warnings about the dangers that can arise when a bhikkhu sits alone with a woman: His own defilements may tempt him to do, say or think things that are detrimental to his resolve in the chaste life; and even when his motives are pure, he is inviting the suspicions of others--suspicions that do not easily fade even when the Community makes an official inquiry and declares him innocent, as mentioned above. At the same time, he is leaving himself at the mercy of the woman, who will later be free to make any claims she likes about what went on while she was alone him. As Lady Visakha said, "It is unfitting and improper, sir, for the master to sit in private, alone with a woman....Even though the master may not be aiming at that act, it is difficult to convince those who are unbelievers." All of this suggests that the Vinaya Mukha's interpretation is the wiser and safer of the two. Still, this is another case where different Communities interpret the rule differently, and the wise policy would be to be no less strict than one's Community in interpreting this factor. Non-offenses. In addition to the bhikkhu not aiming at privacy, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who sits alone with a woman when his attention is elsewhere--i.e., he is absorbed in his work or his meditation when a woman happens to come in and sit down in the room where he is sitting. Also, there is no offense if either the bhikkhu or the woman or both are standing, or if both are sitting when a man is present. Summary: Sitting or lying down with a woman or women in a private, secluded place with no other man present is a pacittiya offense. *** 45. Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman, it is to be confessed. The full offense here has three factors that differ slightly from those for the preceding rule. Object. Here woman is defined as a human female being who knows what is and is not lewd. Pandakas, female petas and animals in the form of a woman are again grounds for a dukkata. Effort. One sits with her alone--without another person present--in a place private to the ear and to the eye, but which is not secluded. Examples of such places would be spots out in the open (e.g, a bench in an open deserted park), seats in a glassed-in porch or room, or in an open-air pavilion. The Commentary would include walled-in open areas--such as a park with a fence around it--here as well, but outside areas screened by a wall or a bush would fall under the preceding rule. Aniyata 1 & 2 suggest that the distinguishing factor here would be how hidden it is. If it would be convenient for committing sexual intercourse, it would fall under the preceding rule; if it wouldn't, it would fall here. As in the preceding rule, sitting includes lying down as well. And again, whether the bhikkhu sits near the woman when she is already seated, or the woman sits near him when he is already seated, or both sit down at the same time, makes no difference here. According to the Commentary, the other person whose presence exempts one from this factor can be either a man or a woman, but must know what is and is not lewd, must be awake, must not be deaf or blind, and must be sitting "within sight", i.e., a radius of six meters. As in the preceding rule, whether or not the man or woman is crazy or drowsy is of no consequence here. Intention. One must be aiming at privacy for this factor to be fulfilled. See the discussion under the preceding rule. Non-offenses. Strangely enough, the Vibhanga's no-offense clauses here are identical with those for the preceding rule--i.e., they make no mention of the fact that the presence of another woman would exempt one from an offense. The Commentary seems justified in assuming this fact, though, for otherwise there would be no reason to have these two separate rules on the same subject. Summary: Sitting or lying down alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place with no one else present is a pacittiya offense. *** 46. Should any bhikkhu, being invited for a meal and without taking leave of an available bhikkhu, go calling on families before or after the meal, except at the proper times, it is to be confessed. Here the proper times are these: the time of giving cloth, the time of making robes. These are the proper times here. The origin story here suggests that the purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from wandering off before an appointed meal time so that they will not show up late or be difficult to track down; and to prevent them, after the meal, from using the invitation as an excuse to go off wandering without taking leave (see Pacittiya 85). However, the definition of the factor of object--which limits this rule to visiting lay people's houses--and the non-offense clauses--which allow one to visit monasteries and nunneries without taking leave--suggest a more over-riding purpose: to prevent bhikkhus from taking the invitation as an excuse to visit lay people and spend their time in inappropriate ways. There are two factors for the full offense here: 1) Object: a family residence. 2) Effort: One enters such a residence--without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu--on a morning when one has been invited to a meal, except during the time exemptions mentioned in the rule. Object. A family residence is grounds for a pacittiya here; its yard, grounds for a dukkata. Effort. Entering the residence is defined as having both feet inside the threshold. Meal here means one consisting of any of the five staple foods. As for the question of how to determine whether another bhikkhu is or is not available, the Commentary draws the distinction like this: After the desire to go calling on families arises in one's mind, and one takes a normal path to leave the monastery, if one comes across a bhikkhu who is close enough to address in a normal tone of voice (within six meters, says the Sub-commentary), that means that a bhikkhu is available and one should inform him of where one is going. If one does not come across a bhikkhu that close, no bhikkhu is available, and there is no need to go out of one's way to find one. This, though, is in direct contradiction to the Vibhanga's definition of available--"It is possible to go, having taken leave"--that is, if there is another bhikkhu in the monastery, and there are no obstacles to taking one's leave from him (he is asleep, he is sick, he is receiving important visitors), one is obliged to go out of one's way to inform him. According to the K/Commentary, taking leave in the context of this rule means the simple act of informing the other bhikkhu that, "I am going to the house of so-and-so," or any similar statement. In other words, one is not asking permission to go, although if the other bhikkhu sees that one is doing something improper in going, he is perfectly free to say so. If one treats his comments with disrespect, one incurs at least a dukkata under Pacittiya 54. (See the discussion under that rule for details.) For a new bhikkhu still living in dependence (nissaya) on his mentor, though, taking leave is a matter of asking permission at all times, whether one has been invited to a meal or not. The Mahavagga (I.25.24; II.21.1) states that one of the duties of such a bhikkhu is that he must receive permission from his mentor before entering a village, going to a cemetery, or leaving the district. Not to ask permission before going, or to go after being denied permission, is to incur a dukkata. As for the mentor, if he gives permission to go when it is not appropriate to do so, he is the one who incurs the dukkata. Non-offenses. As the rule states, there is no offense in not taking leave at the time of giving cloth--the robe season--or at a time of making robes, i.e., any time when one is making a robe. These exceptions enable a bhikkhu to visit his lay supporters easily to obtain gifts of thread, cloth or scissors, etc., at such times. There is also no offense in going when one has taken leave of another bhikkhu, or in going when one has not taken leave under any of the following circumstances: --There is no bhikkhu available (e.g, one is living alone; all the other bhikkhus have left; all the bhikkhus in the monastery are going together). --One is going to the house where one was invited for the meal. --The path to the house in which the meal is to be given leads through another house or its yard. --One is going to another monastery, to bhikkhunis' quarters or to the residence of people ordained in another sect or religion (located in a village, says the Commentary), or one is returning from any of these places. --There are dangers. This, according to the Commentary, refers to dangers to one's life or to one's resolve in practicing chastity.) The general principle. This rule, in conjunction with Pacittiya 85, is designed to keep bhikkhus from visiting lay people and spending their time in inappropriate ways. Pacittiya 85 deals with entire villages and towns, and covers the period from noon until the following dawn. This rule deals with family residences and covers the period from dawn until noon on days when one has been invited to a meal. The period from dawn to noon on days when one is not invited to a meal, and would be expected to go on alms-round, is thus not covered by either rule. Note, however, that the Buddha reprimands Ven. Upananda for visiting families during the latter part of a morning after going for alms. This shows that he did not approve of such behavior, even though he had practical reasons for not laying down a rule against it: On mornings when one is going for alms--and in his time, alms-going could often be an all-morning affair--there is no convenient way to draw a hard and fast line between appropriate alms-going and inappropriate visiting. Thus we have the rules as they stand. At present, though, in monasteries where alms-going takes up much less of the morning, or where the bhikkhus do not go outside the monastery for alms at all, it is a wise policy to adhere to the general principle by informing a fellow bhikkhu whenever possible when one is leaving the monastery for errands or visits which involve lay people, even during periods not covered by the rules. Summary: Visiting lay families--without having informed an available bhikkhu--before or after a meal to which one has been invited is a pacittiya offense except during the robe season or any time one is making a robe. *** 47. A bhikkhu who is not ill may accept (make use of) a four-month invitation to ask for requisites. If he should accept (make use of) it for longer than that--unless the invitation is renewed or is permanent--it is to be confessed. Object. An invitation to ask for requisites is an offer, made by a lay person, to supply a bhikkhu with requisites whenever he (the bhikkhu) asks for them. Such invitations may be made either to individual bhikkhus, to groups or to entire Communities. The responsibilities incumbent on the two sides in such an arrangement are well-illustrated in a passage from the origin story to this rule. "'Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus wore their lower robes improperly, their upper robes improperly, and were not at all consummate in their deportment. Mahanama the Sakyan criticized them: 'Sirs, why do you wear your lower robes improperly, your upper robes improperly, and why are you not at all consummate in your deportment? Shouldn't a person who has gone forth wear his lower robe properly, his upper robe properly, and be consum-mate in his deportment?' "The group-of-six bhikkhus nursed a grudge against him. They thought, 'Now how can we embarrass Mahanama the Sakyan?' Then it occurred to them, 'Listen, friends. Mahanama the Sakyan has made an invitation to provide the Sangha with medicines. Let's ask him for ghee.' "So they went to where Mahanama the Sakyan was staying, and on arrival said to him, 'We have need of a gallon of ghee, my friend.' "'Please wait for a day, sirs. People have just gone to the cattle pen to get ghee. You may come and fetch it in the morning.' A second time...A third time, they said to him, 'We have need of a gallon of ghee, my friend.' "'Please wait for a day, sirs. People have just gone to the cattle pen to get ghee. You may come and fetch it in the morning.' "'Did you make the invitation not desiring to give, in that having made the invitation you don't give?' "So Mahanama the Sakyan was annoyed and offended and spread it about, 'How can revered ones, being told, "Please wait for a day, sirs," not wait?'" As the story shows, the person making the invitation was expected to provide the goods he offered, while bhikkhus were expected to be reasonable in their requests. The Vibhanga and Commentary, taken together, show that this rule covers invitations made to Communities to provide them with medi-cines. The rule and origin stories show that at first invitations of this sort had three standard forms: a four-month invitation (each of the major seasons in India lasts four months, which may have been the reason for this type of invitation), a renewed four-month invitation, and a permanent invitation. Eventually, though, the Vibhanga worked out the following four-fold schema for covering invitations of a wide variety of sorts: those which (1) specify requisites (medicines), (2) specify a time period, (3) specify both or (4) specify neither. (1) An invitation specifying requisites may specify merely the type of item offered--"Let me know if you ever need any honey or sugar"--or it may also specify the amount--"Let me know if you ever need a bottle of honey...a pound of sugar." In cases like these, a bhikkhu may ask for the type or amount of the item which has been offered. If he asks for other items or for more of the proper item than the amount offered, if that too is specified, he incurs a pacittiya. How-ever, since the donor mentions no time limit, the Vibhanga says that the bhikkhu may ask at any time. (2) An invitation specifying the time period may be phrased, for example, "Let me know if you need any medicine during this Rains Retreat." In cases like this, a bhikkhu may ask for any type or amount of medicine during that time period. But as the origin stories to this and the other rules dealing with asking make clear, (see Sanghadisesa 6 and NP 6 & 7), he should be moderate and reasonable when making requests, and not abuse the lay supporter's generosity. If, not being ill, he asks after the period has expired, he incurs a pacittiya. (3) An invitation specifying requisites and the time period might be phrased, "Let me know if you need any honey during the Rains Retreat." In cases like this, a bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya if he asks for items other than those offered--or for more of the proper item than the amount offered, if that too is mentioned--whether or not he asks during the time period mentioned. He also incurs a pacittiya if, not being ill, he asks for the items offered after the time period has expired. (4) An invitation specifying neither requisites nor the time period may be phrased, for example, "Let me know if you even need any medicine." In cases like this, the bhikkhu may ask for any medicine at any time. As in case (2), though, he should try to be reasonable in his requests. Effort. A bhikkhu who asks for medicine outside of the types of medicine or time period specified in the invitation incurs a pacittiya in the asking, regardless of whether or not he is given what he asks for. If he asks for medicine, making use of an invitation to do so, but then uses it for a non-medicinal purpose--e.g, he asks for honey and then has someone else make a desert with it--he incurs a pacittiya as well. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. If the time period has expired, and he asks assuming that it hasn't, he commits the full offense all the same. Non-offenses. Three of the no-offense clauses require no special explanation: There is no offense in asking from relatives, for the sake of another, or for medicine to be bought with one's own resources. One of the two no-offense clauses requiring explanation is that there is no offense in asking from those who have made an invitation. This the Commentary explains by saying that if one has received a personal invitation, one may ask in line with its terms, but that other-wise the limits set by this rule apply only to invitations made to an entire Community, and not to those made on a personal basis to individual bhikkhus. Although the Vibhanga makes no specific mention of this point, it is the only way to make sense of this no-offense clause and the relationship between this rule and Pacittiya 39. Under that rule, a bhikkhu who is not ill and has not been invited incurs a dukkata in asking for any one of the five tonics, and there seems no reason to impose a heavier penalty for requesting one of the five tonics after a personal invitation to do so has expired. If, though, the invitation referred to in this rule is one made to an entire Community, the heavier penalty makes sense as an added protection to the donor against having his/her invitation abused by the less conscientious members of the Community. This added protection would also be a means of encouraging further invitations of this sort in the future. The second no-offense clause requiring explanation is the one for an ill bhikkhu. Reading the rule, one would imagine that the exemp-tion for an ill bhikkhu would read simply, "There is no offense if one is ill," but instead it reads, "There is no offense if one says, "The time period for which we were invited has passed, but we have need of medicine." This is an important point of etiquette. Normally, an ill bhikkhu may ask anyone for medicine at anytime, but in dealing with a person who has made an invitation for medicine to the Community, he has to show special consideration. In mentioning the fact that the time period for the invitation has expired, he gives recognition of the fact that the donor is no longer under any obligation to provide the medicine, thus giving the donor a convenient "out" in case he/she can no longer provide it. This simple gesture is the least consideration that can be shown to someone who has had the generosity to invite the Community to ask for medicines. And again, simple gestures of this sort are what protect donors and encourage similar invitations again in the future. An alternative interpretation. The Vinaya Mukha tries to extend this rule to cover invitations of every sort, individual and communal, dealing with any sort of requisite. It also reads the training rule to mean that if a time-limit is not specified on an invitation, a four-month time limit is to be assumed. All of this has no support in the Vibhanga, and so is not binding, but the last point is something that individual bhikkhus may adopt as a personal policy as a way of teaching themselves to be moderate in their requests. A donor's faith and financial position can change quickly, and it is reasonable not to depend on an invitation for longer periods of time unless the donor makes it clear that he/she is still willing to provide the item offered in the first place. Summary: When a supporter has made an offer to supply medicines to the Community: If any bhikkhu who, not being ill, asks for medicine outside of the terms of the offer, or who asks for a medicine to use for a non-medicinal purpose, it is a pacittiya offense. *** 48. Should any bhikkhu go to see an army on active duty, unless there is a suitable reason, it is to be confessed. Object. An army in the time of the Buddha was a very different affair from what an army is now. We will start with a discussion of how the Vibhanga explains this factor in terms of armies at that time, and then follow with a discussion of how it may be applied to armies at present. Armies in those times consisted mainly of what we would call reserve units. These were organized into four divisions: elephant units, cavalry units, chariot units and infantry units. The soldiers for the most part were citizens who would live at home until called up on active duty to engage in actual warfare or practice maneuvers, activities which always took place outside the city. Battles, both actual and practice, were fought according to rules--total warfare is a modern invention--and it was possible for non-military citizens to watch, with occasional danger to live and limb, much as people at present watch football games. (Going to a battlefield is listed in the Brahmajala Suttanta as a form of entertainment.) With this information in mind, it is easy to understand the Vibhanga's treatment of this rule: An army on active duty--composed of a full panoply of elephant, cavalry, chariot and infantry units who have left the city--is grounds for a pacittiya. Any segment of an army on duty--even one armed archer, says the Commentary--is grounds for a dukkata. An army not on duty--the Commentary illustrates this with a king's pleasure trip--is not grounds for an offense. To apply these definitions to armed forces at present: The Vibhanga's definition for army comes close to the modern definition of a field army with a full array of artillery, armored, airborne and infantry divisions. Navies, marines and air forces did not exist at that time, but the Great Standards would allow us to extend the definition of army to cover similar large units of these branches of the military as well. Since armies on active duty no longer limit their activities to areas outside of cities--they are sometimes based in cities, run practice drills there, and can be called in to quell riots or fight enemy forces there--the definition of "on active duty" must be changed to fit the way armies use it at present. Thus soldiers at work on base or off would count as being on duty, and the only areas of armed bases that would not be grounds for an offense here would be the areas where officer's families are housed. With these points in mind, we may say that a full field army--or the equivalent in naval, marine or air forces--on active duty would be grounds for a pacittiya here. Any smaller unit of the military on active duty--a regiment, a division, or even one armed soldier--would be grounds for a dukkata. Armies not on active duty, as when they organize charity affairs, would not be grounds for an offense. Effort. This factor is fulfilled simply by standing and watching an army on duty except when one has a suitable reason. The Vibhanga gives a dukkata for every step one makes in going to watch an army on duty, and a pacittiya for standing and watching. The origin story's example of a suitable reason is that a bhikkhu's uncle in the army had fallen ill and wished to see him. Other suitable reasons would include accepting an invitation from the soldiers to receive alms or to give a talk. Non-offenses. There is no offense: if, having gone on business, one sees the army; if, standing within a monastery, one watches an army fighting or holding practice maneuvers nearby; if an army comes to where one happens to be; if one meets an army coming from the opposite direction; or if there are dangers. The Commentary interprets this last point as referring to dangers to one's life or chastity which one hopes to escape by taking shelter with the army. Summary: Watching a field army--or similar large military force--on active duty, unless there is a suitable reason, is a pacittiya offense. * * * 49.There being some reason or another for a bhikkhu to go to an army, he may stay two or three (consecutive) nights with the army. If he should stay longer than that, it is to be confessed. Object. Nothing is said in any of the texts as to whether this rule applies only to armies on active duty, or to armies off duty as well, but since this and the following rule are continuations of the preceding one, they would seem to apply only to armies on active duty. Thus this rule does not apply to the housing where military officers live with their families, whether on base or off. Effort. As under Pacittiya 5--the rule that deals with sleeping in the same lodging with an unordained person--nights here are counted by dawns. If a bhikkhu leaves the army before dawn of any night, that night is not counted. If he returns to spend another night/dawn with the army, the series starts over again from one. If, however, he has spent three consecutive nights with the army and is still with the army at any time beginning with sunset of the fourth night, he incurs a pacittiya. Unlike Pacittiya 5, he does not need to be lying down for this factor to count. The Commentary illustrates this point by saying that even if he is using his psychic power to sit levitating above the army at sunset on the fourth day, he still fulfills this factor. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if one miscounts the nights, one is not exempt from the offense. Non-offenses. There is no offense in staying longer than three consecutive nights: if one spends another night somewhere else in the meantime; if one is ill or caring for one who is ill; 'if the army is surrounded by opposing forces; if one is being held captive; or if there are other dangers. Summary: Staying more than three consecutive nights with an army on active duty is a pacittiya offense. *** 50. If a bhikkhu staying two or three nights with an army should go to a battlefield, a roll call, the troops in battle formation or to see a review of the (battle) units, it is to be confessed. "Then a certain bhikkhu of the group of six, having gone to the battlefield, was pierced by an arrow. People made fun of him: 'We hope it was a good battle, venerable sir. How many points did you get?'" A battle field, according to the Vibhanga and Commentary here, is a place where actual fighting may be seen; according to the Commentary to the Brahmajala Suttanta, it is a place where war games are held. Both interpretations seem valid, especially consider-ing the organized and decorous nature of warfare in those days. The Commentary also says that a review of battle units can mean anything down to a review of a single unit. Roll call and troops in battle formation are self-explanatory. The Brahmajala Suttanta mentions all four of these activities as forms of entertainment. From this, using the Great Standards, we may say that any show that the armed forces put on for the public--parades, air shows, etc.--would fall under this factor as well. Notice that these activities fulfill this factor even if they do not include the full array of forces that one would find in a field army or similar large military unit. In other words, a bhikkhu staying with the army would incur the full offense here for watching these activities even if they involve only a small segment of a single division. If he is not staying with the army, though, then under Pacittiya 48 he would incur a pacittiya for watching these activities only if they contain the full complement of artillery, armored, airborne and infantry forces; and a dukkata if they contain only a segment. Effort. As with Pacittiya 48, there is a dukkata for every step one takes towards watching these activities, and a pacittiya for standing and watching them. Non-offenses. The Vibhanga's no-offense clauses here are ident-ical with those for Pacittiya 48. In other words, there is no offense: if, having gone on business, one happens to see any of these activities; if, standing within a monastery, one watches these activities; if an army comes to where one happens to be; if one meets an army coming from the opposite direction; or if there are dangers. Summary: Going to a battlefield, a roll call, the troops in battle formation or to see a review of the battle units while one is staying with an army is a pacittiya offense. Six: The Alcoholic Drink Chapter 51. The drinking of alcohol or fermented liquor is to be confessed. "Then Ven. Sagata went to the hermitage of the coiled-hair ascetic of Ambatittha, and on arrival--having entered the fire building and spread out a grass mat--sat down cross-legged with his body erect and mindfulness established before him. The naga (living in the fire building) saw that Ven. Sagata had entered, and on seeing him was upset, disgruntled and emitted smoke. Ven. Sagata emitted smoke. The naga, unable to bear his anger, blazed up. Ven. Sagata, entering the fire element, blazed up. Then Ven. Sagata, having consumed the naga's fire with his own fire, left for Bhaddavatika. "Then the Blessed One, having stayed at Bhaddavatika as long as he liked, left on a walking tour to Kosambi. Word reached the lay followers of Kosambi: 'They say that Ven. Sagata did battle with the Ambatittha naga!' "Then the Blessed One, having toured by stages, came to Kosambi. The Kosambi lay followers, after welcoming the Blessed One, went to where Ven. Sagata was staying and, on arrival, having bowed down and sat to one side, said to him, 'What, honored sir, is something the masters like which is hard for you to get? What can we prepare for you?' "When this was said, some group-of-six bhikkhus said to the Kosambi lay followers, 'Friends, there is a strong liquor called pidgeon's liquor (the color of pidgeons' feet, according to the Commentary) which the bhikkhus like and is hard for them to get. Prepare that.' "Then the Kosambi lay followers, having prepared pidgeon's liquor in house after house, and seeing that Ven. Sagata had gone out for alms, said to him, 'Master Sagata, drink some pidgeon's liquor! Master Sagata, drink some pidgeon's liquor!' Then Ven. Sagata, having drunk pidgeon's liquor in house after house, passed out at the city gate as he was leaving the city. "Then the Blessed One, leaving the city with a large group of bhikkhus, saw that Ven. Sagata had passed out at the city gate. On seeing him, he addressed the bhikkhus, saying, 'Bhikkhus, pick up Sagata.' "Answering, 'As you say, Lord,' the bhikkhus took Ven. Sagata to the monastery and laid him down with his head towards the Blessed One. Then Ven. Sagata turned around and went to sleep with his feet towards the Blessed One. So the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying, 'In the past, wasn't Sagata respectful to the Tathagata and deferential?' "'Yes, Lord.' "'But is he respectful to the Tathagata and deferential now?' "'No, Lord.' "'And didn't Sagata do battle with the Ambatittha naga?' "'Yes, Lord.' "'But could he do battle with even a salamander now?' "'No, Lord.'" Object. Alcohol means any alcoholic beverage made from grain, yeast or any combination of ingredients. Examples would include whiskey, beer, vodka and gin. Fermented liquor means any alcoholic beverage made from flowers, fruits, honey, sugar or any combination of ingredients. Examples here would include wine, mead and rum. Together, the two terms are meant to cover all kinds of alcoholic beverages. There is some controversy as to what other substances would be included in this factor using the Great Standards. Since the Canon repeatedly criticizes alcohol on the grounds that it destroys one's sense of shame, weakens one's discernment and can put one into a stupor--as happened to Ven. Sagata--it seems reasonable to extend this rule to other intoxicants, narcotics and hallucinogens as well. Thus things like marijuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine and LSD would fulfill this factor. Coffee, tea, tobacco and betel do not have this effect, though, so there is no reason to include them here. Items which look, smell and taste like alcohol but are non-alcoholic also do not come under this rule. Thus, for example, carbonated apple juice that resembles champagne would not fulfill this factor. Perception is not a mitigating factor under this rule. A bhikkhu drinking champagne that he thinks to be carbonated apple juice would fall under this factor, regardless of his ignorance. Effort. The Vibhanga defines drinking as taking even as little as the tip of a blade of grass. Thus taking a small glass of wine, even though it might not be enough to make one drunk, would be enough to fulfill this factor. According to the Commentary, the number of offenses involved in taking an alcoholic drink is determined by the number of separate sips. As for intoxicants taken by means other than sipping, each separate effort would count as an offense. Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense in taking alcohol "mixed in broth, meat or oil." The Commentary interprets the first two items as referring to stews and meat dishes to which alcoholic beverages, such as wine, are added for flavoring before they are cooked. Since the alcohol would evaporate during the cooking, such dishes would have no intoxicating effect. Foods containing unevaporated alcohol--such as rum babas--would not be included under this allowance. As for alcohol mixed in oil, this refers to a medicine used in the Buddha's time for afflictions of the "wind element". The Mahavagga (VI.14.1) allows this medicine for use only as long as the taste, color and smell of the alcohol are not perceptible. From this point, the Vinaya Mukha argues that morphine and other narcotics used as pain killers are allowable as well. In addition, the Vibhanga states that there is no offense in taking alcohol in molasses and embric myrobalan--none of the texts explain what this means--or in taking fermented medicines which are non-alcoholic, but whose color, taste or smell is like alcohol. Summary: Taking an intoxicant is a pacittiya offense regardless of whether one is aware or not that it is an intoxicant. *** 52. Tickling with the fingers is to be confessed. "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were making one of the group of 17 laugh by tickling him with their fingers. Convulsed with laughter and unable to catch his breath, he died." There are three factors for the full offense here. 1) Object: another bhikkhu. 2) Effort: One touches any part of his body with any part of one's own body. 3) Intention: One's intention in touching him is to make him laugh. Object. A bhikkhu is grounds for a pacittiya here; any unordained person, grounds for a dukkata. The Commentary notes that even a bhikkhuni counts as an unordained person in the context of this rule, and that a bhikkhu looking for a little fun can tickle one without incurring a penalty stronger than a dukkata. There are occasional attempts at humor in the Commentary, and we can probably write this off as one of them. Effort. This factor is fulfilled only by body-to-body contact, as defined at length under Sanghadisesa 2. The following actions, if done with the intent of making the other person laugh, would be grounds for a dukkata here regardless of whether the person was ordained or not: using an item connected with the body--such as a stick--to poke at the person; touching an item connected with the other person's body; tossing or dropping things on the other person. Intention. If one has reasons for touching the other person aside from wanting to make him laugh, there is no penalty in doing so. Thus a bhikkhu massaging another bhikkhu's tired back incurs no offense if he inadvertently happens to touch a spot where the other bhikkhu is ticklish. Result is not a factor here. If one tickles another bhikkhu with the thought of making him laugh, one incurs the full offense regardless of whether he actually laughs or not. Summary: Tickling another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. *** 53. The act of playing in the water is to be confessed. Here again, the factors for the full offense are three. 1) Effort: One jumps up or down, splashes or swims 2) Object: in the water deep enough to immerse one's ankle 3) Intention: for fun. Effort. According to the Commentary, each individual effort counts as a separate offense. Thus if one is swimming for fun, one incurs a pacittiya for each hand or footstroke. Object. Jumping up or down in water less than ankle deep incurs a dukkata, as does splashing water with the hands, feet, a stick or a piece of tile; playing with water in a tumbler or a bowl; or playing with such things as sour gruel, milk, buttermilk, colored dyes, urine or mud. The Vibhanga states that there is also a dukkata for playing in a boat. This the Commentary defines as paddling a boat with an oar, propelling it with a pole or pushing it up on shore. Intention. The Vibhanga defines this factor as "for a laugh", which the Commentary translates as "for fun" or "for sport" (kiladhippayo). The question of swimming for exercise or health does not come up in any of the texts, and seems to have been virtually unheard of in Asia until recent times. Swimming in most Asian countries has long been regarded as a childish form of play, and the one mention in the Canon of athletic bhikkhus keeping their bodies in strong shape is disparaging: In the origin story to Sanghadisesa 8, Ven. Dabba Mallaputta assigned separate lodgings to different groups of bhikkhus--those who studied the Suttas, those who studied the Vinaya, those who meditated, etc.--and, finally, "for those bhikkhus who lived indulging in animal talk and keeping their bodies in strong shape, he assigned lodgings in the same place, 'So that even these venerable ones will live as they like.'" Thus it does not seem likely that the Buddha would have recognized physical fitness as an appropriate reason for bhikkhus to go swimming. Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense in jumping in or out of the water, swimming or using a boat: if one goes into the water not for fun but because one has busi-ness to do--examples would include bathing or helping a person who cannot swim; if one is crossing to the other shore of a body of water; or if there are dangers--e.g, one is escaping a fire or a wild beast. Summary: Jumping and swimming in the water for fun is a pacittiya offense. *** 54. Disrespect is to be confessed. This rule refers to cases where one has been admonished for one's behavior. The factors for the full offense are two. 1) Object: One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu, who cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya. 2) Effort: One shows disrespect for the bhikkhu or for the rule. Object. Only if the bhikkhu cites a rule in the Vinaya is this factor grounds for a pacittiya. If he criticizes one's actions, citing standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya--e.g., he says that one has been insensitive, out of touch with modern attitudes or whatever--this factor becomes grounds for a dukkata. If the person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of whether he/she cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya, again this factor is grounds for a dukkata. Whether or not one views the admonition as valid is not an issue here. Even if the other person is really an ignorant fool, has misinter-preted the rule, or has cited some standard of behavior which has absolutely nothing to do with Buddhist practice, one should be careful not to show disrespect in word or deed. Effort. There are two possible targets for one's disrespect--the person and the rule--and two ways of showing it: by word or by gesture. Disrespect for the person would include such things as saying "Who are you to tell me?" "Get lost!" or "Go to hell!" or making a rude gesture or even a slight facial expression to show one's contempt. Disrespect for the rule would include such things as saying, "That's a stupid rule," "That rule doesn't apply to me;" stubbornly repeating the action for which one was admonished (this point is covered in Mv.IV,17.1-9); or making a rude gesture, saying, "This is what I think of that rule." Further action. If one persists in acting disrespectfully when being admonished, one may also be subject to Sanghadisesa 12 or to a formal act of suspension. Non-offenses. There is no offense if, being admonished, one states simply that one was taught differently by one's teachers. As the Dhammapada (verse 76) says, one should regard a person who points out one's faults as a guide who points out hidden treasure. If one shows disrespect to such a guide, it is unlikely that he/she will feel inclined to point out any hidden treasure ever again. A good example of how to receive admonishment was set by Ven. Ananda during the First Council (Cv.XI.1.10). Although he was admonished for committing acts which the Buddha had not declared to be offenses, and although he did not see that he had committed any error, still he willingly confessed his actions as offenses so as to show good faith in his fellow bhikkhus. Summary: Speaking or acting disrespectfully when being admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the training rules is a pacittiya offense. *** 55. Should any bhikkhu try to frighten another bhikkhu, it is to be confessed. There are three factors for the full offense here: Intention. One wants to frighten the other person. Effort. One arranges a frightening sight--such as hanging a sheet in a dark room so that it looks like a ghost--makes a frightening sound, etc., or describes dangers from ghosts, robbers or wild animals. Object. The other person is a bhikkhu. Anyone who is not a bhikkhu is grounds for a dukkata. Result is not a factor here. If the three factors are fulfilled, one commits the offense regardless of whether the other person is actually frightened or not. Non-offenses. To inform another person of dangers from ghosts, robbers, etc., without intending to frighten him/her constitutes no offense. Summary: Attempting to frighten another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. *** 56. Should any bhikkhu who is not ill, seeking to warm him-self, kindle a fire or have one kindled--unless there is a suitable reason--it is to be confessed. "Now at that time, in the winter months, bhikkhus warmed themselves, having kindled a fire by a certain large hollow log. And in that hollow a cobra was scorched by the fire. Coming out, it sprang at the bhikkhus. The bhikkhus ran off every which way." Here again the factors for the full offense are three: 1) Object: One is not ill. 2) Effort: One lights a fire or gets someone else to light one, 3) Intention: for the purpose of warming oneself. Object. Not ill, in the context of this rule, means that one can fare comfortably without warming oneself. The Vibhanga makes the point that perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one perceives oneself to be ill in these terms, but actually isn't, that still fulfills this factor. What this means is that when it is chilly outside, one should be very sure that extra warmth is a necessity for one's health before going ahead and lighting a fire to warm oneself. Effort. Lighting a fire at present would include turning on a heating system in one's dwelling, an automobile, etc., for the sake of the warmth. If, when not ill, one gets someone else to light a fire for the purpose of warming oneself, there is a pacittiya in making the order/request/suggestion, and another pacittiya when the other person lights the fire. To return a burning piece of fuel to a fire is grounds for a dukkata; adding new fuel to a fire--according to the Commentary--is grounds for a pacittiya. Intention. There is no offense if one lights a fire, or has one lit, for purposes other than warming oneself. Thus one may light a lamp or light a fire to boil water, burn dead leaves or fire an alms bowl without incurring a penalty. The Cullavagga (V.32.1) says that if a forest fire is approaching one's dwelling, one may light a counter-fire to ward off its approach. In other circumstances, though, Pacittiya 10 would impose a pacittiya for lighting a fire on top of "live" soil. Non-offenses. In addition, there is no offense in warming oneself at raked-out coals or at a fire lit by someone else (not at one's request). And there is no offense in lighting a fire when there are dangers, which the Commentary says refers to cases when one is bitten by a snake (and wants to make the snake-bite medicine mentioned under Pacittiya 40), when one is surrounded by robbers or disturbed by non-human beings or beasts of prey. Cv.V.14.1 allows bhikkhus to use a "fire hall", similar to a sauna at present, for the purpose of inducing perspiration for health reasons. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense in lighting a fire in a place such as this. The purpose of this rule is suggested by a passage in the Anguttara Nikaya (V.219) that lists the five disadvantages of sitting around a fire: It is bad for one's eyes, bad for one's skin, bad for one's strength and (most importantly, in this context) groups tend to form (which can turn into factions) and they spend their time in "animal talk". Summary: Lighting a fire to warm oneself--or having it lit--when one does not need the warmth for one's health is a pacittiya offense. *** 57. Should any bhikkhu bathe at intervals of less than half a month, except at the proper occasions it is to be con-fessed. Here the proper occasions are these: the last month and a half of the hot season, the first month of the rains, these two and a half months being a time of heat, a time of fever; (also) a time of illness; a time of work; a time of going on a journey; a time of wind or rain. These are the proper times here. "Now at that time bhikkhus were bathing in the hot spring (at Rajagaha). Then King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, having gone to the hot spring with the thought, 'I will bathe my head,' waited to one side, thinking, 'I will wait as long as the masters are bathing.' The bhikkhus bathed until nightfall. "Then King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, after having bathed his head at the wrong time (night)--the gates of the city being closed--spent the night outside the city walls....(The Buddha learned of the incident and rebuked the bhikkhus:) 'How can you worthless men, having seen the king, bathe not knowing moderation?'" The original formulation of this rule--with no allowance for "proper occasions"--seems to have been intended as a temporary disciplinary measure for the bhikkhus who had inconvenienced the king. (There was a similar temporary rule, against eating mangoes (Cv.V.5.1), that the Buddha formulated when King Bimbisara had invited the bhikkhus to help themselves to some of his mangoes, and some group-of-six bhikkhus went and took all the mangoes in his park, even the unripe ones. The rule was later rescinded (Cv.V.5.2) when the Buddha allowed bhikkhus to eat any and all fruit as long as it was allowable in any of the five ways mentioned under Pacittiya 11.) As for this rule: Once the proper occasions were added, they relaxed it considerably. For instance: a time of illness is any time when one does not feel comfortable without bathing; a time of work can involve as little work as sweeping out one's room; a time of going on a journey is whenever one is about to go, is going or has gone on a trip of half a league (approximately 5 miles/8 kilometers); a time of wind and rain is whenever a dusty wind blows and two or three drops of rain fall on one's body. In addition, the Mahavagga (V.13) tells the story of Ven. Maha Kaccana's leaving the middle Ganges Valley and settling in Avanti, towards the south. After some time, one of his students --Ven. Sona Kutikanna--asked permission to visit the Buddha. Ven. Maha Kaccana gave his permission, together with a request to convey to the Buddha: that certain rules inappropriate for areas outside of the Ganges Valley--this rule among them--be rescinded for bhikkhus living in outlying districts. The Buddha complied with the request, and defined the outlying districts in such a way that there is nowhere in the world outside of the middle Ganges Valley where this rule applies. Offenses. For those who live in the middle Ganges Valley, the offenses for bathing more frequently than once a fortnight outside of the proper occasions are these: a dukkata for every time one scrubs oneself with chunam (bathing powder) or clay (soap), and a pacittiya when one has finished bathing. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one miscounts the days, one is still subject to the offense. Non-offenses. In addition to bathing more frequently than once a fortnight during the proper occasions or in areas outside the middle Ganges Valley, the Vibhanga says that there is no offense in bathing more frequently if one is crossing a river or if there are dangers. This last allowance the Commentary explains with an example: One is being chased by bees, and so jumps into the water to escape them. Summary: Bathing more frequently than once a fortnight when residing in the middle Ganges Valley, except on certain occasions, is a pacittiya offense. *** 58. When a bhikkhu receives a new robe, any one of three means of discoloring it is to be applied: green, brown or black. If a bhikkhu should make use of a new robe without applying any of the three means of discoloring it, it is to be confessed. "Now at that time many bhikkhus and wanderers were travel-ing from Saketa to Savatthi. On the way, thieves came out and robbed them. Royal officials, coming out of Savatthi and capturing the thieves with the goods, sent a messenger to the bhikkhus, saying, 'Come, revered sirs, let each identify his own robes and take them.' The bhikkhus could not identify their robes. People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can revered ones not identify their own robes?'" Protocol. As this rule indicates, a bhikkhu should wear robes only which have been marked with an identifying mark. The Vibhanga does not go into any great detail on procedures for marking a robe, aside from saying that the mark may be as small as the tip of a blade of grass, and can be made with any of the colors mentioned in the rule. (The color green in Pali also covers the color blue, so a mark made with blue ink would be acceptable.) The Commentary goes into more detail: After the robe has been dyed, one should make a round mark no smaller than the size of a bedbug's back and no larger than the iris of a peacock's eye in all four corners of the robe, three corners, two, or one, as one sees fit. Only round marks are allowable. Such things as lines or angular marks (squares, triangles or stars) are not. As the Vibhanga notes, once the robe has been marked, there is no need to mark it again, even if the mark wears off, the marked part of the robe gets torn (), one sews a marked cloth together with an unmarked one, or one patches, darns or adds a hem to a marked robe. If Bhikkhu X marks a robe and then gives it to Bhikkhu Y, Y may wear it without having to mark it again. In Thailand at present, the custom is to make three small dots in one corner of the robe, saying,"Imam pindu-kappam karomi," (I make this properly marked) while making each dot. This procedure does not appear in the Canon or commentaries, but does not conflict with any of them. The factors for the offense here are two: Object--a new robe--and effort--one makes use of it without first marking it. Object. According to the Vibhanga, a new robe here refers to one made out of any of the six kinds of robe cloth and which has not yet been marked. Thus an unmarked cloth which has been kept for a long time is still regarded as new. The Commentary adds that robe in the context of this rule refers specifically to robes which can be worn over the shoulders or around the waist--i.e., lower robes, upper robes, outer robes, rains-bathing cloths--and not to ordinary pieces of cloth or other cloth items such as sitting cloths, handkerchiefs or shoulder bags. Any cloth requisite which is not a robe in this sense is not grounds for an offense. Shoulder cloths (ansa) were not worn in the time of the Commentary, but would seem to fall under this factor, as would any other item a bhikkhu might wear around his body. Effort. The Vibhanga defines this factor with the verb "use" (paribhunjati), while the K/Commentary is more specific in saying that this factor is fulfilled when one wears the robe over the shoulders or around the waist. Since the mark is to be added only after the robe is dyed, this factor does not cover such things as trying on a new robe while it is being sewn but has yet to be dyed. Non-offenses. As noted above, there is no offense: in using a robe which has been properly marked; in using a robe whose mark has worn off (as in washing); or in using a robe whose marked corner has been torn off or otherwise destroyed. There is also no need to re-mark a marked robe if one sews it together with an unmarked piece of cloth, or if one patches it, darns it, or adds a new hem to it. The K/Commentary adds that if one's robes have been stolen, destroyed, etc., one may wear an unmarked piece of cloth without incurring an offense. Summary: Making use of an unmarked robe is a pacittiya offense. *** 59. Should any bhikkhu, himself having placed robe material under shared ownership (vikappa) with a bhikkhu, a bhikkhuni, a female probationer, a male novice or a female novice, then make use of the robe material without the shared ownership's being rescinded, it is to be confessed. Shared ownership. As mentioned in the explanations to NP1, vikappa is an arrangement whereby a bhikkhu places a robe or robe material under shared ownership so that he may store it for any length of time without its being counted as an extra cloth. One may share ownership with novices, bhikkhunis, female probationers and female novices, as well as with one's fellow bhikkhus. Passages in the Mahvagga (VIII.20.2; VIII.21.1) show that shared ownership is intended for cloth which is being stored, and not for cloth in use: Cloth which has not been made into a finished robe, rains-bathing cloths being kept during the eight months of the year outside of the rainy season, and skin-eruption covering cloths being kept when they are not needed may all be placed under shared ownership. The three basic robes, miscellaneous requisites, handker-chiefs and the sitting cloth may not. As this rule states, when a bhikkhu wants to use a piece of cloth placed under shared ownership, the shared ownership must first be rescinded. Protocol. The Vibhanga to this rule explains how cloth may be placed under shared ownership, but unfortunately the explanation is rather terse, so we will have to discuss two alternative interpretations. What the Vibhanga says. One may place a piece of material under dual ownership only if it is one of the six kinds of robe material discussed under NP 1, and it measures at least four by eight finger-breadths. There are two ways of doing this: in the presence of (the second owner presumably, although this is a controversial point) or in the absence of (again, this would seem to mean the second owner). In the first method, one says, "I place this under shared ownership with you (plural)" or "with so-and-so." (The Pali formulae for this and the following procedures are in Appendix V.) This is as far as the Vibhanga explains the method, but it seems to refer to two ways of doing the procedure in the presence of the second owner: One uses "you (plural)" if the other owner is a bhikkhu with more seniority than oneself; and the second owner's name if he/she is a junior bhikkhu, a bhikkhuni, female probationer or male or female novice. (Passages throughout the Canon show that it was considered disrespectful to refer to a senior person by his name in his presence. Buddhists, for instance, would never address the Buddha as Gotama, although members of other sects often did. At Mv.I.74.1, Ven. Ananda says that he is not worthy enough to refer to Ven. Maha Kassapa by name, as the latter is his teacher.) The Vibhanga does not say how shared ownership is to be rescinded in a case like this, although the K/Commentary gives a formula for the second owner to say: "Use what is mine, give it away, or do as you like with it." In the second method, one gives the cloth to a witness and says, "I give this robe cloth to you to place under shared ownership." The witness then says, "Who are your friends and acquaintances?" One then names two of one's friends (with whom one has made an arrange-ment for using one another's belongings on trust), and the witness says, "I give it to them. Use what is theirs, give it away or do as you like with it." This second method, apparently, is for use in situations where one has an extra cloth whose time-span is almost up, and one is far away from any co-religionist with whom one has made an arrangement to use one another's belongings on trust. What is happening in the procedure is that one is giving the cloth away to the witness; the witness then places it with one as a gift to one's friends. Since one already has permission to use their things on trust, one may freely make use of the robe if one wants to, or simply keep it for any number of days if not. (See Mv.V.13.13.) Cases of placing gifts in trust in this way are discussed in detail in Mv.VIII.31.2-3. According to those passages, the witness has no business in giving one permission to use the robe after having given it to the two other people; perhaps the statement is included to show that all sides involved--the witness and the two new owners of the cloth--are agreeable to one's making use of the cloth. If the two new owners have not previously given one permission to use their belongings on trust, one may not make use of the cloth before gaining express permission from them to do so, although one may keep it for any number of days without incurring a penalty under NP1. What the K/Commentary says. The Commentary has nothing to say about these procedures, while the K/Commentary goes into great detail, reworking the Vibhanga's descriptions to come up with three methods. In the first method, "in the presence of," one says in the presence of the second owner, "I place this cloth under shared ownership with you." The shared ownership is rescinded when the second owner/ witness gives one permission to use the cloth, give it away or do as one likes with it. In the second method--which the K/Commentary also calls "in the presence of"--one says in the presence of a witness who is not the second owner, "I place this cloth under shared ownership with so-and-so." The shared ownership is rescinded when the witness gives one permission to use the cloth, give it away or do as one likes with it. In the third method, "in the absence of," one gives the cloth to a witness, saying, "I give this cloth to you to place under shared ownership." The witness says, "Who is a friend or acquaintance of yours?" One names a friend, and the witness says, "I give it to him/her. Use what is him/hers, give it away or do as you like with it." The shared ownership is rescinded when the witness says this. There are a number of problems with the K/Commentary's inter-pretations. First, it is hard to see any practical difference between its methods 2 and 3, why one should be called "in the presence of" and the other "in the absence of", and in either case why the witness should have the right to give one permission to use an article which strictly speaking belongs to someone else. Secondly, the K/Commentary's method for "in the absence of" deviates from the Vibhanga's description of the method. In the Vibhanga's description, the witness places the cloth under shared ownership with two of one's friends, while in the K/Commentary's description, he/she places it under shared ownership with one. Why this should be, none of the texts explains. For these reasons, it would seem that the previous explanation--that there are two methods, as explained in the Vibhanga--is preferable to the K/Commentary's. The factors for the offense here are two: Object--any one of the six kinds of robe cloth, measuring at least four by eight finger-breadths, which one has placed under shared ownership; and effort--one uses the cloth without the shared ownership's being rescinded. The K/Commentary notes that this rule applies not only to robe material, but also to bowls as well. There is nothing in any of the other texts on this point, but the Great Standards would seem to support it. Non-offenses. There is no offense in using an item placed under shared ownership if the shared ownership has been rescinded, or if one makes use of the item on trust. The factors for legitimately taking an item on trust are as follows (Mv.VIII.19.1): 1) The other person is an acquaintance. 2) He/she is one's friend. 3) He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means that he/she has said, "You may take any of my property you want.") 4) He/she is still alive; and 5) one knows that he/she will not mind. These factors are discussed in detail under Parajika 2. The K/Commentary's analysis of the factors involved in committing an offense under this rule suggests that when robe material placed under shared ownership is taken on trust, the shared ownership is automatically rescinded and the material reverts to the status of extra cloth. Summary: Making use of cloth or a bowl which is stored under shared ownership--unless the shared ownership has been rescinded or one is taking the item on trust--is a pacittiya offense. *** 60. Should any bhikkhu hide (another) bhikkhu's bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle case or belt--or have it hidden--even as a joke, it is to be confessed. This is another rule which comes from some members of the group-of-six teasing the children in the group-of-17. The factors for the full offense are three: Object. Any of the requisites mentioned in the rule, belonging to a bhikkhu. Robe here means any piece of robe material measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, except for sitting cloths, which are mentioned separately. Needle case covers both cases which contain needles and empty needle cases. Any requisite not mentioned in the rule but belonging to a bhikkhu is grounds for a dukkata, as is any requisite belonging to a person who is not a bhikkhu. Effort. One hides the article or has it hidden. In the latter case--assuming that the other factors are fulfilled--there is a pacittiya in making the request/command/suggestion, and another pacittiya when the other person does one's bidding. Intention. One is doing it as a game. The Sub-commentary makes clear that the "game" here can either be friendly or malicious. If one hides the other bhikkhu's requisites out of the perverse pleasure of annoying him, or simply for a friendly laugh, one commits the full offense all the same. Non-offenses. There is no offense if-- not as a game, one puts away properly items which have been put away improperly (), e.g, a bowl left hanging on a peg (see Cv.V.8.5); or one puts away an item, thinking, "I will give it back (to him) after having given him a Dhamma talk." Dhamma talk here, the Commentary says, refers to such admonitions as, "A contemplative should not leave his requisites scattered around." Hiding things with this purpose in mind is sometimes an effective way for a teacher to train his students to stop being careless with their belongings, but it should be used only with discretion, for it can easily backfire. Summary: To hide another bhikkhu's bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle case or belt--or to have it hidden--either as a joke or with the purpose of annoying him, is a pacittiya offense.