Eight: The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter 71. Should any bhikkhu, admonished by the bhikkhus in accordance with a rule, say, "Friends, I will not train myself under this training rule until I have put questions about it to another bhikkhu, experienced and learned in the discipline," it is to be confessed. Bhikkhus, (a training rule) is to be understood, is to be asked about, is to be pondered. This is the proper course here. This rule deals with cases where a bhikkhu tries to excuse himself from following any of the training rules, without showing out-and-out disrespect for the rule or the person admonishing him. (If he showed out-and-out disrespect, the case would come under Pacittiya 54.) The factors for the full offense here are three: 1) Object: One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu, who cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya. 2) Intention: One does not want to train oneself in line with the rule. 3) Effort: One says something to the effect that one will not train in line with the rule. Only two of these factors--object and effort--require explanation. Object. Only if the other bhikkhu cites a rule in the Vinaya is this factor grounds for a pacittiya. If he criticizes one's actions, citing standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya--e.g., he says that one has been acting out of greed, anger, delusion or fear--this factor becomes grounds for a dukkata. If the person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of whether he/she cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya, this factor is again grounds for a dukkata. As under Pacittiya 54, whether or not one views the admonition as valid is not an issue here. Effort. Looking at the Vibhanga's discussion of this factor, it would appear to cover only cases where one used the precise words mentioned in the training rule, but the K/Commentary--drawing probably on the Great Standards--expands it to cover any case where one says something as a ploy to excuse oneself from following the rule without showing disrespect. Examples might include: "I'll worry about that rule when I come to it." "I don't have time for that right now." "I've been wondering: Do you really think that that rule applies in this day and age?" In other words, this factor closes any loopholes left by Pacittiya 54. Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, the only way to avoid an offense in situations like this is to say that one will learn about the rule and train in line with it. As the no-offense clauses to Pacittiya 54 make clear, though, if one has been admonished with any interpreta-tion of a rule which differs from one's teachers', one may avoid an offense simply by stating that one's teachers taught differently. Summary: Saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself from training under a training rule when being admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the rule is a pacittiya offense. *** 72. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being repeated, say, "Why are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother and confusion?" the criticism of the training rules is to be confessed. "Now at that time the Blessed One had given a talk on the subject of discipline to the bhikkhus. He spoke in praise of discipline, in praise of the mastery of discipline, and in praise of Ven. Upali, referring to him again and again. The bhikkhus (said), '...Come, friends, let's study discipline with Ven. Upali.' They and many other bhikkhus--elders, newly ordained and those in between--studied discipline with Ven. Upali. "Then the thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus: 'Now, friends, many bhikkhus... are studying discipline with Ven. Upali. If they become well-versed in the discipline, they will push us and pull us around however they like, whenever they like and as long as they like. Come, friends, let's criticize the discipline.' Then the group-of-six bhikkhus, approaching the bhikkhus, said, 'Why are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother and confusion?'" The full offense here has three factors: 1) Object: another bhikkhu. 2) Effort: One criticizes the discipline in his presence. 3) Intention: One wants to prevent the study of the discipline. Object & effort. There is a pacittiya for criticizing the discipline in the presence of a bhikkhu; and a dukkata for criticizing the Dhamma in his presence, or criticizing either the discipline or the Dhamma in the presence of an unordained person. The training rule would seem to indicate that these actions are grounds for an offense only while the Patimokkha is being recited or rehearsed, but the no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga give no allow-ance to criticize the discipline at other times, and the K/Commentary follows the Vibhanga in not making the recitation of the Patimokkha a necessary factor for the offense here. In other words, the factor of effort here is fulfilled if one criticizes the discipline at any time. Intention. This factor is fulfilled either if one's intention is to keep that particular bhikkhu from studying or mastering the discipline, or if one wants the discipline in general to disappear from lack of study. Further action. A bhikkhu who makes a concerted effort to speak in dispraise of the Dhamma or discipline may be subject to an act of censure or banishment, depending on the seriousness of the case (Cv.I.4.1; Cv.I.14.2). Non-offenses. There is no offense if, without intending to criticize the discipline, one suggests to another person that he/she master the Suttas or the Abhidhamma first, before mastering the discipline. Summary: Criticizing the discipline in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a pacittiya offense. *** 73. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being recited every half-month, say, "Just now have I heard that this case, too, is handed down in the Patimokkha, is included in the Patimokkha, and comes up for recitation every half-month;" and if other bhikkhus should know, "That bhikkhu has already sat through two or three recitations of the Patimokkha, if not more," the bhikkhu is not exempted for being ignorant. Whatever the offense he has committed, he is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule; and in addition, his deception is to be exposed: "It is no gain for you, friend, it is ill-done, that when the Patimokkha is being recited, you do not pay proper attention and take it to heart." Here the deception is to be confessed. To summarize the Vibhanga: If a bhikkhu, when the recitation of the Patimokkha comes to a rule which he has violated, tries to excuse himself through the sort of pretence cited in the rule, he immediately incurs a dukkata if he has already listened to the Patimokkha in full three times or more. The other bhikkhus may then expose his decep-tion through a formal act of the Community. If he then continues with the pretence, he incurs a pacittiya. If they do not bring the formal act against him, though, he incurs a dukkata for each effort he makes in keeping up the pretence. However, there is no offense if he is not feigning ignorance or if he has not yet heard the Patimokkha in full at least three times. Obviously, these explanations were written when Pali was the bhikkhus' native language, and the recitation of the Patimokkha in Pali offered the opportunity to learn the rules, along with the oppor-tunity to feign ignorance without telling an out-and-out lie. In other words, one could say immediately after the recitation of a particular rule, "Just now have I heard that this rule is in the Patimokkha," and strictly speaking it would be true: One has just heard it, even if for the umpteenth time, but one hopes that the other bhikkhus will be deceived into inferring that one has just heard it for the first time. At any rate, the discussion of this rule in the Vibhanga and com-mentaries makes no exceptions for bhikkhus whose native language is not Pali, and since the Patimokkha is available in a number of translations, the "grace period" in which one is expected to be ignorant--three recitations covers a month to a month and a half--is not too short a time for a new bhikkhu to read and remember the rules in translation. The factors for the full offense here are three: 1) Object: One has heard the Patimokkha in full for at least three times, one has tried to feign ignorance, but the bhikkhus have brought a formal act against one, exposing one's deceit. 2) Intention: One wants to deceive the bhikkhus into believing that one is ignorant of the rule one has broken. 3) Effort: One says a half-truth to deceive them. (Out-and-out lies would come under Pacittiya 1.) Perception is not a mitigating factor here. If the act exposing one's deceit has been properly carried out, then regardless of whether one perceives it as valid or not, one incurs a pacittiya for trying to deceive the bhikkhus any further. If it has been improperly carried out, one incurs a dukkata for trying to deceive them further, regardless of how one perceives the act. Non-offenses. There is no offense if one has heard the Patimokkha in full less than three times, or if one is not intending to deceive anyone. Summary: Using half-truths to deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of the rules in the Patimokkha, after one has already heard the Patimokkha in full three times, and a formal act exposing one's deceit has been brought against one, is a pacittiya offense. *** 74. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, give a blow to (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed. The factors for the full offense here are three: 1) Object: another bhikkhu. 2) Effort: One gives him a blow. 3) Intention: One is motivated by anger. Object. A bhikkhu is grounds for an offense here; anyone unordained, grounds for a dukkata. According to the Commentary, anyone unordained includes animals as well as higher forms of life, such as human or celestial beings. Effort. This factor is fulfilled whether one gives a blow-- with one's own body (hitting with a fist, jabbing with an elbow, kicking with a foot); with something attached to the body (e.g., a stick or a knife); or with something that may be "thrown" (this includes such things as throwing a rock, shooting an arrow or firing a gun). According to the Vibhanga, this last category includes throwing "even a lotus leaf", which shows that the blow need not be painful in order to fulfill this factor. This factor also includes such things as twisting the other person's arm behind his back or wringing his neck: It is fulfilled as soon as one touches his body with the intent to do these things. Intention. If one gives a blow for reasons other than anger, the action does not fall under this rule. Thus, for instance, if one thumps a fellow bhikkhu on the back to help dislodge something caught in his throat, there is no offense. And as the Commentary notes, if--motivated by lust--one gives a blow to a woman, one incurs the full offense under Sanghadisesa 2. For some reason, the Commentary says that if one cuts off the nose or ear of a fellow bhikkhu in order to disfigure him, one incurs only a dukkata. As the Vinaya Mukha points out, though, there is no basis in the Vibhanga or in reason for this statement. It is hard to imagine anyone doing this unless motivated by anger, and cutting another person would come under the factor of giving a blow with something connected with the body. Result is not a factor here. Whether or not the other person is hurt--or how badly he/she is hurt--does not affect the offense. If one intends simply to hurt the other person, but he/she happens to die from one's blow, the case is treated under this rule, rather than under Parajika 3. In other words, the penalty is a pacittiya if the victim is a bhikkhu, and a dukkata if not. Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who, trapped in a difficult situation, gives a blow "desiring freedom". The Commentary's discussion of this point shows that it includes what we at present would call self-defense; and the K/Commentary's analysis of the factors of the offense here shows that even if anger or displeasure arises in one's mind in cases like this, one incurs no offense. Summary: Giving a blow to another bhikkhu, when motivated by anger, is a pacittiya offense. *** 75. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, raise his hand against (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed. This rule is similar to the preceding one, differing only in the factor of effort: Raising one's hand means raising any part of one's body (the hand, the foot, etc.) or anything attached to the body (a stick, a rock, a gun, a bow and arrow) in a threatening manner. The Commentary notes that if one intends only to raise one's hand, but then accidentally gives a blow, one incurs a dukkata. The Sub-commentary explains this in the only way that would make sense: One incurs the dukkata for the blow, but a pacittiya for raising the hand in the first place. The Sub-commentary also notes that if an animal, for example, is making a mess and a bhikkhu raises his hand against it, this would be included under "desiring freedom"--i.e., from the mess--and so would not be an offense. Summary: Making a threatening gesture against another bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya offense. *** 76. Should any bhikkhu charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded sanghadisesa (offense), it is to be confessed. Here again the factors for the full offense are three: 1) Object: another bhikkhu. 2) Perception: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense one is charging him with. 3) Effort: One accuses him in his presence--or gets someone else to accuse him in his presence--of having committed a sanghadisesa offense. If one makes an unfounded charge accusing another bhikkhu of having committed a lesser offense or of falling away from right views, one incurs a dukkata. The same penalty holds for making an unfounded charge accusing an unordained person of having committed a wrong doing or of falling away from right views. The topic of unfounded charges is a complex one, and has already been covered in detail under Sanghadisesa 8. Additional points may be inferred from the discussion of that rule, the differences being that intention is not a factor here, and the change in effort--one is accusing the other bhikkhu of a sanghadisesa or lesser offense--changes the seriousness of the penalty. Non-offenses. As under Sanghadisesa 8, there is no offense if one makes the accusation--or gets someone else to make the accusation--when one thinks it to be true, even if it turns out that the other bhikkhu is actually not guilty of the offense. Summary: Making an unfounded charge in the presence of another bhikkhu--or getting someone else to make the charge in his presence--that he is guilty of a sanghadisesa offense is a pacittiya offense. *** 77. Should any bhikkhu purposefully provoke anxiety in (another) bhikkhu, (thinking,) "This way, even for just a moment, he will have no peace"--if doing it for just this reason and no other--it is to be confessed. The Vinaya Mukha's explanation for this rule is worth quoting at length: "There are people who normally tend to be anxious about one thing or another....If someone speaks to a bhikkhu such as this of contingencies which run counter to the Buddha's ordinances and are impossible to know--e.g., 'When you were ordained, how can you know that all the qualifications (for a valid formal act) were fulfilled? If they were lacking, doesn't that mean you aren't really ordained?'--even this is enough to set him worrying, giving him all sorts of anguish. A bhikkhu who is unrestrained, and who--looking for fun with no concern for how his friends will suffer--takes such matters to tell them, is penalized with a pacittiya in this rule." The full offense here has three factors: 1) Object: another bhikkhu. 2) Effort: One mentions that he might have broken a rule unknowingly. 3) Intention: One's purpose is to cause him anxiety, even if just for a moment. Object. A bhikkhu here is grounds for a pacittiya; an unordained person, grounds for a dukkata. Effort. The Vibhanga gives a few examples of rules the other person might have broken unknowingly: He may have drunk liquor, may have eaten food at the wrong time, or sat in private with a woman, all without knowing it. (Although this last would not be an offense if done unknowingly, it is close enough to an offense that the mention of the possibility would cause an ignorant bhikkhu anxiety.) In the origin story, some group-of-six bhikkhus made insinuating remarks to the group of 17 that since they were ordained when they were less than 20 years old, they were not really ordained. (Again, since the group of 17 were the instigators for that rule, they were not subject to it.) All of this shows that this factor is fulfilled by any statement which one might make to another bhikkhu insinuating that he may have broken a rule, even if the action one mentions is not strictly speaking an offense. Intention. If, not wanting to cause the other person anxiety, one has other reasons for mentioning rules he/she might have broken unknowingly--e.g., one seriously thinks that he may have broken the rules, or that his ordination was improperly carried out, and wants him to look into the matter so that he has no reason for regret in the future--one incurs no offense. Summary: Saying to another bhikkhu that he may have broken a rule unknowingly, simply for the purpose of causing him anxiety, is a pacittiya offense. *** 78. Should any bhikkhu stand eavesdropping on bhikkhus when they are arguing, quarreling and disputing, thinking, "I will overhear what they say"--if doing it for just this reason and no other--it is to be confessed. "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were quarreling with the well-behaved bhikkhus. The well-behaved bhikkhus (meeting among themselves) said, 'These group-of-six bhikkhus are shameless. There's no way you can argue with them.' "Later, the group-of-six bhikkhus said to them, 'Why do you disgrace us by calling us shameless?' "'But how did you overhear?' "'We stood eavesdropping on you.'" The factors for the full offense here are three: 1) Object: other bhikkhus who are involved in an argument over an issue. 2) Effort: One stands eavesdropping on them, 3) Intention: with the purpose of using what they say against them, either in a formal act (reproving, reminding or reprimanding them) or simply to make them feel remorseful or ashamed. Object. According to the Vibhanga, the words, arguing, quarreling and disputing refer to arguments over issues (see Pacittiya 63). The Commentary says that this refers to one kind of issue--disputes--but accusations would appear to fit here as well. This factor is fulfilled regardless of whether the two parties in the dispute/accusation are confronting each other or--as in the origin story--one party is talking in private. It is also fulfilled regardless of whether or not one is already involved in the dispute oneself. Bhikkhus involved in an argument are grounds for a pacittiya; unordained people involved in an argument, grounds for a dukkata. Perception--e.g., whether or not one perceives the bhikkhus as bhikkhus--is not a mitigating factor here. People who are not involved in an argument are not grounds for an offense. Thus there is no penalty in eavesdropping on a Dhamma talk, or on a bhikkhu sitting in private with a woman, to see what they will say to each other. Effort. The Vibhanga goes into a fair amount of detail on this point, allotting the offenses as follows (assuming the other factors to be fulfilled as well): One goes with the purpose of eavesdropping on the other party (): a dukkata. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pacittiya. One is walking behind the other party, and speeds up one's steps to overhear them: a dukkata. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pacittiya. One is walking ahead of the other party, and slows down one's steps to overhear them: a dukkata. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pacittiya. One is sitting, standing or lying down in place, and the other party happens to walk past (): One should cough, clear one's throat or (the K/Commentary states) say, "I'm here." Not to do so is to incur a pacittiya. At present, surreptitiously reading another person's mail would seem to fulfill this factor as well. Intention. According to the no-offense clauses, one incurs no offense if one happens to overhear bhikkhus arguing, and goes away thinking, "I won't get involved," or "I will free myself" ("by declaring my innocence," says the Commentary). Summary: Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument over an issue--with the intention of using what they say against them--is a pacittiya offense. *** 79. Should any bhikkhu, having given consent (by proxy) to a formal act carried out in accordance with the rule, later complain (about the act), it is to be confessed. "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were indulging in bad habits, but protested when a formal act was being carried out against any one of their group. Now it happened that the Community was meeting on some other business, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making robes, sent their consent with one of their members. Then the Community, thinking, 'Look, friends, one of the group-of-six has come alone. Let's carry out a formal act against him,' did just that. "He then returned to where the group-of-six bhikkhus were staying. They asked him, 'What, friend, did the Community do?'" "'They carried out a formal act against me.' "'That wasn't what we gave our consent for, that they would carry out a formal act against you. If we had known that they would carry out a formal act against you, we wouldn't have given our consent!'" Formal acts. A formal act is a procedure the Community follows in settling any of the four kinds of issues: disputes, accusations, offenses or duties. The Vinaya gives the pattern for settling each of the various issues falling into these four categories: the minimum number of bhikkhus that has to be present, the qualifications (posi-tive or negative) of the individual or situation which warrants the act, and the formal procedure--a declaration, a motion, a motion with one announcement or a motion with three announcements--to follow in carrying out the act. An act carried out in accordance with these patterns is said to be carried out in accordance with the rule. However, for a formal act to be valid and irreversible, it must be carried out not only in accordance with the rule, but also by a com-plete assembly (Mv.IX.2.4). This point is to prevent small factions from carrying out acts as they like. When this point was first raised, the question arose, How many bhikkhus are needed for an assembly to be complete? All the bhikkhus in the world? All the bhikkhus in a particular monastery? The Buddha's answer was, All the bhikkhus in a monastery, and he gave permission for the bhikkhus to delineate boundaries (sima) so as to determine who did and who did not have to join in the act for the assembly to be complete (Mv.II.5.2,6.1,12.7). Later, he gave permission that an ill bhikkhu living within the bound-ary did not have to attend the meeting, but could give his consent by proxy, through word or gesture, and the assembly would still be regarded as complete (Mv.II.23.1-2). Thus a complete assembly is defined as follows: All the bhikkhus within the boundary are either present at the meeting (sitting within hatthapasa of other bhikkhus in the meeting) or have given their consent by proxy, and no one makes a valid protest against the act's being carried out (Mv.IX.3.5-6). (An invalid protest would be one made by someone who is not a bhikkhu, by a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by a spirit, outside the boundary or suspended from the Community, or by the bhikkhu against whom the act is being carried out (Mv.IX.4.7-8).) Before we go on to discuss this rule, there are a few added points concerning the origin story we should touch on: 1) When a bhikkhu makes a valid protest, he does not need to justify it. In other words, he can make protest simply because he doesn't agree with the act, and his protest stands regardless of whether he can find any basis for it in the Dhamma and Vinaya or not. 2) One Community may not carry out a formal act against another Community (Mv.IX.2.3). What this means is that they may carry it out against no more than three bhikkhus at a time. This is why the group-of-six bhikkhus were able to protect one another from being subject to a formal act, for there were usually more than three of them at any one meeting of the Community. Even though the ones against whom the formal act was being carried out had no right to protest, their friends did, and they took advantage of their right. 3) In the passage where the Buddha gives permission for bhikkhus to give their consent by proxy (Mv.II.23.1-2), he states that this per-mission applies to ill bhikkhus. Yet in the origin stories to this rule and the following one, the group of six are not ill, they give their consent by proxy and the act carried out with their consent is consi-dered to be valid. None of the texts make note of this point, but it seems to indicate that "ill" in this context covers not only physical illness, but also any other serious inconvenience which prevents one from joining in the meeting. The factors for the offense under this rule are three: 1) Object: a valid formal act to which one has given one's consent. 2) Perception: One perceives it as valid. 3) Effort: One complains about it. Object & perception. The various permutations of these factors are as follows: a valid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a pacittiya; an invalid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one perceives to be invalid, regardless of whether it actually is or not: grounds for no offense. Effort. Any expression of displeasure with the act would fulfill this factor. If, however, one states that the act was not carried out in accordance with the rule, then regardless of whether or not one had given one's consent, the case would fall under Pacittiya 63, rather than here. Non-offenses. There is no offense if one complains about the act if one perceives it as having been carried out not in accordance with the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against someone who did not warrant such an act. This exemption holds regardless of whether, in fact, the act was valid or not. Summary: Complaining about a formal act of the Community to which one gave one's consent--if the act was carried out in accordance with the rule, and one knows that it was--is a pacittiya offense. *** 80. Should any bhikkhu, when deliberation is being carried on in the Community, get up from his seat and leave without having given consent, it is to be confessed. The origin story here is a sequel to the one for the preceding rule. "Now at that time the Community was meeting on some business, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making robes, sent their consent with one of their group. Then the Community, thinking, 'We'll carry out the formal act (against the one member of the group-of-six) that was our real purpose in meeting,' set forth a motion. The bhikkhu--thinking, 'It's just in this way that they carry out formal acts against us one at a time. Well, who are you going to carry out this act against?'--without giving his consent, got up from his seat and left." As explained under the preceding rule, a bhikkhu has no right to protest when the Community is carrying out a formal act against him. However, the Community may not carry out an act against a bhikkhu who is not in its midst (see Adhikarana-Samatha 1), and any act carried out when there is a bhikkhu within the boundary who is not in the meeting and who has not given his consent is invalid. The bhikkhu in the origin story took advantage of these two rules to escape from the formal act being carried out against himself, and the Buddha then formulated this rule to impose a penalty on any bhikkhu who tried the same maneuver in the future. There are four factors for the full offense. 1) Object: A formal act has been started but has yet to be finished, and is being carried out in a valid manner. 2) Perception: One perceives it as being carried out in a valid manner. 3) Intention: One wants to invalidate the act, or to keep the group from carrying it out. 4) Effort: One goes beyond one hatthapasa (1.25 m.) from the bhikkhus sitting in the meeting, without having first given one's consent. Object & perception. The various permutations of these two factor are as follows: a valid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a pacittiya; an invalid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one perceives as invalid, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for no offense. According to the Vibhanga, the time period covered by this factor begins at the point where the matter has been brought up in the Community--or a motion has been set forth--and ends when the Community's decision has been announced. The Commentary, in discussing this point, says that, in the case of an accusation, the point when the matter has been brought up is when both sides have stated their initial positions, and a bhikkhu has been authorized to cross-examine them. Effort. The Vibhanga divides the effort here into three parts, and allots the penalties as follows: One gets up to go: a dukkata. One reaches the distance of one hatthapasa from the meeting: another dukkata. One passes beyond the distance of one hatthapasa: a pacittiya. The K/Commentary adds that one must also remain within the boundary (sima) for this factor to be fulfilled, but the Vibhanga makes no mention of this, and there seems no reason to adopt it. If we did adopt it, it would mean that if a formal act were being carried out against a bhikkhu, and to avoid it he left the meeting and the boundary, he would incur no offense. Thus it seems better to stick with the Vibhanga and say that this factor is fulfilled when one goes beyond one hatthapasa away from the meeting, regardless of whether one then stays within the boundary or not. Intention. There is no offense if, without giving one's consent, one leaves the meeting for purposes other than to invalidate the act. Examples in the Vibhanga include: One is ill. One has to do something (e.g., prepare or give medicine) for one who is ill. One is overcome with the need to urinate or defecate. One leaves, without desiring to invalidate the act, with the thought, "I'll come right back." In all of these cases, though, if possible, it is best to give one's consent before going. Non-offenses. In addition to the above cases, there is also no offense if one leaves a meeting, without giving one's consent, with the purpose of invalidating the act if one perceives that: the act will lead to quarreling, a crack or a split in the Community; or the act is being carried out not in accordance with the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against/for a person who doesn't warrant it. Summary: Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community in the midst of a valid formal act--without having first given one's consent to the act--in hopes of invalidating it, is a pacittiya offense. *** 81. Should any bhikkhu, (acting as part of) a Community in concord, give a robe (to an individual bhikkhu) and later complain, "The bhikkhus apportion the Community's gains according to friendship," it is to be confessed. Apportioning the Community's gains. The Cullavagga (VI.15.2) contains a passage which says that no one--not even the Community itself--can take any of the following items belonging to the Commu-nity and turn them over to individual ownership: monasteries or monastery land; dwellings, or land on which dwellings are built; furnishings, such as couches, chairs or mattresses; metal vessels or tools; building materials or articles made of pottery or wood. The collective term for these goods is garubhanda, or heavy articles. The penalty for handing any of the Community's garubhanda over to individual ownership is a thullaccaya. In the origin story to Parajika 4, the Buddha states that a bhikkhu who hands the Community's garubhanda over to a lay person is one of the five great thieves in the world. Light articles (lahubhanda) belonging to the Community, though, may be turned over to individual ownership--of a bhikkhu or novice--but only when the proper procedures are followed. The usual pattern is to appoint a Community official, through a formal act, to be responsible for making sure that such items be distributed fairly to the members of the Community eligible to receive them. Such officials include distributors of robe-material, of food, of fruit, of non-staple foods and of small accessories, such as scissors, sandals, water strainers, etc. (Cv.VI.21). In addition, this training rule shows that a Community, acting as a whole, may take light articles belonging to it and turn them over to individual bhikkhus or novices. (According to the K/Commentary to Pacittiya 79, this can be done with a simple declaration (apalokana), although the kathina ceremony, which would fall under this general category, follows the pattern of a motion with one announcement.) A typical example, apart from the kathina, would be if the Community receives a particularly fine robe and, instead of cutting it up to share the pieces out among the members, decides to present the entire robe to one of its members who has been especially helpful to the group. This is one way that the Community can reward the Community officials for their services. Any member of the Community who disagrees with such a decision may prevent it from happening by protesting during the declaration. The purpose of this rule is to prevent members of the Community from complaining, after the they have taken part in such a decision, that the Community was acting out of favoritism. The factors for the full offense are two: 1) Object: One has acted as part of a Community which has given robe-material to a bhikkhu who has been chosen, through a prior formal act, to be a Community official. 2) Effort: One complains afterwards that the Community acted out of favoritism. Object. Acting as part of a Community means that one is in communion with the Community that handed over the robe-material, and that one was in the same boundary with them: i.e., one was either in the meeting, or had given one's consent to it. Robe-material means a piece of any of the six kinds of allowable material, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths. The various permutations of articles and recipients are as follows: Complaining when the Community has given robe material to a Community official: a pacittiya. Complaining when the Community has given any other light article to a Community official: a dukkata. Complaining when the Community has given any light article--robe or otherwise--to a bhikkhu who is not a Community official or to a novice: a dukkata. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. For example, if the recipient was made a Community official through a valid formal act, then regardless of how one perceives that act, it has no effect on the penalty under this rule. (The Vibhanga is somewhat confusing on this point, not saying explicitly whether the factor of perception with regard to the formal act refers to the act by which the official was appointed or to the act by which the robe was handed over to him. The first interpretation, though, is the only one that makes sense in light of the no-offense clauses, and the K/Commentary confirms that it is the correct one.) Effort. This factor is fulfilled by any expression of personal dis-pleasure with the Community. If, however, one accuses the Community of having carried out the act improperly--not in accordance with the rule, or with an incomplete assembly--the case would come, not here, but under Pacittiya 63. Non-offenses. The Vibhanga says that if the article was given out of habitual favoritism, anger, delusion or fear, there is no offense in complaining, "What is the use of giving it to him? After receiving it he'll ruin it, he won't take proper care of it." Notice, however, that even in cases of this sort one is allowed to criticize only the recipient, and not the Community--for, after all, one had one's chance to protest during the meeting, but remained silent. Summary: After participating in a formal act of the Community giving robe-material to a Community official: Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a pacittiya offense. *** 82. Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to an individual gains which had been allocated for the Community, it is to be confessed. This rule has already been explained under NP 30. Summary: Persuading a donor to give to another individual a gift which he or she had planned to give to a Community--when one knows that it was intended for the Community--is a pacittiya offense Nine: The Treasure Chapter 83. Should any bhikkhu, without being previously announced, cross the threshold of a consecrated noble king's (sleeping chamber) from which the king has not left, from which the treasure (the queen) has not withdrawn, it is to be confessed. "Having sat down to one side, King Pasenadi of Kosala said to the Blessed One, 'It would be good,venerable sir, if the Blessed One would appoint a bhikkhu to teach Dhamma in our women's quarters.' ... So the Blessed One addressed Ven. Ananda, 'In that case, Ananda, go teach Dhamma in the king's women's quarters.' "Replying, 'As you say, Lord,' Ven. Ananda entered the king's women's quarters time and again to teach Dhamma. Then one day early in the morning, Ven. Ananda, having put on his lower robe, carrying his robe and bowl, went to King Pasenadi's palace. At that time King Pasenadi had gone to lie down on a couch with Queen Mallika. Queen Mallika saw Ven. Ananda coming from afar, and on seeing him got up hurriedly. Her blouse of burnished gold cloth slipped off. Ven. Ananda turned around and went back to the monastery." There are two factors for the full offense here: object and effort. Object. A king--a consecrated member of the noble warrior class, pure in his lineage through the past seven generations--is in his sleeping chamber with his queen. Sleeping chamber means any place where his bed is prepared, even if it is outside, surrounded only by a curtain or screen wall (as was the custom on royal excursions in those days, a custom often depicted in murals on the walls of Thai temples). Effort. Unannounced, one steps--with both feet--over the thresh-old of the sleeping chamber. Perception as to whether or not one has been announced is not a mitigating factor here. Non-offenses. There is no offense if-- One has been announced. The king is not a member of the noble warrior class, or has not been consecrated. The king or queen or both have left the sleeping chamber. The room is not a sleeping chamber. Obviously, there is little chance that a bhikkhu will break this rule at present. However, in the course of formulating the rule, the Buddha mentioned ten dangers for a bhikkhu who enters the king's inner palace even at the king's request, and some of these dangers still apply to any situation in which a bhikkhu is on familiar terms with a person of influence, royal or not: 1) "'There is the case where the king is on a couch together with the queen. A bhikkhu enters there. Either the queen, seeing the bhikkhu, smiles; or the bhikkhu, seeing the queen, smiles. The thought occurs to the king, "Surely they've done it, or are going to do it... 2) "And furthermore, the king is busy, with much to do. Having gone to a certain woman, he forgets about it. On account of that, she conceives a child. The thought occurs to him, "No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 3) "And furthermore, some jewel in the king's inner palace disappears. The thought occurs to the king, "No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 4) "And furthermore, secret consultations in the confines of the inner palace get spread abroad. The thought occurs to the king, "No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 5) "And furthermore, in the king's inner palace the son is estranged from the father, or the father from the son. The thought occurs to them, "No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 6 & 7) "And furthermore, the king establishes one from a low position in a high position... (or) one from a high position in a low position. The thought occurs to those displeased by this, "The king is on familiar terms with one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 8) "And furthermore, the king sends the army out at the wrong time. The thought occurs to those displeased by this, "The king is on familiar terms with one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 9) "And furthermore, the king sends the army out at the right time, but has it turn around mid-way. The thought occurs to those displeased by this, "The king is on familiar terms with one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?" ... 10) "And furthermore, bhikkhus, the king's inner palace is crowded with elephants...horses...chariots. There are enticing sights, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations unsuitable for one gone forth. This, bhikkhus, is the tenth danger for one who enters the king's inner palace.'" Summary: Entering a king's sleeping chamber, unannounced, when both the king and queen are in the chamber, is a pacittiya offense. *** 84. Should a bhikkhu pick up or have (someone) pick up a treasure or what is considered a treasure, except within a monastery or within a dwelling, it is to be confessed. But when a bhikkhu has picked up or had (someone) pick up a treasure or what is considered a treasure (left) in a monastery or in a dwelling, it is to be kept, (thinking,) "Whoever it belongs to will (come and) fetch it." This is the proper course here. The purpose of this rule is to prevent a bhikkhu from picking up misplaced valuables belonging to other people, except when he finds them in a monastery or a dwelling, for as the origin story shows, there are dangers inherent in such an act even when done with the best intentions. "Now at that time a certain bhikkhu was bathing in the Aciravati River. A certain Brahmin, having placed a bag of 500 gold pieces on the dry ground, had bathed in the river and left, forgetting it. The bhikkhu, (saying to himself,) 'Don't let this bag of the Brahmin's be lost,' picked it up. Then the Brahmin, remembering, rushed back and said to the bhikkhu, 'My good man, have you seen my bag?' "'Here, Brahmin,' he said, and gave it to him. "Then the thought occurred to the Brahmin, 'Now how can I get away with out giving the five percent reward to this bhikkhu?' So (saying,) 'I didn't have 500, my good man, I had 1,000!' he detained him for a while and then let him go." However, a bhikkhu who comes across a fallen valuable in a monastery or in a dwelling he is visiting--if he does not pick it up--may later be held responsible if it gets lost: Thus the two situations mentioned as exemptions in the rule. In situations such as these, a bhikkhu is allowed even to pick up money and other items he is not normally allowed to take. In fact, the Vinaya Mukha states that if he does not pick up the valuable and put it in safe keeping, he incurs a dukkata. None of the other texts mention this point, although it is probably justified on the grounds that the bhikkhu is neglecting his duty in not following the "proper course" here. The Vibhanga advises that if a bhikkhu has picked up a fallen valuable in this way, and put it in safe keeping, he should take note of its features. (The Commentary adds that if it is a bag of money, he should open the bag and count how much it contains. The same would hold for such things as wallets at present.) He should then have an announcement made, "Let him come whose goods are lost." If a person comes to claim the item, the bhikkhu should ask him/her to describe it. If the person describes it correctly, the bhikkhu should hand it over. If not, he should tell the person to "keep looking." If the bhikkhu is going to leave the monastery to live elsewhere, he should entrust the item to another bhikkhu, or--if no suitable bhikkhu is available--to a suitable lay person. () The Commentary adds that if, after a suitable length of time, no one comes to claim the item, the bhikkhu should have it exchanged for something of lasting use to the monastery. If, after that, the owner does come to claim the item, the bhikkhu should tell him/her of the use to which it was put. If the owner is satisfied, there is no problem. If not, the bhikkhu should arrange to have the owner compensated. The factors for the offense here are four: 1) Object: a valuable or anything considered a valuable that one finds left behind, except in a monastery or a dwelling which one is visiting. 2) Perception: One does not perceive that it has been thrown away. 3) Intention: One wants to keep it in safe keeping for the owner. 4) Effort: One picks it up or has someone else pick it up. Object. The Vibhanga defines a valuable (treasure) as jewels or silver. What is considered a valuable means anything which is of use to people. Items meeting these definitions at present would include money, wallets, watches, keys, eyeglasses, cameras, etc. According to the K/Commentary, if the owner has given one per-mission to take the article, it does not fulfill this factor. The Vibhanga defines in a monastery as follows: If the monastery is walled, then within the walls. If not, then in the immediate vicinity (according to the Commentary, a radius of one leddupata--the dis-tance a man of average height can thrown a clod of dirt--around the monastery buildings). As for in a dwelling: If the area around the dwelling is walled, then within the walls. If not, then in the immediate vicinity (according to the Commentary, the distance one can thrown a basket or a pestle (!) from the dwelling). For some reason, the Commentary says that if the item has fallen in an area of the monastery where many people come and go--e.g., the doorway to the Bodhi tree or public shrine--one should not pick it up. What its reasoning is here, is hard to say, but it does note that the Kurundi--one of the ancient commentaries--does not agree with this position. It also notes that if someone asks a bhikkhu to put belongings in safe keeping with him at the monastery, he should not accept--so as to avoid being responsible for them--but if they leave the things with him and go off in spite of his objections, or before giving him a chance to object, he should take the belongings and put them away in safe keeping. Perception & intention. According to the Commentary, if one picks up money for ones own use, for the Community, or for anyone aside from the owner, the case would come under NP 18, rather than here. The same holds true with dukkata objects, such as jewels and semi-precious stones. However, since one does not perceive the object to be thrown away, and one is not borrowing it or taking it on trust, it would seem more fitting to consider the case under Parajika 2, regardless of what the item is. The Commentary also makes the peculiar point that if one sees an item belonging to one's mother or other close relative left behind on the roadside, one would incur the full offense under this rule for picking it up to put in safe keeping for the owner, but no offense if one took the item, on trust, for one's own. Of course, after taking it on trust like this, one could then give it back to the owner as one liked without penalty. Effort. For some reason, none of the texts go into detail on the question of getting someone else to pick up the item. Does one incur the pacittiya simply in the act of asking/commanding, or only if the other person actually picks the item up as asked? None of the texts say, but the usual pattern in other pacittiya rules like this is one pacittiya for the asking, and another one when the other person does as asked. Non-offenses. There is no offense if, within a monastery or a dwelling, one picks up an item or has it picked up with the thought, "Whoever this belongs to will come for it." () Also, according to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if one takes an item left behind anywhere if one takes it on trust, borrows it, or perceives it as having been thrown away. () The Commentary notes, though, that these last three allowances apply only if the item is something a bhikkhu may normally touch and take; and not, for instance, a dukkata or nissaggiya object as defined under NP 18. Summary: Picking up a valuable, or having it picked up, with the intent of keeping it in safe keeping for the owner--except when one finds it in a monastery or in a dwelling one is visiting--is a pacittiya offense. *** 85. Should any bhikkhu, without taking leave of an available bhikkhu, enter a village at the wrong time--unless there is a suitable emergency--it is to be confessed. As the origin story here indicates, the purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from passing their time among householders talking of things inappropriate for a bhikkhu to discuss. The Pali term used here, "animal talk", means worldly talk about "kings, robbers and ministers of state; armies, alarms and battles; food and drink; clothing, furniture, garlands and scents; relatives; vehicles; villages, towns, cities, the countryside; women and heroes; the gossip of the street and the well; tales of the dead; also, philosophical discussions of the past and future (this is how the Sub-commentary explains 'tales of diversity'), the creation of the world and of the sea, and talk of whether things exist or not." The Sub-commentary notes here that to discuss any of these topics in such a way as to foster an understanding of the Dhamma--e.g., discussing politics to illustrate the impermanence of worldly power--is not considered improper. The factors for the full offense here are two. 1) Object: a village (this would include larger inhabited areas, such as towns and cities, as well). 2) Effort: One enters the village--without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu--at the wrong time, except when there is an emergency. Object. The Vibhanga says that if the village as a whole is enclosed, everywhere inside the enclosure is considered to be in the village. If not, the area in the village includes all the buildings and their immediate vicinity. According to the Sub-commentary, this means every where within a 2 leddupata radius of the buildings. (One leddupata is the distance a man of average height can throw a clod of dirt.) If one is staying in a monastery located within a village or town, the area covered by this factor begins at the boundary of the monastery. Effort. The Vibhanga defines the wrong time as from after noon until the following dawn. Thus this rule dovetails with Pacittiya 46, which deals with the period from dawn until noon on days when one has been invited to a meal. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if one perceives the time to be morning, when it is actually after noon, one's actions would still fall under this rule. As under Pacittiya 46, another bhikkhu is said to be available for taking one's leave if, in the Vibhanga's words, "It is possible to go having taken leave of him"--that is, if there is another bhikkhu in the monastery, and there are no obstacles to taking one's leave from him (he is asleep, he is sick, he is receiving important visitors), one is obliged to go out of one's way to inform him. According to the K/Commentary, taking leave in the context of this rule means the simple act of informing the other bhikkhu that, "I am going into the village," or any similar statement. In other words, one is not asking permission to go, although if the other bhikkhu sees that one is doing something improper in going, he is perfectly free to say so. If one treats his comments with disrespect, one incurs at least a dukkata under Pacittiya 54. (See the discussion under that rule for details.) The Commentary states that if there is no bhikkhu in the monas-tery to take leave from, there is no need to inform any bhikkhu one may meet after leaving the monastery. If many bhikkhus are going together, they need only take leave from one another before entering the village. For a new bhikkhu still living in dependence (nissaya) on his mentor, though, taking leave is a matter of asking permission from his mentor at all times, "wrong" or not. The Mahavagga (I.25.24; II.21.1) states that one of the duties of such a bhikkhu is that he must receive permission from his mentor before entering a village, going to a cemetery, or leaving the district. Not to ask permission before going, or to go after being denied permission, is to incur a dukkata. As for the mentor, if he gives permission for his student to go when it is not appropriate, he is the one who incurs the dukkata. As for the suitable emergencies under this rule--which would seem to exempt even new bhikkhus from having to take leave from their mentors--the Vibhanga gives the example of a bhikkhu rushing to get fire to make medicine for another bhikkhu bitten by a snake. Examples more likely at present would include rushing to get a doctor for a sick bhikkhu, or to get help when a fire has broken out in the monastery. Further action. Although there is no penalty for engaging in "animal talk", a bhikkhu who enters a village frequently and engages in it, even if he takes leave of other bhikkhus, can be subject to an act of censure on the grounds of "unbecoming association with householders" (Cv.I.4). Non-offenses. There is no offense in entering a village when one has taken leave of another bhikkhu, or in going when one has not taken leave if-- There is an emergency. There is no bhikkhu available (e.g., one is living alone; all the other bhikkhus have left; all the bhikkhus in the monastery are going together). One is going to another monastery (), to bhikkhunis' quarters or to the residence of people ordained in another sect or religion (located in a village, says the Commentary), or one is returning from any of these places. One is going along a road which happens to pass through a village. (According to the Commentary, a bhikkhu who wants to leave the road and enter the village proper should take leave of another bhikkhu if one is available.) There are dangers. (Examples in the Commentary include seeing lions or tigers approaching, or clouds building up and threatening a storm.) Summary: Entering a village, town or city during the period after noon until the following dawn, without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu--unless there is an emergency--is a pacittiya offense. *** 86. Should any bhikkhu have a needle case made of bone, ivory or horn, it is to be broken and confessed. The origin story here echoes the one for NP 21. "Now at that time a certain ivory-worker offered an invitation to the bhikkhus: 'If any of the masters have need of a needle case, I will supply them with needle cases.' So the bhikkhus asked for many needle cases. Those with small needle cases asked for large ones; those with large ones asked for small ones. The ivory-worker, making many needle cases for the bhikkhus, was not able to make other goods for sale. He could not support himself, and his wife and children suffered." There are three factors for the full offense here: 1) Object: a needle case made of bone, ivory or horn. 2) Effort: One acquires it after making it or having it made, 3) Intention: for one's own use. Object. Anything aside from a needle case--such as a fastener or ointment box--is not grounds for an offense here, even if it is made of bone, ivory or horn. Effort. The permutations under this factor are as follows: The act of making the needle box or having it made--a dukkata. Acquiring the finished box--a pacittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the box was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others, or whether one finished what others began, or let others finish what one began oneself. In any event, one must break the case before confess-ing the offense. Intention. There is a dukkata in using an ivory, bone or horn needle box made for the sake of another person; and in making such a box--or having it made--for another's use. The general principle. The Vinaya Mukha derives a general principle from this rule: The Buddha, in formulating this rule, was putting a halt to the sort of fad that can occur among bhikkhus when certain requisites become fashionable--to the point of inconveniencing donors--and senior bhikkhus at present should try to put a halt to any similar fads. Summary: Acquiring a needle box made of ivory, bone or horn after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one break the box before confessing the offense. *** 87. When a bhikkhu is making a new bed or bench, it is to have legs (at most) eight fingerbreadths long--using Sugata fingerbreadths--not counting the lower edge of the frame. In excess of that it is to be cut down and confessed. Tall furnishings. The purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from making and using furnishings that are high and imposing. The Canon contains many rules dealing with furnishings, especially in the Khandhakas, and since furnishings in the time of the Buddha were somewhat different from what they are now, it is often a matter of guesswork as to what, precisely, the rules are referring to. The bed (manca) in this rule almost certainly refers to what we mean by a bed. The bench (pitha), according to the K/Commentary, is shorter than a bed, but not so short that it is square. This comment comes from the passage in the Cullavagga (Cv.VI.2.4) that allows bhikkhus to use an asandika--apparently a square stool, large enough to sit on but not to lie on--even if the legs are long. Another piece of furniture with long legs allowed in the same passage is the sattanga, a chair or sofa with a back and arms. The Vinaya Mukha includes a pancanga--a chair or sofa with a back but no arms--under this allowance as well. The Canon and commentaries make no mention of this point, but it seems valid: Chairs and sofas without arms are less imposing than those which have them. The factors for the offense here are three: 1) Object: a bed or bench whose legs, measuring from the lower side of the frame to the floor, are longer than eight Sugata fingerbreadths (approximately 16.6 cm.) 2) Effort: One acquires it after making it or having it made, 3) Intention: for one's own use. Object. As mentioned above, Cv.VI.2.4 shows that stools, as well as chairs and sofas with backs--with or without arms--would not fulfill this factor. The Sugata measures are a matter of controversy, discussed in Appendix II. For the purposes of this book, we are taking the Sugata span to be 25 cm., and since there are 12 Sugata fingerbreadths in a Sugata span, that would put eight Sugata fingerbreadths at 16.6 cm. Effort. The permutations under this factor are as follows: The act of making the bed/bench or having it made--a dukkata. Acquiring the finished article--a pacittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the bed/bench was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others, or whether one finished what others began, or let others finish what one began oneself. In any case, one must cut down the legs to the proper size before confessing the offense. Intention. There is a dukkata in making a bed or bench with extra long legs--or having it made--for the sake of another person; and in using such a bed or bench made for another's use. This last penalty would seem to apply only inside the monastery, for Cv.VI.8 allows bhikkhus to sit--but not to lie down--on furnishings in a lay person's house even if the furnishings are the sort not allowable in the monastery. There are three exceptions to this allowance, the one piece objected to on account of its height being the asandi--apparently a square platform, large enough to lie on, and very high. Bhikkhus are not allowed to sit on such a thing, even in a lay person's house. Non-offenses. There is no offense in making a bed or bench--or having one made--if the legs are eight Sugata fingerbreadths or less; or in receiving a bed or bench with extra long legs if one cuts the legs down to regulation size before using it. The Commentary notes that if one buries the legs in the ground, so that no more than eight fingerbreadths separate the ground from the lower frame, that is also allowable. Summary: Acquiring a bed or bench with legs longer than eight Sugata fingerbreadths after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one cut the legs down before confessing the offense. *** 88. Should any bhikkhu have a bed or bench upholstered, it (the upholstery) is to be torn off and confessed. Upholstery & cushions. Cotton down was apparently the most luxurious material known in the Buddha's time for stuffing furniture, cushions and mattresses, inasmuch as bhikkhus are forbidden from making beds and benches upholstered with cotton-down (under this rule), and from sitting on cushions stuffed with cotton down, even in the homes of lay people (Cv.VI.8). The only article of furnishing stuffed with cotton down allowed to bhikkhus was a pillow (not a squatting mat, as translated in some places), although the pillow could be made no larger than the size of the head (Cv.VI.2.6). The Commentary's explanations of this point show that the pillow used in those days was an oblong cushion, looking like a rectangle when viewed from above, and like a triangle when viewed from either the right or left side (like the old style of pillow still in use in Thailand). Such pillows, the Commentary says, should be no more than two cubits (1 meter) long, and one span plus four fingerbreadths (32 cm.) from corner to corner on the sides. A bhikkhu who is not ill may use such a pillow for his head and feet; an ill bhikkhu may line up a series of pillows, cover them with a cloth, and lie down on them without incurring an offense. Hair--such as human hair and horse-hair--was another forbidden form of stuffing. Cv.VI.8, in addition to forbidding bhikkhus from sitting down on an asandi and cushions stuffed with cotton down, also forbids them from sitting down on a pallanka--a couch stuffed with horse-hair--even in the house of a lay person. According to Cv.VI.14, though, if the bhikkhus are presented with asandis, pallankas and cushions stuffed with cotton down, they may use the asandis after cutting the legs down to size, the pallankas after removing the hair stuffing, and the cotton-down cushions only after tearing them up and making them into pillows. Mattresses and cushions stuffed with other materials, though, are allowed, even for use in the monastery. Cv.VI.7 mentions five kinds of allowable stuffing: wool, cloth, bark, grass and leaves. (According to the Commentary, wool here includes all kinds of animal fur and bird feathers. Goose down would thus be allowable. It also mentions that, according to the Kurundi, mattresses and cushions stuffed with these materials are allowable whether covered with cloth or leather.) The purpose of all this is to keep bhikkhus from using furnishings which are extravagant and ostentatious. As the Vinaya Mukha men-tions, though, standards of what is extravagant and ostentatious vary from age to age and culture to culture. Some of the things allowed in the Canon and commentaries now seem exotic and luxu-rious; and other things forbidden by them, common and ordinary. Thus the wise policy, in the monastery, would be to use only those furnishings allowed by the rules and which seem unostentatious at present; and when visiting a lay person's home, to avoid sitting on furnishings which seem unusually grand. The factors for the offense here are three: 1) Object: a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down. 2) Effort: One acquires it after making it or having it made, 3) Intention: for one's own use. Object. Cotton down, according to the Vibhanga, includes any cotton down from trees, vines and grass. The Commentary to Cv.VI interprets this as meaning cotton down from any plant, since "trees, vines and grass" is the Canon's usual way of covering all plant life. Kapok, flax fibers, jute and cotton would thus all come under this category. Since cotton-down cushions are forbidden in all situations, bed and bench here would seem to include all forms of furniture, including the stools, chairs and sofas exempted from the preceding rule. Effort. The permutations under this factor are as follows: The act of making the bed/bench or having it made--a dukkata. Acquiring the finished article--a pacittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the bed/bench was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others, or whether one finished what others began, or let others finish what one began oneself. In any case, one must tear off the upholstery before confessing the offense. Intention. There is a dukkata in making a bed or bench uphol-stered with cotton down--or having it made--for the sake of another person; and in using such a bed or bench made for another's use. Non-offenses. There is no offense in using cotton down to stuff a pillow, a belt, a shoulder strap, a binding or a bag for carrying the alms bowl; or to form the filter in a water strainer. If one obtains a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down made for another person's use, there is no offense in using it if one removes the upholstery first. Summary: Acquiring a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one remove the stuffing before confessing the offense. *** 89.When a bhikkhu is making a sitting cloth, it is to be made to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: two spans--using the Sugata span--in length, 1 1/2 in width, the border a span. In excess of that, it is to be cut down and confessed. The origin story here follows on the passage in Mv.VIII.16.3, where the Buddha allows bhikkhus to use a sitting cloth in order to protect their robes from getting soiled by their furnishings, and their furnish-ings from getting soiled by their robes and bodies. "Now at that time the Lord had allowed a sitting cloth for the bhikkhus. Some group-of-six bhikkhus...used sitting cloths without any limit in size, which hung down in front and behind even on beds and benches." (As a result, the Buddha set the limit at 2 spans by 1 1/2.) Now, Ven. Udayin was very large. Setting out his sitting cloth in front of the Blessed One, he stretched it out on all sides before sitting down. The Blessed One said to him, 'Why is it, Udayin, that when setting out your sitting cloth you stretch it out on all sides, like an old skin?' "Because the sitting cloth the Blessed One has allowed for the bhikkhus is awfully small.'" (Thus the Buddha added the allowance for the border.) There are three factors for the full offense here: 1) Object: a sitting cloth larger than the standard measure. 2) Effort: One acquires it after making it or having it made, 3) Intention: for one's own use. Object. A sitting cloth, by definition, has to have a border, regard-less of whether it is made of felted or woven material. However--as none of the texts give any clear indication as to how many borders it should have, or how they are to be patterned--there is no definitive measurement as to how large the overall cloth should be. A wise policy, then, is to take the origin story as a guide: Make the cloth large enough so that one can sit cross-legged on it without soiling one's robes or furnishings, but not so large that it extends out on any one side. Effort. The permutations under this factor are as follows: The act of making the sitting cloth or having it made--a dukkata. Acquiring the finished article--a pacittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the cloth was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others, or whether one finished what others began, or let others finish what one began oneself. In any case, one must cut down the cloth to the proper size before confessing the offense. Intention. There is a dukkata in making an overly large sitting cloth--or having it made--for the sake of another person; and in using such a cloth made for another's use. Non-offenses. There is no offense if one receives an overly large sitting cloth made for another person's use and cuts it down to size before using it oneself. Summary: Acquiring an overly large sitting cloth after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. *** 90. When a bhikkhu is making a skin-eruption covering cloth, it is to be made to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: four spans--using the Sugata span--in length, two spans in width. In excess of that, it is to be cut down and confessed. Object. The Mahavagga (VIII.17) allows bhikkhus to use a skin-eruption covering cloth to protect their robes when they are suffering from boils, running sores, rashes or "thick scab" diseases (large boils? psoriasis?). The Vibhanga to this rule states that the cloth is to cover the area from the navel down to the knees, thus suggesting that the cloth is intended to be worn as an inner robe, beneath the lower robe. As we already mentioned under NP 1, one should determine these cloths for use when one is suffering from such a disease, and then place them under shared ownership when not. As mentioned under Pacittiya 87, above, the Sugata measures are discussed in Appendix II. Here we take the Sugata span to equal 25 cm., which would put the standard measurement for the skin-eruption covering cloth at 1 meter by 50 cm. If either of these measurements is exceeded, the cloth would fulfill this factor for the full offense. Effort, intention & non-offenses. The permutations of these factors are the same as under the preceding rule. Summary: Acquiring an overly large skin-eruption covering cloth after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. *** 91. When a bhikkhu is making a rains-bathing cloth, it is to be made to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: six spans--using the Sugata span--in length, 2 1/2 in width. In excess of that, it is to be cut down and confessed. Object. The rains bathing cloth has already been discussed in detail under NP 24. Taking the Sugata span to equal 25 cm., the standard measurement for the rains-bathing cloth would be 1.5 meter by 62.5 cm. If either of these measurements is exceeded, the cloth would fulfill this factor for the full offense. Effort, intention & non-offenses. The permutations of these factors are the same as under Pacittiya 89. Summary: Acquiring an overly large rains-bathing cloth after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. *** 92. Should any bhikkhu have a robe made the size of the Sugata robe--or larger--it is to be cut down and confessed. Here, the size of the Sugata robe is this: nine spans--using the Sugata span--in length, six spans in width. This is the size of the Sugata's Sugata robe. Object. The term "Sugata"--meaning well-gone or accomplished--is an epithet for the Buddha. Robe is not defined in the Vibhanga, and apparently means any of the three basic robes: the lower robe, the upper robe and the outer robe. This raises an interesting point: Perhaps in the Buddha's time, all three of the basic robes were approximately the same size. This would have made it much more convenient than it is at present to hold to the practice of using only one set of three robes. When washing one robe, one could wear the other two without looking out of place. At any rate, taking the Sugata span to be 25 cm. would put the size of the Buddha's robes at 2.25 m. by 1.50 m.--much larger that the lower robes used at present, but much smaller than present-day upper and outer robes. As we will see under Appendix II, various theories have been offered over the centuries as to how large the Sugata span was. Beginning at least with the time of the Maha-Atthakatha, one of the ancient commentaries, the Buddha was assumed to be of super-human height, and his handspan, cubit, etc., were assumed to be three-times normal length. Only recently, within the last century or so, have Vinaya experts taken evidence from the Canon to show that the Buddha, though tall, was not abnormally so, and thus the estimate of the Sugata span, etc., has shrunk accordingly. Still, the traditional estimates of the Buddha's height continue to influence the size of the robes that bhikkhus wear today throughout the Theravadan countries; and although there was a movement in Thailand during the mid-19th century to return to the original size and style as shown in the earliest Indian Buddha images, the idea never caught on. Effort, intention & non-offenses. The permutations of these factors are the same as under Pacittiya 89. Summary: Acquiring an overly large robe after making it--or having it made--for one's own use is a pacittiya offense which requires that one cut the robe down to size before confessing the offense.