CHAPTER THREE
  
  
  
  Disrobing
  
  
  
  The first rule in the Patimokkha opens with the statement that 
  it--and, by extension, every other rule in the Patimokkha--applies to 
  all bhikkhus who have not disrobed by renouncing the training and 
  returning to the lay life.  Thus the Vibhanga begins its explanations 
  by discussing what does and does not count as a valid act of 
  disrobing.  Because this is, in effect, the escape clause for all the 
  rules, I am discussing it first as a separate chapter, for if a 
  bhikkhu disrobes in an invalid manner, he still counts as a  bhikkhu 
  and is subject to the rules whether he realizes it or not.  If he then 
  were to break any of the Parajika rules, he would be disqualified from 
  ever becoming a bhikkhu again in this lifetime.
  
  To disrobe, a bhikkhu with firm intent states in the  presence of a 
  witness words to the effect that he is renouncing the training. The 
  validity of the act depends on four factors:
  
       1. The bhikkhu's state of mind.
  
       2. His intention.
  
       3. His statement.
  
       4. The witness to his statement.
  
  State of mind.  The bhikkhu must be in his right mind.  Any statement 
  he makes while insane, crazed with pain or possessed by spirits does 
  not count.
  
  Intention.  He must seriously desire to leave the  Community.  If, 
  without actually intending to disrobe, he makes any of the state-ments 
  usually used for disrobing, it does not count as an act of disrobing.  
  For example, if he makes the statement in jest or is telling someone 
  else how to disrobe, the fact that he mentions the words does not mean 
  that he has disrobed.  Also, if he says one thing and means something 
  else--e.g., if he makes a slip of the tongue--that too does not count.
  
  The statement.  The Vibhanga gives a wide variety of statements that 
  may be used to renounce the training.  The most basic one follows the 
  form, "I renounce x," where x may be replaced with the Buddha, the 
  Dhamma, the Sangha, the training, the discipline (vinaya) the 
  Patimokkha, the chaste life, one's preceptor, one's teacher, one's 
  fellow bhikkhus, or any equivalent terms.  Other examples follow 
  similar forms, such as, "I am tired of x,"  "What is x to me?" "X 
  means nothing to me," or "I am well freed of x."  A separate form 
  follows the pattern, "I will be y," where y may be replaced with a 
  householder, a lay follower, a novice, a member of another sect, an 
  adherent of another sect, or any other equivalent term. 
  
  The Vibhanga stipulates that the statement may not be put in the 
  conditional tense ("Suppose I were to renounce the training,") and the 
  Commentary further stipulates that the "x" statements must be in the 
  present tense.  Thus to say, "I have renounced the training," or  "I 
  will renounce the training," would not be a valid statement of 
  disrobing.
  
  The witness must be a human being in his or her right mind, and must 
  understand what the bhikkhu says.  This rules out the practice 
  legendary in Thailand of bhikkhus who disrobe by taking a Buddha image 
  as their witness, or who disrobe in front of a tree on the assumption 
  that the tree deity counts.
  
  These four factors cover all that is absolutely necessary for an act 
  of disrobing to be valid.  However, each of the different national 
  traditions has developed a set of formal ceremonies to surround the 
  act--such as making a final confession of all one's offenses and 
  recit-ing the passage for reflection on one's past use of the four 
  requisites--to give psychological weight to the occasion, and to help 
  minimize any sense of remorse one may feel afterwards.
  
  Because disrobing is a serious act with strong consequences  for one's 
  mental and spiritual well being, it should be done only after due 
  consideration.  Once a bhikkhu decides that he does want to disrobe, 
  he would be wise to follow not only the stipulations given in the 
  texts, but also any additional customs dictated by the traditions of 
  his particular Community, as a sign to himself and to others that he 
  is acting seriously and with due respect both for the religion and for 
  himself.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  CHAPTER FOUR
  
  
  
  Parajika
  
  
  
  This term, according to the Parivara, derives from a  verb meaning to 
  lose or be defeated.  A bhikkhu who commits any of the four following 
  offenses has surrendered to his own mental defilements to such an 
  extent that he defeats the purpose of his having become a bhikkhu in 
  the first place.  The irrevocable nature of this defeat is illustrated 
  in the Vibhanga by a number of similes: "as a man with his head cut 
  off...as a withered leaf freed from its stem...as a flat stone that 
  has been broken in half cannot be put together again...as a palm tree 
  cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth."  A bhikkhu who 
  commits any of these offenses severs himself irrevocably from the life 
  of the community and is no longer considered a bhikkhu.
  
  
  
  1.  Should any bhikkhu--participating in the training and livelihood 
  of the bhikkhus, without having renounced the training, without having 
  declared his weakness--engage in the sexual act, even with a female 
  animal, he is defeated and no longer in communion.
  
  
  
  Effort.  In this rule, the term "sexual act" refers to all kinds of 
  sexual intercourse.  The Vibhanga classifies the various types 
  inter-course by the organs involved--the genitals, the mouth, the 
  anus--and in any of the possible combinations (except for 
  mouth-to-mouth, which is treated separately under Sanghadisesa 2, 
  below) the sexual act has been performed when one organ enters the 
  other even if just to "the extent of a sesame seed."  This means that 
  a bhikkhu engag-ing in genital, oral or anal intercourse is subject to 
  this rule regardless of which role he plays.  Whether or not there is 
  a covering, such as a condom, between the organs is irrelevant, as are 
  the questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively or passively 
  involved, and whether or not any of the parties involved reaches 
  orgasm. 
  
  Object.  The full penalty under this rule applies to any voluntary 
  sexual intercourse with a human being, a "non-human" being (a yakkha, 
  naga or peta) or a common animal, whether female, male, neuter or 
  hermaphrodite. 
  
   Performing the sexual act with a dead body--even a decapitated 
  head--also incurs the full penalty if the remains of the body are 
  intact enough for the act to be accomplished.
  
  The Vinita Vatthu also lists two examples of "self-intercourse":  a 
  bhikkhu with a supple back takes his penis into his mouth, and a 
  bhikkhu with an unusually long penis inserts it into his anus.  Both 
  cases come under the term "sexual act" and carry the full penalty.
  
  Knowledge & consent.  For the sexual act to count as an offense, the 
  bhikkhu must know that it is happening and give his consent.  Thus if 
  he is sexually assaulted while asleep or otherwise unconscious and 
  remains oblivious to what is happening, he incurs no penalty.  If, 
  however, he becomes conscious during the assault, or was conscious 
  even before the assault began, then whether or not he incurs a penalty 
  depends on whether or not he gives his consent during any part of the 
  sexual act.
  
  Strangely enough, neither the Canon nor the Commentary discusses the 
  factor of consent in any detail, except to mention by way of passing 
  that it can apply to the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, 
  staying in place or pulling out.  From the examples given in the 
  Vinita Vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to a mental state 
  of taking pleasure, rather than mere physical compliance, as there are 
  cases where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but 
  without consenting mentally, and so are absolved of any offense.  
  
  The Vinita Vatthu contains a case where a bhikkhu wakes up to find 
  himself being sexually assaulted by a woman, gives her a kick and 
  sends her rolling.  The Commentary states that his is how a bhikkhu 
  still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to preserve his 
  state of mind.  In another case, a bhikkhu who, without consent-ing, 
  is forced by a group of Licchavi youths into having intercourse with a 
  woman, is later absolved of any offense.  Unfortunately, neither the 
  Canon nor the Commentary tells how he was able to preserve his state 
  of mind throughout the encounter.  Perhaps he was adept at the 
  cemetery contemplations.  At any rate, the mere fact of his being 
  forced was not what absolved him, as there are parallel cases of 
  bhikkhus who are forced by Licchavi youths into intercourse with a 
  variety of women, men and eunuchs but who give their consent, and so 
  incur the full penalty.  All the Commentary has to say is that this 
  sort of behavior is what led to the downfall of the Licchavis.  
  
  Derived offenses.  The derived offenses here are as follows:  The only 
  thullaccaya directly related to this rule is for the unlikely case of 
  a bhikkhu who attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus or 
  genitals of a corpse. (!)  To attempt intercourse with any other part 
  of a dead body or with any part of an insentient object, such as an 
  inflatable doll or mannikin, incurs a dukkata. 
  
  The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any 
  part of a living being's body apart from the three orifices, the case 
  falls under the Sanghadisesa rules -- either Sanghadisesa 1 for 
  intentional ejaculation, or Sanghadisesa 2 for lustful bodily contact.  
  As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in the latter case are 
  as follows:  if the partner is a woman, a sanghadisesa; if a pandaka 
  (see Sanghadisesa 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a common animal, a 
  dukkata.  We can infer from the Vibhanga's ruling here that if a 
  bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse with the decomposed 
  mouth, anus or genitals of a corpse, any other part of a dead body or 
  with any part of an insentient object, the case comes under 
  Sanghadisesa 1.
  
  The Commentary disagrees with the Vibhanga on these points, however, 
  saying that the derived offenses under this rule can include only 
  dukkata and thullaccaya penalties.  In its explanation of Sanghadisesa 
  1, it sets forth a system of eleven types of lust in which the lust 
  for the pleasure of bringing about an ejaculation, lust for the 
  pleasure of bodily contact and lust for the pleasure of intercourse 
  are treated as completely separate things, and must be treated under 
  separate rules.  Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu is aiming at intercourse 
  and takes hold of a woman's body, it is simply a preliminary to 
  intercourse and thus incurs only a dukkata, rather than a 
  sangha-disesa for lustful bodily contact.  Similarly, if he has a 
  premature ejaculation before beginning intercourse, there is no 
  offense at all.
  
  These are fine academic distinctions, and are clearly motivated by a 
  desire to draw neat lines between the rules, but they lead to 
  practical problems.  As the Commentary itself points out, if a bhikkhu 
  commits an act that falls near the borderline between these rules, but 
  cannot later report precisely which type of lust he was feeling in the 
  heat of the moment, there is no way his case can be judged and a 
  penalty assigned.  At any rate, there is no basis in the Canon for the 
  Commentary's system, and in fact it contradicts not only the 
  Vibhanga's ruling mentioned above, but also its definition of 
  "lustful" under Sanghadisesas 2, 3, and 4, which is exactly the same 
  for all three rules and places no limits on the type of lust involved.  
  All of this leads to the conclusion that the Commentary's neat system 
  is invalid, and that the Vibhanga's judgment holds.  
  
  Blanket exemptions.  In addition to bhikkhus who do not know they are 
  being assaulted or do not give their consent when they do know, the 
  Vibhanga states that there are four special categories of bhikkhus 
  exempted from a penalty under this rule:  any bhikkhu who is insane, 
  possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, or the first offender (in 
  this case, Ven. Sudinna) whose actions prompted the Buddha to 
  formulate the rule in the first place.  The Commentary notes that 
  anyone who "goes about in an unseemly way, with deranged perceptions, 
  having cast away all sense of conscience and shame, not knowing 
  whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules" counts as 
  insane here.  It recognizes this as a medical condition, which it 
  blames on the bile.  As for spirit possession, it says that this can 
  happen either when spirits frighten one, or when by distracting one 
  with sensory images they insert their hands into one's heart by way of 
  one's mouth.  (!)  At any rate, it notes, insane and possessed 
  bhikkhus are exempt from penalties they incur only when their 
  perceptions are deranged ("when their mindfulness is entirely 
  forgotten, and they don't know what fire, gold, excrement and 
  sandalwood are") and not from any they incur during their lucid 
  moments.   As for a bhikkhu overcome with pain, he is exempt from 
  penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great that 
  he does not know what he is doing.  
  
  These four categories are exempted from penalties under all of the 
  rules, although the first offender for each rule is exempted only for 
  the one time he acted in such a way as to provoke the Buddha into 
  formulating the rule.  I will not mention these categories again, but 
  the reader should bear them in mind as being exempt in every case.
  
  Lastly, the Vinita Vatthu to this rule includes an interesting case 
  that formed the basis for an additional rule:
  
  "At that time a certain monk had gone to the Gabled Hall in the Great 
  Wood at Vesali to pass the day, and was sleeping, having left the door 
  open.  His various limbs were stiff with the 'wind forces' (i.e., he 
  had an erection).  Now at that time a large company of women bearing 
  garlands and scents came to the park headed for the vihara.  Seeing 
  the bhikkhu, they sat down on his male organ, and having taken their 
  pleasure, and remarking, 'What a bull of a man!' they went on their 
  way, taking up their garlands and  scents."
  
  The bhikkhu incurred no penalty, but the Buddha gave formal permission 
  to close the door when resting during the day.
  
  Summary: Voluntary sexual intercourse -- genital, anal or oral -- with  
  a human being, non-human being or common animal is a parajika offense.
  
  
  
     * * * 
  
  
  
  2.  Should any bhikkhu, in the manner of stealing, take what is not 
  given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness--just as when, in 
  the taking of what is not given, kings arresting the criminal would 
  flog, imprison or banish him, saying, "You are a robber, you are a 
  fool, you are benighted, you are a  thief"--a bhikkhu in the same 
  manner taking what is not given is defeated and no longer in 
  communion.  
  
  This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, the 
  most complex in the Patimokkha and requires the most explanation.  Not 
  that stealing is a concept especially hard to understand:  simply that 
  it can take so many forms.
  
  The Vibhanga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors:
  
  1. Object:  The object belongs to another person, group of  persons or 
  place (such as the offerings made to a sacred place).
  
  2.  Perception:  One perceives that the object belongs to  another 
  person, etc.
  
  3. Intention:  One decides to steal it.      
  
  4. Effort:  One takes possession of it.
  
  Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense.  However, the 
  severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is
  
  5. The value of the object.
  
  
  
  Object.  For an object to qualify as "what is not given"--the rule's 
  term for anything that may be the object of a theft--it must belong to 
  another person or be guarded as common  property of a group or of a 
  location, such as the offerings to a Buddha image, chedi or other 
  sacred place, as mentioned above.  A further stipulation is that the 
  owner or person responsible for guarding the object has neither given 
  nor thrown it away.  Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes 
  an object that has been thrown away, such as rags from a pile of 
  refuse; unclaimed things from a wilderness; or things unclaimed by any 
  human being but which are in the possession of an animal or ghost.  
  The Vinita Vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the guard of a 
  plantation permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the planta-tion, even 
  though he was not authorized to do so.  The bhikkhus were not guilty 
  of an offense.
  
  The question of property belonging to the Sangha logically fits here, 
  but since the topic is fairly complex, I will treat it as a special 
  case below
  
  Perception.  For the act of taking "what is not given" to count as 
  theft one must also perceive the object as being something not given.  
  Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it is "not 
  given", if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or thrown away.  
  Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it for his own or as 
  belonging to a friend who has given him permission to take his things 
  on trust, there is no offense.  Or again, a bhikkhu who takes things 
  from the Community's common stores, on the assumption that he has the 
  right to help himself, commits no offense even if the assumption 
  proves false.
  
  Intention.  The act of taking "what is not given", even when one 
  perceives it as "not given", counts as theft only if one's intention 
  is to steal it.  Thus if a bhikkhu takes an object on loan or on 
  trust, he incurs no offense.  According to the Commentary, to take 
  something on loan means that one has the intention that, "I will 
  return it," or "I will make  compensation."
  
  As for taking an object on trust, Mv.VIII.1.19 lists five factors that 
  are necessary if a bhikkhu is rightly to take an object on trust:
  
       a. The owner is a friend.
  
       b. He/she is an intimate.
  
       c. He/she has given one permission to take from his things.
  
       d. He/she is still alive.
  
       e. One is confident that he/she will not mind.
  
  If any of these factors is lacking--for example, the owner is a good 
  friend but has never given explicit permission to take from his/her 
  things--one has no right to take the things on trust.  However, the 
  Vinita Vatthu gives the case of a bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly 
  thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; the Buddha termed 
  this a "misconception as to trust" and did not impose a penalty.  
  
  The most common problem that arises in this area is when one sincerely 
  assumes that the owner will not mind, but it turns out that he/she 
  does.  In cases of this sort there is no offense, and the matter is 
  left to the bhikkhu and the owner to settle on their own as amicably 
  as possible.
  
  A bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be 
  damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner commits no offense. 
  
  Effort.  Assuming that all of the above conditions are fulfilled-- the 
  object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to 
  someone else and one intends to steal it--if one then takes it, that 
  constitutes stealing.  The question then arises as to precisely what 
  acts constitute taking.  To summarize the Vibhanga's treatment of this 
  question, we can classify objects into two broad types:  moveable and 
  immovable.
  
  Moveable items are said to be taken when they are moved entirely from 
  their "base(s)", i.e., the spot(s) on which they rest.  An object such 
  as a box or a trunk that lies flat along the ground or that touches 
  its support at a single area has a single base and counts as "taken" 
  if it has been moved entirely from its base.  An object such as a 
  table or chair that touches its support at a number of separate places 
  has that number of bases.  For instance, a stool with three legs 
  touches the floor at three points and so has three bases.  An object 
  with more than one base is "taken" when it has been moved from all of 
  its bases.  Thus a television set standing on four legs is taken when 
  all four of its legs have been lifted or slid away from the four spots 
  on which they were standing.
  
  If a moveable object is placed on another moveable object,  such as a 
  television set placed on a cart, there are two ways to count it as 
  taken--either when it is removed from its base on the cart or when the 
  wheels of the cart have been moved from all of their bases on the 
  floor--whichever occurs first.
  
  If person A is carrying an object and person B tries to take it from 
  him, it is counted as taken even if B succeeds only in  moving it from 
  one spot on A's body to another.
  
  According to the Vibhanga, if a person holding an object with the 
  owner's permission then decides to abscond with it, it counts as taken 
  when he shifts it to another part of his person  (e.g., into his 
  pocket) or places it elsewhere.  The Vinaya Mukha,  however, takes 
  issue with this point, saying that cases of this sort should be 
  treated under the terms of a breach of trust, which is discussed 
  below.
  
  Animals are reckoned to have one base (e.g. snakes, any reclining 
  animal) or more (e.g., chickens or dogs on their feet) in the same way 
  as inanimate objects, and are said to be taken when they are pulled, 
  chased, etc., completely from their base(s). 
  
    When a bhikkhu takes a moveable object in theft, the  question of 
  whether he makes off with it is irrelevant as far as the offense is 
  concerned.  For example, if he tries to steal a radio and succeeds in 
  moving it completely from its bases, but then hears the owner coming 
  and so returns it to its original place, the owner would not even know 
  that the object was in danger of being taken, and the civil law would 
  regard the act at most as an attempted theft.  As far as the Vinaya is 
  concerned, though, the theft occurred when the bhikkhu first moved the 
  object, and the fact that he returned it would not erase the theft.  
  He would still be guilty of an offense.
  
  As for immovable objects--such as land or things like buildings or 
  trees affixed to the land--these are taken when the rightful owner 
  unwillingly abandons his claim to them of his own accord (through fear 
  of intimidation or reluctance to incur the expense and bother of a 
  court battle) or when he is forced to do so by a court of law and 
  cannot, or does not, make  a further appeal.  In the Buddha's time, a 
  court dispute involving land was considered fully settled when the 
  winner of the case staked out his claim with the permission of the 
  court.  Thus the Vibhanga states that a bhikkhu who unfairly wins a 
  court case of this sort has "taken" the land when he formally stakes 
  out his claim after winning the case.  At present we would say that he 
  has taken the land when he receives the deed.
  
  Immovable objects in the secondary sense--trees, buildings, etc.--are 
  treated in the same light as ordinary moveable objects if a bhikkhu 
  cuts them down or dismantles them, i.e., they count as taken when 
  removed from their bases.
  
  These are the general considerations for determining when an object is 
  taken.  The Vibhanga, though, cites a number of additional cases 
  involving special contingencies, as follows:
  
  a. Fraudulence:  Objects are being distributed by lot to the Sangha.  
  A bhikkhu desiring the portion rightfully going to another bhikkhu 
  exchanges his ticket for the ticket of the other bhikkhu.  The 
  "taking" is accomplished when the tickets have been exchanged.
  
  b. Breach of trust:  A person places goods in trust with a  bhikkhu.  
  When the owner comes to ask for their return, the  bhikkhu claims that 
  he does not have them.  The taking is accomplished when the owner 
  stops pressing his claim.  If the case goes to court, the taking is 
  accomplished when the owner loses the case in the final court to which 
  he appeals.
  
  c. Embezzlement:  A bhikkhu responsible for items kept in a storeroom 
  removes one of the items from the storeroom.  The taking is 
  accomplished when the item leaves the storeroom's boundary.
  
  d. Smuggling:  A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an import duty 
  hides them as he goes through customs.  The taking is accomplished 
  when the item leaves the customs area.  If, however, the bhikkhu 
  informs the customs official that he has an item subject to customs 
  duty, and yet the official decides not to collect the duty, the 
  bhikkhu incurs no penalty.  And there is no penalty if the bhikkhu 
  goes through customs not knowing that an item subject to import duties 
  is among his effects.
  
  Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:
  
  a. False dealing:  A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or uses 
  counterfeit weights.  The taking is accomplished when the counterfeit 
  is accepted. 
  
  b. Extortion:  Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object 
  to give it to him.  The taking is accomplished when the owner 
  complies.
  
  The value of the object.  As stated above, any case of  stealing 
  counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined by 
  the value of the object.  This is the point of the phrase in the rule 
  reading, "just as when there is the taking of what is not given, 
  kings... would banish him, saying...'You are a thief.'"  In other 
  words, for theft to incur a parajika, it must be a case of grand 
  larceny, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved 
  were worth at least five masaka, a unit of money used at the time.  
  Goods valued collectively at more than one masaka but less than five 
  are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one masaka 
  or less are grounds for a dukkata, the worth of the articles being 
  determined by the price they would have fetched at the time of the 
  theft.
  
  This leaves us with the question of how a masaka would translate into 
  current monetary rates.   No one can answer this question with any 
  certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the  masaka to the gold 
  standard dates from the V/Sub-commentary, which sets one masaka as 
  equal to 5 rice grains weight of gold.  At this rate, the theft of an 
  item worth 20 rice grains (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or more 
  would be a parajika offense.
  
  One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the items 
  mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu as being grounds for a parajika when 
  stolen--e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a robe, a handful of rice 
  during a famine--would seem to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce 
  of gold.  We must remember, though, that many items which seem 
  commonplace now might have been regarded as expensive luxuries at that 
  time.
  
  In spite of this objection, there is one very good reason for 
  adopt-ing the standard set by the V/Sub-commentary:  It sets a high 
  value for the least article whose theft would result in a parajika.  
  Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy  ounce of gold or 
  more, there can be no doubt that he has incurred the full offense.  
  When the item is of lesser value there will be unavoidable doubt--and 
  when there is any doubt concerning a  parajika, the tradition of the 
  Vinaya consistently gives the  bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt:  He 
  is not compelled to disrobe.  A basic principle operating throughout 
  the Vinaya is that it is better to risk letting an offender go 
  unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.
  
  There is a second advantage to the V/Sub-commentary's method of 
  calculation:  its precision and clarity.  Some people have 
  recom-mended adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself--that 
  if the theft would result in flogging, imprisonment or banishment by 
  the authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would 
  consti-tute a parajika--but this standard creates more problems than 
  it would solve.  In most countries the sentence is largely at the 
  discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value is only 
  one among many taken into account when determining the penalty.  This 
  opens a whole Pandora's box of issues, many of which have nothing to 
  do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken the judge's mood, his 
  social philosophy, his religious background and so forth--issues that 
  the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of how to 
  determine the penalty for a theft. 
  
  Thus the V/Sub-commentary's method of calculation has the benefits 
  that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries 
  between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it 
  involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and--as 
  noted above--it draws the line at a value above which there can be no 
  doubt that the penalty is a parajika.
  
  If a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the values 
  of the different items are added together to determine the severity of 
  the offense only if they were stolen as part of a  single plan or 
  intention.  If they are stolen as a result of separate intentions, 
  each act of stealing is treated as a  separate offense whose severity 
  depends on the value of the  individual item(s) stolen in that act.  
  This point is best explained with examples:
  
  In a case given in the Vinita Vatthu, a bhikkhu decides to steal a 
  spoonful of ghee from a jar.  After swallowing the spoonful, he 
  decides to steal one more.  After that he decides to steal another, 
  and so on until he has finished the jar.  Since each spoonful was 
  stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs 
  several offenses -- probably dukkatas --  each appropriate to the 
  theft of one spoonful of ghee.
  
  If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to build 
  himself a hut, and then steals a plank from here and a  rafter from 
  there, taking lumber over many days at different places from various 
  owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total value of 
  all the lumber stolen, since he took al the pieces of wood as a 
  consequence of one prior plan.        
  
  Derived  offenses.   If a bhikkhu tries to steal an article that would 
  be grounds for a parajika but does not succeed--e.g. he is going to 
  steal a book from a shelf, but before he can remove it from its place 
  on the shelf he hears someone approaching and so walks off without 
  taking it--he commits a lighter offense in accordance with the effort 
  made.  Offenses of this sort are called offenses committed in the 
  pubbayoga or preliminary steps.  In the case of stealing, they are 
  determined as follows:
  
   Inanimate moveable objects:  If the article is made to budge 
  slightly, but is not moved completely from its base, or from some but 
  not all of its bases--thullaccaya.  All actions prior to this, 
  beginning with the act of walking towards the object with intent to 
  steal it-- dukkata.
  
  Animals:  If in driving the animal along the bhikkhu gets it to move 
  its front feet--thullaccaya.  All actions prior to this--dukkata.
  
  Immovable objects and articles placed in trust:  If the bhikkhu 
  creates doubt in the mind of the owner as to whether he will deprive 
  him or her of the property in question--thullaccaya.  All actions 
  prior to this--dukkata.
  
  Immovable objects in the secondary sense (e.g., a tree):  If with one 
  more blow of the ax the tree will fall--thullaccaya.  All actions 
  prior to this--dukkata, unless (according to the Vinaya Mukha) there 
  is a training rule imposing a higher penalty, such as the pacittiya 
  rule concerning injury to plant life.
  
  For ease of remembrance, if the bhikkhu is one step away  from taking 
  the object, he incurs a thullaccaya; if he does not go that far, he 
  incurs a dukkata.
  
  In offenses of this sort, when a heavier offense is  committed, only 
  that offense is counted, and the preceding lighter offenses are 
  null-ified.  For example, in the case mentioned above, if the bhikkhu 
  trying to steal the book simply touches it, he incurs a string of 
  dukkatas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of 
  it.  If he budges the  book slightly but not so much as to move it 
  completely from its spot, the dukkatas are nullified and replaced with 
  a  thullaccaya.  If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the  
  thullaccaya and replaces it with a parajika.
  
  Shared responsibility.  A bhikkhu may commit an offense not only if he 
  himself steals an object, but also if instigates another to steal.  
  The offenses involved in working up to the crime are as follows:
  
  If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to steal an object that would be 
  grounds for a parajika, he incurs a dukkata.  If the  accomplice 
  agrees, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya.  Once the  accomplice 
  succeeds in taking the object as instructed--whether or not he gets 
  away with it, and whether or not he shares it with the instigator--the 
  instigator incurs a parajika.  If the accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too 
  incurs a parajika.
  
  If the object to be taken is grounds for a thullaccaya or a  dukkata, 
  the only offenses incurred prior to the actual theft would be 
  dukkatas.  
  
  If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions--e.g., if 
  the accomplice, instead of taking the book specified by the 
  instigator, takes something else instead, or if he is told to take it 
  in the after-noon but instead takes it in the morning--the instigator 
  incurs only the offenses for proposing the theft and persuading the 
  accomplice, and not the offense for the theft itself.  The same holds 
  true if the instigator rescinds his order before the theft takes 
  place, but the  accomplice goes ahead and takes the object anyway.
  
  According to the Commentary, an instigator who wishes to call off the 
  theft before it is carried out, but who for one reason or another 
  cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the full 
  penalty for the completed theft.
  
  If there is a chain of command--e.g. Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to 
  tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft--then once D 
  takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming from 
  the theft.  If there is any confusion in the chain of command--e.g., 
  Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly--neither A nor C 
  incurs the penalty for the  theft itself.
  
  If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft but only one of them does 
  the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft.  
  Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five 
  masaka but which when shared among them yield shares worth less than 
  five masaka each, all incur a parajika. 
  
  Special cases.  As mentioned above, the notion of stealing  covers a 
  wide variety of actions.  The texts deal with a number of actions that 
  border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule and some of 
  them not.
  
  Belongings of the Sangha.  According to the Commentary to Nissaggiya 
  Pacittiya 30, an item belongs to the Sangha when donors, intending for 
  it to be Sangha property, offer it to one  or more bhikkhus 
  representing the Sangha, and those bhikkhus receive it, although not 
  necessarily into their hands.  Sangha property thus counts as "what is 
  not given" as far as individual bhikkhus are con-cerned, for it has an 
  owner--the Sangha of all times and places--and is guarded by the 
  individual Community of bhikkhus. 
  
  Sangha property is divided into two sorts: light (lahubhanda) and 
  heavy (garubhanda).  Light property includes such things as robes, 
  bowls, medicine and food.  Heavy property includes such things as 
  monastery land, buildings and furnishings.  The Buddha gave 
  permis-sion for individual Communities to appoint certain of their 
  members to be officials responsible for the proper use of Sangha 
  property.  The officials responsible for light property are to 
  distribute it among the  members of the Community, following set 
  procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair.  Once an 
  individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his 
  own and use it as he sees fit.
  
  In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are  responsible 
  for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the  Community, but 
  the individual bhikkhus who are allowed to use it  may not regard it 
  as their own personal property.  This is an  important point.  At 
  most, such items may be taken on loan or exchanged--with the approval 
  of the Community--for other heavy property of equal value.  A bhikkhu 
  who gives such items  away to anyone--ordained or not--perceiving it 
  as his to give, commits a thullaccaya, no matter what the value of the 
  object.  Of course, if he knows that it is not his to give or take, 
  then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the offense for 
  stealing.
  
  The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy 
  property of the Sangha.  In the origin story to Parajika 4, he cites 
  the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, 
  gives that person some of the Sangha's heavy property.  Such a 
  bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.
  
  A bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Sangha donated for use in a 
  particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkata.  If he 
  takes it on loan, he commits no offense.
  
  Receiving stolen goods.  Accepting a gift of goods or purchasing them 
  very cheaply knowing that they were stolen, would in Western criminal 
  law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself.  However, neither 
  the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case.  The closest they 
  come is in the Vinita Vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus 
  fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it was not his to 
  give.  There was no offense for the bhikkhus.  Thus the implication is 
  that there is no offense for receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, 
  although a bhikkhu who does so would not be exempt from the civil law 
  and the consequent proceedings, in the course of which the Community 
  would probably urge him to disrobe.  (In Thailand, the civil law 
  empowers the police to force a bhikkhu to disrobe if he is charged 
  with a criminal case.)
  
  Destroying property.  The Commentary maintains that a bhikkhu who 
  knowingly destroys another's property must compensate the owner--if 
  the owner demands it--or else face the penalty for stealing.  It goes 
  on to say that the same conditions apply to a bhikkhu who borrows or 
  looks after something that then gets lost or destroyed through his 
  negligence; or who takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was 
  discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.  
  
  In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following the 
  civil law of its day, for the Canon gives it no support whatsoever.  
  The Vinita Vatthu mentions a case in which a bhikkhu knowingly sets 
  fire to a field of grass (which in those days would have been worth 
  more than five masaka), and yet the penalty is a dukkata.  In cases 
  where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, there is no 
  offense at all.  Of course, in all cases of this sort it would be a 
  wise policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by 
  no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal to do so.  
  The Canon places only one responsibility on such a bhikkhu--to 
  apologize to the owner (see Cv.I.18-20).  If he doesn't apologize, the 
  Community, if it sees fit, can force him to.  Beyond that, though, the 
  Canon does not require that he make any material compensation; and 
  since the Commentary clearly contradicts the Canon on this point, its 
  assertions would seem to be invalid. 
  
  Court actions.  As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an 
  unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the final 
  court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a parajika.  The 
  Commentary to the Bhikkhuni's Sanghadisesa 1, however, states that 
  even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone--defamed, 
  physically injured, robbed, etc.--and then tries to take a just court 
  action against the guilty party, then if the bhikkhu wins he commits a 
  parajika.  Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no 
  support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya Mukha points out, its 
  assertion cannot stand.  However, the training of a bhikkhu requires 
  that he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking 
  after the state of his mind rather than for compensation in physical 
  or material things. 
  
  There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to 
  give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in accordance with 
  the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the outcome for the 
  others involved.
  
  Deceit.  If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive  another person 
  into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not as a case 
  of stealing--since, after all, the item is given to him--but rather as 
  a case of lying.  If the lie involves making false claims to superior 
  meditative attainments, it is treated under Parajika 4, below.  
  Otherwise it is treated  under Pacittiya 1, the general rule against 
  lying.  The Vinita Vatthu gives two examples:
  
  During a distribution of requisites among the Sangha, a  bhikkhu asks 
  for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu.
  
  A bhikkhu approaches his teacher's lay supporter and asks  for 
  medicines, saying that they will be for his teacher, although  he 
  actually has no intention of giving the medicines to the teacher and 
  plans to use them himself instead.      
  
  In both of these cases, the penalty is a pacittiya for lying.
  
  Compassion.  The Vinita Vatthu contains a case in which a  bhikkhu, 
  out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a  hunter's snare.  He 
  incurs no offense.
  
  In another case, a bhikkhu with psychic powers uses them to retrieve a 
  pair of kidnapped children.  The Buddha states that no offense was 
  incurred because such a thing was in the province of those with 
  psychic power.  The Vinaya Mukha, in discussing this case, takes it as 
  a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a stolen article to 
  its legal owner, there is no offense.  The Buddha's state-ment, 
  though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without psychic 
  powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of this sort.  
  If a bhikkhu happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen goods, 
  kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees 
  fit, and let them handle the situation themselves. 
  
  Taking articles from undecomposed corpses.  In the early  days of the 
  Sangha, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from dis-carded 
  cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses laid in 
  charnel grounds.  (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth before 
  using it themselves.)  However, they were not to take cloth from 
  undecomposed bodies, and this was for a reason.
  
  "At one time a certain bhikkhu going to the charnel ground took hold 
  of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed.  And the spirit of 
  the dead one was dwelling in the body.  It said to the bhikkhu, 
  'Honored sir, don't take hold of my cloak.'  The bhikkhu, paying it no 
  attention, went off (with the cloak).  The body, arising, followed 
  closely on the heels of the bhikkhu until the bhikkhu, entering the 
  vihara, closed the door and the body fell down right there."  
  
  The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for 
  ourselves the bhikkhu's state of mind while being chased by the body, 
  and his friends' reaction to the event.  As is usual with the stories 
  in the Vibhanga, the more outrageous the event, the more 
  matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the 
  understatement. 
  
  At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a 
  dukkata penalty for taking cloth from an undecomposed body--which, 
  according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm. 
  
  Modern cases.  The modern world contains many forms of  ownership and 
  monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, and so 
  contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then as well.  Here 
  are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of ways in which 
  the standards of this rule might be applied to modern situations.
  
   Breach of copyright.  The international standards for copyright 
  advocated by UNESCO state that breach of copyright is tantamount to 
  theft.  They go on to state, however, that if one duplicates articles, 
  books, cassette tapes or video tapes for private use, for study or for 
  non-profit distribution, one may copy as much as one likes.  In some 
  countries, however, one is allowed to copy only small portions of 
  copyrighted material for such purposes, although exactly how small is 
  small is only vaguely defined. Thus, as local copyright laws do not 
  always adopt the UNESCO standard, a bhikkhu should check with the law 
  before copying anything.  In particular, the agreements covering the 
  copying of commercial computer software usually do not permit the 
  owner to give copies of the software to anyone for any reason, and 
  limit the number of copies one may make for one's own use.  One should 
  follow such agreements to the letter. 
  
  Credit cards.  The theft of a credit card would of course be an 
  offense.  The seriousness of the offense would be determined by how 
  much the owner would have to pay to replace the stolen card.  
  Nissaggiya Pacittiya 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit 
  card to buy anything, even if the card were his to use, although a 
  bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably 
  not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use 
  it.  At any rate, each use of a stolen card would also count as a 
  theft, the seriousness of which would be calculated in line with the 
  principle of the "prior plan" mentioned above.
  
  Long distance telephone calls.  Unauthorized use of a telephone to 
  place long distance calls would also count as a theft, and again the 
  seriousness of the offense would be calculated in light of the 
  principle of the prior plan.
  
  Tax evasion.  If a bhikkhu intentionally does not pay a tax to which 
  he is subject--say, on an inheritance he receives--he is guilty of a 
  theft, which would occur on the deadline for payment of the tax.  Of 
  course, a bhikkhu who fails to pay a tax out of ignorance would not be 
  guilty of an offense.
  
  Exchanging currency on the black market is also a form of tax evasion 
  in countries where there is a tax on currency exchange, so a bhikkhu 
  in such a country who directs his steward to make such an exchange 
  would be guilty of a theft.  If, however, the steward on his own 
  initiative exchanges money on the black market for use in the 
  bhikkhu's account, the bhikkhu commits no offense.
  
  Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more 
  is a parajika offense.
  
   
  
                                 * * *
  
  
  
  3.Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive a human being of life, or 
  search for an assassin for him, or praise the advantages of death or 
  incite him to die (thus): "My good man, what use is this wretched, 
  miserable life to you?  Death would be better for you than life," or 
  with such thoughts in mind, such intentions in mind, should in various 
  ways praise the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is 
  defeated and no longer in communion.
  
  This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being is 
  best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be met for 
  there to be a parajika offense.
  
  1. Object:  a human being, which according to the  Vibhanga includes 
  human fetuses as well, counting from the time conscious-ness first 
  arises in the womb immediately after conception.
  
  2. Intention:  knowingly, consciously, deliberately and purposefully 
  wanting to cause that person's death.  "Knowingly" also includes the 
  factor of 
  
  3.  Perception:  perceiving the person as a living being.
  
  4. Effort:  whatever one does with the purpose of causing that person 
  to die.
  
  5. Result:  the person dies as the result of one's act.
  
  
  
  Object.  The Vibhanga defines a human being as a person "from the time 
  consciousness first becomes manifest in a mother's womb, until the 
  time of death."  It follows from this that a bhikkhu who intentionally 
  causes an abortion--by arranging for the operation, supplying the 
  medicines or by giving advice that results in an abortion--incurs a 
  parajika.  A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of 
  contraception that works after conception has taken place would be 
  guilty of a parajika if she were to follow his advice.
  
  There is a series of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which  bhikkhus 
  provide medicines for women seeking an abortion, followed by two cases 
  in which a bhikkhu provides medicines to a barren woman who wants to 
  become fertile, and to a fertile woman who wants to become barren.  In 
  neither of these two latter cases does anyone die, but in both cases 
  the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata.  From this, the Commentary infers that 
  bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people, an inference 
  supported by the Vibhanga to Sanghadisesa 13.  (The Commentary, 
  though, gives a number of exceptions to this ruling.  See the 
  discussion under Sanghadisesa 13.)
  
  The parajika offense is for killing another human being aside from 
  oneself.  A bhikkhu who attempts suicide incurs a dukkata. 
  
  A bhikkhu who kills a "non-human being"--a yakkha, naga or peta--or a 
  devata (this is in the Commentary) incurs a thullaccaya.  According to 
  the Commentary, when a spirit possesses a human being or animal, it 
  can be exorcised in either of two ways.  The first is to command it to 
  leave:  This causes no injury to the spirit, and results in no 
  offense.  The second is to make a doll out of flour paste or clay, and 
  then cut off various parts of it.  If one cuts off its hands and feet 
  the spirit will lose its hands and feet.  If one cuts off its head, 
  the spirit will die, and this is grounds for a thullaccaya.
  
  A bhikkhu who intentionally kills a common animal incurs a pacittiya.
  
  Intention & perception.  The Vibhanga defines intentionally as "having 
  made the decision knowingly, consciously and purposefully."  According 
  to the Commentary, "having made the decision" refers to the moment 
  when one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act.  Knowingly 
  means that one knows that, "This is a living being."  Consciously 
  means that one is aware that one's action is depriving the living 
  being of life.  Purposefully means that one's purpose in acting is to 
  murder.  Whether one is motivated by compassion, hatred or 
  indifference is irrelevant as far as the offense is concerned.
  
      All of the above sub-factors must be present for the factors of 
  intention and perception under this rule to be fulfilled.  Thus there 
  is no offense for a bhikkhu who causes a death--
  
  accidentally--e.g., accidentally dropping a rock that kills a person 
  standing below; or toying with a gun, trying to decide whether or not 
  to kill the person, and the gun accidentally goes off before he can 
  make up his mind;
  
   not knowing that a living being was there--e.g., placing a heavy load 
  on a pile of cloth without realizing that a person was lying 
  underneath it; 
  
  not conscious that his action is causing death--e.g., by unwittingly 
  giving poisoned food to another bhikkhu who eats it and dies; 
  
  or when his actions are motivated by a purpose other than that of 
  causing death--e.g., giving medicine to a fellow bhikkhu, sincerely 
  trying to help cure him, but the sick bhikkhu chokes on the medicine 
  and dies.
  
  One aspect of the Commentary's definition of "knowingly" is worth 
  noting here:  One does not need to know that the living being  is a 
  human being there for the factor of intention to be fulfilled.  Thus 
  if one hears a noise in the dark and, thinking it to be a wild animal, 
  shoots at it with intent to kill, then if it turns out to be a human 
  being who dies from the gunshot wound, one has committed a parajika.
  
  The Vinita Vatthu contains an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a 
  friend as a guinea pig for testing poison.  The friend  dies, and the 
  bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya.  The Commentary explains this by 
  distinguishing two types of test: one to see if a particular poison is 
  strong enough to kill a person; the other, to see if a particular 
  person is strong enough to survive the poison.  In either of these 
  cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya whether or not the victim 
  dies.  If though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the desire 
  that it cause that person's death, he incurs a parajika if the victim 
  dies, and a thullaccaya if not.       
  
  Effort.  This rule covers three types of effort:  taking life, 
  assisting a murderer or suicide, and describing the advantages of 
  death to a person in hopes that he/she will give up the will to live. 
  
  Taking life.  According to the Commentary, the act of taking life has 
  four components:  a living being; the taking of life motivated by the 
  intention to kill, as discussed above; the person taking life; and the 
  effort to take life.  All of this sounds obvious enough, but it has 
  important implications that we will discuss below.
  
  The Commentary lists six means by which one may make the effort to 
  take life:
  
  a. One's own person.  This includes using not only one's hands or 
  feet, but also such weapons as knives, sticks, clubs, etc.
  
  b. Throwing.  Hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun, etc.
  
  c. Stationary devices.  Setting a trap, placing poison in food, etc.  
  The Vibhanga includes a number of unusual cases in which a bhikkhu 
  arranges a terrible sight, sound, etc. to frighten a person to death, 
  or a beautiful, "heart-stirring" sight or sound to attract a person 
  who will then pine away to death when the sight or sound fades.  These 
  instances would probably come under this category, although if the 
  bhikkhu creates the sight or sound using his psychic powers, they 
  would come under (e), below.
  
  d. Magical formulae.  Calling on malevolent spirits to bring about a 
  person's death, using voodoo, etc.
  
  e. Psychic powers.  Using the "evil eye" or other similar powers.
  
   f. Commanding.  Telling another person to do something that will 
  result in death.  This is the broadest of the categories, and can 
  include recommendations and the use of one's rhetorical powers to 
  inspire the death of a person without giving any express commands.  A 
  few examples:
  
  Telling A to kill B.  The way in which a bhikkhu is penalized for 
  inciting another person to kill may be inferred from the discussion 
  under the preceding rule.  The Commentary to this rule goes into great 
  detail concerning the six ways the command to kill can be specified:  
  the object [the person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon 
  to use, the action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g. "Stab him 
  in the neck"], and the position the victim should be in [sitting, 
  standing, lying down] when the act is to be done.  If the instigator 
  specifies any of these things, and yet the person following his orders 
  does not carry them out to the letter, the instigator does not incur 
  the penalty for the actual murder.  For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his 
  student to kill B while B is sitting in meditation at midnight.  The 
  student gets into B's room at midnight, only to find B asleep in bed, 
  which is where he kills him.  Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the 
  thullaccaya for convincing his student to accept the command.   
  
  Inciting A to kill B.  The Commentary includes a case of a socially 
  active bhikkhu who tells people,  "In such-and-such a place a bandit 
  is staying.  Whoever cuts off his head will receive great honor from 
  the King."  If any of the bhikkhu's listeners kills the bandit as a 
  result of his instigation, the bhikkhu incurs a parajika.
  
  Recommending suicide.  This includes not only telling a person to 
  commit suicide, but also giving advice--whether asked or not--to a 
  would-be suicide on the best ways to commit the act.   
  
  Recommending means of euthanasia.  The Vinita Vatthu includes a case 
  of a criminal who has just been punished by having his hands and feet 
  cut off.  A bhikkhu asks the man's relatives, "Do you want him to die? 
  Then make him drink buttermilk."  The relatives follow the bhikkhu's 
  recommendation, the man dies, and the bhikkhu incurs a parajika.
  
  Recommending means of capital punishment.  Again from the Vinita 
  Vatthu:  A bhikkhu advises an executioner to kill his victims 
  mercifully with a single blow, rather than torturing them.  The 
  executioner follows his advice, and the bhikkhu incurs  a parajika.  
  This judgment indicates that a bhikkhu should not involve himself in 
  matters of this sort, no matter how humane his intentions.  According 
  to the Vinita Vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not follow 
  the bhikkhu's advice, and then kills his victims as he pleases, the 
  bhikkhu incurs no penalty.  The  Commentary adds that if the 
  executioner tries to follow the bhikkhu's advice, and yet needs more 
  than one blow to do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya.  As we 
  have mentioned, though, the best course is to leave matters of this 
  sort to the laity.
  
  Telling a person to go to a certain place, hoping that he/she will die 
  of the dangers there.
  
  Negligence.  The Commentary's analysis of the act of taking life, in 
  which the effort to take life must be a component factor, means that 
  "non-action" or negligence does not come under this rule, even when 
  motivated by the desire to have the victim die.  Thus a bhikkhu who 
  makes no effort to artificially prolong the life of a brain-damaged 
  friend, preferring that he die rather than lead a vegetable-like 
  existence, would incur no offense even if the friend then dies.  
  
  However, if the bhikkhu were to advise a doctor to make no effort to 
  prolong the friend's life, this would come under the category of 
  "command", and if the friend were to die as a result of the doctor's 
  following the bhikkhu's advice, the penalty would be a parajika.    
  
  Assisting a murderer or suicide.  A bhikkhu may commit an offense not 
  only by using any of the six above-mentioned means of taking life, but 
  also by intentionally assisting anyone who uses any of them to commit 
  a murder or a suicide.  This is how the Vibhanga explains the phrase, 
  "search for an assassin" in the rule.  The act of assisting includes 
  not only finding an assassin, but also procuring weapons for the 
  would-be murderer or suicide.
  
  Getting a person to give up the will to live.  The third type of act 
  covered by this rule is speaking to a person of the miseries of life 
  or the bliss of dying and going to heaven, in hopes that he/she will 
  take the cue and either commit suicide or simply pine away to death.
  
  Expressing a wish.  According to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who expresses 
  an idle wish that so-and-so be murdered would incur a dukkata, whether 
  or not he was overheard.  If, however, the bhikkhu's purpose in 
  expressing the wish is that his listener take him up on it and commit 
  the murder, his action would come under the factor of "command", 
  mentioned above. 
  
  Result.  If a bhikkhu intentionally tries to cause the death of a 
  person in any of the above ways, and the person actually dies as a 
  result, the bhikkhu incurs a parajika.  This holds even if the person 
  does not die immediately, but dies later, say, from complications 
  arising from a wound caused by the bhikkhu's actions.  If the person 
  does not die, but experiences pain or injury as a result of the 
  bhikkhu's efforts, the penalty is a thullaccaya.  If the bhikkhu's 
  efforts result in neither pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkata for 
  each separate action leading up to the attempt on the person's life or 
  the attempt to make the person give up the will to live.  
  
  If a bhikkhu intends simply to injure the victim or cause him/her 
  pain, and yet the victim dies as a result of the bhikkhu's action, the 
  case is treated under Pacittiya 74.  
  
  There is an apparent contradiction in the Vinita Vatthu concerning the 
  penalty for a bhikkhu who tries to kill one person but ends up killing 
  another instead.  In one passage, it says that a bhikkhu who means to 
  kill X but kills Y instead incurs a  parajika.  In another passage, it 
  tells of a bhikkhu who gives medicine to a woman who wants to commit 
  an abortion near the end of a full-term pregnancy.  The woman takes 
  the medicine, but instead of the fetus' aborting, the woman dies and 
  the infant survives.  In this case, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya,  
  presumably for the pain he caused the infant.  
  
  The Commentary tries to resolve this contradiction with an 
  illus-tration:  A bhikkhu with a grudge against A decides to ambush 
  him.  He sees B coming down the road and, mistaking him for A, shoots 
  him dead on the spot.  Since his intention was to kill the person he 
  was aiming at, he incurs a parajika.  We can call this a case of 
  mistaken identity.  In cases of this sort, whether the "right" or the 
  "wrong" person dies is of no consequence to the offense.
  
  If, however, the bhikkhu is a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses him 
  and inadvertently kills C instead, he does not incur a parajika, for 
  he did not intend to kill C during any part of his action.  His only 
  penalties are the dukkatas he incurs while preparing for B's murder.
  
  If a bhikkhu means to cause the death of any member of a group, then 
  when any member of the group dies as a result of his efforts, he 
  incurs a parajika.          
  
  Special cases.  The Vinita Vatthu includes three special cases that 
  touch on this rule but inspired the Buddha to formulate separate rules 
  to deal specifically with them:
  
  A bhikkhu, throwing a stone from a precipice in fun, accidentally 
  kills a person standing below--no penalty for the death, but the 
  Buddha imposes a dukkata on the act of throwing a stone in fun from a 
  precipice.
  
  A bhikkhu, hoping to commit suicide, throws himself over a cliff.  He 
  doesn't die, but lands on and kills a hapless basket-maker standing at 
  the foot of the cliff.  Again, no offense for the death, but the 
  Buddha imposes a dukkata on the act of throwing oneself from a high 
  place.
  
  A bhikkhu, sitting down hard on a chair without first checking it 
  carefully, kills a child lying in the chair and covered with a 
  blanket.  Again, no penalty for the death, but the Buddha imposes a 
  dukkata on the act of sitting down without first checking carefully.
  
  Summary:  Intentionally causing the death of a human being, even if it 
  is still a foetus, is a parajika offense.
  
  
  
    * * *
  
  
  
  4. Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, boast of a  superior 
  human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision as present in himself, 
  saying, "Thus do I know; thus do I see," such that regardless of 
  whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, he--being 
  remorseful and desirous of purification--might say, "Friends, not 
  knowing, I said I know; not seeing, I said I see--vainly, falsely, 
  idly," unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and no 
  longer in communion.
  
  All conscious lies are forbidden by the first pacittiya rule, but 
  knowingly to make a false claim to a superior human state is the most 
  heinous lie a bhikkhu can tell, and so here it is given its own rule 
  and the heaviest possible penalty.
  
  The seriousness with which the Buddha regarded a breach of this 
  training rule is indicated by his statements to the original 
  instigators:
  
  "You misguided men, how can you for the sake of your  stomachs speak 
  praise of one another's superior human states to householders?  It 
  would be better for you that your bellies be slashed open with a sharp 
  butcher's knife than that you should for the sake of your stomachs 
  speak praise of one another's superior human states to householders.  
  Why is that?  For that reason you would undergo death or death-like 
  suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the 
  body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad bourn, the abyss, 
  purgatory.  But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the 
  body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad bourn, the abyss, 
  purgatory....  Bhikkhus, in this world with its gods, maras and 
  brahmas, its generations with priests and contemplatives, princes and 
  men, this is the ultimate great thief:  he who claims an unfactual, 
  non-existent superior human state.  Why is that?  You have consumed 
  the nation's almsfood through theft."
  
  Superior human states.  The Vibhanga lists a large number of superior 
  human states, which the Commentary classifies into two broad 
  categories: mahaggata dhamma, those related to the practice of 
  meditative absorption; and lokuttara dhamma, those related to the 
  absolute eradication of the mental fetters that bind the mind to the 
  cycle of rebirth.
  
  a. Meditative absorption--the Pali term is jhana--is of  two major 
  sorts:  absorption in a physical object or sensation (rupa jhana) and 
  absorption in a non-physical object or sensation (arupa jhana).  Both 
  contain four levels, and are described in the discourses (e.g., D.2) 
  as follows:
  
  "The bhikkhu--quite withdrawn from sensual pleasure, withdrawn from 
  unwholesome (mental) qualities--enters and remains in the first jhana:  
  rapture and pleasure born from  withdrawal, accompanied by directed 
  thought and evaluation.  He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills 
  this very body with the rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal....
  
  "And furthermore, with the stilling of directed thought and 
  evaluation, he enters and remains in the second jhana:  rapture and 
  pleasure born of composure, one-pointedness of awareness free from 
  directed thought and evaluation-- internal assurance.  He permeates 
  and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and 
  pleasure born of composure....
  
  "And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains in 
  equanimity, mindful and fully aware, and physically sensitive of 
  pleasure.  He enters and remains in the third jhana, and of him the 
  Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous and mindful, he has a pleasurable 
  abiding.'  He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very 
  body with the pleasure divested of rapture....
  
  "And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain--as with 
  the earlier disappearance of elation and sorrow--he enters and remains 
  in the fourth jhana:  purity of equanimity and mindfulness, neither 
  pleasure nor pain.  He sits permeating the body with a pure, bright 
  awareness, so that nothing of his entire body is unpervaded by pure 
  bright  awareness."
  
  The four levels of arupa jhana are based on the fourth level of rupa 
  jhana.
  
  "With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, and 
  the passing away of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding 
  perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite space', one enters and 
  remains in the sphere of the infinitude of space....
  
  "With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of 
  space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness', one enters and remains in 
  the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness....
  
  "With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of 
  consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' one enters and remains in 
  the sphere of nothingness....
  
  "With the complete transcending of the sphere of nothingness, one 
  enters and remains in the sphere of neither perception nor 
  non-perception." (D.15)
  
  The Vibhanga mentions only the four rupa jhanas in its list of 
  superior human states, but as the four arupa jhanas are based on the 
  fourth rupa jhana, the Commentary includes them in the list as well.
  
  In addition to these states of absorption themselves, the category of 
  mahaggata dhamma also includes the intuitive powers (abhinna) that can 
  arise from them:
  
  iddhividhi--the ability to manifest one or more images of  oneself, to 
  appear in a different bodily form, to create a "mind- made" (astral) 
  body, to pass through solid matter, etc.
  
  dibbasota--clairaudience, enabling one to hear sounds both heavenly 
  and human, far and near.
  
  cetopariyanana--the ability to read the minds of other living beings.
  
  dibbacakkhu--clairvoyance, the ability to see beings in other realms 
  of being, and particular to see them pass from death in one level to 
  rebirth in another.
  
  pubbenivasanussati--the ability to remember previous lives.
  
  There are other occult abilities that are not based on jhana, and for 
  this reason do not count as mahaggata dhamma:  such things as 
  divination, giving protective charms, casting malevolent spells, 
  psychic healing, practicing as a medium, etc.  These and other similar 
  activities are listed in the discourses as "tiracchana vijja", bestial 
  knowledge, which as the name implies is far removed from superior 
  human states.
  
  b. Lokuttara dhamma, in its fullest sense, refers to the  series of 
  mental states, called paths and fruitions, in which the fetters that 
  bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth are  eradicated; and to the 
  ultimate state of nibbana, or liberation.
  
  The paths and fruitions occur in four pairs.  In the first  pair, the 
  path to and fruition of stream-entry, three fetters are  abandoned:  
  self-identity views (sakkaya-ditthi), uncertainty  (vicikiccha) and 
  attachment to precepts and practices (silabbata-paramasa).  In the 
  second pair, the path to and fruition of once-returning, two 
  additional fetters--sensual passion (kama-raga) and irritation 
  (patigha) are weakened, only to be abandoned fully in the third pair, 
  the path to and fruition of non-returning.  In the fourth pair, the 
  path to and fruition of arahantship, a final set of five additional 
  fetters is abandoned:  rupa-raga--passion for physical phenomena 
  (e.g., the objects of rupa jhana); arupa-raga--passion for 
  non-physical phenomena (e.g., the objects of arupa jhana); 
  mana--conceit; uddhacca--restlessness; and avijja--unawareness.  With 
  the cutting of this last set of fetters, all bonds with the cycle of 
  rebirth are cut for good, and the mind attains nibbana.
  
  The term nibbana literally means extinguishing, like a fire.  The 
  commentarial literature (Vism.VIII,247), derives the word 
  etymologi-cally from nir, a negative prefix, and vana, or binding.  
  Thus it means unbinding or liberation.  In the physics of the Buddha's 
  time, fire as it burned was said to be in a state of agitation, 
  dependence, attachment and entrapment--both clinging to and 
  constrained by its sustenance or fuel.   Extinguished, it was said to 
  become calm, independent and unattached.  It let go of its sustenance 
  and was released.  In the mind's extinguishing, or unbinding, a 
  parallel change occurs.
  
  Nibbana is one; the paths and their fruitions, eight.  Thus there are 
  nine lokuttara dhammas.  
  
  Aside from jhana, the states mentioned in the Vibhanga--such as the 
  destruction of the mental pollutants (asava), the signless 
  libera-tion, the desireless liberation, the liberation of emptiness 
  and so forth--are either synonymous with these transcendent states or, 
  as with the "wings" of Awakening (bodhi-pakkhiya dhamma), conjoined 
  with them.
  
  The full offense under this rule has five factors:
  
  1) Effort:  One makes a direct claim
  
  2) Object:  to a superior human state
  
  3) Perception:  that one perceives as not present in oneself.
  
  4) Intention:  One's intention is to misrepresent the truth.
  
  5) Result:  One's listener understands what one is saying.
  
  Effort.  To make a direct claim means to say outright that one has 
  attained a superior human state, saying such things as, "I have 
  attained the first jhana," "I have seen the heavenly realms," "I know 
  my pre-vious lifetimes," etc.  Outright claims, here, include not only 
  spoken statements, but also written statements and physical gestures.  
  An example of a claim by gesture occurs in the Vibhanga:  A group of 
  bhikkhus make an agreement that the first to set out from their 
  dwell-ing would, by that very gesture, be known to the rest as an 
  arahant.  One of the group, who was not an arahant but wanted to be 
  regarded as one, set out first from the dwelling and was soon known to 
  the rest as an ex-bhikkhu from having committed a parajika.
  
  Indirect claims.  An indirect claim to a superior human state is not 
  grounds for a parajika.  If it is a deliberate lie, it is at most 
  grounds for a thullaccaya.  Such claims, which contain an uncertainty 
  in their wording even though the listener may feel no uncertainty in 
  under-standing their import, may be uncertain in one of two ways:  
  uncertain as to the person and uncertain as to the attainment.
  
  The Vinita Vatthu contains several examples of the first sort:  a 
  bhikkhu states that whoever lives in a particular dwelling is an 
  arahant, the dwelling being the one where he lives; a bhikkhu saying 
  that all the disciples of his teacher are arahants, and so forth.  
  
  There is only one example in the Vinita Vatthu of a bhikkhu who makes 
  a claim "uncertain as to the attainment":  a sick bhikkhu, meaning to 
  deceive the fellow bhikkhus nursing him, says to them, "There is no 
  way that this sickness could be endured by an ordinary person 
  (puthujjana)."
  
  According to the Commentary, if the person to whom such  indirect 
  remarks are directed understands them, the penalty for the speaker is 
  a thullaccaya.  If he/she does not understand them, the penalty is a 
  dukkata.  The factor of understanding is covered in the section on 
  "Result", below.
  
  Claims about other people.  The original instigators of this rule, 
  instead of each making claims about his own attainments, made false 
  claims about each others' attainments.  This case is not men-tioned in 
  the Vibhanga or the commentaries, and so is not an offense under this 
  rule, but it would come under Pacittiya 1.
  
  Perception.  Claiming a superior human state that one mistakenly 
  thinks one has achieved is no offense under this rule, although if 
  addressed to a lay person the claim would come under Pacittiya 8.  The 
  same holds for a claim that is actually true.
  
  If, however, a bhikkhu has attained a superior human state without 
  realizing it, and then claims to have attained the state, thinking his 
  statement to be a lie, he incurs the full offense under this rule.
  
  Intention.  To fall under this rule, a claim to have attained any of 
  these superior human states must be a deliberate lie.  "Deliberate 
  lying", according to the Commentary, requires the arising of the 
  intention to misrepresent the truth just prior to, and motivating, the 
  actual statement.  When the intention to misrepresent the truth is 
  absent, the statement does not come under this rule.  Examples would 
  include
  
  --meaning to say one thing, but accidentally saying another which 
  comes out as a claim to a superior human state; and
  
  --innocently making a statement that someone else misconstrues to be a 
  claim to a superior human state.  
  
  Neither of these cases would involve an offense.
  
  Equivocation.  It is not uncommon for a bhikkhu to be put on the spot 
  by lay people asking him point-blank about his attainments, and for 
  him to respond by equivocating.  The Vinita Vatthu contains a number 
  of examples of this sort.  In one of them, the bhikkhu responds by 
  saying, "I have attained a state attainable through the exertion of 
  effort," which of course could mean almost anything.  Because his 
  purpose was simply to avoid the question, he incurred no offense.  Had 
  he meant the statement as an indirect claim, he would have incurred a 
  thullaccaya.
  
  Result.  The Vibhanga, in discussing an obscure case, states that when 
  the listener understands a deliberate lie claiming a superior human 
  state, the bhikkhu making the claim incurs a parajika.  If the 
  listener does not understand, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya.  The 
  Vibhanga mentions this condition only in the context of a peculiar 
  lie--one in which the speaker intends to lie saying one thing, but 
  actually states another lie--but the Commentary generalizes from this 
  case to say that this condition applies to all cases covered by this 
  rule.  Its explanations run as follows:
  
  "Understanding", here, means simply that the listener hears the 
  statement clearly enough to know that it is a claim.  Whether or not 
  he/she understands the names for the states claimed--jhana, 
  clairvoyance, clairaudience or whatever--is not an issue here.  Also, 
  whether or not he/she believes the statement to be true is irrelevant 
  as far as the offense is concerned.  If the listener to whom the 
  remarks are directed does not understand them, but a passer-by does, 
  the penalty is still a parajika.
  
  If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu clearly enough to catch all 
  he says, the penalty is a thullaccaya.  If the listener at first has 
  some doubt as to what the bhikkhu said, but later realizes that it was 
  a claim to a superior human state, the offense is still a thullaccaya.  
  If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu at all, the offense is a 
  dukkata.
  
  According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata for a bhikkhu sitting in 
  solitude who states a deliberate lie claiming a superior human state, 
  and another dukkata if he is overheard by a devata.  The Commentary 
  adds the same penalty applies if he is overheard by a non-human being 
  or a common animal.
  
  Thus, to incur a parajika, the outright claim to a superior human  
  state must be a deliberate lie and must be heard and understood by a 
  another human being. 
  
  Special cases in the Vibhanga:
  
  A bhikkhu, intending to make a false claim for one superior human 
  state, muddles his words and claims another:  a parajika.  The 
  Com-mentary explains this by noting that all the factors necessary for 
  a parajika offense are present:  the bhikkhu makes a claim based on 
  the intention to tell a deliberate lie and the listener understands 
  the claim.  The fact that the intended claim and actual claim are both 
  superior human states is crucial; the fact that they are different 
  states is not.
  
  In a series of cases, a person speaking with exaggerated faith or 
  politeness addresses bhikkhus of no particular attainment as if they 
  were arahants ("May the arahants come....May the arahants be seated").  
  This puts them in a quandary, and so they ask the Buddha how to behave 
  in such a  situation.  His response:  There is no offense in accepting 
  invitations such as these from a "speaker with faith"--the  point 
  being that there is no offense in coming, sitting, etc., as long as 
  the intention is just to accept the invitation and not to imply a 
  claim.
  
  A bhikkhu, hoping that people will esteem him, engages in special 
  practices--the example given in the Vinita Vatthu is living in the 
  jungle, but from it we can extrapolate to other practices such as long 
  periods of sitting, any of the ascetic (dhutanga) practices, 
  vegetarianism, etc., followed so that others will esteem one.  The 
  penalty:  a dukkata.
  
  Summary:  Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a 
  superior human state is a parajika offense.
  
  
  
  ***
  
  
  
  A bhikkhu who commits an offense against any of these four parajika 
  rules is automatically no longer a bhikkhu.  There is no need for him 
  to go through a formal ceremony of disrobing, for the act of 
  committing the offense is an act of disrobing in and of itself.  Even 
  if he continues to pretend to be a bhikkhu, he does not really count 
  as one; as soon as the facts are known he must be expelled from the 
  Sangha.  He can never again properly ordain as a bhikkhu in this life.  
  If he tries to ordain in a Community that does not know of his 
  offense, his ordination does not count, and he must be expelled as 
  soon as the truth is found out. 
  
  The Commentary, however, states that such an offender may "go forth" 
  as a novice if he wants to, although it is up to the individual 
  Community to consider the circumstances of his offense to decide 
  whether or not it wants to accept him.
  
  Ignorance of these rules does not exempt an offender from the penalty, 
  which is why the Buddha ordered that they be taught to each new 
  bhikkhu as soon as possible after ordination (Mv.I.77).  Because the 
  rules cover a number of cases that are legal in present-day society 
  (e.g., recommending abortion, proving to oneself how supple one has 
  become through yoga by inserting one's penis in one's mouth) or that 
  are common practice among people who see nothing wrong with flirting 
  with the edges of the law (e.g., telling a doctor to turn off a 
  life-support machine for a comatose patient, copying computer 
  soft-ware for a friend, hiding an article subject to customs duties 
  when entering a country), it is especially important to inform each 
  new bhikkhu of the rules' full implications right from the very start.
  
  If a bhikkhu suspects that he has committed a parajika, he should 
  immediately inform a senior bhikkhu well-versed in the rules.  The way 
  the senior bhikkhu should handle the case is illustrated by a case 
  reported in the Commentary to Parajika 2:
  
  Once a king together with an enormous crowd came to worship the Great 
  Stupa at a certain monastery.  One of the crowd was a visiting bhikkhu 
  from the South who was carrying an expensive roll of cloth.  The 
  commotion of the event was so great that the bhikkhu dropped the 
  cloth, was unable to retrieve it and soon gave it up for lost.  One of 
  the resident bhikkhus happened to come across it and, desiring to 
  steal it, quickly put it away before the owner might see it.  
  Eventually, of course, he became tormented by guilt and went to the 
  resident Vinaya expert to admit a parajika and disrobe. 
  
  The Vinaya expert, though, wouldn't let him disrobe until he had found 
  the owner of the cloth and inquired about it more fully.  Eventually, 
  after a long search, he was able to track down the original owner at a 
  monastery in the distant South, who told him that at the time of the 
  theft he had given the cloth up for lost and had abandoned all mental 
  attachment for it.  Thus, as the cloth was ownerless, the resident 
  bhikkhu had incurred not a parajika, but simply a dukkata for the 
  preliminary effort with intention to steal.
  
  This example shows several things:  the great thoroughness with which 
  a senior bhikkhu should investigate a possible parajika, the 
  compassion he should show to the offender, and the fact that the 
  offender should be given the benefit of the doubt wherever possible:  
  He is innocent until the facts prove him guilty. 
  
  Finally, the Commentary concludes its discussion of the parajikas by 
  noticing that there are altogether 24, actual and virtual, in the 
  Vinaya.  They are: 
  
  The four for bhikkhus.
  
  The four additional parajikas for bhikkhunis.
  
  The eleven disqualified types who should not be ordained in the first 
  place.  If they happen to be ordained, their ordination does not 
  count, and once they are found out they must be expelled for life 
  (Mv.I.61-68).  Thus they are virtual parajikas.  They are--
  
       a pandaka (essentially, a eunuch or a person born neuter--see  
            Sanghadisesa 2),
  
       a "non-human" being, such as a naga or yakkha, that can  
                 assume human form,
  
       a hermaphrodite,
  
       a person who poses as a bhikkhu without having been ordained, 
  
       a bhikkhu who has ordained in another sect or religion without  
            first giving up his status as a bhikkhu;
  
       a person who has murdered his father;
  
       a person who has murdered his mother;             
  
       a person who has murdered an arahant;
  
       a person who has sexually violated a bhikkhuni;
  
       a person who has injured a Buddha to the point of causing him  
            to bleed;
  
       a person who has caused a schism in the Sangha.
  
       In addition to the above actual and virtual parajikas, the 
  Commentary gives separate listing to the four "anulomika" (derived) 
  parajikas, which refer to four cases included under Parajika 1:  the 
  bhikkhu with a supple back who sticks his penis in his mouth, the 
  bhikkhu with a long penis who inserts it into his anus, the bhikkhu 
  who performs oral intercourse with someone else, and the bhikkhu who 
  receives anal intercourse.
  
       The 24th Parajika refers to the case of a bhikkhuni who, taking 
  up the role of a housewife, goes to live in a lay person's household.