The Buddhist conceptions of "subject" and "obejct"
and their moral implications
By David J. Kalupahana
Philosophy East
ans West
Volume 38, no.3
July 1988
P.290-306
(C) by University of
Hawaii Press
P.290
Thomas Nagel begins his recent work, The View from
Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), with a criticism of the
perennial search for objectivity not only in
relation to our conception of the object, but also
to our conceptions of the subject as well as the
moral life. Philosophers, starting with the obvious
distinction between subjective life and objective
experience, have moved in different directions in
formulating their views of the world. The pendulum
has swung in different directions. If we start from
the subjective side, we are said to be confronted
with the problems of skepticism, idealism, or
solipsism. If we are to begin with the objective
side, we are faced with a different set of problems.
We need to accommodate the individual and his
perspective as well as the perspectives of others in
a world that is generally looked upon as being
neutral, objective, and perspectiveless. Nagel
focuses on the second approach.
It is this second version of the problem that
particularly interests me. It is the obverse of
skepticism because the given is the objective
reality--or the idea of an objective reality--and
what is problematic by contrast is subjective
reality. Without receiving full acknowledgment this
approach has been very influential in recent
analytic philosophy. It accords well with a bias
toward physical science as a paradigm of
understanding.
But if under the pressure of realism we admit
that there are things which cannot be understood in
this way, then other ways of understanding must be
sought. One way is to enrich the notion of
objectivity. But to insist in every case that the
most objective and detached account of a phenomenon
is the correct one is likely to lead to reductive
conclusions. I have argued that the seductive appeal
of objective reality depends on a mistake. It is not
the given. Reality is not just objective reality.
Sometimes, in the philosophy of mind but also
elsewhese, the truth is not to be found by
travelling as far away from one's personal
perspective as possible.(1)
Nagel's effort to resurrect the human
perspective without, at the same time, allowing it
to deteriorate into an idealism or a form of
solipsism will certainly be in conformity with that
of the mainline Buddhist tradition traceable to the
Buddha and continued by such disciples as
Moggaliiputta-tissa (third century B.C.), Naagaajuna
(second century A.C.), Vasubandhu (fourth century
A.C.), and Dignaaga (fifth century A.C.). The reason
is that the philosophical atmosphere in India before
and during the sixth century B.C., against which
Buddhism was responding, was not very different from
the gestalt against which Nagel is reacting, even
though the former may not appear to be as
sophisticated as the latter. The search for ultimate
objectivity and the need to accommodate the subject
within that objective perspective, as it was in the
Cartesian enterprise in Western philosophy, led some
of the Upani.sadic thinkers to rely upon some form
of intuition to establish the ultimate reality of
the self (aatman).
In the beginning this was only the self (aatman) in
the form of a person. Looking around he saw nothing
else than the self. He first said "I am." Therefore,
even
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to this day when one is addressed he says that "this
is I" and speaks whatever other names he may
have."(2)
This does not look very different from the
Cartesian enterprise. Here we find the ordinary
self-awareness being placed inside a casket made of
stainless steel and preserved as a permanent and
eternal mental substance, a self that can be
comprehended through an intuition that allows no
room for doubt. However, in the Indian speculation,
unlike in the Cartesian system, it was this very
same ultimately real self that also constituted the
reality of everything in the universe. The
realization of the oneness or unity of the self
(aatman) therefore implies an intuitive
understanding that the mysterious entity within the
individual is identical with the mystery that is
inherent in all phenomena.
In more recent times, the Cartesian "ghost in
the machine" came to be repudiated as a result of a
landmark treatise by Gilbert Ryle entitled The
Concept of Mind (Hutchinson, 1949).(3) The private
metaphysical subject, the agent behind human
experience and action, came to be abandoned in favor
of a public concept which the community of
philosophers, leaving all their prejudices behind,
were able to analyze and for which they could assign
publicly verifiable meaning. In that process the
ghost in the machine was eliminated along with
certain parts of the machine. This positivistic
approach is what contributed to the behavioristic
model of explanation adopted by the psychologists
with a scientific bent of mind, and which is now
being challenged by people like Nagel. In the
ancient Indian tradition, a similar attempt to
eliminate the Upani.sadic version of the "ghost in
the machine'' led to an equally positivistic
doctrine propounded by the Materialists. For the
Materialists, the objective reality consists not
simply of matter, but also of the principle that
governs the behavior of material bodies. This
mysterious principle is referred to as "nature"
(svabhaava).(4) As in the positivist tradition in
the West, the Materialists were enthusiastic about
eliminating not only the "ghost in the machine", but
even a part of the machine, that is, the
psychological and moral experiences of humanity.
Nagel would be pleased to learn that his problem
was also the Buddha's problem, even though the
solutions are not the same. The Buddha was
confronted with theories, some of which were the
results of individual perspective (di.t.thi), like
those of the Upani.sadic thinkers, and some others
which supposedly avoided any such individual
perspective (adi.t.thi) like those of the
Materialists.(5) No doubt, the middle path between
the two extremes of individual perspective and no
perspective is not an easily circumscribed
perspective so long as our attempt is to achieve
ultimate objectivity. This means that there is
something radically wrong with our search for
ultimate objectivity itself.
The first attempt on the part of the Buddha was
to avoid the search for ultimate objectivity
regarding the subject. This is one aspect of his
doctrine of non-self or nonsoul (anatta). It is
intended to get rid of the "ghost in the machine"
without, at the same time, abandoning any part of
the machine. The machine is
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the psyche-physical personality consisting of the
five basic constituents, the physical body (ruupa),
feeling or sensation (vedanaa) , perception
(sa~n~naa) , dispositions (sa^nkhaara) , and
consciousness (vi~n~naa.na) .(6) These are not
radically distinguishable ultimate elements.
Instead, they represent five mutually dependent
aspects of the conscious human personality.
The Buddha's definition of the physical body has
objective as well as subjective features.
Objectively, it is made up of the four primary
elements (mahaabhuuta) and the derived elements
(upaadaava-ruupa) .(7) Subjectively, it represents
the function of being affected. This function is
explained by the use of the verb ruppati, "is
affected," in the definition of the concept of ruupa
or physical form.(8) This twofold definition,
objective and subjective, enabled the Buddha to
retain the physical personality as necessary
condition for the objective identification of a
human person, while at the same time allowing that
objective personality to be related to the
subjective aspects of human life. The Buddha seems
to be reluctant to speak of a human person
independent of a physical organism. A purely
immaterial (aruupa) personality is a mental
fabrication (manomaya).(9) Physical identification
is thus one of the important means of preserving the
objectivity of the human person. The sensations and
perceptions, understood in a non-reductive way,
account for the shared experiences of human beings.
Being dependent upon the physical personality for
their occurrence, these sensational and perceptual
experiences have their limitations. Such limitations
provide the occasion for the generation of what the
Buddha called dispositions (sa^nkhaara), and these
dispositions represent a watershed between the
subjective and objective aspects of the self.
Serving as the most important factor in the
individuation of a human personality, the
dispositions account for the fact of subjectivity.
At the same time, by placing its indelible
impression upon the objectively identifiable
physical personality as well as the commonly shared
sensations and perceptions, these dispositions
enable a human person to reveal the objectivity of
that subjective self. The Buddha's explanation of
this most significant aspect of the personality
reads as follows:
Disposition is so called because it processes
material form (ruupa), ... feeling (vedanaa), .,
perception (sa~n~naa) , ... disposition
(sa^nkhaara),... consciousness (vi~n~naa.na), which
has already been dispositionally conditioned, into
its present form.(10)
In other words. the personality consisting of the
five aggregates that has come to be as a result of
past dispositional conditioning (abhisa^nkhata.m) is
continually provided with an individuality or unity
by the activity of the dispositions.
According to Nagel, "We are in a sense trying to
climb outside of our own minds, an effort that some
would regard as insane and that I regard as
philosophically fundamental."(11) For the Buddha,
such stepping out can be achieved only by a careful
examination of the dispositional tendencies that
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bring about the unity as well as the individuality
of a person. The individual is not merely a "bundle
of perceptions.'' but also a bundle that is
integrated by the dispositional tendencies.
Finally, we are left with the problem of
re-identification, The physical body certainly helps
in the objective re-identification of the human
personality. Yet that objective re-identification
can turn out to be extremely superficial and could
be even misleading if we are to ignore the
re-identification that takes place subjectively on
the basis of consciousness (vi~n~naa.na). The Buddha
characterized this constant process of
re-identification as the "stream of consciousness"
(vi~n~naa.nasota),(12) an idea that was to become
the central theme of William James when he tried to
dispose of the metaphysical conception of self."
Once again, the dispositions (sa^nkhaara) that
are responsible for the individuation of the
subjective stream of consciousness also turn out to
be the mirror through which the objectivity of that
stream is reflected. It is for this reason that the
Buddha combined the dispositions and the stream of
consciousness to speak of the "stream of becoming"
(bhavasota),(14) which is another way of explaining
the psychophysical personality.
The doctrine of the five aggregates (khandha),
therefore, represents two important aspects or
processes, one of deconstruction intended to show
the absence of a permanent and mysterious self or a
ghost in the machine, and the other of
reconstruction or re-integration that attempts to
retain the entire machinery without leaving behind
what Nagel calls the "irreducible feature of
reality, " namely, consciousness.(15) The manner in
which these elements are defined, as explained
above, eliminated the possibility of their reduction
into ultimately further unanalyzable constituents as
material and mental substances.
It is significant to note that even though the
five aggregates--physical form, feeling, perception,
disposition, and consciousness--can be looked upon
or are understood as concepts, that very function of
conceiving is not included among the aggregates.
As pointed out earlier, the Buddha was willing
to provide a subjective definition even of the
physical body. However, he avoids doing so in the
case of conception. Here one may notice an important
point of comparison (or even contrast) between the
Buddha and the psychologist James. James, the
psychologist, was reluctant to use the word
'concept' because it "is often used as if it stood
for the object of discourse itself, ..."(16) He
therefore speaks of the "conceiving state of
mind."(17) If that were the case, in the Buddhist
scheme, it could find a more appropriate place among
the aggregates. Yet it did not. James himself
proceeds to qualify his statement immediately,
saving: "It properly denotes neither the mental
state nor what the mental state signifies, but the
relation between the two, namely, the function of
the mental state in signifying just that particular
thing."(18) The Buddha's definition of conception is
less complicated and is couched in rather impersonal
terminology. Instead of
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speaking about a conceiving state of mind or the
individual act of conceiving, the Buddha speaks of
"conception taking place" (sa^nkha.m gacchati).(19)
The reason for this definition will become evident
as we proceed with the analysis of the various
conceptions. This impersonal definition of
conception will also have significant implications
for the Buddhist philosophy of language, which is
beyond the scope of this article.
In the so-called Theravaada tradition, the
continued tendency to reify the psychophysical
personality into a metaphysical self or soul was
countered by the Buddhist philosopher
Moggaliiputta-tissa when he criticized the theory of
the personalists (pudgalavaada) .(20) His
Kathaavatthu, compiled during the third century
B.C., begins with a lengthy refutation of this
theory.
The first century A.C. witnessed the
finalization of the Vajracchedikaapraj~naapaamitaa,
generally regarded as a Mahaayaana text. The term
vajra (diamond) occurring in the title expresses the
basic theme of the work, namely, deconstruction. It
is indeed the symbolism used by the Buddha in the
early discourses. In fact, the process of
deconstruction is immediately followed by
reconstruction, and these two processes applied to
the conception of a human person are presented as
follows:
Personal existence, personal existence, as
no-existence that has been taught by the
Tathaagatas; for not, O Lord, is that existence
non-existence? Therefore it is called "personal
existence."(21)
The process is presented in three steps and has led
to much confusion and misunderstanding among
Buddhist scholars. The three steps may be explained
as follows:
1. Personal existence = ontological commitment or
the attempt to reach ultimate objectivity.
2. No personal existence = deconstruction or the
abandoning of that ultimate objectivity.
3. Therefore, "personal existence" (in quotes) =
reconstruction or restatement without
ontological commitment, that is, the recognition
that it is mere conception.
Similarly, Naagaarjuna emphasized the
appeasement of the methods of self and selfhood
(aatmaatmani-naya).(22) So did Vasubandhu when he
identified the objectivity-seeking faculty of mind
(manas) as the generator of the four kinds of
defilements: self-view, self-love, self-pride, and
self-confusion.(23)
With this explanation of the human personality
or the subject, it will be possible to move on to
the Buddhist conception of the object. The Buddhist
view of the object bears little resemblance to what
is available in the more recent philosophical
traditions, and may even appear to be rather exotic,
especially after the Western tradition has come to
bury the contributions of a philosopher like George
Berkeley.
To return to Nagel: "The aim of objectivity
would be to reach a conception of the world,
including oneself, which involved one's own point of
view not es-
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sentially, but only instrumentally, so to speak: so
that the form of our understanding would be specific
to ours, but its contents would not be."(24)
In spite of Nagel's attempt in the earlier part
of the book to remain satisfied with limited
objectivity, especially in the explanation of the
human self, ethics, and science, he seems to be
determined to adopt an extremely rationalist
approach toward the object. "What there is and what
we, in virtue of our nature, can think about are
different things."(25) He says: "I want to resist
the natural tendency to identify the idea of the
world as it really is with the idea of what can be
revealed, at the limit, by an indefinite increase in
objectivity of standpoint".(26)
Indeed the tone in which Nagel began his work,
namely, a criticism of positivist science that does
not allow room for "the subjectivity of
consciousness as an irreducible feature of reality,"
seems to change as he proceeds to analyze the nature
of the objective world. While he was willing to let
go the ghost in the human machine, he is not
prepared to let loose the ghost in the world
machine. The early Indian thinkers as well as
Descartes were consistent in their philosophical
enterprise in trying to retain the ghosts in every
instance.
In contrast to these different theories,
including Nagel's, the Buddha, who abandoned the
ghost in the human machine with his theory of
nonself (anatta), was, for the sake of consistency
as well as for epistemological reasons, equally
prepared to renounce any conception of mystery
associated with the objective world. According to
him, just as much as stepping outside of oneself
will enable one to understand and appreciate the
truth about the individual subject, a similar
stepping out of the object will be conducive to the
better understanding and appreciation of the object
itself. This is the reason for the Buddha's
extension of the doctrine of nonself (anatta) to the
objective world as well. The demystification of the
self or the desolidification of the concept of self
went hand in hand with the demystification and
desolidification of the concept of the object.
In order to restrain the tendency toward
solidification of the objective experience into
incorruptible and ultimately real objects, the
Buddha recommended the adoption of a perspective
that resembles the Berkeleyan method in Western
philosophy. According to Buddhism, in the
meditations that eventually bring about more
accurate knowledge and understanding, the initial as
well as the most essential step is the avoidance of
the substance/quality or primary/secondary
distinction. Explaining the restraint of the sense
faculties, the Buddha says:
Having perceived a material form with the eye, a
person remains non-grasping on to a substance or
mysterious cause (nimitta) and perceivable qualities
(anuvya~njana). If he dwells with the faculty of
sight uncontrolled, covetousness and dejection, evil
unhealthy states of mind, might predominate. So he
fares along controlling it; he guards the faculty of
sight, he comes to control over the faculty of
sight. (This statement is repeated with regard to
the other senses as well, including mind, mano.)(27)
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This does not mean the transcendence of sense
experience, as some interpreters of Buddhism make it
out to be, for the restraint is called for after the
complete act of perception has taken place, not
before. It is only an admonition to give up the
wild-goose chase, that is, the search for a
mysterious entity or cause (nimitta) to which the
perceived qualities (anuvya~njana) are supposed to
belong. A Berkeleyan approach is further reflected
when the Buddha advised one of his disciples,
Bahiya, to adopt the following method:
Then. Bahiya, thus must you train yourself: "In the
seen there will be just the seen; in the heard just
the heard; in the reflected just the reflected; in
the cognized just the cognized." That is how,
Bahiya, you must train yourself. Now, Bahiya when in
the seen there will be to you just the seen;...just
the heard;... just the reflected;... just the
cognized, then, Bahiya, you will not identify
yourself with it. When you do not identify yourself
with it, you will not locate yourself therein. When
you do not locate yourself therein, it follows that
you will have no "here" or "beyond" or "midway
between, " and this would be the end of
suffering.(28)
This Buddhist approach, however, differs from
that of Berkeley in that the elimination of a
mysterious substance to account for the identity and
the reidentification of the object is not followed
by the introduction of an equally mysterious
conception of God. The identity as well as the
continuity of the object is explained in terms of
the principle of dependence (pa.ticcasamuppaada), to
which we shall return soon.
As it was with the conception of the subject, we
observe in the literature of some of the later
Buddhists, especially the Sarvaastivaadins, an
attempt to reify the object. The Sarvaastivaada
conception of substance, denoted by the term
svabhaava, a term that was utilized by the
positivist Materialists of pre-Buddhist India, is
well known to the student of Buddhism. The more
prominent philosophers of the tradition mentioned
earlier reacted against this conception of the
object in the same way as they did with regard to
the reification of the subject.
Moggaliiputta-tissa's Kathaavatthu contains one
whole chapter devoted to a criticism of the
Sarvaastivaada notion of existence (atthittaa).(29)
The Vajracchedikaa utilizes the method of
deconstruction and reconstruction mentioned earlier
in treating the problem of the object or "the
element of the world" (lokadhaatu).(30) Following
the Buddha's admonition relating to the restraint of
the senses, referred to earlier, Naagaarjuna
concludes his analysis of the objective elements
(dhaatu) encouraging the appeasement of the
conception of the object (dra.s.tavopa`sama).(31)
Similarly, the psychologist Vasubandhu reminds his
readers that here the subject of discourse is a
"conception of the object'' (vi.saya-vij~napti).(32)
Reification of concepts, whether these pertained
to the subject or the object, has been a pervasive
tendency among most philosophers. The Buddhist
doctrines of the nonsubstantiality of the person
(pudgala-nairaatmya) and the non-
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substantiality of elements (dharma-nairaatmya)
served as two powerful fenders against the
constantly emerging hazards of reification.
For the Buddha, the constant attempt to
introduce a mysterious substance in the explanation
of the subjective life as well as objective
experience is the work of the tender-minded. The
tender-minded are the victims of anxiety
(paritassanaa) in relation to things that do not
exist either subjectively or objectively.(33) The
tough-minded approach is to renounce the search for
"things as they are" and confine oneself to what is
given, that is, "things as they have come to be"
(yathaabhuutam).(34)
Vasubandhu's characterization of the object as a
concept (vij~napti) is rather significant, for with
it he is focusing attention on one of the most
significant theoretical solutions to the problem of
objectivity attempted by the Buddha. We have already
pointed out the manner in which the Buddha described
a concept (sa^nkhaa) as something that is neither
ultimately subiective nor ultimately objective. We
also compared the Buddha's view of concepts with
that of William James. A conception is thus
distinguishable from imagination or daydreaming.
Vasubandhu clarifies the status of conception thus:
"The determination of mutually related concepts is
based upon mutual domination (or dependence). In
dream experience thought is overwhelmed by torpor.
Hence the difference in fruit."(35) A genuine
concept is not simply the arbitrary creation of the
individual's mind; it is also dependent upon the
object of experience as well as recognition and
agreement by a community of intelligent human
beings. Looking upon conception in this manner, the
Buddha was able to step outside both the subject and
the object. It also enabled him to deal with new
situations and new perspectives without falling into
any dogmatic slumber. Dogmatism (di.t.thi) is the
result of allowing the vehicle of conception,
namely, the concept, to be solidified through a
process of reification.
James struck a similar note when he maintained:
''The facts are unquestionable; our knowledge does
grow and change by rational and inward processes, as
well as by empirical discoveries. Where the
discoveries are empirical, no one pretends that the
propulsive agency, the force that makes the
knowledge develop, is mere conception."(36)
Unfortunately, James was unaware that the Buddhist
psychologist of the fourth century A.C., Vasubandhu,
had compiled a whole treatise entitled the
"Establishment of Mere Conception"
(Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi), not to justify any form
of idealism, but to elaborate upon the Buddha's view
of conception as a means of stepping outside the
metaphysical subject (pudgala-nairaatmya) as well as
the metaphysical object (dharma-nairaatmya) .(37)
Here again, Vasubandhu was preceded by his
illustrious co-religionist, Naagaarjuna, who equated
conception (praj~napti) with dependent arising
(pratiityasamutpaada), for it is a way of emptying
the subject and object of substantialist
implications (= emptiness, `suunyataa) and
representing a middle standpoint between extremes
(madhyamaapratipat).(38)
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If the negative doctrine of nonsubstantialism
(anaatmavaada) that represents a stepping outside of
both subject and object may sound unfamiliar to the
modern Western student of philosophy, more
cumbersome is the positive doctrine of dependent
arising (pratiityasamutpaada) . Yet, it can be
understood in terms of the more familiar category of
causation provided one is prepared to shed the
substantialist or essentialist perspectives.
Skepticism regarding causal explanations,
especially in the area of perceptual experience, is
rampant in the traditional Indian schools as well as
in some of the modern Western philosophical
traditions. Once again such skepticism is the result
of the pursuit of excess objectivity that Nagel is
complaining about. In the modern world, the most
prominent advocate of such skepticism has been
Bertrand Russell. Nagel expresses this dilemma when
he says: "The same ideas that make the pursuit of
objectivity seem necessary for knowledge make both
objectivity and knowledge seem, on reflection,
unattainable."(39) This dilemma is inevitable so
long as we deal with an objectivity that is
excessive to the point of being absolute, while
human knowledge remains undeniably limited and
relative. If objectivity is not as excessive and
absolute, skepticism may not appear to be so
troublesome.
Here the problem is created by the science of
logic that derived its inspiration from the
two-valued logic of Aristotle. In this particular
system, which incidentally is not so alien to the
traditional Indian logical system, where absolutism
reigned supreme in discussions relating to
'existence', it is possible to speak of the true and
the false distinction appearing in the following
form. If the statement "all swans are white'' is
true, the statement "some swans are not white" is
false in the sense that the latter contradicts the
former. Here, the term "all" (sarva.m) is used in an
absolute sense. Thus, whenever there is a need to
account for possibilities (which may be otherwise),
it is necessary to introduce counterfactual after
counterfactual, an attempt that some modern
philosophers now look upon as being futile.(40)
The Buddha was clearly aware of the problems
relating to the absolutist conception of "all" or
"everything" (sabha.m). His empiricism as well as
his explanation of conception, as mentioned earlier,
prevented him from absolutizing even the conception
of "all." Questioned by a metaphysician by the name
of Jaanusso.ni specifically on the problem of "all"
(sabba.m), the Buddha replied that as far as he was
concerned "all" meant the eye and material form, ear
and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, body
and tangible, mind and concept--that is, the six
forms of sense experience. Pressed by Jaanusso.ni
with questions regarding other definitions of "all,"
the Buddha insisted that he would avoid any such
definition, the reason being that they would be
beyond experience (avisaya).(41) It is for this
reason that whenever the Buddha was compelled to
utilize universal terms, that is, to use the
conception of "all," he, as far as we can know from
the available discourses. always qualified it as
"all this" (sabbam ida.m). Modern Buddhist scholars,
misled by medieval Hindu
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thinkers like Udayana AAcaarya, have failed to
realize the epistemological significance of this
qualification. This qualification, as I have pointed
out elsewhere, is faithfully followed by a disciple
like Naagaarjuna.(42) It is also clearly reflected
in Vasubandhu's description of reality as "this is a
mere concept" (vij~naptimaatram evaitad).(43)
The avoidance of any absolutistic notions of
truth does not mean the wholehearted sponsorship of
skepticism, either in its absolute form as reflected
in a philosopher like Sa~njaya or in its less severe
form portrayed in the Jaina logic of syaadvaada,
where everything is a possibility or a "maybe,"
until the attainment of "omniscience'' (kaivalya).
The difficulty consists in discovering a middle path
between these extremes. In the first place, the
Buddha had to admit that every rational human being
needs to recognize certain things as being true and
others as being false. Otherwise human life would be
chaotic. Therefore, to the question as to whether
there is a variety of truths (regarding the same
matter), the Buddha declared that "truth is one and
there is no second" (eka.m hi sacca.m na dutiiyam
atthi).(44) Secondly, it was necessary to prevent
this truth from deteriorating into an absolute truth
as reflected in the statement: "This alone is true,
everything else is false" (idam eva sacca.m mogham
a~n~na.m),(45) which leaves no room for change as
well as possibilities. The Buddha realized the
necessity to account for change as well as
creativity and novelty in the explanation of
experience. His conception of truth and the method
by which that truth is to be clarified, namely,
logic, had to accommodate such creativity and
novelty.
This task was accomplished by the Buddha by
dissolving the absolutistic true/false dichotomy and
replacing it with a trichotomy: the true, the
confused, and the false--the first accounting for
what is available in the present context, the second
allowing for the possible, and the third explaining
the impossible. The Buddha refers to truth as sacca,
the confusion or the confused as musaa, and the
false as kali.
This repudiation of the absolute true/false
distinction, comparable to one unsuccessfully
attempted by William James in Western
philosophy,(46) seems to leave the Buddha with a
method of providing truth value to propositions that
appears very different from the methods adopted in
the essentialist or absolutistic systems.
An extremely interesting passage in the
A^nguttara-nikaaya (misinterpreted by K. N.
Jayatilleke(47) because of his careless handling of
the terminology used by the Buddha) illustrates the
Buddha's standpoint.
The passage reads as follows:
I know what has been seen, heard, thought, cognized,
attained, sought and reflected upon by the people
including the ascetics and brahmans. If I know what
has been seen... by the people... and I were to say:
"I do not know it," that would be confusion (musaa)
on my part. And if I were to say: "I know it and I
do not know it," that too would be confusion on my
part. [However,] if I were
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to say: "I neither know it nor do not know it." I
would be committing a sin (kali) on my part.(48)
The truth values assigned to the last three
statements by Jayatilleke seem to be inconsistent
with the terminology used by the Buddha to
characterize them. The four statements may be
summarized as follows:
1. I know p.
2. I do not know p.
3. I know and do not know p.
4. I neither know nor do not know p.
According to the Buddha, if (1) is true, then
both (2) and (3) are confusions (musaa) and (4)
alone is false (kali). Compared with the term musaa,
the term kali expresses the heightened sense of
epistemological sin. If proposition (2) were to be
characterized as the contrary of(1), as is done by
Jayatilleke, then even (3) would be a contrary, and
(4) alone would be a contradiction.
The four propositions may be stated as follows:
1. p (true)
2. ~ p (contrary)
3. (p. ~ p) (contrary)
4. ~ (p. ~ p) (contradictory)
The question remains as to why the Buddha did
not characterize (3) as contradiction (kali), even
though Jayatilleke seems to interpret it as such.
Jayatilleke formulates the propositions as follows,
leaving room for assigning truth value to each one
of them:
1. p (true)
2. not p (contrary)
3. both p and not p [?] (contradictory)
4. neither p nor not p [?] (excluded middle)
It is our contention that the conclusions
derived by Jayatilleke from an analysis of the
Buddha's statement reflect not only his failure to
observe the important distinction between the two
terms "confusion" (musaa) and "sin (kali), but also
his enthusiasm to adopt the essentialist true/false
dichotomy as well as the method of providing truth
value to propositions rather indiscriminately. For
the Buddha, the true/false dichotomy needs to be
modified whenever the evaluation involves both
knowledge and description, that is, empirical
statements. An empirical statement would be
contradicted only by a statement that represents a
total negation of both knowledge and description,
and for the Buddha this would also involve a denial
of all possibilities of knowing or describing, which
is the effect of the fourth proposition. By
describing the fourth proposition as
"(epistemological) sin" (kali) , the Buddha was
probably condemning the Jainas for giving
truth-value to it. For the Buddha, a truly con-
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tradictory statement implies not only
indescribability as this or that, but also the
absence of any possibility of knowing through
empirical means. Therefore, Jayatilleke's attempt to
give truth-value to proposition (4) [~(p.~p)](49) is
based upon the true/false distinction as well as the
system of evaluation adopted in the essentialist
systems of epistemology and would not be appropriate
in the Buddha's anti-essentialist teachings.
Proposition (3), (p. ~ p), does not rule out the
possibility of knowledge altogether and is therefore
a contrary rather than a contradiction.
The foremost among Buddhist logicians,
Di^nnaaga, who attempted to formulate the ideas
expressed by the Buddha in more concrete logical
language, was actually preserving the fundamental
spirit of the Buddha's rationalizations when he
presented the hetu, the probandum, before proceeding
to work out the proof.(50)
With such a definition of existence or truth,
the Buddha could formulate a theory of causation or
dependence and even utilize counterfactuals without
making them overwork. This fact is clearly expressed
in his general formulation of the principle of
dependence:
When that exists, this comes to be; on the arising
of that, this arises. When that does not exist, this
does not come to be; on the cessation of that,
this ceases.(51)
It may be noted that the second statement of the
preceding quotation serves the function of a
counterfactual.
What is most important in the preceding analysis
is that the truth value of a concept, a statement,
or a proposition is determined on a contextual basis
rather than in an absolute way. This has important
bearings on the Buddhist theory of linguistic
convention, a subject that is outside the scope of
the present article. We will focus our attention on
its significance in the area of ethics or moral
discourse.
In the Upani.sads, while the search for ultimate
objectivity reached its culmination in the
conception of aatman, the ultimate reality of the
subject as well as the object, a similar search in
the area of ethics gave rise to the conception of
brahman.(52) Brahman was the source of the fourfold
caste system. The creation of the dharma or the
moral law being subsequent to the creation of the
caste system, the latter is seen to take precedence
over the former. Therefore, the caste specifies the
duty which serves as the foundation of morality.
This conception of duty came to be elaborated in the
Bhagavadgiitaa, where its ontological status is
preserved leaving no room for the human perspective.
The Buddha was inclined to use the term dharma
to refer to the moral ideal, since he had very
little sympathy with the Hindu caste system, which
gave meaning to the Upani.sadic term brahman. For
him, the term dharma, used in an ethical sense,
denoted good, in both its concrete and its ideal
forms.(53) Its negation, a-dharma, meant bad or evil.
For the Buddha, good is what produces
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good consequences (attha),(54) and such consequences
are dependently arisen, that is, they depend upon
various factors operating within each context.A
pragmatic criterion of good, therefore, has to be
contextual as well. For this reason, dharma as the
moral ideal was never looked upon as an Absolute.
Indeed, grasping on to any conception of good as the
ultimately real, the universally valid, and
eternally existent is criticized by the Buddha. This
idea is clearly expressed by him in his discourse on
the "snake simile" addressed to a monk named
Arittha, available both in Pali and Chinese.(55) He
insists that a person has to "abandon even the good,
let alone evil." Utilizing an appropriate simile,
the simile of the raft (kulla), the Buddha argues
that a person builds a raft only for the purpose of
crossing over a stream. If, after crossing over, the
person were to carry the raft on his shoulders
wherever he goes, insisting that the raft was useful
and, therefore, he should not abandon it, that
person would not understand the function of the
raft.(56) This means that the usefulness of the raft
is contextual and concrete. Apart from the context,
the raft has no meaning, and it is not possessed of
absolute value. The pragmatist James struck a
similar note when he said that "there is always a
pinch between the actual and the ideal which can be
gotten rid of by leaving part of the ideal
behind."(57)
What does the Buddha mean by abandoning the
good? Most scholars take this to mean the
transcendence of both good and evil and the
attainment of an ineffable state comparable to the
brahman. If this interpretation is correct, it would
mean that the epistemology and the conceptual
analysis which were adopted in determining the
subject and object are inappropriate in the sphere
of moral discourse, and the Buddha can be rightly
accused of being inconsistent. Therefore,
"abandoning the good" needs to be understood in a
totally different way.
The raw materials on the basis of which we
arrived at a reasonable conception of a human person
were subjective as well as objective. Similar facts
served as the raw material for our conception of the
object. The very same epistemology and conception
call for the preservation of three factors in
arriving at any conception of morality. These are:
(1) the conception of the individual human person,
which we have already arrived at as a viable
philosophical concept without having to sacrifice
the human perspective; (2) the conception of the
objective world, including other human persons, for
objectivity is not completely abandoned, and (3) the
reality of new and varying contextual situations
(that is, the possibilities) that continue to unfold
before humanity as a result of dependent arising and
which needs to be accounted for. These constitute
the raw material that goes to produce a reasonable
conception whenever human beings are called upon to
make moral decisions or judgments.
Thus, a reasonable moral judgment will require a
careful decision regarding the manner in which we
incorporate any one of these factors whenever that
particular factor becomes relevant to the situation
without ruling it out before-hand, This can be done
only when we realize that, as in the case of factual
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truths, what is involved in a moral decision is also
a conception. The Buddha used the term vohaara
(=vyavahaara) to refer to moral conception, (58)
while he reserved the term sa^nkhaa, as noted
earlier, to refer to conception relating to
facts.Realizing that moral conceptions are more
variable than conceptions relating to facts, the
Buddha was willing to speak of an ideal moral
standard as a useful guide. Thus, we have the term
dhamma used in the plural to refer to concrete
conceptions of the good, while the same term used in
the singular as dhammo refers to the ideal good. It
is only the need to modify the ideal (dhammo) when
that ideal comes into conflict with the concrete
good (dhamma) that is implied in the Buddha's
admonition to "abandon the good." It is not a call
to renounce any and every conception of the good.
This is the reason for the Buddha's statement that a
person should aspire to be moral or virtuous
(siilavaa) rather than to being one who is made up
of morals or virtues (siilamaya).(59) It is another
way of stating the fact that concrete moral
situations are not derived from ultimate and
absolute moral laws. Instead, the so-called
absolutely objective moral laws are abstractions
from concrete moral situations.
We have already seen how the Vajracchedikaa
avoided metaphysical assertion and metaphysical
negation by explaining the status of conception
relating to the self as well as the world. The same
method is applied in the case of moral discourse,
and in doing so the Vajracchedikaa utilizes a
quotation from the earlier discourse on the simile
of the raft and the need to abandon the good
(dharma).(60) This is a more faithful philosophical
explanation of the Buddha's moral discourse
(dharmakaaya), presented at a time when popular
Mahaayaana was elevating it to the level of a
transcendent or ultimate reality.
The relationship between the concrete moral
situations and a moral ideal was explained by
Naagaajuna when he claimed that "without relying
upon convention (vyavahaara) the ultimate fruit
(paramaartha) is not taught."(61) As pointed out
earlier, the term vohaara (=vyavahaara) was used by
the Buddha to refer specifically to moral conception
or convention. Naagaarjuna's explanation here of the
relationship between concrete moral situations and a
moral ideal resonates with that of the Buddha and
serves as a corrective to the ever recurring
absolutism in ethics.
Finally we come to Vasubandhu, whose work is
devoted primarily to the establishment of "mere
conception" (vij~naptimaatra). Even though he is
utilizing different terminology, the ideas he
expresses are those of his predecessors. According
to him, in the sphere of moral discourse, as in
discussions of factual truths, a "mere conception"
is to be distinguished from "mental fabrication"
(parikalpita), for a "mere conception" is the result
of mutual dependence (paratantra); that is, it
involves the subject, the object, and the context as
well as agreement among different subjects. However,
what is ultimately accomplished or achieved
(parini.spanna) cannot, in any way, go beyond or
transcend such mutual dependence, for "in the
absence of any conception of the concrete (moral)
situation, the (moral) ideal is also not
perceived."(62)
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The understanding just presented of the subject,
the object, and the morals will enable us to
appreciate the contents of the Buddha's first
discourse to the world. In this discourse, popularly
known as the "Establishment of the Conception of
Righteousness" (Dhammacappavattana) , the Buddha
speaks of two extremes of behavior: self-indulgence
and self-mortification.(63) Self-indulgence is
characterized as being low, vulgar, individualist,
ignoble, and unfruitful (in the long run). It
represents excessive selfishness stemming from a
perspective that leaves no room for the objective
reality of other human persons or of the world at
large. Contrasted with this form of behavior is
self-mortification, described as being painful,
ignoble, and unfruitful. This is the result of an
excessive altruism that tends to ignore the
objectivity of the human person, to dissolve him
completely in an excessively objective world.
Selfishness and altruism in their extreme forms
therefore represent two different extremes according
to which we perceive the individual and the world.
An extreme form of selfishness is easily
condemned. Yet a similarly extreme form of altruism
is rarely denounced. The Buddha was aware of this
when he characterized selfishness as being low,
vulgar, and individualist, and described
self-mortification as being simply painful.
Excessive altruism may eventually be traced back to
excessive skepticism regarding human knowledge,
which, in turn, can feed heroism. In the Indian
context, this position is reflected in the Hindu
religious text, the Bhagavadgiitaa as well as in the
Buddhist text, the S.addharmapu.n.dariika-suutra.
Rationalist Nagel believes that truth must lie
either in skepticism or in heroism or in both.(64)
Hence he is able to justify a position where the
so-called moral life can override the good life.(65)
If by the moral life Nagel means an excessively
objective moral principle comparable to one sought
for by Kant, with whom he has great sympathy, the
good life would represent the concrete life of human
happiness, whether it be of an individual person or
a specific community of persons. Indeed, it is the
excessive objectivity of that moral life that
compels Nagel to favor the overriding of the good
life by the moral life. The Buddha, who was less
inclined to adopt such a rationalist position and
favored the modification of the ideal when it comes
into conflict with the concrete, looked upon both
selfishness and altruism as being ignoble and
unfruitful. For him, the noble and fruitful way of
life is represented by a carefully conceived middle
path that will contribute to the welfare of oneself
as well as of others.(66) This is a more enlightened
form of ethical pragmatism.
NOTES
1. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 27.
2. B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, 1.4.1, in S.
Radhakrishnan, ed. and trans., The Principal
Upani.sada (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953).
3. Gilbert Ryle, The Conception of Mind(London:
Hutchinson, 1949), pp. 15-16.
P.305
4. `Svetaa`svatara Upani.sad, 1.2, in
Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upani.sads.
5. Sutta-nipaata, ed. D. Anderson and H. Smith
(London: Pali Text Society. 1913). 840.
6. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, ed. L. Feer (London: Pali
Text Society, 1884-1904), 3.86.
7. Ibid., 3.68.
8. Ibid., 3.86.
9. Diigha-nikaaya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J.
E. Carpenter (London: Pali Text Society, 1890-1911),
1.77.
10. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 3.87.
11. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p.11.
12. Digha-nikaaya, 3.105.
13. William James, The Principles of Psychology
(Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1983), pp. 219-278.
14. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 1.15.
15. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 7.
16. James, Principles, p. 436.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Diigha-nikaaya, 1.202; Majjhima-nikaaya, ed.
V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers (London: Pali Text
Society, 1887-1901), 1.190.
20. Vajracchedikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, ed. and
trans. by Edward Conze (Rome: Instituto italiano per
il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957), p.36.
21. Kathaavatthu, ed. A. C. Taylor (London: Pali
Text Society, 1894-1897), I.1.1-1.23.
22. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, XVIII.2 (hereafter
cited as Kaarikaa) ; see David J. Kalupahana,
Naagaarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way
(Albany, New York. State University of New York
Press, 1986).
23. Tri.m`skaa, 6; see Kalupahana, The
Principles of Buddhist Psychology ? (Albany, New
York: State University of New York Press, 1987).
24. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 74
(emphasis mine).
25. Ibid., p.91.
26. Ibid.
27. Diigha-nikaaya, 1.70; Majjhima-nikaaya,
1.180 ff.
28. Udaana, ed. P. Steinthal (London: Pali Text
Society, 1948), 8.
29. Kathaavatthu, I.6.1-6.4.
30. Vajracchedikaa, p.38.
31. Kaarikaa, v.8.
32. Tri.m`sikaa, 2.
33. Majjhima-nikaaya, 1.136.
34. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 2.17.
35. Vi.m`satikaa, 18.
36. James, Principles, p. 439.
37. Vi.m`satikaa, 10.
38. Kaarikaa, XXIV, 18.
39. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p.67.
40. Saul Kripke, "Counterfactual Theories of
Knowledge" (Paper read before the University of
Hawaii. Department of Philosophy Colloquium, 22-23
January 1987).
41. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 4.15, see David J.
Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism."
Philosophy East and West 19, no.1 (January 1969):
65-67.
42. Kalupahana, Naagaarjuna, pp.326-328.
43. Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist
Psychology, p.273
44. Sutta-nipaata, 884.
45. Majjhima-nikaaya, 1.169.
46. See William James, The Will to Believe
(Cambridge, Masachusetts: Harvard University Prss,
1979), p.89.
47. K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge (London: Alien & Unwin, 1963), p. 346.
P.306
48. A^nguttara-nikaaya, ed. R. Morris and E.
Hardy (London: Pali Text Society, 1885-1900), 2.25.
49. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory, p. 345.
50. See Radhika Herzberger, Bhart.rhari and the
Buddhists (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), p. 135.
51. Majjhima-nikaaya, 1.262-264, etc.
52. B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, 1.4.11 ff.
53. Majjhima-nikaaya, 1.415-417; THeragaathaa,
ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel (London: Pali Text
Society, 1883), 304.
54. See David J. Kalupahana, A Path of
Righteousness: Dhammapada (Lanham: Maryland:
University Press of America, 1986), pp. 39-40.
55. Majjhima-nikaaya, 1.130-142; Chung AA-han
Ching, 54.1 (Taisho, 1.763b-766b) .
56. Majjhima-nikaaya, 1.135: Chung AA-han Ching,
54.1 (Taisho, 1.764c).
57. James, The Will to Believe, p. 153.
58. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 1.14-15.
59. Majjhima-nikaaya, 2.27.
60. Vajracchedikaa, p. 32.
61. Kaarikaa, XXIV. 10.
62. Tri.m`sikaa, 22.
63. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 5.420.
64. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 69.
65. Ibid., p. 169.
66. Dhammapada, 166, in Kalupahana, A Path of
Righteousness.