[EL. 151, undated, unsigned, in Ven. Ñánavíra's handwriting]
...No letter, having nothing to say (except that Mr. M. has written to say that he is now practising meditation under the Ven. Nyanaponika Thera who, in his opinion, is "very sound" -- your diagnosis is confirmed).
Para. 10, note 2 -- "...the term adhivacana-samphassa ('designation-contact') is employed to refer to the application of the name to the named in the field of ideas, and is distinguished from the corresponding patigha-samphassa ('resistance-contact') of the five snese-faculties with their respective objects..."
This statement seems to allot náma to manañca dhamme ca and rúpa to cakkhuñca rúpe ca and the other four. But it is quite clear from M. 28 that all five upádánakkhandhas arise with contact in the case of each of the six áyatanas, and there are no grounds for supposing that only rúpa (and viññána) arises from cakkhu-sota-ghána-jivhá-káya-samphassa, and that vedaná saññá and sankhárá (and viññána) arise from manosamphassa. This is perhaps even more specifically stated in M. 9: Chayime ávuso vedanákáyá, cakkhusamphassajá vedaná...manosamphassajá vedaná[1] (see also D. 15). The source of the confusion is perhaps the fact that mano is used in the Suttas with rather different meanings: sometimes it is opposed to káya (and vací), and sometimes apparently even equated to viññána (yadidam vuccati cittam itipi mano itipi viññánam itipi[2] -- Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. vii(?xii),1) [but see later comment on Para. 293].
But, as an áyatana, mano is neither the same as viññána, since manañca paticca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññánam, nor opposed to káya as something non-material opposed to something material (this distinction is the famous and misleading mind-body paradox which all the scientists in the world have failed to solve), since not only are cakkhu, sota, ghána, jivhá, and káya "that in the world by which there is a perceiver and conceiver of the world" but also mano is "that in the world by which..." (this is a latish Saláyatana Samy. Sutta, whose exact reference I have not), and anything in the world must be of the world, i.e. it must be material (whatever else it is besides). It is tempting, but I think quite mistaken, to identify dhammá with what Sartre calls "images", and the other five báhiráyatanas with what Sartre calls "perceptions". Dhammá are simply the other five in combination. (In fact, all áyatanas are námarúpa, since the world is námarúpa.)
How, then, is D. 15 (Nidána Suttanta) to be understood? Clearly it is saying that rúpa cannot arise independent of náma, or náma of rúpa. By this I understand that in any experience, involving no matter which sense (note that I am not denying that whenever there is cakkhuviññána [say] there is also manoviññána, but simply asserting that this fact is irrelevant in the present context), what appers is (i) describable: it is saññá (which is náma), or distinguishable as colour(-and-shape), sound, smell, taste, touch, or idea -- and note that of saññá the Buddha says (I quote from memory): Saññatvá, evam saññí ahosinti hoti[3] (A. VI,vi,8), which shows why saññá, being the basis of description, is náma or adhivacana --; and it is (ii) possessed of a certain resistance that is independent of the particular quality or percept that manifests it (though it cannot be manifest except in the form of some percept or other -- rather as different instruments can be devised to detect or "perceive" electromagnetic waves), and this resistance (patigha) is rúpa (and just as the programme that is received by the wireless set can only be heard when the set is on, yet is independent of the set in that the set is not responsible for the programme, which thus possesses its own inertia or resistance vis-à-vis the set, so the "programme" of rúpa that we perceive when this or that sense is on is dependent upon perception in order to appear, but is independent of, or resistant to, perception in that we do not perceive whatever we wish to perceive but what is arbitrarily forced upon us -- which, of course, is distorted by our maññaná, rather [though not exactly] as a defective wireless set distorts the programme [but with "defective" perception, i.e. maññaná, it is useless trying to discover the "undistorted programme" that was "actually broadcast by the BBC" before our "defective" perception distorted it]). The division of phassa into patigha and adhivacana samphassa does not, as I understand it, correspond to a distinction between the five senses and the mind, but rather to the twofold necessity of all experience, in that it consists of a certain independent, arbitrary, resistant, datum (RÚPA) which, however, is obliged, in order to appear, to be descriptible as seen or heard or smelt and so on (as well as pleasant, unpleasant, etc.), i.e. to appear as a particular percept (NÁMA). This D. 15 passage describes phassa from the inside -- i.e. reflexively and without reference to the twelve áyatanas (which are seen from the outside as in M. 28). [Beyond this, I think it is possible to specify the basic structure of rúpa or patigha, in terms of pathaví, ápo, tejo, and váyo, not so much, however, as solid, liquid, ripening/fiery, and motile/windy (which are derived notions, themselves requiring analysis), but rather as isolation, cohesion, combination, distension, or some such terms (which can be given exact definition with the aid of Kummer, since they simply describe the relation of the present object with its immediate negative, the surrounding absent objects). Distension (váyo) is the measure of a thing's inertia -- it cannot vanish until distension (or "potential" if you prefer) has dropped to zero. The arbitrary "pattern" of rúpa -- its given teleological significance -- to some extent justifies its translation as "form"; but this must not be identified with the shape of an object as opposed to its other qualities (such as colour, texture, sound, and so on) -- all the qualities of an object, not excluding the particular quality of shape, manifest form (indeed, strictly, each quality is itself an object [in the field of the particular sense concerned, and the qualities combine in virtue of mind which combines the individual fields of the sensual senses], and each object has an arbitrary, resistant, foundation). On the more everyday level, however, there is no harm in (con)fusing "form" with "shape". Since we most easily apprehend matter in the shape of objects, their most obviously resistant feature; and it is thus possible partly to justify "form" for rúpa also on this level. Thus the four mahábhútas both (as solid, liquid, fiery, and windy) are "form" (everyday level) and (as isolation, cohesion, combination, distension) are that upon which "form" depends (fundamental level) -- cattári ca mahábhútáni catunnañca mahábhútánam upádáya rúpam: ayam vuccat'ávuso rúpam.[4] But all this in the square bracket is beyond the scope of your note.]
Para. 79, note 3 -- Is there an authority for extending 'misapprehension of virtue and duty' beyond beyond what you say in this note (which is obviously correct [as far as it goes]), to cover also the mistaken view that enlightenment or extinction is to be obtained through the practice of síla alone (i.e. without samádhi and paññá)? It seems to me to be unduly restricted to limit it to 'ox-virtue' etc. There is a school of opinion in Ceylon that Vinaya by itself is enough.
Para. 138 -- I dislike "zeal" for chanda. "Desire" seems to suit all contexts much better. "Zeal" is quaint.
Para. 144 -- In M. 62 (i,424) there is upekkham hi te Ráhula bhávanam bhávayato yo patigho so pahíyissati.[5]
Para. 161 -- There seem to be no good grounds for the Netti's saying that the sixth áyatana is not material -- see my remarks to para. 10, note 2. nevertheless, since it is not distinguishable as a material sense separate from the first five (being the combination of them) it is not necessary to say that it is the footing for "lust for form" in addition to the first five. Why the Netti here speaks of the five faculties and then switches to the sixth facticity-base, I don't know -- there is Sutta authority (Indriya Samyutta, I think) for calling the mind a faculty as well as the five (N.B. In para. 255 all six are "faculties"). Were the sixth indriya or áyatana not material it would have no existence whatsoever (since reflexively it does not appear).
Para. 164, note 5 -- "Eye-as-vision" is an odd translation of the pair of facticity-bases,[a] cakkhuñca rúpe ca. Perhaps you have a reason? From Sal. Samy. X,2 it is clear that "vision (seeing)" = "eye-consciousness". What, then, is "eye-as-eye-consciousness"? Also, the word corresponding to mind is viññána (or ñána in the verses), which is "cognition[b] (knowing)" and not "mentation" (what is the Pali for this?). Cf. also dittha-suta-muta-viññáta.[6]
-- do -- note 9 -- Though holding no brief for "clinging", I do not much favour your "assuming". I translate "holding".
Para. 165, note 1 -- How charmingly innocent is this use of bhavanga! I am all in favour. The Abhidhammikas have put their foot in it.
Para. 173 -- Where are the notes? The second note is given under para. 172, and the first note is missing altogether. Perhaps you will find this quotation in the Rádha Samyutta.
Para. 174 -- Perhaps you will find this quotation (which is untraced presumably because of the initial Tasmátiha) in the Satipatthána Samyutta.
Para. 46, note 2 -- (Turn back, I'm afraid.) The translation of yoniso manasikára as "reasoned mind-work", though certainly correct from the etymological point of view, seems to overshoot the mark. In the first place, it is terribly stiff and un-English (like the horrible "making-become" for bhávaná [I see (para 46, note 1) you translate bhávaná as "maintaining in being": why not simply "keeping in being", which is shorter? But both of these seem to miss the idea of development which I think is essentially what is meant -- to cause to be what already is = to develop, to increase in being -- what about "growth in being", if you insist on preserving the ontological aspect? To grow is also causative in English.]) In the second place, "mind-work" inevitably suggests thinking -- and indeed you say that it is the mental activity inseparable from all cognition --; but in the higher jhánas (see M. 111 -- vol. 3, p. 28) there is still manasikára, and the emphasis there is certainly not on mental activity (after all, vitakkavicára have been left behind after the first jhána). I cannot help feeling that "attention" is not only more natural English, but also more accurately and less misleadingly conveys what is intended by manasikára. Manasikára, in itself, is purely direction -- it is not "work in the mind" but "making to the mind" --, and the part played by manasikára in a train of thought is simply the direction of the mind to each idea; but the succession of ideas is not manasikára -- it is the manner of its employment (yoniso or ayoniso). As regards "reasoned" there is less to say. "Reasoned attention" is perhaps unobjectionable, though still a little starchy. For my part, even in face of your arguments, I would translate "proper attention" and "improper attention", where "proper" can be taken in the sense of "straight" or "upright", and "improper" as "crooked". "Reasoned" also has a faintly logical air about it -- Rationalism, one feels, is somewhere in the background ("A feast of Pure Ration", as one might say). "Wise" and "unwise" are not very satisfactory.
Para. 152, note 1 -- Even admitting that natthi kiñcíti is a play on the two words kiñci (pron.) and kiñcana, I find that "nothingness" is to be preferred as a translation. Obviously, if there is nothing, then there is no obstruction or owning; but the translation "no owning" seems liable to confusion with n'etam mama, which, after all, is quite a different department of the Dhamma. Alternatively, you might compromise between "no owning" and "nothing" with "no property" (i.e. "nothing owned"); but even this does not quite avoid confusion with n'etam mama (though it is perhaps better). The point seems to be this. Except in an arahat (and the arúpa jhánas do not specifically concern arahats) everything is maññita, everything is "mine", everything is owned. In consequence, there is only no owning or property when there is nothing at all. But if you say "no owning" there might, logically, still be things that are not owned, and if you say "no property" there might still be things that are not property, whereas if you say "nothing" this mistake cannot arise (though you lose the significant point that the only way a non-arahat can delude himself that he is free from owning is by abolishing everything -- I say "delude himself", because the Múlapariyáya tells us that will still conceive akiñcaññáyatanam-me ti: "'no owning', 'no property', 'nothing' is mine", which is a pleasing example of the treachery of the Theory of Types). Or you might translate ákiñcaññáyatana as "the base (or as I should say, "occasion") of dispossession" and in the same sentence translate natthi kiñcíti as "'there is nothing at all'"; this would give you the benefit (in those contexts where both expressions occur) of both senses, and all you would lose is the similarity of the words in the Pali (kiñci-kiñcana).
Paras. 194-7 -- I note that you translate ajjhattika as "in oneself" and báhira as "external". That would be perfectly unobjectionable, except that in combination with these you use the word "object", which inevitably points to a "subject". Does the pain "in oneself/external" correspond to "subject/object" or not? If it does, why do you distinguish? The difficulty is, of course, that the body, which is ajjhattika relative to the báhiráyatanas, is itself a báhiráyatana when we come to consider how we perceive our own body. I suggest this complication can be avoided if you use the word "thing" instead of "object". If you stick to "in oneself/external" for ajjhattika/báhira, you will then have no occasion at all to use the words "subject/object" (except, of course, in other senses: "What is the object of your journey?" "What is the subject of your lecture?" etc.). [Hitherto I have been following Sartre in speaking of the "object" of consciousness, but this won't do unless consciousness is the "subject", which I have now decided it is not -- I shall use "subject(-ive)/object(-ive)" for ajjhattika-báhira. Since áyatana is "occasion", the word "base" is available for árammana, and it will be convenient and correct to speak of námarúpa ass the "base (of consciousness)". A "thing" will then be a "base (of consciousness)" if it is considered in relation to its existence or presence, and it will be an "object" (where I speak of objects you will speak of externals) if it is regarded in relation to my self ("subject"), and "objective" if it is regarded in relation to a (bodily) sense ("subjective"). My body can be a base (of consciousness), an object, objective, or subjective, depending on how it is regarded. It can never be the subject (self).]
Para. 202 -- You here use the words "subjective" and "objective". How are these related to "in oneself" and "external"? See previous note.
Para. 212 -- The word "singularity" is rather singular.
Para. 239 -- There might be something to say about this if I knew what the Pali was. Is "concomitant of cognizance" cittasankhára or not? If so, I disagree with the translation. Cittasankhára is mental determination or intention (= mental action), not a (or the) concomitant of citta/mentality. I must also register an objection to translation of citta as "cognizance", for the reason that the word 'cognizance" is more or less equivalent to "consciousness" or viññána, whereas citta is something on a different level. Confusion of citta and viññána leads to difficulties. "Heart" for citta is much better, though perhaps not ideal. Provisionally I use "mentality", which also is not ideal. Perhaps, however, "concomitant of cognizance" is cetasika? If so, I object only (as above) to the word "cognizance", but fail to understand this para. of the Netti. Citta is a less determinate or technical word than mano (as áyatana) on the one hand, and viññána on the other hand, and corresponds to "mind" in such expressions as "I've got a good mind to...", "bloody-minded", "he's got a dirty mind", "make up your mind", and so on. Cittasankhára and manosankhára (I think both terms occur and are used synonymously) are both "mental determinations", and though this is not on the same level as manokamma (which is much coarser), nevertheless mano is used and in the same sense -- i.e. non-áyatana and as opposed to vací and káya -- in both; but as far as I know, though mano is sometimes, as here, the same as citta, citta is never used as an equivalent to the manáyatana or manindriya. And I know of no passage where citta and viññána are at all interchangeable. Citta (mano) is no more nor less than the everyday notion of "mind", and as such defies any precise definition -- "what is mind?" It is tempting to identify it with náma, as such translations of námarúpa as "mentality-materiality" go to show; but actually náma is on quite a different level, being a precise technical term on the same level as viññána and manáyatana (from which it is clearly distinct). There is a similar difference of level between the káya of káyakamma and káyasankhára on the one hand and the káyáyatana and káyindriya on the other hand. In my view it is a fundamental mistake to seek connexions between different levels -- citta, for example, can by no means be defined in terms of pañcakkhandhá or saláyatana. Even the apparently exact correspondence between káya-, vací-, citta-sankhára and káya-, vací-, mano-kamma is deceptive: an unspoken covetous or deluded thought (vitakka) is vacísankhára but manokamma, and verbal expression, particularly by gestures, seems to be káyasankhára but vacíkamma.
Para. 260, note 1 -- You now have no excuse for translating árammana as "object".
Para. 293-4 -- ! (N.B. Could you send me the whole of the relevant passage (not the whole Sutta) in S. ii,94-5 [which I imagine is the same as the Nidána/Abhisamaya Samyutta vii (?xii),1], so that I can decide whether it is necessary to understand it as asserting that citta, mano, and viññána are synonymous? If you asked the average Englishman whether mind and consciousness are the same or different, what would he say? I imagine he would say that they are the same, opposing both to matter. I think this Sutta probably means no more than that. I cannot help feeling that the Netti is wrongly attributed to the Venerable Mahá-Kaccána Thera -- it is much more likely to have been composed by Procrustes.)
Para. 428, note 1 -- This note is missing.
Para. 424, note 1 -- How do you distinguish between a "component" and a "category"? What, exactly, do you mean by a component of existence? This is not quite clear. I do not consider the five categories and the twelve facticity-bases quite as "alternative", i.e. mutually exclusive, or equivalent. They are, rather, "complementary" or related, as can be seen from their occurrence in the p.s. viññána--námarúpa--saláyatana. This note has rather an air of oversimplification.
Para. 424, note 1 -- "the only authentic Pitaka reference", though correct, suggests Buddhavacana, yet you say at the end "to repeat, the word never seems to have been used at all by the Buddha". Why "to repeat..."? This takes too much for granted from your reader, who may have his own opinions about the Ps., or may consider that all, or alternatively none, of the Pitaka is Buddhavacana.
Para. 453, note 2 -- If you put milk into a pot and leave it, does it become curd? doesn't it just go sour? Or is that the same thing? And is the transition gradual or abrupt? The translation "milk, when put into a pot, is curd" rather suggests that it becomes curd merely in virtue of its being transferred to a pot ("curd is potted milk"), which is hardly what is intended: would not "milk, being left in a pot, is curd" be better, if you want to avoid the word "becomes"? The arbitrariness of the decision at what moment the milk becomes curd is largely a rational affair: if the transition is gradual we are perplexed only because we presuppose that it must be either milk or curd (if we do not presuppose "is this milk?" "is this curd?" doubt does not arise -- it is what it is) and if the transition is abrupt we have no reason for perplexity. The less rational our attitude, the more evident becomes the moment when a thing ceases to be what it was.
Para. 470 -- Is the second "concentration" right?
Para. 472 -- Is the second "heart-deliverance" right?
Para. 508 -- See comment on para. 260, note 1.
Para. 510 -- Note number 1 missing in text.
Para. 521, note 1 -- "Unmaterialistic" sounds a little odd combined with "noble" -- Anticommunism?
Para. 524 -- "Universal-wholeness" is rather a teutonic compound -- is there nothing simpler?
Para. 535, note 1 -- This note is missing.
Para. 553, notes 1 and 2 -- Perhaps arúpa beings are intended -- not having a káya they will not have a sak-káya? But see áneñjasakkáya.
Para. 559 -- Why D. 2 for the sixty-two ditthis? Surely D. 1 (Brahmajála)?
Paras. 561-2 -- Are you right in expanding "the way that leads anywhere" into "the way that leads [from] anywhere [to extinction]"? Does it not simply refer to those who are not committed either to hellish or to heavenly rebirth -- i.e. those who might go [to] anywhere? That, at least, is how I understand para. 567.
Para. 577, note 1 -- For "blunt" read "light".
Para. 580, note 2 -- Should not "attainment percipient of nonentity" be "attainment of nonentity of perception" (= asaññásattáyatanam)?
For Para. 645, note 1 -- read para. 644, note 1.
Para. 662 -- See comment to para. 559 above.
Para. 674, sub-para. 3 -- I think that you go against the Netti's intention by giving the four "assumptions" as you do -- it is clear from para. 678 that the Netti's four (in this context) are sensual-desire, being, views, self-doctrine. Better check with the Pali that you have got para. 257 correctly. How inconvenient and tiresome must the Suttas be to the exegetists! Both the Netti and Bhante prefer bhavupádána though perhaps for different reasons. (The Ven. Bu. Thera at least does not alter the texts or suggest they are mistaken.) From para. 675 sub-para. 4 I see that the Bond of Views corresponds to the Tie of Misapprehension of Virtue and Duty. This would tend to make ditthupádána and sílabbatupádána coalesce, no doubt making room for bhavupádána. All this part of the Netti is pure Procrustes.
Para. 689, note 1 -- Why do you say that any soul-concept must fall into the name-body? What about rúpam attato samanupassati and so on, and viññánam attato samanupassati and so on?
Para. 757, note 2 -- Note number missing in text.
Para. 760, note 3 -- Note number missing from text.
Para. 794 et. seq. -- You would probably find all these untraced quotations in the Vimána Vatthu.
Para. 827 -- The whole of this quotation is from the Báhiya Sutta in the Udána (i,10), and not as you have divided it.
Para. 850 -- Read D. 1 for D. 2. The note here is given in the notes as belonging to para. 851.
Para. 823, note 2 -- Full marks for the "teleological suspension of the ethical" -- that will fox everybody.
Para. 904-5 -- This passage seems to suggest that the first beginning is not evident to sávakas but is evident to the Buddhas. This is a strange confusion.
Para. 931 -- Would not "How has my passing of the nights and days been?" be better?
1. The foregoing comments do not pretend to be exhaustive. I have rather skimmed through the translation, and these were the most striking points. I have also made no attempt at all to correct the numerous misprints.
2. As regards the Netti itself, it is indeed a cosy little desert as you describe it. While it is neat, methodical, and systematic, it is also entirely superfluous where it is not positively misleading. It is a combination of glimpses of the obvious (particularly the last part) and Procrustean drill-serjeant methods. I found it wholly useless. It is like being absorbed in a slow snd difficult chess problem and having a well-meaning bystander come up and offer to show how one can get along much faster and more easily. And show one he does -- by treating all the pieces as draughtsmen. A game of draughts played with chessmen, that's what it is. (Long ago I heard the Ven. Soma Thera speak of the Netti Method, which I rather gathered was the art of transferring any one set of things in the Dhamma (the four jhánas, say) into any other set (the seven bojjhangas, say). While it is not exactly that (though, also, it is not exactly not that), it may have set a fashion that the other commentators have been only too eager to follow and develop (draughts is easier than chess).
3. As regards your translation, something may be said about (i) choice of words, and (ii) quantity of words.
(i) Choice of words. Naturally I do not always agree with you in this matter, and for different reasons. But since it is always, ultimately, a matter of difference of personal views there is no point in insisting. In addition to what I have noted above, I would register disapproval of "relishing" for nandi, which, though perfectly correct, is rather quaint (like the word "zeal", which, however, I do not regard as correct for chanda). Only a canibal chief "expects his dear relatives with relish", and though, no doubt, we do devour each other, the word seems a little gross in most contexts. Also "choice" for cetaná and "intention" for sankappa: but my objection to these is on philosophical grounds, which it is impossible to discuss at all briefly.
(ii) Quantity of words. Far too many. This seems to be due to two things. The first is your attempt to be accurate and consistent. This in itself is admirable, and without consistency at least this translation could not have been done (though whether it deserves your efforts is another matter). But your insistence upon maintaining being in being, and upon sticking to "idea" for dhamma through thick and thin sometimes produces some verbal monstrosities. (Your original intention, now mercifully abandoned, to translate yathábhúta as "according as it actually comes to be" and "inseparable from the idea of [vanishing]" for [vaya]dhamma are examples.) Note that "ideas" for dhamme in manañca dhamme ca may lead (by taking "ideas" as equivalent to "images" rather than to "essences" or "natures") to identification of manáyatana with citta, which is a confusion of levels with serious consequences. Dhamme, here, is "things(-as-essence)" -- but note that I do not say you should so translate it, I only point out the danger of translating it as "ideas". Since the Netti itself makes this mistake, perhaps in these circumstances you would be wrong not to translate as "ideas"? You would be guilty of betraying the trust reposed in you by the author of the Netti -- Procrustes -- when he appointed you his translator. The gain in accuracy and significance that you make in this way is sometimes entirely negatived by loss of intelligibility. It cost me quite an effort to decipher "for one who is virtuous there is no choice to make thus 'How shall non-remorse be born in me?' since it is essential to the idea of the virtuous man that non-remorse is born in him" as "one who is virtuous does not have to think 'How shall I become non-remorseful?' since a virtuous man naturally becomes non-remorseful". Mark you, I do not say you ought to have translated it in this way. I only point out that by being accurate and consistent you may become unreadable (I offer no solution). Also, in aiming at accuracy you sometimes produce some little monsters by adhering to etymology -- "in-shutting hindrance" for nívarana, for example [I suggest "constraint", which carries the idea both of restriction and coercion (hedges constrain traffic to keep you to the road] --, and over-reliance on etymology sometimes makes you, in my opinion, overshoot the mark (I have already discussed "mind-making" for manasikára, but think of the strange result of a strict etymological paraphrase of "mind the step!", which contains an almost exact rendering of manasikaroti!). "Universal-wholeness" is another example. The second source of excess words is your way of interpolating words in square brackets in order to complete the sense of elliptical statements. This device is certainly unavoidable in many places, but it is sometimes overdone. For example (para. 511): "For in the fourth meditation cognizance possessed of eight factors is maintained in being: [it is then] quite purified, quite bright, unblemished...". Why not simply "...cognizance of eight factors is maintained in being, quite purified, quite bright, unblemished..."? A desire to be explicit sometimes results in an oversimplification of the sense and even in mistakes. Particularly in Suttas it is important not to put there what is not in the Pali unless it is impossible even to make sense in English without. A good example is found in your Vis. Mag. translation -- (p. 603) "Now this body [with its six internal bases] and externally [the six bases due to] mentality-materiality make a duality". The Pali gives simply "Now this body and externally mentality-materiality make (are) a duality", and this is perfectly good grammatical English giving an exact rendering of the Pali. By adding the brackets you both add words and run the risk of misinterpreting the text. In this case I think your interpretation is on the right lines, except that it oversimplifies the situation by apparently smoothing out the difficulties in an otherwise obscure text. But in fact the obscurities remain, though now concealed in your artful gloss -- what exactly are we to understand by "this body with its six internal bases" and "the six bases due to materiality-mentality"? And besides, the Pali tells us that mentality-materiality is external, whereas you tell us that the six bases are external, which is not quite the same thing. If the text is obscure it is purposely obscure, and should be left so in translation. It is a little ironical that in translating a work by the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera you should gratuitously have given an interpretation to this Sutta passage quoted by him that is quite different from his own interpretation (see the Samy. Commentary, where "externally mentality-materiality" is glossed as "other people"): had you refrained from interpolating you would have saved words, remained faithful to the text, and not laid yourself open to adverse comment either by me or by the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera supposing he were still alive. This example, however, I admit is past history; nevertheless I still sense the same tendency in the present translation. Verse translation presents additional difficulties, of course, metri causa.
It is obvious that if I am to comment on your translation I shall mention principally what I disagree with, or find is wrong, and not what I agree with and approve. If, then, the foregoing reads like a dozen pages of carping criticism, purely destructive bourgeois negative thinking, you have really only yourself to thank, since you said that any comments would be joyfully received, and, taking you at your word, I have produced twelve pages of them in the confident expectation that they will seem like purest nectar. Needless to say, what I have left unsaid in the way of praise and admiration for your really rather remarkable achievement would fill an entire [...one word indecipherable] [7]. As for your learned notes, I find I have some relish for them -- perhaps rather in the sense of Mark Twain's remark "I love work; I can watch it for hours".
Back to Letters to Ven. Ñánamoli Thera - Contents
Back to Ñánavíra Thera Dhamma Page
[151.1] There are, friends, these six bodies of feeling, feeling born of eye-contact, ...feeling born of mind-contact. [Back to text]
[151.2] That is to say, that which is called "heart", "mind", "consciousness".... [Back to text]
[151.3] Having perceived it occurs (to him): "Thus I was perceiving". [Back to text]
[151.4] See EL. 80. [Back to text]
[151.5] When you develop equanimity, Ráhula, that which is resistant, that is abandoned. [Back to text]
[151.a] Without disagreeing with this translation of áyatana, recent thoughts on the matter lead me to prefer "occasion" (which, incidentally, also fits other uses of áyatana, e.g. Sati sati áyatane -- "whenever there is occasion"). [Back to text]
[151.b] N.B. I may change from "consciousness" to "cognition" for viññána, since "to cognize" is shorter than "to conscious of" for vijánáti; but the point is not important. [Back to text]
[151.6] This paragraph is triple noted and marginally noted: Strong disapproval here. [Back to text]
[151.7] Ven. Ñánavíra's entry. [Back to text]