Ñánavíra
Thera
Miscellany
(A collection of various loose papers)
The usual reason given for saying that nibbána is
anattá, is simply that there is clearly no
attá
in nibbána, that nibbána is void of
attá. It is only on the surface that this seems to be
true. A closer inspection shows it involves one or other of
two misconceptions. If it is taken together with the fact
that the five aggregates are void of attá, it implies
that the five aggregates and nibbána are on the same
level. But nibbána is, in fact, void of the five
aggregates. If it is taken together with the fact that
nibbána is void of the five aggregates, it implies
that attá and the five aggregates are on the same
level. But the five aggregates (which are real) are, in fact,
void of attá (which is imaginary).
Upaníyati loko addhuvo ti.
Attáno loko anabhissaro ti.
Assako loko sabbam paháya gamaníyan ti.
Úno loko atitto tanhádáso ti.
Transient is the world, unstable.
Without shelter is the world, without an overlord.
Not one's own is the world, having put all away one must go.
Wanting is the world, insatiate, a/the slave to/of craving.
Eye is old action, it should be known and seen, having been
determined and intended.
Dependent arising has neither duration nor instantaneity: it is, as it were, the
gradient of the curve of existence taken over an infinitesimally short period.
At any time, thus, it describes what is now happening.
Chaque dimension... ['Each dimension is the For-itself's way of projecting
itself vainly toward the Self, of being what it is beyond a nothingness, a different
way of being this fall of being, this frustration of being which the For-itself has
to be.' B&N, p. 137] ...Pour-soi à être.
p. 183.
Námarúpa = rúpa and
rúpa-given-rúpa [náma]
repetition of this is rúpa and r-g-r and r +
r-g-r given r + r-g-r.
[r-g-r is not-r]
námarúpa which is rúpa and
rúpa-given-rúpa and r-g-r[1] and (r-g-r given r-g-r).
This now is asserted afresh, wherefore r-given-r is r' (i.e.
not-r, but on the same level).
Given the straightforward hierarchy of experience. In Immediate
Experience attention rests on the world. This requires no effort. In
Reflexive Experience attention moves back one step in the
hierarchy. It does not, however, move back spontaneously: it requires
to be pulled back by an intention that sees both the fundamental (or
ground) level and the first step. This intention is located on the second
step. A deliberate intention to enter upon reflexion requires a
further intention on the third step; for deliberate intention is intention to
intend (= volition). Double attention is involved. But though,
in Immediate Experience, attention rests at ground level, the entire
hierarchy remains 'potential' (it is there, but not attended to),
and Immediate Experience is always under potential reflexive
observation (i.e. it is 'seen' but not 'noticed'). The added complication
of 'self' is not, despite philosophical opinion, an essential feature
of this structure. Sartre's reflet-reflétant (p. 118) is a brave
(but inadequate[2]) effort to describe the
structure of 'self'; but he is quite wrong to reject Spinoza's
idea-ideae-ideae-....to infinity. In the puthujjana both are
found.
All things obey the Laws of Science, except when they don't.
Graecum est: non legitur.
Note on Catupatisambhidá
The Four Departments/Discriminations
-
ATTHAº -- (Identification of) REFERENT.
(a) When communication is not involved: -- Selection of
relevant, and rejection of irrelevant, signs (any event
mental or material, perceiving which we think of something
else, is a sign; the 'something else' is the referent and,
ultimately, is an expectation/expected[3] event) until the
completion of a context/pattern of events becomes clear.
(N.B. Some relevant signs will be remote both in time and
place. Signs may be mental or material.) (Primary)
interpretation of the sign situation. [I sweat on a
warm Tuesday. Referent: Activation of sweat glands by
heat -- Tuesday is not a relevant sign (or is not a
sign).]
(b) When communication is involved: -- Expansion of symbol
(symbols are signs as words or gestures in rational
communication) until sign-situation behind the symbolized
reference/communication becomes clear. (Primary)
interpretation of the symbol situation. (See
Meaning of Meaning, Canon III.)
Cf.
| Nítattho -- Unqualified or literal
Neyyatho -- Qualified or provisional
| interpretation of symbols (Ang. II,iii,5-6 [A.i,60]).
|
Etam attham viditvá -- having grasped/felt/known (see
2. Cf. below) the interpretation of/the (sign or symbol)
situation. (Udána, passim)
Ime dhammá ekatthá vyañjanameva nánanti
-- these things
are one in referent/interpretation and various only in the
letter. (Citta Samy. 1 [S.iv,281]).
Suggested translations.
Technical:
Literary:
|
(Identification of) Referent.
(Primary) Interpretation of the sign/symbol situation.
Interpretation. [Bespoke for upaparikkhati?]
Meaning [convenient but vague].
Significance.
Sense.
|
-
DHAMMAº -- (Correct) REFERENCE.
Allotting of interpretations of signs or symbols to the proper
context. Seeing the wider significance of interpreted sign or
symbol situations (events or communications), in particular
in the context of the Buddha's Teaching.
Cf. Attham na jánáti. Dhammam na passati.
-- He does not know the referent/interpretation. He does not
see the reference/idea.
Suggested translations.
Technical:
Literary:
|
(Correct) Reference.
Literary: (True) Ideas.
|
-
NIRUTTIº -- (Knowledge of) SYMBOLS.
Knowledge of actual and conventional usage of symbols to
symbolize and communicate reference. Awareness of the general
or individual reaction to words and gestures.
Cf. D. 15 -- Nirutti is equivalent to
adhivacana (expression) and paññatti
(denotation). M. 139 -- Janapadanirutti -- Local
usage, dialect.
Suggested translations.
Technical:
Literary:
|
(Knowledge of) Symbols.
Verbal usage.
Language.
Speech.
Dialect.
|
['Expression', already bespoke by adhivacana, is
condemned in Meaning of Meaning.]
-
PATIBHÁNAº -- (Appropriate) SYMBOLIZATION.
Ability to symbolize reference by appropriate words and
gestures. Perspicuous expression of ideas.
Cf. Yuttapatibháno -- Pertinent perspicuity,
Muttapatibháno -- Fluent perspicuity (Ang. IV,xiv,2
[A.ii,135])
Appatibháno -- Without perspicuity, tongue-tied (M.
152)
Suggested translations.
Technical:
Literary:
|
(Appropriate) Symbolization.
Perspicuity.
|
[Query: how to translate patibháti. Patibháti mam
Bhagavá...patibhátu tam Vangísa
(Vangísathera Samy. 5).]
Dhammá pi mam na patibhanti (Khandha Samy. ix,2
[S.iii,106]).
Dvayanissito khváyam Kaccáyana loko yebhuyyena
atthitañ
ceva natthitañ ca. Lokasamudayam kho Kaccáyana
yathábhútam
sammapaññáya passato yá loke natthitá
sá na hoti:
lokanirodham kho Kaccáyana yathábhútam
sammapaññáya passato
yá loke atthitá sá na hoti.
Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. 15 (S.ii,17)
Atthitá ceases when cessation of the world is seen
Yathábhútam, i.e. when cessation is seen to occur
with cessation of conditions.
Natthitá ceases when arising of the world is seen
Yathábhútam, i.e. when arising is seen to occur
with arising of conditions.
Therefore: --
| Atthitá is the view that the
world arises or contiues, even though conditions have
ceased.
Natthitá is the view that the world ceases, even
though conditions arise or continue.
|
Therefore:
| (i) Where there is no world (i.e.
pañcakkhandhá) one cannot say
'Atthíti'.
(ii) Where there are no conditions (i.e.
rágadosamoha) one cannot say 'Natthíti'.
|
But: --
| (i) In 'one who has passed away'
(atthangato) there are no five khandhas. (After
anupádisesa.)
(ii) In 'one who has passed away' there is no
rágadosamoha. (Before anupádisesa.)
|
Therefore:
| In 'one who has passed away' there is
nothing whereby one might say either (i) Atthíti, or
(ii) Natthíti.
|
Sabbesu dhammesu samúhatesu Samúhatá
vádapathá pi
sabbe may then easily be understood as follows: --
'When all phenomena (both (i) paccuppanná dhammá
[five khandhas] and (ii) paccayas
[rágadosamoha]) have been removed, all ways of saying
(both atthíti and natthíti), too, have been
removed.
For there to be contact, inertia must be felt;
the datum must be perceived; but the feeling
and the perception must be specific (and this is
designation-contact). And vice versa, for there to be
contact feeling must possess inertia, it must
endure; and perception must have a datum, there
must be something that is perceived; but the inertia and the
datum must be specific (and this is
resistance-contact). Any inertia and datum can be
specifically felt and perceived (a specific
pleasant blue light can endure for any length of
time); and any feeling and perception can have a
specific inertia and datum (a specific
alternation of long and short can be any pleasant or
unpleasant coloured light). But for contact, both must be
specific, and thus both designation and resistance are
needed.
Whence by you, B, then seen shall be merely seen.
Thence you, B, will not be that by which [the seen] -- i.e.
the perceiver.
Thence you, B, will not be that where [= therein (the seen)]
-- i.e. the conceiver.
Thence you, B, will not be there [the perceiver], nor
beyond [the conceiver], nor between both [the (visual)
cognizer (or seer)].
Perception is by which
The Perceiver is that by which
Conception is where
The Conceiver is that where ['where' in the sense of a
bare datum]
Perception and Conception is by which there, or
námañca rúpañca
(adhivacana-patigha)
tena = tam yena yena = by which
tattha = tam yattha yattha = where
Yena and yattha fulfil each other and do not
require a tam in addition -- i.e. there is the
percept and the concept but no perceiver
or conceiver.
Yato te Báhiya ditthe ditthamattam bhavissati...
tato tvam B na tena
Thence B there will not be that visible object [in the world
complete with negatives] of zero visibility by reason of
which you are perceived [as visible]. (Can end of
perception [and conception (as subjectivity of the world)]
form a point of view?)
Tato tvam B na tattha
Thence B there will not be an 'in the world' [of that said
visible object (the said object of zero visibility is
nothing beyond 'that which is in the world')] by
reason of which you are conceived [as the subjectivity
of the world]
Tato tvam B n'ev'idha na huram na ubhaya...
Thence B there will be no visible object of zero visibility
(here) or non-world (beyond) or both combined
(i.e., the world); by reason of all of which you are
conceived as the visible subjectivity of the world.
N.B.
| I am the subjectivity
of the world (i.e. that part of the world that is
missing)
The eye is the polarity
of the world (the visible eye is au ______ du monde)
|
Whence by you, B, the seen shall be merely seen
Thence, B, there will not be that in the
world by reason of which you are perceived and
conceived as possessor or subjectivity of the world (i.e. the
world is perceived and conceived as yours)
Thence, B, you will not be engaged in
the world (since there will be neither you nor the world)
Thence, B, you will not locate yourself
here, or there, or in between
Thence, B, there will not be that
whereby you are perceived
Thence, B, there will not be that
wherein you are conceived
The eye is a determinate partial structure (as is also the
world).
The total structure is indeterminate, i.e. a contradiction
(attá).
[The contradiction being, precisely, that the determinate,
and therefore impermanent, structure is permanent]
The eye is negative náma-rúpa
(yena -- loko) (tena -- tattha) (perception --
conception)
Perception and conception (determinate) become the Perceiver
and the Conceiver in the contradiction -- i.e. the former are
the condition (tena/tattha) for the latter.
Rúpa is the (arahat's) non-world.
Cakkhu is the distortion of this (polarization).
Cakkhuviññánam is the world
(a matter of degree).
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Footnotes:
[1] but r-g-r without r given, itself is r (i.e. asserted by
itself)
[Back to text]
[2] S.'s 'self' is an 'itself', not a 'myself' -- an objective 'self' instead of a
subjective 'self'. A mere negative is not enough.
[Back to text]
[3] Not necessarily future or even temporal. [Back to text]