A discussion of nibbána and anattá might,
perhaps, have been needless, were it not that, in spite of
the Buddha's silence on the matter, the view that
nibbána is anattá is often put forward. To
justify this view, appeal is generally made to these three
statement of the Buddha's, which occur in the Suttas in many places:
Sabbe sankhárá aniccá.They are interpreted in this way. Sabbe sankhárá means everything that is sankhata, or formed; or, in other words, everything excluding the asankhata, the unformed, nibbána. Sabbe dhammá means both sankhata and asankhata; that is to say, everything, nibbána included. Nibbána is thus anattá.
Sabbe sankhárá dukkhá.
Sabbe dhammá anattá.
(Anguttara III,134; Dhammapada 277-279; &c.)All formations are impermanent.
All formations are suffering.
All things are not-self.
As evidence of the correctness of such an interpretation, this Sutta passage will perhaps be adduced:
Yávatá bhikkhave dhammá sankhatá vá asankhatá vá, virágo tesam dhammánam aggam akkháyati, yadidam madanimmadano pipásavinayo álayasamuggháto vattúpacchedo tanhakkhayo virágo nirodho nibbánam.At first sight this passage seems convincing; and it is only on closer examination that the argument based on it is seen to be falacious. For this reason, and also because it provides a salutary warning against treating the Buddha's teaching as an exercise in logic, it is dealt with here. It is clear enough that, in this Sutta, the asankhata, or nibbána, is referred to as a dhamma. But to suppose that the term dhamma can therefore always apply to nibbána would be a mistake, for it is said elsewhere,
(Anguttara IV,34)Whatever things (dhammá), monks, there are, formed or unformed, the topmost of those things is declared to be dispassion, that is to say, the ending of intoxication, the removal of thirst, the uprooting of yearning, the interruption of the round, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, extinction.
Dhammá aniccá: yad aniccam tam dukkham: yam dukkham tad anattá.Since nibbána, as we saw earlier, is both permanent and pleasant -- pleasant precisely because it is void of suffering --, it is evident that the word dhamma does not always have exactly the same meaning. It is not intended to prove that nibbána is never referred to as dhamma, but simply to show that any syllogistic reasoning using the term dhamma -- 'All things (dhammá) are anattá: nibbána is a thing (dhamma): therefore nibbána is anattá.' -- is suspect and unreliable. And, in fact, reference to the full text of the Sutta passage in question shows dhammá in the company of the words buddha and sangha -- a context where dhamma means '(The Buddha's) Teaching' or 'Doctrine' or 'Norm'. This is clearly a quite different order of meaning of dhamma from that in sabbe dhammá anattá, and the above argument is consequently invalid.[5]
(Saláyatana Samyutta 4)Things (dhammá) are impermanent: what is impermanent is suffering: what is suffering is not-self.
The earlier discussion should leave no doubt that sabbe dhammá anattá cannot possibly refer to nibbána; but if this is once admitted, it becomes necessary to account for the change from sankhára to dhamma in the three statements, sabbe sankhárá aniccá, sabbe sankhárá dukkhá, and sabbe dhammá anattá. Why not simply sabbe sankhárá aniccá, dukkhá and anattá? In the absence of an explanation by the Buddha, all that we can hope for, and, indeed, all that we can really want, is a simple interpretation that should not conflict with the Suttas and should be in conformity with the general intention of the Buddha's teaching. What follows does not pretend to be more than a tentative opinion: it is a suggestion rather than an assertion.
Like the colours of the rainbow, the meanings of sankhára and dhamma are many and various; and just as the blue merges into the green, and the green into the yellow, without any abrupt change, so each meaning of these two words merges into another, and that into a third, without our ever being able to say where one ends and the next begins: under these circumstances, exact definition is impossible, and formal logic, as we have seen, misleading. Some of these meanings -- káyasankhára, 'in and out breaths', for example, and dhamma and adhamma, 'right' and 'wrong' -- are clearly irrelevant to the problem; others, just as clearly, are essential to it. The task is to decide where the dividing line shall be drawn. Quotations from the Suttas are here chosen according as they seem to illustrate various relevant meanings of sankhárá and dhammá (in their plural form); and their general sense, indicated by these quotations, which cover for each word a certain limited range of meanings, will be found to give a reasonable intepretation of the three statements under discussion.
Four texts will be enough to show that sankhárá -- at least within the range that is taken here -- has a threefold aspect.
Katamañca bhikkhave rúpam....All the volitions of a living being, which arise in connexion with objects either of senses or of the mind, all his affective reactions to experience, his desires and aversions, his likes and dislikes, are called sankhárá, or -- as it is translated here -- formations, and are included in the aggregate of formations. In this passage, therefore, sankhárá are just volitions, and compose one of the five aggregates.
Katamá ca bhikkhave vedaná....
Katamá ca bhikkhave saññá....
Katame ca bhikkhave sankhárá. Chayime bhikkhave cetanákáyá, rúpasañcetaná saddasañcetaná gandhasañcetaná rasasañcetaná photthabbasañcetaná dhammasañcetaná. Ime vuccanti bhikkhave sankhárá....
Katamañca bhikkhave viññánam....
(Khandha Samyutta 56)And which, monks, is matter?....
And which, monks, is feeling?....
And which, monks, is perception?....
And which, monks, are formations? There are, monks, these six groups of volition: volition regarding forms, volition regarding sounds, volition regarding smells, volition regarding tastes, volition regarding touches, volition regarding things. These, monks, are called formations....
And which, monks, is consciousness?....
In the next quotation the emphasis shifts:
Kiñca bhikkhave rúpam vadetha....Sankhárá are no longer merely volitions: though still one of the five aggregates, they are now seen in their dynamic function. Sankhárá 'form what is formed'. And what is formed? The five aggregates are formed; all existence is formed. This simply means that the present existence of a living being -- the five aggregates -- is conditioned by his volitions in the past, and that his present volitions condition his future existence.
Kiñca bhikkhave vedanam vadetha....
Kiñca bhikkhave saññam vadetha....
Kiñca bhikkhave sankháre vadetha. Sankhatam abhisankharontíti bhikkhave tasmá Sankháráti vuccanti. Kiñca sankhatam abhisankharonti.
Rúpam rúpattháya sankhatam abhisankharonti.
Vedanam vedanattháya sankhatam abhisankharonti.
Saññam saññattháya sankhatam abhisankharonti.
Sankháre sankhárattháya sankhatam abhisankharonti.
Viññánam viññánattháya sankhatam abhisankharonti.
Sankhatam abhisankharontíti kho bhikkhave tasmá Sankharáti vuccanti.
Kiñca bhikkhave viññánam vadetha....
(Khandha Samyutta 79)And what, monks, do you say is matter?....
And what, monks, do you say is feeling?....
And what, monks, do you say is perception?....
And what, monks, do you say are formations? 'They form what is formed', that, monks, is why they are called 'formations'. And what is the formed that they form?
Matter as matter is the formed that they form,
Feeling as feeling is the formed that they form,
Perception as perception is the formed that they form,
Formations as formations are the formed that they form,
Consciousness as consciousness is the formed that they form.
'They form the formed', that indeed, monks, is why they are called 'formations'.
And what, monks, do you say is consciousness?....
Finally, here are two texts in which the meaning of sankhárá has moved right over; and the word now refers to 'what is formed', to all five aggregates, to the new existence or the embryo in the womb.
Rúpam bhikkhave aniccam, vedaná aniccá, saññá aniccá, sankhárá aniccá, viññánam aniccam...: sabbe sankhárá aniccá....Sankhárá are first, volitions; secondly, what form the formed; and thirdly, the five aggregates, the living being. Volitions, thus, are what form the formed; and what is formed is the living being. Combining these, we get a single phrase, 'volitions form the living being', which covers all three meanings. This we shall take as expressing the general sense of sankhárá. The emphasis, in particular contexts, on any one of these three aspects may be more than on the others, as the quotations show; but if the general sense is entirely forgotten in such contexts, the essential background connecting different uses of the word sankhaárá is lost; and many passages, thus isolated, become hard to understand. If the context does not indicate any one particular aspect, then sankhárá may be understood in its general sense.
(Majjhima 35)Matter, monks, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, formations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent...: all formations are impermanent....
Kabalinkáre ce bhikkhave áháre atthi rágo atthi nandi atthi tanhá, patitthitam tattha viññánam virúlham; yattha patitthitam viññánam virúlham, atthi tattha námarúpassa avakkanti; yattha atthi námarúpassa avakkanti, atthi tattha sankháránam vuddhi; yattha atthi sankháránam vuddhi, atthi tattha áyatim punabbhavábhinibbati; yattha atthi áyatim punabbhavábhinibbati, atthi tattha áyatim játijarámaranam; yattha atthi áyatim játijarámaranam, sasokam bhikkhave sarajam saupáyásanti vadámi.
(Nidána/Abhisamaya Samyutta 64)If, monks, there is lust for the sustenance of solid food, if there is delight in it and craving for it, consciousness established there increases; where established consciousness increases, there is descent (into the womb) of mentality-and-materiality; where there is descent of mentality-and-materiality, there is growth of formations; where there is growth of formations, there is in the future a coming into renewed existence; where there is in the future a coming into renewed existence, there are in the future birth, decay, and death; where there are in the future birth, decay, and death, monks, there will found sorrow, passion, and despair, I say.
It will be seen that the general sense of sankhárá, 'volitions form the living being', describes a process taking place in time -- past volitions form present beings, present volitions form future beings. Since the chief characteristic of a temporal process is change, we may say 'every formation of living beings by volitions is a process of change', or more shortly, 'all formations are impermanent'; and we thus arrive at sabbe sankhárá aniccá.
A general sense of sankhárá has been found by putting together three particular and connected meanings: the result is, as it were, the Lowest Common Multiple. The meanings of dhammá, however, seem to be related rather differently, and the general sense may perhaps best be arrived at by finding a formulation that is true of all of them -- a kind of Highest Common Factor.
Manañca paticca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññánam.In these quotations, and in many other passages, dhammá -- here translated as the neutral word 'things' -- means anything that can be the object of mind-consciousness (as opposed to eye-consciousness and so on), or in brief, 'objects of the mind'.
(Majjhima 148)Dependent upon the mind and upon things, mind-consciousness arises.
Mano anicco: dhammá aniccá: manoviññánam aniccam.
(Saláyatana Samyutta 43)The mind is impermanent: things are impermanent: mind-consciousness is impermanent.
The second quotation shows that dhammá, as objects of the mind, are impermanent. Nibbána, being permanent, is clearly not an object of the mind; for if it were, consciousness and nibbána would both cease together, and lust, hate, and delusion, would return to plague an Arahat upon his death -- a strange state of affairs.
Seyyathápi Sandaka purisassa hatthapádá chinná, tassa carato ceva titthato ca suttassa ca jágarassa ca satatam samitam jánáti, chinná me hatthapádáti, udáhu paccavekkhamáno jánáti, chinná me hatthapádáti.The man, when he is reflecting, actually sees only the stumps at the ends of his arms and legs -- for there is nothing else to be seen --, and from the fact that he no longer sees his hands or feet he infers that these are cut off. In much the same way, the Arahat sees only his own undefiled mind, and from the fact that he no longer sees his former defilements he infers their destruction -- which is nibbána. Even if an Arahat is not engaged in reflecting on the state of his mind, still lust, hate, and delusion, remain absent, and nibbána endures. To think about nibbána is to entertain an idea or a concept; to realize nibbána is to destroy lust, hate, and delusion;[c] to infer or reflect upon nibbána is to compare two states -- before, and after, destruction of lust, hate, and delusion --: but just as we can never actually see, only infer, 'minus three oranges', so in no case can nibbána itself -- namely, 'minus lust, hate, and delusion' -- be directly an object of the mind.
Na kho bho Ánanda so puriso satatam samitam jánáti, chinná me hatthapádáti, api ca kho pana paccavekkhamáno jánáti, chinná me hatthapádáti.
Evameva kho Sandaka yo so bhikkhu araham khínásavo vusitavá katakaraníyo ohitabháro anuppattasadattho parikkhínabhavasamyojano sammadaññávimutto, tassa carato ceva titthato ca suttassa ca jágarassa ca satatam samitam ñánadassanam na paccupatthitam, Khíná mé ásaváti, api ca kho pana paccavekkhamáno jánáti, Khíná mé ásaváti.'Suppose, Sandaka, there is a man whose hands and feet are cut off; whether he walks or stands or sleeps or wakes, does he perpetually and continuously know "My hands and feet are cut off", or, rather, is it when he reflects that he knows "My hands and feet are cut off"?'
'No indeed, master Ánanda, that man does not perpetually and continuously know "My hands and feet are cut off", but it is when he reflects that he knows "My hands and feet are cut off".'
'Just so, Sandaka, a monk who is an Arahat, whose cankers are destroyed, who has lived the life, done what was to be done, laid down the burden, destroyed attachment to becoming, who is free through knowing rightly; whether he walks or stands or sleeps or wakes, he does not have knowledge and vision perpetually and continuously established in him "My cankers are destroyed", but it is when he reflects that he knows "My cankers are destroyed".'
(Majjhima 76 -- Burmese reading)
Even though dhammá -- as objects of the mind -- cannot, perhaps, include nibbána, yet it may still be maintained that sabbe dhammá -- all things -- cannot possibly exclude nibbána. Nevertheless, here, surely, is a passage where sabbe dhammá does not refer to nibbána:
Chandamúlaká ávuso sabbe dhammá, manasikárasambhavá sabbe dhammá, phassasamudayá sabbe dhammá, vedanásamosaraná sabbe dhammá, samádhipamukhá sabbe dhammá, satádhipateyyá sabbe dhammá, paññuttará sabbe dhammá, vimuttisárá sabbe dhammá, amatogadhá sabbe dhammá, nibbánapariyosáná sabbe dhammáti.The meaning of dhammá in this text is less easy to determine precisely than in those considered first. Desire, in one way or another, is the root condition of all sentient existence; and feeling, as the Buddha explains at length in the Mahá Nidána Suttanta (Dígha 15), is the source of tanhá, or craving, which is responsible immediately for much of the suffering of this existence, and more remotely for rebirth in the next. But sabbe dhammá, although it undoubtedly refers to sentient existence in general, has a more definite meaning. 'All things -- sabbe dhammá -- are born of attention' and 'originate with contact', and they are therefore not separate from consciousness; for when there is no consciousness there is neither attention nor contact. Furthermore, concentration, mindfulness, understanding, and release, all of them relate only to the mind. A meaning of dhammá that suggests itself as valid throughout this Sutta is 'experiences', understood in a wide sense to include all mental events: without experiences there is no sentient existence; experiences are not separate from consciousness; and also, concentration and other mental states are experiences in the sense intended here. Nibbána, the deathless, brings all experiences to an end.
(Anguttara X,58)All things, friends, are rooted in desire; all things are born of attention; all things originate with contact; all things have their source in feeling; all things have concentration as the foremost; all things have mindfulness as the chief; all things have understanding as the highest; all things have release as the heart; all things are swallowed up in the deathless; all things are ended in extinction.
'All things -- sabbe dhammá -- are born of attention': so it was said above. This leads us to another Sutta.
Catunnam bhikkhave satipatthánánam samudayañca atthagamañca desissámi, tam sunátha. Ko ca bhikkhave káyassa samudayo.Here, dhammá are one of the four satipattháná, or stations of mindfulness. The body, feelings, and mental states, the first three satipattháná, are, for all their variety, fairly simple entities, and they can be observed more or less immediately. They originate and pass away together with sustenance, contact, and mentality-and-materiality, respectively; independently, that is to say, of whether they are deliberately made the objects of mindful contemplation or not. But dhammá, as described in the Satipatthána Sutta (Majjhima 10), are the complex elements of five quite different elaborate analyses of various aspects of existence -- five hindrances, five aggregates, six internal and external bases, seven factors of enlightenment, and four noble truths. These elements are entities that have been observed and identified by analysis and given a mental label.
Áhárasamudayá káyassa samudayo, áháranirodhá káyassa atthagamo. Phassasamudayá vedanánam samudayo, phassanirodhá vedanánam atthagamo. Námarúpasamudayá cittassa samudayo, námarúpanirodhá cittassa atthagamo. Manasikárasamudayá dhammánam samudayo, manasikáranirodhá dhammánam atthagamoti.
(Satipatthána Samyutta 42)I shall teach, monks, the origination and the passing away of the four stations of mindfulness; listen to it. And what, monks, is the origination of the body?
With the originating of sustenance there is the originating of the body; with the cessation of sustenance there is the passing away of the body. With the originating of contact there is there is the originating of feelings; with the cessation of contact there is the passing away of feelings. With the originating of mentality-and-materiality there is the originating of mental states; with the cessation of mentality-and-materiality there is the passing away of mental states. With the originating of attention there is there is the originating of things (dhammá); with the cessation of attention there is the passing away of things.
Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu santam vá ajjhattam kámacchandam, Atthi me ajjhattam kámacchandoti pajánáti; asantam vá ajjhattam kámacchandam, Natthi me ajjhattam kámacchandoti pajánáti; yathá ca anuppannassa kámacchandassa uppádo hoti tañca pajánáti; yathá ca uppannassa kámacchandassa pahánam hoti tañca pajánáti; yathá ca pahínassa kámacchandassa áyatim anuppádo hoti tañca pajánáti.Here, the observed entity is the lustful emotion that has arisen, and 'sensual desire' is the label. This labelling, and the elaborate analysis of the situation that accompanies it, are only possible in a deliberate contemplative effort of the mind; and the identified entities, the elements of analysis, the dhammá, can only occur in the mental process of analysing experience, irrespective of whether the original entities are mental or material. That is why dhammá only last as long as attention (manasikára) is being paid to them, and why 'with the cessation of attention there is the passing away of dhammá'. This suggests a more specific meaning of dhammá, having particular reference to the fourth satipatthána, namely, 'elements of mental analysis'.
(Majjhima 10)Here, monks, a monk understands present sensual desire, 'Sensual desire is present in me'; or he understands absent sensual desire, 'Sensual desire is absent in me'; and how there is arising of unarisen sensual desire, that he understands; and how there is putting aside of arisen sensual desire, that he understands; and how there is no arising in the future of sensual desire that is put aside, that he understands.
From the discussion in the last paragraph, it is apparent that dhammá as 'elements of mental analysis' represents what is common to both dhammá as 'objects of the mind' and dhammá as 'experiences' (in its widest sense); for 'elements of mental analysis' are experiences that have become objects of the analysing mind. We can now formulate a general sense of dhammá that is valid at least within the range of meanings indicated by the Suttas that have been considered: dhammá are 'objects of mental analysis'. This general sense has been derived, not as an exact definition of dhammá, but as a guide to the implication of sabbe dhammá anattá.
When this result is applied, sabbe dhammá anattá becomes 'all objects of mental analysis are not-self'. Since attá, or self, arises in the first place merely as a delusive figment of the mind, and is then attributed by the deluded mind to its objects -- 'the five aggregates of clinging or one of them' --, a statement that mental analysis finds no attá in any of its objects is equivalent to an absolute denial of attá. Remembering this, and also the fact that the mind is the only means there is of investigating anything at all, the foregoing interpretation of sabbe dhammá anattá may not seem unreasonable.[d]
Cakkhum kho Ánanda suññam attena vá attaniyena vá: rúpá suññá attena vá attaniyena vá: cakkhuviññánam suññam attena vá attaniyena vá: cakkhusamphasso suñño attena vá attaniyena vá: yampidam cakkhusamphassapaccayá uppajjati vedayitam sukham vá dukkham vá adukkhamasukham vá, tam pi suññam attena vá attaniyena vá.Thus the Buddha analyses the world into forty-two dhammá, and finds no self. There is no mention, be it noted, of nibbána.
Sotam suññnam...: saddá suññá....
Ghánam suññnam...: gandhá suññá....
Jivhá suññá...: rasá suññá....
Káyo suñño...: photthabbá suññá....
Mano suñño...: dhammá suññá....
Yasmá ca kho Ánanda suññnam attena vá attaniyena vá, tasmá, Suñño lokoti vuccatíti.
(Saláyatana Samyutta 85)The eye, Ánanda, is void of self and of anything to do with self: forms are void of self and of anything to do with self: eye consciousness is void of self and of anything to do with self: eye-contact is void of self and of anything to do with self: whatever feeling arises conditioned by eye-contact, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, that too is void of self and of anything to do with self.
The ear is void...: sounds are void....
The nose is void...: smells are void....
The tongue is void...: tastes are void....
The body is void...: touches are void....
The mind is void...: things are void....
Since, Ánanda, it is void of self and of anything to do with self, therefore 'The world is void', it is said.
What more remains to be said? We have sabbe sankhárá aniccá because change is the characteristic of sankhárá, a synthesis, a process involving time: sabbe sankhárá dukkhá because suffering is a characteristic of change: and sabbe dhammá anattá because dhamma implies an analysis, a tally of the state of affairs at a given moment, in which no self can be found.
If a length of cable is looked at sideways, the strands can be traced without difficulty from end to end, but it is hard to tell how many there are, and to make sure that not one is overlooked. Sabbe sankárá aniccá is existence seen sideways, as a process: impermanence is easy to observe, but can we be certain there is no hidden core of self inside? If a cross-section of the same cable is looked at, although the strands cannot be seen as they run through the cable they can be counted immediately, and not one will pass unnoticed. Sabbe dhammá anattá is existence seen in cross section, as a state: although impermanence is not immediately not evident, a hidden core of self inside would be noticed at once.
Rúpam bhikkhave aniccam, vedaná aniccá, saññá aniccá, sankhárá aniccá, viññánam aniccam; rúpam bhikkhave anattá, vedaná anattá, saññá anattá, sankhárá anattá, viññánam anattá: sabbe sankhárá aniccá, sabbe dhammá anattáti.Seen as sankhárá, the five aggregates are aniccá, seen as dhammá, they are anattá. Existence -- the five aggregates -- may be looked at, like the cable, in one way or in another: but in whichever way it is looked at, it is still anicca, dukkha, and anattá.
(Majjhima 35)Matter, monks, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, formations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent; Matter, monks, is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is nor-self, formations are not-self, consciousness is not-self: all formations are impermanent; all things are not-self.
How, then, can nibbána be any of these things? For it is cessation of existence.
Sabbesu dhammesu samúhatesu
Samúhatá vádapathá pi sabbeti.
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Footnotes:
[5] From this point to the end the argument is seriously at fault and hopelessly misleading. Ñánavíra. 12.iii.65. [Back to text]
[c] 'To realize nibbána and 'to destroy lust, etc.' are synonymous expressions. Extinction is cessation of craving (and consequently of the five aggregates). When craving is put aside (pahíná), nibbána is ipso facto achieved or realized (sacchikatam); and this happens when the eightfold path is developed (bhávito) and suffering is thereby penetrated (pariññátam) -- i.e. by seeing the five aggregates as impermanent, suffering, and not-self. In the path (which is sankhata) both sammásati and sammásamádhi are present, and the object of the latter is the four satipattháná (Cúlavedalla Sutta, Majjhima 44). Thus the object of the mind at the moment of the path is the five aggregates or (which amounts to the same thing) the four satipattháná, and not nibbána. To say that nibbána is seen at the moment of the path is only to speak figuratively. [Back to text]
[d] Perhaps the most satisfactory translation of
dhamma in this sense is 'phenomenon' -- that of which
a sense or the mind directly takes note, immediate object of
perception (Concise Oxford Dictionary). 'All formations are
impermanent, all formations are suffering, all phenomena are not-self.'
[Back to text]