Changing
Principle in the Samantapāsādikā¡¦s Commentary
on
the Firs Rule of the Defeat Peculiar to Nuns
Institute
of Religion and Cuture Tzu Chi University Juo-hsűeh
Shih
Journal
of the Center for Buddhist Studies
Vol.5(2000)
pp.135-158
Abstract
The ruling
against physical contact with the opposite sex is shared by monks and nuns. In
commenting on this rule for nuns, the Samantapaasaadikaa¡Ðthe
commentary on the Paali
Vinaya¡Ðraises
a hypothetical case of physical contact between a monk and a nun. In the same
situation , the monk is not to be accused of an offence, but the nun is. The
reason given is because the rule for nuns contains the word
saadiyeyya(should
consent to ). Consent indicates passivity.
The
investigation of this issue involves three criteria: consent, activity vs
passivity, and immobility. As the rule for nuns is expressed passively but that
for monks actively, this paper
firstly demonstrates that passivity or activity is no crucial factor. So the
word saadiyeyya
is irrelevant to deciding penalties. Secondly, this paper looks carefully into
the rule prohibiting sexual intercourse in order to extract some principles for
determining guilt in sexual offences. This discussion shows that the offender's
mental attitude (i.e. consent to the act after its perform-ance or initial
intention to do the act), not his/her physical reaction to the act serves as the
criterion for determining guilt. In the rule against monks' physical contact
with women, however, there exists one dubious case, which seems to present
conflicting principles. But our interpretation excludes the superficial
inconsistency. Moreover, immobility as a factor for innocence is fairly likely
to be of later origin. This paper goes on to examine the corresponding or
relevant texts of the other Vinaya traditions. We find consistency in the
primary principle(i.e. consent or no consent) for determining guilt. The
consideration of immobi-lity is shared only by the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, and for
this Vinaya immobility never leads to innocence. The Chinese recension of the
Samantapaasaadika
also demonstrates that immobility does not guarantee innocence. Thus we may
con-clude that the Samantapaasaadika
switches the principle for determining innocence from mental attitude to
physical reaction. This new principle, however, applies only to monks. So in the
case of physical contact if a monk is the passive partner and he remains
motionless, he is not to be accused of an offence even though heconsents to it.
Consent implies pleasure derived from the act. Such growing to-lerance does not
apply to nuns.
Keywords:
Vinaya, Buddhist ethics, Buddhist nuns
1. Introduction
In
the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha (monastic code for monks) the first class of offence,
i.e. the category of Defeat (Pārājika) contains four rules, but in the
Bhikkhunī Pātimokkha ( monastic
code for nuns ) there are eight rules in the same category. The first four of the eight rules are
common rules (i.e. to be observed by both monks and nuns) and hence are adopted
from the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha. The latter four rules are peculiar to nuns, among
which the first one prohibits physical contact with men. I shall refer to this
rule as Defeat 1 (N). In commenting on this rule, the Samantapāsādikā ( Sp
hereafter ) raises a hypothetical case of physical contact between a monk and a
nun. The penalties for them respectively are, however, not the same: in the same
situation, the monk is not to be accused of an offence but the nun is. Why is
there such discrepancy? The Sp then refers to the authority of the commentarial
tradition, according to which, the pivot lies in the word sādiyeyya
(should consent to) in the rule for nuns.
The ruling against physical contact with
the opposite sex is shared by both monks and nuns, however, in the nuns' Vinaya
it falls into the first (the most serious) category, i.e. Defeat, but in the
monks' counterpart it belongs to the second category, i.e. Sa~nghādisesa (S
agh hereafter). It is interesting to investigate the
ground for such a penalty decision presented in the Sp. For this purpose, it is
necessary first to compare Defeat 1 (N) and S
agh 2
(M).
In
addition to such comparison, we have to look further into the first rule
prohibiting sexual intercourse. This ruling is common to both monks and nuns,
therefore I shall refer to it as Defeat 1 (M+N). This discussion provides us
with the principles for determining a monk's guilt in sexual offences. Finally
the examination of the corresponding texts of the other Vinaya traditions will
broaden our view, particularly the Chinese recension of the Samantapāsādikā
(ChinSp hereafter) is inspiring. The issues involved in the discussion are
technical and complicated. But they are worth pursuing, because what finally
emerges is that principles for judging an offence changed over time. One could describe the direction of
change as becoming harsher towards nuns; but this is of secondary
importance. It is the fact of
change itself which is of great interest, for it has hitherto gone unnoticed in
Vinaya studies.
2.
Physical contact with the opposite sex by monk or nun: the Pāli
tradition
2.1 The Sp's position
In commenting on Defeat 1 (N), t he Sp
discusses the hypothetical case
of
such contact between a monk and a nun. The fact that the sexual partner of an
offending nun is a monk, rather than any other man, or that the partner of an
offending monk is a nun, rather than any other woman, is of no relevance; the
hypothetical meeting of the two simply serves to juxtapose the rule for nuns
with that for monks. The following passage presents different decisions and the
reason for the difference, ascribing them to the commentarial tradition:
However, in the case of a
monk and a nun, [Case 1]: should the nun touch the monk, should he remain
motionless but mentally consent to (sādiyati) it, he is not to be accused
of an offence. [Case 2]: Should the monk touch the nun, should she remain
motionless and accept (adhivāseti) it mentally only, even though she does
not disturb her limbs, she is to be accused of the offence of Defeat when it is
a matter of Defeat, a gross offence when it is a matter of a gross offence, an
offence of wrong-doing when it is a matter of wrong-doing. Why? Because of the
words "should consent (sādiyeyya) to physical contact"[1].
This is the decision in the commentaries.[2]
There
seem to be two issues here: the physical (active/passive) and the mental
(consent/no consent). We shall see below that to equate passivity (which refers
to how the act is initiated) with immobility (which refers to reaction to the
initiative) is too simple, but for the moment this can stand.
We have mentioned in the introduction
that the monks' rule parallel to Defeat 1 (N) is S
agh 2. Both prohibit physical
contact with a sexual motive, but the monks' rule is expressed actively, the
nuns' rule passively. The reasoning
in the above Sp passage would seem to be: because Defeat 1 (N) is formulated in
a passive manner (i.e.consent to the touching by a man), a nun commits an
offence even though she is passive. For the same reason, in Case 2 a nun is to
be accused of an offence even though she does not move at all but merely
"accepts" it mentally. However, the monks' rule, i.e. S
agh 2, expresses activity, so
when the nun is the initiator, the monk is not to be accused of an offence if he
merely "consents to" it mentally, because the monks' rule does not use the word
"consent to" (see next section). Although this is not spelt out in the text just
quoted, it is logical to infer so from the context.
To summarise the above analysis in
simplified formulas:
For
nuns:
Defeat
1 (N) = passivity + consent ¡÷
offence
Case
2 = passivity + consent ¡÷
offence
(physical
reaction is not considered relevant)
For
monks:
Sa^ngh
2 (M) = activity (consent is envisaged)
¡÷
offence
Case
1 = passivity ¡÷
no offence
(consent
is not considered relevant)
Case
2 agrees with Defeat 1 (N) in the physical passivity and mental consent to the
act, so there is an offence. Case 1 is the negative corollary of Sa^ngh 2 (M),
so there is no offence.
2.2 Saadiyati
and
adhivaaseti
Before we discuss the issues of passivity and consent, we must dispose of
another matter raised by the above passage. The word there used to describe the
monk's attitude is saadiyati,
while the word for the nun's attitude is adhivaaseti.
Is there any difference? Apparently not, because the passage immediately goes on
to say that adhivaaseti
glosses the word saadiyeyya
which is used in the rule. Nevertheless, since so much will hang on the word
saadiyat,
it seems advisable to investigate its use more thoroughly. My conclusion will
mean that we can accept what the passage says, for the difference between the
two terms is at most one of nuance. Those readers willing to accept the
conclusion without further evidence are advised to skip the rest of this
section.
According to the Paali-English
Dictionary(PED hereafter), saadiyait
means "to enjoy for oneself, to agree to, permit, let take place". The word is
etymologically connected to Sanskrit svaadu,
"sweet, pleasant"; but how is it used in Paali?
Where
it means "consent to" or "accept", it is synonymous with
adhivaaseti,
to which A Critical Paali
Dictionary
(CPD hereafter) gives three meanings: (1) to wait; (2) to consent (especially to
accept an invitation); (3) to bear, endure, pardon, give in[3].
To take an example in the Dighaanikaaya
(DN hereafter): adhivaasetu
me bhava.m Gotamo
ajjataanaya
bhatta.m saddhi.m
bhikkhusa^nghena ti.
adhivaasesi
Bhagavaa
tu.nhi
bhaavena[4]
("May the venerable Gotama, together with the Savg7ha
of monks, accept today's meal from me." The Blessed One accepted it in silence).
The subcommentary identifies adhivaasetu
with saadiyatu:
adhivaasetuuti
sadiyatu[5].
However, it may be possible to distinguish a nuance between these two words by
enhancing the connotation of
saadiyati to imply taking pleasure and by
weakening that of
adhivaseti to mean "allow".
The
use of saadiyati
in the sense of accepting or consenting to is frequent in the Vinaya. For
example, Nissaggiya Pacittiya
(N-Paac
hereafter) 18: yo pana bhikkhu jaataruuparajata.m
ugga.nhaapeyya
vaa
ugganhapeyya
vaa
upanikkhitta.m vaa
saadiyeyya
¡K[6]
(Should any monk receive gold or silver or have them received or consent to
their deposit ¡K). Saadiyeyya
occurs in N-Paac
7 (M+N)[7]
and Paac
47 (M+N)[8]
respectively in the context of accepting material offering. On the other hand,
saadiyati
is also used to mean to consent to/accept appointment as an exhorter of nuns
(bhikkhunovaadaka-sammuti.m
saadiyati).[9]
In
matters concerning sexuality, whether saadiyati
should be rendered as "consent to" or "feel pleasure in" is often ambiguous.
Among the four additional Defeats peculiar to nuns, Defeats 1 and 4 (5 and 8
respectively in a full list of the Paatimokkha)
contain the word saadiyeyya.
Defeat 1 (N)[10]
prescribes that nuns should not have physical contact with men; here the word
saadiyeyya is usually rendered as "should consent to", in that this rule is
formulated in a passive manner:
yaa
pana bhikkhunii
avassutaa
avassutassa purisapuggalassa¡Kaamasanaj
vaa
¡K
patiipi.lanaj
va
saadiyeyya,
ayam pi paaraajikaa
hoti
¡K (Should any nun, ¡Koozing
with desire, consent to the touching or ¡K or pressing by a male person, who is
oozing with desire ¡K, she too becomes defeated ¡K).
Defeat
4 (N)[11]
prohibits nuns from preliminary actions of asaddhamma (wrong practice)
and it is also formulated passively: yaa
pana bhikkhunii
avassutaa
avassutassa purisapuggalassa hatthagaha.na.m vaa saadiyeyya sa^nghaa.ti
ka.n.nagaha.na.m vaa saadiyeyya
¡K
purisassa vaa abbhaagamanaj
saadiyeyya
¡K
(If any nun, oozing with desire, should consent to the taking hold of her
hand(s) by a male person, oozing with desire, or should consent to the taking
hold of the edge of [her] outer robe, ?or should consent to the approach of a
man ?. Under the precondition that she is oozing with desire, presumably the nun
derives pleasure from the taking hold of her hand(s), but in the case of taking
hold of the edge of [her] outer robe, or the approach of a man, it would make
better sense to render saadiyeyya
as "should consent to" as in Defeat 1 (N).
A
collation of the Chinese translations of this rule confirms this rendering. The
corresponding rules (i.e. Defeat 6 = Paali Defeat 4 or 8 in a full list) of the
Dharmaguptaka (Dha hereafter), Mahaasaajghika
(Maa
hereafter), Mahii¡¦saasaka (Mi hereafter)
and Sarvaastivaada
(Sa hereafter) read very similarly and all of them contain the expression
"allow/consent to the taking hold of hand(s) and robe [by the man] ¨ü¡e¨k¤l¡f®»¤â®»¦ç
".[12]
The corresponding rule of the Muu (Chinese
and Tibetan) is formulated quite differently so that no parallel can be
recognised. However, one does read the expression "allows him to approach her or
go with him".[13]
In his German translation of the corresponding rule in the Maa,
Waldschmidt
renders svaadiiyeta
as
"sich gefallen läßt".[14]
On the other hand, we shall see below
that in S
agh 2 (M) the
parallel to saadiyati
in Chinese versions does connote feeling pleasure, as is appropriate to that
context.
So, finally, what of our Sp passage? As
it says, saadiyati can be used as a synonym of adhivaaseti.
On the other hand,
saadiyati
may imply pleasure. By preferring to use adhivaaseti,
the Sp excludes from discussion the question whether the nun takes pleasure in
the contact; mere consent is enough to make her guilty.
2.3 Defeat 1 (N) compared to Sa^ngh
2 (M)
These
two rules prohibit physical contact with a member of the opposite sex. As
mentioned above, whether the sexual partner is ordained is not relevant. But in
its hypothetical juxtaposition of monk and nun, the Sp is implicitly juxtaposing
these two rules; so our next step must be to consider them as they appear in the
Paali.
Defeat 1 for nuns says:
Should
any nun, oozing with desire, consent to the touching, or handling, or taking
hold of, or contacting, or pressing by a male person, who is oozing with desire,
below the collarbone, above the kneecaps, she also becomes defeated and no more
in communion. She is "above the kneecaps". (yaa pana bhikkhunii avassutaa avassutassa purisapuggalassa adhakkhaka.m ubbhajaanuma.n.dala.m
aamasana.m vaa paraamasanaj
vaagaha.na.m
va
chupana.m vaa
patipiilanaj
va
saadiyeyya,
ayam pi paaraajikaa
hoti asa.mvaasaa ubbhajaanuma.n.dalikaa ti.)[15]
This
envisages passivity on the nun's part, touching and so on by a man. No action of
the nun can be observed, so her attitude is the criterion for determining guilt.
If she consents (i.e. puts up no resistance), there is an offence; if she does
not, there is no offence. That is why the rule contains the word "should consent
to" (saadiyeyya).
This is attested in the non-offence (anaapatti)
section, where "not consenting" (asaadiyantiyaa is
listed as one of the reasons for innocence:
There
is no offence should it be unintentional, or should she be unconscious, not
aware, not consenting, mad, distracted, afflicted by pain, or the original
offender. (anaapatti
asa~ncicca,
asatiyaa, ajaanantiyaa,
asaadiyantiyaa,
ummattikaaya,
khittacittaaya,
vedana.t.taya,
aadikammikaaya
ti.)[16]
Sa^ngh
2 for monks prescribes:
Should
any monk, affected by desire, with perverted heart, come into physical contact
with a woman, or hold her hand, or hold a braid of her hair, or touch some of
her limbs, [he commits an offence which] entails legal acts of the S
agha. ( yo pana bhikkhu otinno viparinatena cittena matugamena saddhij
kayasaj-saggaj
samapajjeyya
hatthagahaj
vaa venigahaj
vaa abbatarassa
vaa a~n~natarassa vaa
a^ngassa paraamasanaj
sa^nhaadiseso
ti.)[17]
The
non-offence section[18]
is exactly the same as that just cited for Defeat I (N), except of course that
it is in the masculine.
In
contrast with Defeat 1 (N), this rule is formulated in an active manner, so the
word saadiyeyya would be redundant: consent is presupposed by the
activity of the agent. So the presence or absence of a word for consent is
irrelevant to determining guilt.
We
shall see below that the evidence of the other traditions corroborates this
conclusion: in most of themthe rule corresponding to S
agh 2 (M) does contain a word
corresponding to saadiyeyya.
So its absence from the Paali rule seems to be of no
significance.
2.4
Principles for determining a monk's guilt in sexual
offences
The active
construction in S
agh 2 (M)
informs us that a monk commits an offence of S
agh when he takes the
initiative in physical contact with a woman. The passive construction of Defeat
1 (N) shows that a nun commits an offence of Defeat even though she be the
passive party. The rule for nuns appears to be stricter than that for monks.
This distinction, however, is superficial, as we shall see by looking further at
the question of a monk's activity or passivity.
The
passive case is not so fully discussed under S
agh 2 (M) as under the first
Defeat common to both monks and nuns,
the prohibition on sexual intercourse, where many examples of passivity
are discussed.
2.4.1 Mental attitude:
consent/pleasure
The
rule proper of Defeat 1 (M+N) envisages activity,[19]but
the surrounding text considers many cases where a monk is involved in sexual
intercourse passively (willingly or unwillingly) or accidentally or
unexpectedly. The surrounding text
in this case includes not only casuistry but also the Vinitavatthu.
This is a further text, annexed to the non-offence (anaapatti) section,
which served as guidance to the later Vinaya experts by providing cases in which
the potential offenders are involved for a variety of reasons.[20]
In each case the Buddha asked the monk whether he consented
(sadiyi
tvaj
bhikkhu
ti).
If he did, he committed an offence of Defeat; if he did not, then there was no
offence.[21]
For example, a monk, while sleeping, was defiled by another monk. As he( i.e.
the defiled) was unconsciously involved in sexual intercourse, that fact alone
was not sufficient to decide whether or not he committed an offence; his mental
attitude towards the act was the decisive factor. So this is the decision: if he
[i.e. the defiled one] consents to the act on waking up, both are to be
expelled; if he does not, the defiling monk alone is to be expelled
(pat.ibuddho
saadiyati,
ubho naasetabbaa;
pa.tibuddho
na saadiyati,
duusako
naasetabbo).[22]
In some contexts saadiyati may be
rendered as "consent to" with the implication of "feeling pleasure", as in the
case just mentioned. However, such an implication must be spelt out on certain
occasions when the potential offenders are left with no room to agree or
disagree with what happens to them. For example, the text discusses a case of
forced sexual intercourse. In Vesaalii some naughty boys caught a monk and a nun
and forced them to have sex. In that case, the decision is: if both feel
pleasure in the act, both are to be expelled. If both do not feel pleasure in
it, both are innocent (ubho saadiyi.msu ubho naasetabbaa. ubho na
saadiyi.msu
ubhinna.m anaapatti).[23]
It is evident that the feeling derived from the act becomes another principle
for judging whether or not there is an offence. One may therefore extract a
principle from these instances : that in a passive case, mental attitude towards
the act or even the feeling derived from the act is the criterion for judging
whether there is an offence.
2.4.2 Initial intention
The above principle, i.e. feeling
derived from the act, is not applicable to cases where offenders tried to take
advantage of a legal loophole. For example, [Case 1]: a monk engaged in sexual
intercourse with the view that he would not be committing an offence, in that he
felt neither pain nor pleasure, because his faculties were impaired. However,
this is the decision: Monks, whether or not this foolish man had [any] feeling,
he committed an offence of Defeat (vedayi vaa
so bhikkhave moghapuriso na vaa
vedayi, aapatti
paaraajikassaati).[24]Another
incident [Case 2] recounts that a woman twice invites a
monk to sexual intercourse, and in the first case he is not to exert himself but
she will (ehi bhante ahaj
vaaayamissaami
tvaa.m maa
vaayaami, evaan te anaapatti bhavissatiiti),[25]
while in the second case she will not exert herself but he will (ehi bhante
tva.m vaayama
aha.m na vaayamissaami,
evan te anaaapatti bhavissatiiti).[26] She thought that so long as one of the
parties remained motionless, there would be no offence for the monk (evan te
an-aapatti
bhavissatiiti).
She was wrong. In both cases, the verdict is the same: Monk, you have committed
an offence of Defeat (aapattij
tva.m bhikkhu aapanno
paaraajikan
ti).[27]
In Case 1, the offender's feeling derived from the act ceases to be the
principle for judging an offence, because he intended to take advantage of a
legal loophole. In that case, it is his initial intention that counts. Case 2
shows that passivity (i.e.
immobility, another legal loophole ) does not guarantee innocence. Since the
offender intentionally had sexual intercourse, his initial intention determined
his guilt. It is clear, then, that a different principle is applied in judging
cases where the intention was to take advantage of a legal loophole. Case 2
confirms that there is an offence for the monk whether he be active or passive.
Thus activity or passivity is by no
means the criterion for judging a case; in other words, passivity does not
necessarily make a monk free of guilt. In the first instance the monk "did not
exert his body", but he still incurred a Defeat. In these cases, the monk was
not asked whether he consented to it or not, because it is self-evident that he
agreed to the woman's suggestion.
Does the same principle apply to S^nagh
2 (M)? Apparently yes, but the matter is complicated.
We begin by noting that in the
non-offence (anaapatti) section, "not consenting"
(asaadiyantassa)
is a reason for innocence, as it is in the cases of Defeat 1 (M+N) against
sexual intercourse and Defeat 1 (N) against nuns' physical contact with men.
Furthermore, in the Viniitavatthu
of S^nagh 2 (M), one does find an instance where a monk was passively involved
in physical contact with a woman. When asked whether he consented to it or not,
he answered in the negative and thus was exempt from an offence
(saadiyi
tva.m bhikkhuuti.
Naaha.m
bhagavaa
saadiyin
ti. anaapatti bhikkhu asaadiyantassaa
ti).[28]
Since this shows the same principle, consent, to determine guilt, what is the
problem?
2.4.3 Conflicting
principles?
The
problem lies in the casuistry to this rule. After discussing cases where the
monk is the passive party (Vin III 124.32¡Ð125.30
= II:3.1¡Ð5),
the conclusion (Vin III 125.31¡Ð126.3
= II:3.6) seems to present two conflicting principles, physical reaction and
initial intention, by which to judge an offence. According to the latter half of
that passage, the determining factor for innocence is the monk's initial
intention. So long as it is his intention to remove himself (
mokkhaadhippaayo)
from physical contact with the woman, there will be no offence whatever happens,
i.e. whether or not he exerts his body or recognizes the contact.[29]
In this case, physical reaction plays no role. But if he intends contact
(sevanaadhippaayo),
then four possibilities are considered:
Case
1: If he exerts his body (kaayena
vaayamati)
and recognizes the contact, it is an offence of S^nagh.
Case
2: If he exerts his body but recognizes no contact, it is an offence of
wrong-doing.
Case
3: If he does not exert his body but recognizes the contact, there is no offence
(sevanadhippayo
na ca kaayena
vaayamati
phassa.m pa.tivijaanaati
sanaapatti).[30]
Case
4: If he neither exerts his body nor recognizes the contact, there is no offence
either.
Contrasting
Cases 1+2 with Cases 3+4, one would at first sight take physical reaction to be
the principle for deciding an offence, as does the Sp passage with which we
began. But this principle conflicts with that of mental attitude, the primary
one in making verdicts. However, another interpretation is possible, one which
creates no conflict.
In Cases 1+2, the monk eventually exerts
his body and hence is no longer the passive partner although he was passive
initially.[31]
His mobility shows consent to the act, so there is an offence. In Cases 3+4, the
monk does not exert his body, so he remains the passive partner in physical
contact. In such a case, his
immobility implies lack of consent to what is happening. Therefore, what is
crucial is not his mobility or immobility per se, but what that indicates
about consent. This interpretation is supported by the ChinSp (see below).
However, the Sp's comment on this passsage gives a different
interpretation, reversing the parts mental attitude and physical reaction play
in judging whether or not there is an offence.
In the third case,
there is no offence owing to the lack of bodily exertion. Because if any one,
even desiring association, recognizes, consents and experiences mere contact by
remaining motionless, for him there is no offence, in that offence does not
exist in the mere arising of a thought. (tatiye kaayena
avaayamato
anaapatti, yo hi sevanaadhippaayo
pi niccalena kaayena
kevala.m phassa.m
pa.tivijaanaati
saadiyati anubhoti tassa cittuppadamatte
apattiya
abhavato
anaapatti.)[32]
This
is a specious argument. It is true that a mere thought, however evil it may be,
never incurs any offence, as the Vinaya only deals with actual events. But that
certainly does not mean that the Vinaya concerns itself only with monks' and
nuns' actions, not their thoughts. Gombrich has argued against such a standpoint
and remarked: " [A] monk can only
be disciplined for something he did consciously (sa~ncicca). This
synthesis between intention and action, between the mind and the body, in
Buddhist ethics was doubtless first worked out in monastic jurisprudence."[33]
When nothing happens, one's intention plays no role; but when something does
take place, one's intention plays an essential part, even if one is the passive
party. We have seen this to be attested by many decisions about penalties found
in the canonical Vinaya texts.
In the passage just cited the Sp argues
that since his desire for association is a mere thought, the monk in the
hypothetical case is innocent. But the principle that a thought alone incurs no
offence is not applicable here, because it was not a mere thought in isolation:
there was already an actual context. Although the monk was passive and remained
motionless, he did experience and
consent to physical contact with a woman. So one expects his mental attitude to
be the factor determining guilt.
The same discrepancy between the
canonical text on S^nagh 2 (M) and the Sp's commentary arises in an other case.
In the Vinitavatthu[34]it
says that a monk committed an offence of S^nagh because he became
infatuated (saratto) and raised his foot when revered by a woman.
What makes this an offence of S^nagh is actually the monk's infatuation, and his
movement results in direct physical contact with the woman. However, in
commenting on this case, the Sp says:
In the case of veneration, he should prevent a woman from rubbing his
feet desiring to pay veneration. He should cover his feet or remain immobile.
Because there is no offence for one who does not move although he consent/feel
pleasure in his heart. (vandanavatthusmi.m itthii
paade
sambaahitvaa
vanditukaamaa
vaaretabbaa
paadaa
vaa
paticchaadetabbaa
niccalena vaa
bhavitabba.m niccalassa hi cittena saadiyato
pi anaapatti)[35]
Covering
his feet is to avoid physical contact. If this is not possible, alternatively he
may remain motionless. One would
expect this to suggest that he does not consent to it but cannot avoid it. The
Sp's commentary, however, disregards how he feels but takes account of how he
reacts physically.
2.4.4 A different interpretation: immobility
implies lack of consent
On an examination of the Paali
canonical texts, we have demonstrated that mental attitude, not physical
reaction, is the primary principle for determining guilt, but there exists a
seemingly conflicting principle, i.e. physical reaction, in a discussion of an
exceptional case. We have also shown that the Paali post-canonical commentary
makes use of this dubious principle for the innocence of monks. However, a
different interpretation is possible, an interpretation which gives rise to no
conflict with the main principle for determining guilt or
innocence.
To attempt at a fresh interpretation of
that case, it is necessary to clarify the applications of mental attitude and
physical reaction either separately or jointly. To that end I shall first
classify three possible modes of presenting a passive case:
(1)
Consent alone is mentioned. In a passive case, the potential offender's consent
needs to be spelt out in order to judge an offence because there will be no
offence if (s)he does not consent to the act. As can be seen in Defeat 1 (N),
the nun is passive and the rule says that if she consents to physical contact
with men, she commits an offence of Defeat. In this situation, physical reaction
does not need to be stated in that it is not crucial.
(2)
Immobility plus consent. In addition to the passive partner's mentality, his or
her physical reaction is also stated. However, that addition affects nothing
because mental attitude is the decisive factor for an offence or innocence. For
example, the Sp's commentary says that if the nun mentally accepts that act but
remains motionless, she is still to be accused of an
offence.
(3)
Immobility alone is stated. Immobility of the passive partner can signify the
opposite mentality: it may signify their consent to the act in that they put up
no resistance, or, it may signify their unwillingness (when there is no way to
escape); they would otherwise exert their bodies in response to the act. Owing
to the equivocal nature of the mention of immobility, in the case where an
offence is incurred, consent must be stated in order to legitimate it. In the
case where immobility alone is stated, the implication is that the passive party
is not consenting. That leads to his or her innocence. So the pivot of not being
guilty still lies in the passive party's mentality, not physical reaction. In this interpretation, there is consistency in the main principle for
judging an offence in the canonical text.
A
further analysis of that exceptional case may provide us with clues to resolve
the confusion as regards whether bodily immobility leads to the conclusion that
mental attitude is a mere thought, which is the cause of
innocence:
Case I: The monk desires association,
but does not exert his body. The implication is that he does not feel pleasure
in physical contact with women.
Case II: The monk desires association.
He feels pleasure in physical contact with women and exerts his body [in
response].
In either Case I or Case II, "desire for
association" is a thought, and whether the very thought remains "a mere thought"
or whether it prompts the passive party into an actual contact depends on his
attitude towards physical contact with women. In Case II, by his mental act
(i.e. feeling pleasure in physiccal contact), the monk enters an actual contact.
In that situation, his desire for association is no longer a "mere thought". In
Case I, the monk may, due to a sense of guilt, refrain from taking delight in
physical contact although originally he is not without desire. His desire
remains "a mere thought" in that it is not developed into any bodily exertion or
mental enjoyment. That is why the monk commits no offence.
That exceptional case falls in the
category of Case I. The above analysis demonstrates that the mention of
immobility does not mean replacing the principle of attitude with that of
physical reaction. However, the Sp apparently understands it differently by
referring "a thought" to attitude towards the act, not the original intention
before the act. We learn by comparison that there is disagreement between the Sp
and ChinSp, for in the latter immobility is not the decisive factor for
innocence (see below Sec.3.3, pp. 24f).
Our foregoing discussion is inspired by the ChinSp.
3.
Physical contact with the opposite sex by monk or nun: the other
traditions
3.1
The canonical texts of the Bhik.sunii-Vinaya
We have shown above that in the
Paali
Vinaya what happens is not enough to determine whether there is an offence: why
and how it happens must be taken into consideration. To determine guilt, mental
attitude is the crucial factor.
Collation of the parallel texts in the
other traditions shows that most of them use the same principle. The non-offence
section in the Dha is basically the same as in the Paali.
It contains similar factors[36]
for innocence to those listed in the Paali,
but elaborates on the cases where the nun is not oozing with desire or the
contact is unintentional.[37]
The Sa gives a different list: contact while regarding the man as her father,
brother or son; contact in an emergency, and so on.[38]
In conclusion, there is no offence in any case where she conceives no desire.[39]
The Chinese recension of the Muulaasarvaastivada
Vinaya (ChinMuu
hereafter) demonstrates the same principle: the nun's mental attitude (i.e.
whether she has passion) is the criterion for deciding whether there is an
offence. This is attested by an example: if a nun is ill and a man is massaging
her, if she becomes desirous, there is an offence of wrong-doing; if she does
not, there is no offence.[40]
In the Mii,
there are four factors for innocence: madness, disturbance in mind, illness and
being the original offender. This list appears only at the end of Defeat 1 (M+N)
and is omitted in the rest of the rules because it applies to all of them.[41]Additional
factors are given wherever applicable. In the rule against physical contact, no
word-for-word commentary or casuistry is provided because they are the same as
those in the corresponding rule for monks, namely, S^nagh 2 (M). From the
casuistry one learns that a pure mental attitude is the only factor for
innocence.[42]
(see below)
The Maa
is the only tradition which allows no innocence. Even if neither the nun nor the
man feels desire, there is an offence of light infringement.[43]So
for the Maa
what happens is crucial: once physical contact occurs, the nun is guilty of an
offence, albeit a light one.
3.2
The canonical texts of the Bhik.su-Vinaya
3.2.1
Saadiyeyya
Subsection 2.2 above discussed the
meaning of the verb saadiyati and its use in the current context; and in
3.3 we said that though its optative form, saadiyeyya, was absent from
the wording of rule Saasdfsafsdfis S^nagh 2 (M), .this did not affect the
meaning of the rule or detract from the principle that for monks as for nuns
consent is crucial for determining offences of this character. We begin this
section by collating the parallel passages in the other Vinaya traditions, thus
both shedding light on the exact meaning that they attributed to this term and
corroborating our conclusion that in this respect there is no difference between
the rulings for monks and for nuns.
Readers not interested in a detailed study of the meaning of this word are again
advised to skip to 3.2.2.
In the Maa-L,
both the monk's and nun's rules (S^nagh 2, M and Defeat 1 ( 5 in a full list) ,
N = Paali Defeat 1, N) against physical contact contain the word
saadiyeya.
Maa-L
S^nagh 2 (M):
yo puna bhik.su
otiirno
vipari.natena
cittena maatrgraamena
saardha.m
kaayasa.msarga.m
samaapadyeya
sa.myathiida.m hastagraha.na.m
vaa
ve.niigraha.na.m
vaa
anyataraanyatarasya
vaa punr a^ngajaatasya
aamo.sa.naparaamo.sana.m
saadiyeya
S^aghaati¡¦se.so.[44]
Ma-L
Defeat 5 (N):
Yaa puna
bhik.sunii
ava¡¦srutaa ava¡¦srutasya
puru.sasya
adho kak.saabhyaam
upari jaanuma.n.dalaabhyaam
aamo.sa.naparaamo.sa.na.m
saadiyeya
iya.m pi bhik.suni
paaraajikaa
bhavaty
asamvaasya.[45]
In
S^nagh 2 (M), ssadiyeya
can be rendered as "should feel pleasure", for since the monk is the initiator,
that already implies his "consent". In Defeat 5 (N),saadiyeya
can still be rendered as "should consent to", as the nun is passive. The two
translations differ because of the context, but what is important is that the
rules use the same word.
Collating S^nagh 2 (M) of the Paali,
Ma[46]
and Ma-L,
one finds that they read nearly the same, but the Ma¡¦s
and Ma-L's
rules contain the word saadiyeya[47]which
is not found in the Paali. The Chinese rendering of the Maa
Vibhavga
reads: " feeling [the pleasure
in] fineness and smoothness
¨ü
²Ó
·Æ
",[48]
but in the Praatimok.sa-suutra
it is "feeling pleasure ¨ü¼Ö".[49] It seems that in Chinese
saadiyati is rendered as "feeling pleasure" or more specifically "feeling
[the pleasure in] fineness and smoothness".[50]
The Sanskrit Mu
has the different word sviikuryaat,
which means: "should agree, accept, assent".[51]
Its Chinese rendering in both the Vibhavga
and Praatimoksa-suutra
is "generating the mind of feeling pleasure" §@¨ü¼Ö¤ß.[52]
The Sanskrit Sa[53]
does not contain any description of the monk's mental attitude, neither does its
Chinese parallel in the Vibhavga.[54]
However, in the Chinese Praatimok.sa-suutra,
the expression "fineness and smoothness ²Ó·Æ"
appears.[55]
Among the other
Vinayas in non-Indian languages, the Dha has no expression equivalent to
saadiyeyya in its Vibha^nga[56]
and Praatimok.sa-suutra.[57]However,
the Mii
does. The rules in its Vibha^nga[58]and
Praatimok.sa-suutra[59]
read exactly the same: "If a monk, affected by desire, with perverted heart ¡K
seizes [her] body part by part, rubbing [to feel] fineness and smoothness
(¼¯µÛ²Ó·Æ),
[he commits an offence of ] S^nagh."[60]
The Chieh-t'uo-chieh-Ching ( ¸Ñ²æ§Ù¸g
)[61]
uses another phrase: "If a monk ¡K comes into physical contact with a woman ¡K
should [he] touch [her] body part by part, feeling the touching (ıIJ),
[he commits an offence of] S^nagh."[62]
As pointed out above, the sense of "fineness and smoothness ²Ó·Æ"
may be derived from the phrase kaayasajsaggaj
saadiyeya/saadiyeyya, of which the expression " ıIJ
feeling the touching" in the Chieh-tuo-chieh-Ching ¸Ñ²æ§Ù¸g
may be another translation.
s In summary, some traditions use the word
saadiyeya/saadiyeyya,
which in this context they interpret as expressing pleasure; some do not. In
some traditions, this word or its equivalent expression ( in the case of Chinese and Sanskrit
verions) appears in both texts, namely, Vibha^nga and Praatimok.sa-suutra,
but in some it appears only in the latter. Moreover, it appears in almost all
the Chinese Paartimoksa-suutra
texts except for the Dha; the same holds true of the extant Sanskrit
Praatimoksa-suutra
texts except for the Sa.
3.2.2 Principles for determining
guilt
The monastic discipline for nuns is
compiled on the model of that for monks, and we have seen that the non-offence
section of S^nagh 2 (M) in the Paali Bhikkhu-Vinaya reads exactly the same as
its parallel in Defeat I (N). A collation of the different recensions of S^nagh
2 (M) confirms that the factors for innocence parallel those in the related
Bhikkhunii-Vinaya
traditions as they have been presented above. I shall therefore focus on cases
where the monk is passive.
We have seen above in the Paali that if
a monk intends to get free of a woman, he is not guilty of an offence even
though physical contact occurs and even though he exerts his body and recognizes
the contact. The Mii
presents the same case with a minor discrepancy:[63]
a monk is seized by a woman, but he desires no association and tries to free
himself from her; if he does not consent to (or, feel [pleasure] in) the
contact, even if he recognizes it ( ÁöıIJ¦Ó¤£¨ü
), there is no offence for him. Here the monk's intention is made clear by
expressions such as "desiring no association" and "not consenting to the
contact". It is obvious that the
Paali and the Mi
use the same principle in deciding the case: mental attitude is the crucial
factor.
The Sa[64]
discusses cases where the monk plays the passive role, and the description of
the monk is always: infatuated, exerts his body and feels the sensation of
fineness and smoothness (¦³±ý¤ß¡A¨°Ê¡A¨ü²Ó·Æ).
In these cases, he commits an offence of S^nagh or a gross offence, depending on
the situation. However, there is no
presentation of cases where the monk remains motionless.
We recall the discussion in the Paali
casuistry which gave rise to conflicting interpretations in the later Paali
tradition (see pp. 11 above). There is no such discussion in the Mi
Nor does the ChinMuu[65]
contain anything even remotely similar. However, the Dha[66]
does contain similar casuistry,[67]
and it is of great interest, for it disagrees with the Paali. The difference
between the two traditions can easily be seen from the following
table.
mental attitude |
exerts
the body |
recognize
the contact* |
penalties |
Paali desiring association** |
yes |
Yes |
Sa^n |
yes |
No |
wrong-doing | |
no |
yes |
no
offence | |
no |
no |
no
offence | |
Dha oozing
with desire ±ý¤ß¬VµÛ |
yes |
yes |
Sa |
yes |
no |
Gross
offence | |
no |
yes |
Gross
offence | |
no |
no |
wrong-doing |
*
The wording in the Dha is different: feeling pleasure in
contact.
**
Sevanaadhippaaya.
We recall that in case 3 the Paali frees
the monk from guilt if he does not exert his body, even though he does desire
association (sevanaadhippaayo)
with the woman. The Dha, by contrast, allows no innocence when the monk's
mentality is not pure. In an actual
event, the passive partner's mental attitude, in the Dha called "oozing with
desire" ±ý¤ß¬VµÛ,
is no mere thought (as was argued by the Sp), so a monk still incurs an offence
of wrong-doing even if he does not exert his body, or feel pleasure in the
contact.
Another example suffices to demonstrate
the Dha's stance : immobility never leads to innocence. In the case of a woman
paying veneration parallel to that in the Paali Viniitavatthu
which we dealt with above, it says that a woman, while venerating him, seizes a
monk's feet, if he feels pleasure in the contact but remains motionless, he
commits an offence of wrong-doing.[68]
The Maa[69]
too considers this case, but with a different conclusion: instead of deciding
the penalty, the text only offers recommendations. It says that in case a woman
comes to venerate a monk's feet, if he becomes infatuated, he should sit upright
and bid the woman pay reverence at some distance. However, if the woman, out of faith, eventually draws
near to venerate him, at that moment the monk should bite his tongue so that the
pain will distract him from the sensation of female fineness and smoothness.[70]
This last recommendation clearly indicates that what concerns the canonical
commentator(s) - as in the Paali - is the control of the monk's mind, not the
movement of his body.
Like the Paali, the Maa shows
much concern with heterosexual relationships, in that its casuistry[71]
contains extensive discussion of occasions when there may be some contact,
direct or indirect, between a monk and a woman. While it is not necessary to go
into every detail, one important point must not be overlooked, a point closely
related to our previous discussion of the Sp's theory of innocence: immobility =
mere thought = no offence.
The
discussion of the Maa
usually starts with a scenario in which a monk appears together with a woman,
for example, walking on the same road; holding the same vessel; sharing the same
coach and the like. These are
considered as improper conduct. However, should the monk become desirous, it is
an offence of light infringement of the Vinaya (vinayaatikrama);
should he touch (or move or shake), out of desire, something shared with the
woman, it is a gross offence (sthuulatyaya;
Paali: thullaccaya). In many
cases the penalty decision stops here and it informs us that even a "mere
thought" (becoming desirous) incurs an offence, albeit a light one, and that
"intention" plus "action" incurs a heavier offence.
In some cases, however, the decision
goes on to determine innocence. For example, suppose a monk and a woman are
walking on a piece of long board, this is not appropriate, but should the monk
become desirous, it is an offence of light infringement of the Vinaya; if the
monk becomes desirous and shakes the board, it is a gross offence; if the board
does not shake or if a man is standing between the monk and the woman, there is
no offence.[72]
Note that the "immobility" of the board makes the monk guiltless. This is open
to two lines of interpretation:
firstly, the result of the monk's action serves as the criteria for
determining guilt. As the board does not shake as his action intends, there is
no offence. Secondly, when the board does not shake, it means that the monk does
not take an action and that implies he is not desirous, that is why he commits
no offence.
I take the second line, for the first
one is not in accord with the principle underlying the penalty decision. Remember that it incurs a light offence even
though the monk only becomes desirous but takes no action yet. Apparently even a
"mere thought" counts, then how can he be guiltless after taking an action (this
implies that he has become desirous)? and how can he be guiltless just because
his intention is not fulfilled?
The difference between the Paali and
Ma
lies here: in the Paali, the monk is the passive partner, who consents to the
contact but remains motionless. There is no offence for him, because a "mere
thought" does not count. The
Ma
presents active cases, and this tradition is strict to the effect that a "mere
thought" without action still counts. So there is no room for innocence unless
the monk has a pure mind, i.e. not becoming desirous. This results in his taking
no action, and his inaction is reflected by the "immobility" of the object the
monk may move or shake.
3.3
The post-canonical commentaries
The two post-canonical commentaries to
the Sa S^nagh 2 (M)[73]
do not contain any discussion of cases in which a monk is the passive partner in
physical contact with a woman.
The ChinSp has a subtler consideration
than the Paali Sp, but at first sight it seems to present, like the latter,
conflicting principles. However, a close examination of the ChinSp proves that the principle applied in its
commentary on Sa^ngh 2 (M) is consistent,
and that the ChinSp differs
from the Sp on the part immobility plays in deciding whether there is an
offence.
Within one single passage
(T1462[24].762a.20-28)
one reads the following verdicts: in one case [Case 1] it says that there is an
offence of S^nagh for the monk who is oozing with desire and moves his body;[74]
in another case [Case 2], where a woman seizes a monk, It is a wrong-doing for the monk
who, out of desire, feels pleasure
in [the contact] but remains motionless.[75] Following this, there is yet another
case [ Case 3 ] in which no offence is committed by a monk who is oozing with
desire but remains motionless.[76]
Case 2 and Case 3 present an interesting
contrast. Although immobility is present in both cases, it does not nullify
guilt in Case 2: there is at least an offence of wrong-doing even though he
remain motionless. It is therefore evident that immobility cannot be the
decisive factor for judging an offence.
Yet what is decisive? The difference between Case 2 and Case 3 is that
the former has the word "feel pleasure ¨ü¼Ö",
which is the Chinese rendering for saadiyati, but Case 3 has not. That is
the reason why in Case 3 there is no offence. So innocence is not due to
immobility but to not feeling pleasure in the act. It is the same principle, i.e. mental
attitude towards the act, that the ChinSp applies in discussing the passive
cases. As we remember, the Sp's commentary totally disregards the potential
offender's mental attitude and makes physical reaction the criterion for the
monk¡¦s innocence.
4. Conclusion
The investigation of the dubious
decisions quoted in the Sp involves three criteria: activity/passivity, consent
and immobility. Our discussion proves that although S^nagh 2 (M) and Defeat 1
(N) are differently formulated, they both rule: firstly, that physical contact
with the opposite sex, whether in active or passive mode, entails an
offence; and secondly, that mental
attitude ( i.e. consent to the act after its performance or initial intention to
do the act) is the primary principle for determining guilt. We also demonstrate that immobility does
not guarantee innocence, and that
although the Paali canonical text at first sight seems to present a conflicting
principle not found in the other traditions, our interpretation excludes the
superficial inconsistency.
However,
if one follows the Sp's position, taking physical reaction to be a new principle
for judging an offence, there is obviously disagreement between the casuistry
and the Viniitavatthu
as regards the criteria for deciding penalties. One point deserves attention:
the natures and styles of the casuistry and the Viniitavatthu
are apparently different. The former consists of systematic penalty gradation
based on hypothetical examples. For the purpose of gradation, it is necessary to
go into the details of any situation and take all possibilities into
consideration. Contrary to the casuistry, the Viniitavatthu
deals with actual[77]
cases and is much simpler in style, in that normally the Buddha applies an
essential principle (e.g. consent to the act or not) to judge an offence without
going into detail (e.g. exerting the body or not).
Thus the Viniitavatthu
and the casuistry appear to me to have been composed by different authors and
they may represent different strata of the canonical text. It seems that the consideration of
physical reaction in judging a case
represents a later development in most of the Vinaya traditions, thus it
is not entirely impossible that the exceptional case in the Paali canonical
casuistry is a later interpolation (Even so, the further innocence by immobility
is unique in the Paali tradition alone).
This assumptive view just mentioned is
based on the following observations: (1) The discussion considering immobility
as a factor for determining guilt, as far as our examination goes, is an
isolated case in the Paali canonical commentary; (2)such a case is shared only
by the Dha, also in the canonical casuistry; and most importantly, (3) immobility never leads to innocence
for the Dha; (4) the ChinSp disagrees with the Sp on switching the principle for
determining a monk's innocence from his mental attitude towards the act to his
physical reaction to the act, that is to say, immobility for monks alone results
in innocence.
In commenting on Defeat 1 (N), the
Paali post-canonical tradition has presented a changing principle, namely,
physical reaction to sexual contact, for determining guilt. However, this new
principle applies only to monks. When it comes to the case of nuns, the old
principle, namely, mental attitude, applies.
Abbreviations
and Bibliography
BD
= I. B. Horner, The Book of the Discipline (Vinaya.tpitaka),
6 Vols., London 1938-1966 (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20,
25).
BhiPr
= Ernst Waldschmidt, Bruchstycke
des Bhik.su.ni-Praatimoksa
der Sarvaasivaadins,
Leipzig 1926 (Kleinere Sanskrit-Texte, 3). [Nachdruck: Wiesbaden 1979
(Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, 2),
1-191].
BhiVibh
= Bhikkhunii-Vibha^nga/Bhik.su.ni-Vibha^nga.
BhiVin(Ma-L)
= Bhik.sunii-Vinaya,
including Bhik.sunii-Prakiir.naka
and a summary of the Bhik.su-Prakiir.naka
of the AArya-Mahaasa.mghika-Lokotta-ravaadin,
ed. Gustav Roth, Patna 1970 (Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series,
12).
Chin
= Chinese.
ChinMu
= the Vinaya of the Muulasarvaastivaadins,
T1443[23].
ChinSp
= S^naghabhadra, Shan Chien P'i P'o Sha, A Chinese Version of
Saman-Tapaasaadikaa,
transl.
P. V. Bapat in collaboration with A. Hirakawa. Poona 1970 (Bhandarkar Oriental
Series, 10).
CPD
= A Critical Paaali Dictionary, begun by V. Trenckner, ed. D. Andersen,
H. Smith, H. Hendriksen, Vol. 1, Copenhagen 1924-1948, Vol. 2, Copenhagen
1960-1990, Vol. 3 (Fasc. 1-3): Copenhagen 1992-1994.
Dha
= Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T1428[22].
DN
= Dighanikaaya,
ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, 3 Vols. London
1890-1911.
Finot,
"PrMoSuu(Sa)"
= [Louis Finot and É. Huber] "Le Praatimok.sasuutra
des Sarvaastivaadins",
texte Sanskrit par M. Louis Finot, avec la version chinoise de Kumarajiva
traduit en Français par M. Édouard
Huber", Journal Asiatique,
Novembre-Décembre 1913, 465-557.
Gombrich,
"Buddhist Ethics" = Richard F. Gombrich, "Notes on the Brahminical Background to
Buddhist Ethics" in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava
Saddhaatissa,
eds. G. Dhammapala, R. Gombrich, K.R. Norman. Colombo
1984.
Hirakawa,
Vinaya-pitaka =
Akira Hirakawa, A Study
of the Vinaya-pi.taka.
Tokyo
1970.
Hirakawa,
Two Hundred and Fifty Precepts = Hirakawa, Studies on the Two Hundred and Fifty
Precepts, 4 Vols. Tokyo 1993-1995.
M
= Monks.
Maa
= Mahaasaa.mghika
Vinaya, T1425[22].
Mii=
Mahii¡¦sasaka
Vinaya, T1421[22].
M+N
= For both monks and nuns.
MW
= M. Monier Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford
1899.
N
= Nuns.
N-Paac
= Nissaggiya Paacittiya/Ni.hsargika-Paacattika.
op.
cit. = opere citato.
PED
= The Paali Text Society's Paali-English Dictionary, ed. T.W. Rhys
Davids, W. Stede, London 1921-1925.
PrMoSuu(Ma)
= The Pratimoksasutram
of the MahaS^naghikas,
ed. W. Pachow, R. Mishra. Allahabad 1956.
PrMoSuu(Ma-L)
= Nathmal Tatia (ed.), Lokottara-mahaasaa^mghikaana^m
Praatimok.sasuutram.
Patna
1975.
PrMoSuu(Mu)
= A.C. Banerjee, Two Buddhist
Vinaya Texts in Sans.krit.
Praatimoksasuutra
and Bhik.sukarmaavakya.
Calcutta 1977.
PrMoSu(TibMu)
= " So-sor-thar-pa; or, a Code of Buddhist Monastic Laws: Being the Tibetan
Version of Pratimoksa
of the Muula-sarvaastivaada
School", ed. and tr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, JASB 1915, 29-139.
Sa
= Sarvaastivaada
Vinaya, T1435[23].
Sp
= Samantapaasaadikaa
Vinaya-a.t.thakathaa
ed. J. Takakusu, M. Nagai (Vols. 5 and 7 by Mizuno), 7 Vols., London 1924-1947
(PTS) [Index Vol. by H. Kopp, London 1977 (PTS)].
s.v.
= sub verbo.
Sv-.t=
Dighanikaaya.t.thaakaa.thatikaa,
Liinatthava.n.nanaa 3 Vols. ed. Lily de Silva. London 1970
(PTS).
T
= Taishoo
Shinshuu
Daizokyo,
100 Vols. Tokyo 1924ff.
Vin
= Vinaya-pitaka,
ed. Hermann Oldenberg, 5 Vols. London 1879-1883.
[1]
Quoted from the introductory story to Defeat 1 (N), Vin IV 212.38
213.1,
where the ex-
pression
is actually kāyasajsaga.m
saadiyissatiti
([How] can she consent to physical contact?).
[2] Sp 902.1-8.
[3] CPD saadiyati s.v.
[4] DN I 109.23-25.
[5] Sv-t405.6-7.
[6] Vin III 237.36- 38.
[7] Vin III 214.19- 22.
[8] Vin IV 102.38-103.2.
[9] Vin II 5.28ff.
[10] Vin IV 213.34ff.
[11] Vin IV 220.16ff.
[12]
Ma: T1425[22].516a.11-13;
Mi: T1421[22].78b.10-13;
Sa: T1435[23].303c.15-18;
Dha: T1428 [22].716a.24-
28;
cf. BhiPr, p.76-78 for German translations of this rule in all the Vinaya
traditions.
[13] Tsomo, Sisters, p. 82; ChinMu(T1443[23].930c.9): ¨Ó¥h¤V¤Ò±¡¬Û³\¥i¡C
[14] BhiPr, p. 74.
[15] Vin IV 213.34-38.
[16] Vin IV 215.33.
[17] Vin III 120.33ff. Translation is from the BD with slight alteration.
[18] Vin III 126.4ff.
[19] Vin III 23.33ff.
[20] See
v. Hinyber,
Handbook, p. 13. For the difference between the casuistry and the
Vinita-
vatthu,
see below Conclusion, pp. 31ff.
[21] Vin III, pp.38ff.
[22] Vin III 33.25-26.
[23] Vin III 40.1-2.
[24] Vin III 37.27-29.
[25] Vin III 36.23-24.
[26] Vin III 36.29-30.
[27] Vin III 36.26.
[28] Vin III 126.35-36.
[29] Vin
III 125.37,
126.3:
mokkhaadhippayo
kaayena
vayamati
phassa.m
pa.tivijaanaati,
anaapatti. mokkhaadhippayo
kaayena
vaayamati
na
ca phassa.m
pa.tivijaanaati,
anaaapatti. mokkhaadhippaayo
na
ca kaayena
vaayamati
phassaj
pa.tivijaanati,
anaapatti. mokkhadhippayo
kayena
na
ca vaayamati
na
ca phassaj
pativijanati,
anaapatti.
[30] Vin III 125.33-35.
[31] The
general background for the two sections starting with
sevanaadhippaayo
and mokkhaadhipp-aayo
respectively (Vin III 125.31ff) is omitted, but it can be found at the beginning
of the whole discussion (Vin III 124.32ff): itthi ca hoti,
itthisa^n^niii
saaratto
ca, itthi cana.m bhikkhussa
kayena
kaaya.m
aamasati
paraamasati
omasati ummasati ¡K ga.nhaati
chupati, sevanaadhippaayo
kaayena
vaayamati
sa^nghaadisesassa.
[32] Sp 540.20-23.
[33] Gombrich, "Buddhist Ethics", p. 99.
[34] Vin III 127.15-17.
[35] Sp 546.15-18.
[36] T1428[22].716a.4 5: ¤£¥ÇªÌ¡A³Ìªì¥¼¨î§Ù¡Aè¨g¤ß¶Ãµh´o©ÒÄñ¡C
[37] T1428[22].716a.2 4:
¤£¥ÇªÌ¡AY¨ú»P®ÉIJ¨¡FYÀ¸¯º®ÉIJ¡FY¦³©Ò±Ï®ÉIJ¡A¤@¤ÁµL±ý¤ß¤£¥Ç¡C
[38] T1435[23].303b.28ff: ¤£¥ÇªÌ¡AY¤÷·Q¡B¥S§Ì·Q¡B¨à¤l·Q¡CY¤ôº}¡BY¤õ¿N ¡BY¤M矟¤}¤V¡BY±ý¼Z§|¡BYÈ´cÃ~Ãø¡B´c°Ãø¡A¤£¥Ç¡C
[39] T1435[23].303c.1: ¤@¤ÁµLµÛ¤ß¤£¥Ç¡C
[40] T1443[23].930a.24-25: Y¥§¦³¯f¡A¨k¬°¼¯¨¡A¥§°_¬V¤ß±o´c§@¸o¡AµL¬V¤ßªÌ µL¥Ç¡C
[41] T1421[22].5a.27-29: ¤£¥ÇªÌ¡A¨g¤ß¡B¶Ã¤ß¡B¯fÃa¤ß¡Bªì§@¡C¦¹¥|ºØ¤£¥Ç¡A ¤U¤@¤Á½Ñ§Ù¬Ò¦p¬O¡A±x¤£´_¥X¡C
[42] T1421[22].11b.1ff.
[43] T1425[22].515c.16-17: ¤ñ¥C¥§µLº|¤ß¡A¨k¤lµLº|¤ß¡A¶V¤ñ¥§¸o¡C
[44] PrMoSu(Ma-L) 8.21-23.
[45] BhiVin(Ma-L) ¡±123, 84.6-8.
[46] PrMoSu(Ma-L) 8.6-9.
[47] Ma¡¦s text: ¡¥Sadiyeya, misprint for saadiyeya.
[48] T1425[22].265c.22.
[49] T1425[22].550a.7.
[50] According to Hirakawa (Two Hundred and Fifty Precepts, I, p. 400), there are no Sanskrit equivalents to the Chinese ¨ü¼Ö, ²Ó·Æ in the Ma context. The phrase ²Ó·Æ (fineness and smoothness) may be an extended rendering for physical contact ( kaayasajsagga.m ) in that the former is a more concrete description of the desire underlying the latter. This is supported by an example in the ChinSp (T1426[24].762a.14), where one reads the translation: "Desire refers to the desire for fineness and smoothness [in] physical contact." The parallel in the Sp (538.8-9) only says: "raago ti kaayasa.msaggaraago." So, "feeling [the pleasure in] fineness and smoothness" may be the rendering for kaayasajsaggaj saa.diyati.
[51] MW Svi s.v.
[52] Vibh: T1442[23].683c.1; PrMoSu T1454[24].501b.7-9.
[53] Finot, "PrMoSuu (Sa)", 479.7-10; VinVibh(R), p. 59, fn. 1.
[54] T1435[23].15a.14-15: Y¤ñ¥C±ý²±ÅܤߡA¬GIJ¤k¨¡AY®»¤âÁuÀY¾v¡A¤@¤@¨¤À¡A¤W¤U¼¯Ä²¡A¹¬¦÷±C¤r¨F¡C
[55] The wordings of the rule in the Praatimok.sa-suutra reads slightly different from that of the Vibhavga. T1436[23].471b.3-5: Y¤ñ¥CÔÙ¶ÃÅܤߡA»P¤k¤H¨¦@¦X¡FY®»¤â¡BY®»Áu¡BY®»¾v¡BY®»¤@¤@¨¤À¡AY¤WY¤U¼¯µÛ?·Æ¡A¹¬¦÷±C¤r¨F¡C
[56] T1428[22].580b.28-29.
[57] T1430[22].1023c.21-23.
[58] T1421[22].11a.25-27.
[59] T1422[22].195a.27-28.
[60] Y¤ñ¥C±ý²±ÅÜ¤ß ¡K ®»¤@¤@¨¤À¡A¼¯µÛ²Ó·Æ¡A¹¬¦÷±C¤r¨F¡C
[61] T1428[22].580b.28-29.
[62] T1460[24].660a.17-19: Y¤ñ¥C ¡K ¦@¤k¤H¨¬ÛIJ ¡K¡AYIJ¤@¤@¨¤À¡AıIJ¡A¹¬¦÷±C¤r¨F¡C
[63] T1421[22].11b.6-9: ¤¨ÆIJ¤k¤H¤£¥Ç¡A¤k¡B¤k·Q¡B¤H¤k¡B¬¡¤k¡B¤ß¬V¡A¤£¥H¿Ëªñ±¡¡A¦Ó¤k¤H®»¤ñ¥C¡A¤ñ¥C§@¤è«K¨D²æ¡AÁöıIJ¦Ó¤£¨ü¡A¤D¦ÜIJ¾v¥ç¦p¬O¡C
[64] T1435[23].14c.22-15c.18.
[65] T1442[23].681c.18-684a.14.
[66] T1428[22].580b.4 -81a.24.
[67] T1428[22].580c.8ff.
[68] T1428[22].581a.15-16: Y¤k¤H§@§¡A®»¨¬Ä±Ä²¼Ö¡A¤£°Ê¨¡A¬ð¦Nù¡C
[69] T1425[22].264a.13-267c.18.
[70] T1425[22].266b.19-23: Y¤ñ¥C§¤®É¡A¦³¤k¤H¨Ó§¤ñ¥C¨¬¡A¤ñ¥CY°_±ý¤ß¡A·í¥¿¨¦í¡F·í»y¤k¤H¨¥¡G¤p»·Â§§Û¡C¤k¤H¿w«H¨ò¨Ó±µ¤ñ¥C¨¬ªÌ¡Aº¸®ÉÀ³¦Û«r¦Þ¡A¥Oµh¤£¥Oı¤k¤H²Ó·Æ¡C
[71] T1425[22].266a.6ff.
[72] T1425[22].267a.23-26.
[73] ÂıC¦hÏi¥§Ïi±C¨F
(T1440[23].519c.18-520b.8); ÂıC¦h³¡Ïi¥§¼¯±o°Ç¦÷
(T1441[23]. 571c.5-10).
[74] T1462[24].762a.20-22: Y¤k¤H¦@¤ñ¥C¤@³B§¤¡A¤k¤HÔÙ±ýÅܤߡA¨Ó¼¯Ä²®»¤ñ¥C¡A¤ñ¥C¦³±ý¤ß°Ê¨¡A¹¬´Ý¡C
[75] T1462[24].762a.23-24: Y¤k¤H±»¤ñ¥C¡A¤ñ¥C¥H±ý¤ß¨ü¼Ö¡A¤£°Ê¡A¬ð¦Nù¡C
[76] T1462[24].762a.27-28: Y¤k¤H¼¯Ä²¤ñ¥C¨¡A¤ñ¥C¦³±ý¤ß¡A¨¤£°Ê¡AµL¸o¡C
[77] One can of course be skeptical about whether or not those in the Viniitavatthu are actual events, but this is how the text presents them: tena kho pana samayena a^n^nataro bhikkhu ¡K