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FREEDOM AND BONDAGE:

an exploration of interdependent arising and the interdependently
arisen in early Buddhism.

by Patrick Kearney

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Letters with Honours in the Faculty of Arts at Deakin
University Canberra 1994.

**  Prepared at BuddhaNet for Free Distribution 1996 **
                  All Rights Reserved.


"Who sees interdependent arising sees the dhamma;
who sees the dhamma sees interdependent arising.(1)

Who sees the dhamma sees me;
who sees me sees the dhamma.(2)"


ABBREVIATIONS

A      Anguttara Nikaya
D      Digha Nikaya
M      Majjhima Nikaya
S      Samyutta Nikaya
Sn     Sutta Nipata
Vin    Vinaya Pitaka
Vism   Visuddhimagga

All translations from the Pali are by the writer



CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. The middle way
3. The arising of the psycho-physical person
4. The person in bondage
5. Interdependent cessation
6. Interdependency
7. Causation over time
8. Conclusion
Bibliography



1. INTRODUCTION

The natural order

The doctrine of interdependent arising points to the structure of
reality as experienced. The Buddha discovered this structure of reality
under the Bodhi tree, and it was this discovery that turned Siddhattha
Gotama into a buddha. Buddhism is a wisdom tradition. Buddha comes from
the root budh, "know, wake". A buddha is one who knows, one who is
awake; one who knows the nature of things as they are, who has awakened
to reality. Where Christianity seeks to overcome the problem of
original sin, Buddhism seeks to overcome the problem of original
ignorance.

Referring to interdependent arising, the Buddha said:

Whether Tathagatas appear or do not appear this fact of nature remains,
this fixed state of nature, this natural order, the
conditionality-of-this [idappaccayata].

This is what the Tathagata awakens to, this is what he realises. After
awakening to and realising it he explains, teaches, declares, lays it
out, reveals, analyses and clarifies it, saying: "Look!".(3)


Interdependent arising is the "fixed state of nature", the "natural
order", which reveals the regularity and pattern in the cosmos as
experienced. It is not a description of objectively perceived entities
out there in the universe, but concerns one's own consciousness and its
interaction with the world(4). Because one's interaction with the
cosmos is experienced as orderly, and functions according to laws which
are discoverable, liberation from suffering is possible. If events
occurred simply according to chance or by inevitable decree of fate,
there would be nothing we could do to change our lives; we would be
hapless victims of circumstances beyond our control.

As the Buddha, looking back to his awakenment(5), explained:

Before awakening, Bhikkhus, when I was a bodhisatta and not a fully
awakened one, I thought: "Alas, this world has fallen into misery! One
is born, ages and dies; one falls [from one existence] and rises [into
another]. And yet escape from this suffering, this ageing and death, is
not known. Surely escape from this suffering, this ageing and death,
will be discovered!"...

"Arising!" Vision arose in me, Bhikkhus, regarding dhammas previously
unheard of; insight, wisdom, knowledge and intuition arose...

"Cessation!" Vision arose in me, Bhikkhus, regarding dhammas previously
unheard of; insight, wisdom and knowledge and intuition arose.(6)

The "fixed state of nature" that the Buddha discovered is one of
ceaseless change; nothing is fixed, all is shifting. That is, what is
fixed is the fact of change, and moreover the fact that things change
according to certain patterns of relationship. Everything is subject to
arising and cessation according to certain specific conditions. The
path of practice consists in living in accordance with these natural
conditions in such a way that suffering ceases and freedom arises.
Means and end, path and result, are two aspects of the same "natural
order". The practice that leads to the cessation of suffering is that
of living without interfering with the natural arising and cessation of
phenomena; life without interfering with the natural arising and
cessation of phenomena is the cessation of suffering.

The doctrine of interdependent arising is therefore central to
Buddhism. We suffer because we are ignorant of the natural laws that
govern our existence. These laws determine the arising and cessation of
phenomena. As we discover these laws, the relationships between things,
we learn to let go of arising and cessation, and therefore what arises
and ceases. In this way we ensure the cessation of that which causes us
suffering and the arising of that which liberates us. The full
understanding of these laws constitutes our final goal, awakenment.

At the time of the Buddha's awakenment two young men, Upatissa and
Kolita, were students of the samana (philosopher) Sanjaya, the sceptic.
The two friends vowed to each other that whoever awakened first would
immediately inform the other. One day, Upatissa saw one of the Buddha's
students, Venerable Assaji, going on alms round in Rajagaha. He was so
impressed by the appearance of this monk that he approached him and
asked for the teaching. Assaji protested that he was a new student and
understood little of the Buddha's doctrine. What he did understand he
summed up in the following verse:

The Tathagata has spoken of the cause
Of those dhammas produced by a cause,
And also their cessation.
This is the teaching of the Great Philosopher.(7)

Upatissa was immediately awakened to stream entry (sotapatti), the
first stage of awakenment. He hastened to his friend and repeated the
verse. Kolita also attained stream entry. The two men became students
of the Buddha, bringing with them the other students of Sanjaya. These
two converts became the Buddha's chief disciples, and were known as
Sariputta, foremost in wisdom, and Maha-Moggallana, foremost in psychic
powers.

This story illustrates the liberating power contained in the teaching
of interdependent arising. "Dhammas" are arising and ceasing dependent
upon causes; seeing this arising and cessation has the power to
transform one's life, here and now.


The twelvefold formula

Interdependent arising is normally presented as consisting of 12
nidanas (ground, foundation, cause) linked in a causal chain which, in
its forward order, shows how suffering arises dependent on ignorance,
and in reverse order shows how suffering ceases with the cessation of
ignorance.

This formula, which later became known as the "wheel of becoming"
(bhavacakka), presents a number of problems in interpretation for the
modern reader. Its importance is immediately evident as it explains the
arising and cessation of suffering, which is the fundamental concern of
the Buddha. The individual nidanas themselves create difficulties, as
they make up a list of some of the most fundamental terms in Buddhist
philosophy. In addition, however, the nature of the relationships
between the nidanas present a major obstacle for modern Buddhists in
their understanding of interdependent arising.

According to a tradition that has its roots in the Patisambhidamagga, 
an early treatise which systematically sets out the way to awakenment,
the causal chain consisting of twelve nidanas takes three lives to
complete one cycle. Interdependent arising therefore explains the
process of rebirth and the end of rebirth. However, this explanation
raises as many questions as it solves. If interdependent arising refers
to a process which will come to completion in a future lifetime, what
relevance is it to me now? And on what basis can I accept it as true
other than that of an act of faith divorced from experience?


An existential problem

In the contemporary world traditional religions and religious world
views are under attack from an advancing tide of secular and 
materialist culture. Buddhists in both East and West are seeking
interpretations of traditional teachings which are directly relevant to
their lives, and rejecting those that appear to be of merely
historical, philosophical or cosmological interest. In the West, many
Buddhists do not believe in rebirth and find the notion of liberation
from an endless cycle of life after life is not an ideal which inspires
them. Western converts to Buddhism are generally attracted to Buddhist
meditation techniques for the benefits they provide in this life, not
for the hope that rebirth will come to an end some time in the future.
Their interest in Buddhism is existential, not cosmological. The same
trend is observable among the emerging middle class in modernising
Buddhist cultures such as Thailand.

Bhikkhu Buddhadasa was, until his recent death, one of the most
influential teachers of Theravada Buddhism in contemporary Thailand. He
was renowned as a meditation master, scholar and writer. At his forest
monastery in southern Thailand, Wat Suan Mokkhabalarama (or Suan Mokh),
more than 1,000 foreigners a year come to study and practice
Buddhism.(8) His demythologising approach to Buddhist teachings has a
particular appeal for Westerners seeking contact with the ageless
wisdom of Buddhism, and for the Thai urban and intellectual middle
class, who are at the cutting edge of Thailand's transformation from a
traditional Buddhist to a modern secular culture.

For Buddhadasa, interdependent arising is the essence of Buddhism, and
it forms the subject matter of most of his writings and talks. Yet he
is uncompromising in his attacks on the classical interpretation of
interdependent arising extending over three lives. His central
objection to this theory is simple: interdependent arising that extends
over three lives cannot be practised.

If it is understood in this way what can be done?...How can there be a
practice to extinguish suffering when the whole thing is broken apart
with the cause in one life and the result in another? So now no benefit
is derived from Dependent Origination because it is incorrectly
understood and taught so that it straddles three life times although
there is only one cycle of Dependent Origination.(9)

Also, to suggest that interdependent arising covers three lifetimes of
a person, in which defilements in one life cause karmic results in the
next life, makes it into "a teaching of a self, soul, being or person
which whirls about in the maelstrom of existence...to teach that
paticcasamuppada covers three lives is to undo the Buddha's teaching
and teach that there is a self."(10)

Buddhadasa, while himself a scholar, was primarily a teacher of
Buddhist practice. He opposed any theory that diverts people from 
meditation practice and believed that Buddhist orthodoxy actively
discourages Thais from seeking the freedom promised by the Buddha. It
does this by encouraging an eternalist view that pushes the attainment
of nibbana far into the future. Buddhists who should be encouraged to
practise for awakenment in this life are instead encouraged to make
merit for their future lives. For Buddhadasa, the three life theory is
at the centre of this eternalist agenda.

The same concern is echoed by other voices within the Theravada.
Nanavira Thera was an English bhikkhu who ordained in Sri Lanka and
lived there until his death in 1965. He has influenced young Western
bhikkhus with his radical and uncompromising attacks on Theravada
orthodoxy, again with the three life theory at the centre of his
sights. His objection is essentially the same: interdependent arising
spread over three lives cannot be seen or realised now.

It is a matter of one's fundamental attitude to one's own existence -
is there, or is there not, a present problem or, rather, anxiety that
can only be resolved in the present?(11)

Nanavira was strongly influenced by Existentialism, and presented his
understanding of interdependent arising in existentialist terms. He
distinguishes the existentialist from the scientific method:

The scientist (or scholar) becomes "objective", puts himself right out
of the picture...and concerns himself only with abstract facts; the
existentialist remains "subjective" (not in the derogatory sense of
being irresponsible), keeps himself in the picture, and describes
concrete things (that is, things in relation to himself as he
experiences them).(12)

Hence the similarity in language between some existentialist passages
and the Nikayas. Both are concerned with the nature of the concrete or
specific existence of oneself in the world, rather than with an
abstract, objective entity entirely separate from the detached
observer. That is, Nanavira believes that the Buddha's teaching is
concerned with my present existence; your present existence; and
anything that distracts us from this central fact is not true to the
teaching.

It is significant that Sariputta and Maha-Moggallana were both sceptics
before their conversion to Buddhism. The difficulty that the twelvefold
formula creates for people today is partly a product of the scepticism
that is inherent in the scientific, secular, materialist culture that
dominates the planet. Even in Buddhist countries there is a reluctance
to accept doctrines that appear to have no scientific basis or which
must be accepted simply on faith. Teachers like Buddhadasa and Nanavira
have a wide appeal because they insist on making a pragmatic
examination of religious doctrines, no matter how hallowed by
tradition, in an attempt to grasp the existential core of their
meaning. Only doctrines which can be seen to correspond with the
realities of human experience can be expected to survive the analysis
of a rational, sceptical age. It is in this context that the question
arises: what is the essential meaning of interdependent arising?

This thesis is an exploration of the meaning and significance of
interdependent arising in early Buddhism. I will base my examination of
interdependent arising on texts found in the Nikayas, especially
Samyutta Nikaya. The Nikayas provide us with an account of the Buddha's
teaching which is as close to the source as we can hope to get.(13) In
addition, they present us with profound and subtle teachings which go
to the essence of the Buddhist tradition, and do so in deceptively
simple language. While the Nikayas are part of the Theravada scriptural
tradition they precede the classical Theravada by centuries, and
constitute a heritage common to all subsequent Buddhist traditions.

The subject of interdependent arising is so vast that I cannot hope to
consider every aspect, but will confine myself to some fundamental
questions which are implicit in the story of Sariputta and
Maha-Moggallana:

ù What is the view of reality which underlies the teaching of
interdependent arising?; what is meant by the arising and cessation of
dhammas?
ù What is the significance of interdependent arising to life as we
experience it?; how does an understanding of causation change one's
life?



2. THE MIDDLE WAY

The Buddha called his teaching the middle way, and by the use of this
term asserted the uniqueness of his doctrine. There are two suttas
which together encapsulate the middle way. In the Buddha's first
discourse, the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta, he says:

There are these two extremes, Bhikkhus, which should not be practised
by one who has gone out. What two? The practice of sensual enjoyment in
relation to sense-objects, which is inferior, common, ordinary, ignoble
and not useful; and the practice of self-exhaustion, which is painful
and not useful.

After experiencing both these extremes the Tathagata has fully awakened
to the middle way, which leads to tranquillity, higher knowledge, full
awakening and nibbana.

And what is the middle way fully awakened to by the Tathagata,
productive of vision and insight, which leads to tranquillity, higher
knowledge, full awakening and nibbana? This very noble eightfold way,
that is: right view; right intention; right speech; right action; right
livelihood; right effort; right awareness; and right concentration.(14)

The noble eightfold way is the middle way of practice, or of one's way
of life. lt refers to what one does to gain freedom, and represents the
practical aspect of the Buddha's teaching. Most of the suttas are
concerned with expounding this noble eightfold way, which is the way
from suffering to the cessation of suffering; from bondage to freedom.
The Buddha was a practical teacher who was primarily concerned with
propagating the practice that results in the experience of freedom.
This practical aspect of the teaching, however, is embedded within a
doctrinal structure - the "right view" which is the first aspect of the
eightfold way. This ontological middle way is expounded in the
Kaccayanagotta-sutta:

Venerable Kaccayanagotta said this to the Blessed One:

"'Right view!', Bhante(15), is spoken of. In what respect is there
right view?"

"This world is normally reliant upon the duality of existence and
non-existence. To one who sees with perfect wisdom, Kaccayana, the
arising of the world as it is, there is no 'non-existence' regarding
the world. To one who sees with perfect wisdom the cessation of the
world as it is, there is no 'existence' regarding the world."(16)

The Buddha's assertion of the ontological middle way between the
extremes of existence and non-existence, absolute identity and 
absolute otherness, was propounded in the context of the two major
philosophical theories of his time. These were:

ù       Existence (sat, astiva) in the Vedic tradition, which involved
a belief in a permanent substratum within the person (atman) and the
universe (brahman).

ù       Non-existence (asat, nastitva) proposed by the Materialists,
which involved a belief in the indestructibility of matter, the
annihilation of the personality after death and the denial of any moral
responsibility for human actions.'(17)

Existence implies the existence of "things out there" that are
independent of me; and the "I in here" who is independent of the 
things out there. That is, "existence" refers to our conventional view
of existing entities, the belief that entities are independent,
self-contained, and endure without change over time. "I" am one of
these independently existing entities. My belief in this "I" is bound
up with notions of substance and attribute.(18) I see that I am
constantly changing: my body grows and ages, my beliefs and opinions
change and develop, my social circumstances alter over time, and so on.
However, I assume an underlying, unchanging substance to whom these
changes occur. This substance remains the same, but its various
attributes - physical, ideological, social, etc. - change. Similarly, I
project the same substance on to the world beyond the boundaries of
myself. The world is constantly changing, but I assume an entity
labelled "world" which is undergoing the changes, and which therefore
remains the same beneath the surface changes of its attributes. This
outlook is programmed into our language. For example, when discussing 
the weather I may say "It is raining"; I assume a substance called
"weather" which has a number of changing attributes: sometimes 
raining, sometimes shining, sometimes hot, sometimes cold.

Identity assumes otherness. As an independently existing entity I
possess a clear border beyond which I am not. The world is that which
is not I, that which is separate from me. As such, it constitutes at
least a potential threat against which I must defend myself, and a
field of activity where I can expand myself and my own interests
against the interests of others. The world is necessarily a
battlefield.

Non-existence is a corollary of existence. Conceiving self, I conceive
other; conceiving that entities exist, it is clear that non-existence
too is possible. Entities end; their substance is no more, they cease
and are annihilated. The most common form this belief takes is the
belief that "I" as an independently existing entity will cease to exist
after death.

The Buddha rejected these two views as extremes that go beyond the
empirically available evidence of arising and cessation. He saw that
all entities are constantly coming into being, changing and
disappearing, and no view of existence that ignores either the arising
or the cessation of entities can be regarded as encompassing their
reality. Further, there is no separate, solid ground upon which this
arising and cessation occur. There are no exceptions to this process,
no substance to which this process occurs. The process of universal
arising and cessation is the middle way between existence and
non-existence.

The Buddha developed a technical vocabulary to express his vision of
the middle way. Three central terms we need to become familiar with
are: idappaccayata; paticcasamuppada; and paticcasamuppanna dhamma.


Idapaccayata

The general principle of interdependent arising is expressed in the
compound term idappaccayata. Paccaya is derived from the verb pacceti
(pati + i; come back to, fig. fall back on, find one's hold in).
Literally meaning "support", its applied meaning is "reason, cause,
ground, condition". The other parts of the compound are: ida (this);
and the abstract suffix -ta. Idappaccayata refers to the fact that any
given experience or phenomenon (ida - this) is supported (paccaya) by
something other than itself. That is, any given phenomenon is
contingent, coming into existence through phenomena other than itself,
and going out of existence through phenomena other than itself. The
whole compound can be translated as "the conditionality-of-this".

The general formula which expresses this structural principle is:

    Imasmim sati idam hoti; imass 'uppada idam uppajjati.
    Imasmim asati idam na hoti; imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati.(19)

    When this is, that is; because this arises, that arises.
    When this is not, that is not; because this ceases, that ceases.

The first part of the verse uses the locative absolute (imasmim sati),
which does not convey causality, but structural or logical 
coincidence. "When this is, that is" does not say this causes that; it
says this invariably accompanies that. To say that when there is x
there is y and when there is no x there is no y is to assert both x and
y are contingent. Their "reality" or "substance" depends on that of
entities other than themselves, entities whose reality or substance in
turn depends on entities other than themselves. Contingency asserts the
reality of things to be their lack of independent or separate reality;
their substance to be their lack of independent or separate substance.

The second part of the verse is unambiguously causal; because of the
arising of this (imass 'uppada), that arises (idam uppajjati). To say
because x arises, y arises, and because x ceases y ceases, is to assert
causality, which implies change over time. However, the causation of
entities is not being asserted, because the notion of independent and
separate entities has already been denied. Causation occurs, but no
entities are caused.

Idappaccayata expresses the nature of a phenomenon in terms of its
relationship with other phenomena. It does not deal with the essence of
a phenomenon, but with its movement, its activity; or rather, it sees
the essence of any given thing to be its behaviour. Idappaccayata
describes a dynamic model of reality, a model of things as processes.
The pattern of this process, the behaviour of phenomena, is expressed
in our next term.


Paticcasamuppada

Paticcasamuppada is a compound term made up of paticca and samuppada.
Paticca is the gerund of the verb pacceti (come back to,  fig. fall
back on, find one's hold in), and means "grounded on" or "on account
of". Samuppada is a compound word from the prefix sam (together) and
the verb uppajjati (arise). Samuppada therefore means "arising
together", or "co-arising". Paticcasamuppada has been translated in a
number of ways, among them "dependent arising", "dependent co-arising",
"dependent origination", "conditioned genesis", and "conditioned
co-production".

A glance at the translations shows basic agreement except for the use
of the prefix sam. Is paticcasamuppada dependent arising or dependent
co-arising? Does it refer to production or co-production? Buddhaghosa,
the great fifth century commentator, casts light on  this question in a
playful linguistic analysis found early in the Pannabhuminiddesa 
(Exposition of the ground of wisdom) of his Visuddhimagga.

This totality of dhammas [dhammasamuha] resulting from conditionality
[paccayata] which is paticcasamuppada is a term which is regarded in
two ways. Befalling [patiyamana] it leads to welfare and happiness, and
therefore the wise regard it as worthy to fall back on [paccetum]; so
it is paticca. And arising, it arises rightly [samma] and together
[saha], not one after another and not causelessly; so it is samuppada
Thus it is paticca and samuppada, so it is paticcasamuppada.

Further, it arises together [saha uppajjati], so it is co-arising
[samuppada]; it is dependent upon [paticca] a combination of 
conditions, not rejecting any. Therefore paticca and samuppada is
paticcasamuppada...

This totality of causes...is called paticca, taking it as "united with
its opposite" [patimukham ito gato] by the mutuality of its combined
factors, in that none are missing and they accomplish a common result.
It is called samuppada in that it gives rise to dhammas together, such
that each gives rise to the other and they are inseparable in their
behaviour. Therefore paticca and samuppada is paticcasamuppada.(20)

Buddhaghosa is emphasising that, in practice, cause and effect manifest
as a totality of causes leading to a totality of results, not as a
single cause leading to a single result. That is, causation over time
refers to totalities, not individual entities. That which is paticca
(dependent) is a combination of factors; that which is samuppada
(co-arising) is a combination of results. From this we can see that sam
applies to both parts of the compound, and expresses the
interdependency of causes and causes, effects and  effects, and causes
and effects; therefore paticcasamuppada is translated here as
"interdependent arising".


Paticcasamuppanna dhamma

Dhammas arise and cease; because they arise and cease due to
conditions, they are interdependently arisen dhammas 
(paticcasamuppanna dhamma), or, more simply, the interdependently
arisen.

The Buddha's teaching is a "doctrine of analysis" (vibhajjavada). His
analysis examines the given world of sense experience, and in so doing
sees that entities which appear solid and lasting break up into a
series of shifting experiences. They resolve into "dhammas" (Skt.,
dharmas). A. K. Warder defined the meaning of "dhamma" in this way:

The basic or more original meaning of dhamma appears to have been
"nature", what truly exists, true reality, what actually is in the
universe. An enumeration of dhammas (plural) will then be a list of
what there is in the universe, the entities of which it is composed,
.... its real elements as opposed to less real combinations of them or
superficial appearances. In this book we use  "principles" for dharma
in the sense of these entities, understanding "natural principles",
many of them "natural elements" as irreducible principles out of which
the universe and all experience is constructed.(21)

For Warder, dhammas are "real elements", the basic building blocks of
the universe. However, to understand the meaning of dhammas we must
remember that the Buddha was primarily a yogin, not a scientist.
Buddhist philosophy arises out of the foundation of Buddhist yogic
experience, and can be regarded essentially as an analysis of the self
and the world from the viewpoint of one who has awakened. It is an
analysis of human experience based on yoga, not science.

As such it is very different from our science-based psychology. Science
studies the objective world and assumes a radical division between the
subjective and objective aspects of experience, investing "reality"
into the objective.(22)  In our science-based culture, to call a given
view "subjective" is to regard it as at best suspect, very probably
false. When we say we are being "objective", we are saying our view
should be taken seriously; it is probably true. Subjective and
objective in everyday discourse are almost synonymous with false and
true.

The Buddha recognised the distinction between subjective (ajjhatta) and
ohjective (bahira), but did not equate subjective with false and
objective with true. The inner world of (subjective) experience and the
outer world of (objective) facts are equally real, insofar as both of
them are simply manifestations of experience.

The Buddha's view of the world is revealed in the Sabba-sutta:

I will teach you everything [sabbam].... 

And what, Bhikkhus, is everything? The eye and forms; ear and sounds;
nose and scents; tongue and tastes; body and tangible things; mind and
phenomena.

Whoever would say, "Rejecting this everything, I declare another
everything", the basis for that would be mere words, and if asked he
could not sustain it. Furthermore, he would become distressed.

Why is that? Because it is beyond experience (avisaya).(23)


"Everything" is the totality of our experience. That which is beyond
experience is, by definition, unknowable. Anything said about what is
unknowable can be based only on speculation and logic - "mere words".
The field of the known is the field of the six senses (which includes
the mental sense of everything thought, felt, seen, heard, smelt,
tasted and touched in the mind, imagination and memory).(24) The range
of the six senses is the known universe, and therefore it is, for us,
the universe.

In other words, the world is not an independently existing entity out
there which, within our limits, we perceive and relate to; the world is
our experience of the world. This does not mean that the world is
merely subjective, for sense perception depends upon an object of
sense. Nor is the world merely objective, for objects out there are
beyond our experience and knowledge except for our perception of them.

That is, dhamma does not refer to "things" which are out there or in
here, to substances which possess attributes, but to our experience of
things.(25) A dhamma is a thing-as-experienced, or the
experience-of-a-thing. Note that the experience-of-a-thing has two 
essential aspects: the experience and the thing experienced. Remove
either and the dhamma does not manifest. This subtle shift in 
perception is vital for understanding the Buddha's teaching. His
concern is with the nature of human experience, not with a scientific,
objective description of the world. His concern is pragmatic - the
cessation of suffering - not scientific - the development of a new
theory.

Hence the Buddha's response to a question posed by a deva (god), who
asked:

"Bhante, is it possible for us, by means of movement, to know, see, and
arrive at the end of the world, where one is not born, does not age or
die, does not fall [from one existence] and rise [into another]?"

"I declare, Friend, I would not, by means of movement, know, see, or
arrive at that end of the world where one is not born, does not age or
die, does not fall [from one existence] and rise [into another].

Moreover, I declare that within this very fathom-long body, endowed
with perception and mind, is the world, the arising of the world, the
cessation of the world, and the practice leading to the cessation of
the world."(26)


Here a question which assumes the existence of an objectively existing
and material "end of the world" receives an answer which turns the
perception of the questioner around to the nature of his own
experience, and the practice which illuminates that experience.

When examined with yogic insight, the self and the world resolve into a
series of experiences. These experiences are not random and chaotic,
but manifest according to patterns of perceived cause and effect. That
is, experiences arise because of causes and cease because of causes.
Experiences arise and cease interdependently - all dhammas are
interdependent (paticcasamupanna dhamma).

Indeed, they are dhammas because they arise and pass away
interdependently. A fundamental characteristic of "things out there" in 
our conventional sense of "things" is that they are regardless of our
experience of them. A scientist has no experience of an atom, but he
knows it is there. I have no experience of Melbourne, but I know it is
there. The validity or existence of a "thing" is not affected by
whether or not I have any direct experience of it. The Buddha gives the
example of a blind man who denies the existence of the sun and moon
because he cannot see them. He is wrong, because they do objectively
exist.(27)

A dhamma, in contrast, refers to my experience-of-a-thing; it arises
and passes away interdependently, because it is dependent on 
experience. Experience, in turn, is dependent on a functional sense
organ (e.g., an eye), a corresponding sense object (form) and the
appropriate sense consciousness (eye consciousness), all coming
together as contact. The absence of any one of these factors means the
dhamma (my experience of seeing "this") does not arise; the dhamma is
dependent on the conjunction of these factors.

The thing-in-itself, or the thing out there, however, is not dependent
on my seeing it. It is its in-dependence which makes it a thing; it is
its inter-dependence, embracing both subjective and objective, which
makes it a dhamma. Hence, the most appropriate translation for "dhamma"
in the context of paticcasamuppada is not element or principle, but
"phenomenon". This translation points out that all we know is what is
present to consciousness; there is no "thing-in-itself" beyond the
range of consciousness.(28)


Anatta

Central to the Buddha's teaching is the concept that all dhammas are
anatta, not-self. This is the subject of his second discourse, the
Anattalakkhana-sutta:

"What do you think, bhikkhus, is the body permanent or impermanent?"

"Impermanent (anicca), Bhante"

"Is that which is impermanent happy (sukha) or painful (dukkha)?"

"Painful, Bhante."

"Is it appropriate to regard that which is impermanent, painful and
subject to change: "This is mine; I am this; this is myself (atta)'?"

"Certainly not, Bhante."

"Is sensation ... perception ... creations ... consciousness permanent
or impermanent? ... Is it appropriate to regard that which is 
impermanent, painful and subject to change: "This is mine; I am this;
this is myself (atta)'?"

"Certainly not, Bhante"(29)


Belief in attan (Skt.: atman) is characteristic of the thought of the
Upanisads, but the Buddha, while also rejecting the Upanisadic
teaching, was pointing to something more fundamental than an opposing
religious doctrine. He was referring to a universal human view that "I"
exist separately from the rest of the universe. My world is divided
irrevocably into two aspects: me in here and everyone else out there.
This conviction in my separate existence as "I" is characterised by a
sense of permanence, in that even though I acknowledge that I was born
and will die, yet I remain convinced that the I that was born so many
years ago is the same I reading these words, who in turn will be the
same I who eventually dies. The teaching of anatta is based on the
experience of the yogi who investigates his mind-body process and fails
to find any aspect of his experience which actually corresponds to this
"I";  he fails to find anyone to whom experience is occurring, who owns
the experiencing mind-body. That is, he fails to find any aspect of his
experience which is independent of every other aspect.

The absence of a separate, independently existing self is the corollary
of the absence of a separate, independently existing world. Separate
things and a separate self are two sides of the same coin. When we see
"things", we assume the self that sees things; when we construct
"things", we assume the self that constructs things. Interdependent
arising, however, presupposes no separate self, and therefore no
separate things. Or, alternatively, interdependent arising assumes no
separate things, and therefore no separate self.

To summarise, interdependent arising, the middle way between the
extremes of existence and non-existence, involves three aspects:

ù       Idappaccayata (the conditionality-of-this): the general
principle that any given phenomenon is contingent. It is dependent 
upon something else and arises and ceases dependently upon that
something else. That is, things depend on each other for their 
existence.

ù       Paticcasamuppada (interdependent arising): the pattern of
arising and cessation. What is central here is the behaviour of 
phenomena rather than their identity; the relationship between
phenomena rather than the phenomena themselves. Together, the 
conditionality-of-this and interdependent arising comprise the
structural principle of ourselves and the world as we experience them,
the natural order, the fixed state of nature.

ù       Paticcasamuppanna-dhamma (the interdependently arisen): what
arises and ceases. All phenomena are contingent; all phenomena are
dependent upon other phenomena. As the Buddha is primarily concerned
with suffering and the cessation of suffering, the phenomena associated
with "the middle way which leads to tranquillity, higher knowledge,
full awakening and nibbana" receive a detailed analysis. We will begin
this analysis in the next chapter.


3. THE ARISING OF THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PERSON

        What, Bhikkhus, is paticcasamuppada?

Depending on ignorance (avijja), creations (sankhara);
Depending on creations, consciousness (vinnana);
Depending on consciousness, mind-body (nama-rupa);
Depending on mind-body, six sense-spheres (salayatana);
Depending on six sense-spheres, contact (phassa);
Depending on contact, sensation (vedana);
Depending on sensation, craving (tanha);
Depending on craving, clinging (upadana);
Depending on clinging, becoming (bhava);
Depending on becoming, birth (jati);
Depending on birth, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief
and despair.
Thus this entire mass of suffering (dukkha) arises.

This, Bhikkhus, is called arising.(30)


The most common exposition of paticcasamuppada is contained in the
twelvefold formula. In forward order (anuloma), it begins with the
arising of ignorance and ends with the arising of suffering; in reverse
order (patiloma), it begins with the cessation of ignorance and ends in
the cessation of suffering. The twelvefold formula in reverse order
will be examined in the next chapter.

The twelvefold formula is essentially an expansion and application of
the general formula ("When this is, that is ... "), which it often
accompanies in the suttas.(31) Each factor of the formula is a nidana,
a word which comes from da, dyati to bind, and the prefix ni, denoting
downward direction. Literally "tying down to", nidana means "ground,
foundation, cause". The twelvefold formula shows how suffering arises
dependent upon the arising of ignorance, and ceases dependent upon the
cessation of ignorance. This concern with suffering shows the practical
intent of the formula. Its purpose is soteriological, and its subject
matter is the nature of human experience. Suffering is not considered
as an abstract category but as an inherent aspect of life, so any
explanation of the arising of suffering is intimately bound up with an
account of the human situation.


Ignorance

And what, Bhikkhus, is ignorance [avijja]? That which is absence of
insight [annanaJ into dukkha, the arising of dukkha, the cessation of
dukkha, and the way leading to the cessation of dukkha.(32)

Ignorance is simply ignorance of the four noble truths. The first noble
truth asserts the truth of dukkha. Usually translated as "suffering" or
"pain", dukkha is a technical term which points to the fact that no
experience is perfect; all experience is imperfect, and therefore
unsatisfactory. Dukkha ranges from the extremely gross to the extremely
subtle. Extreme physical pain is dukkha; the knowledge lurking at the
back of the mind during the most blissful experience that this too will
end is dukkha. Dukkha can therefore be most accurately translated as
"unsatisfactoriness", but here I will follow the usual convention and
use "suffering".

Suffering arises and ceases. The fact of arising and cessation, of
impermanence, is central to the Buddha's understanding. Suffering has a
beginning, and because of that it also has an end. While the Buddha's
preoccupation with suffering has caused some scholars to regard
Buddhism as pessimistic, this assessment ignores the fact that the
necessary corollary to the arising of suffering is its cessation.
During a discussion on impermanence the Buddha picked up "a pinch of
cow dung" and said:

There is not even this much of oneself [atta-bhava] which is permanent,
fixed, eternal, immune to change, that will remain forever just as it
is.

If, Bhikkhu, there was even this much of oneself which is perrnanent,
fixed, eternal, immune to change, this living of the holy life for the
complete destruction of suffering would not be known. But because there
is not even this much of oneself which is permanent, fixed, eternal,
immune to change, the living of the holy life for the complete
destruction of suffering is known.(33)

The fact that suffering is not "immune to change" means that it is
possible to bring it to an end. Suffering, moreover, arises and ceases
interdependently;(34) the development of certain conditions will cause
it to cease. The development of such conditions comprises the noble
eightfold way, the way leading to the cessation of suffering.

Ignorance arises and ceases within a specific context:


"'Ignorance' is spoken of, Bhante. What is ignorance, and in what
respect is one in ignorance?"

"Here, Bhikkhu, an untrained ordinary person does not know, in
accordance with truth, the arising of the body. He does not know, as 
it is, the cessation of the body. He does not know, as it is, the
arising and cessation of the body.

"An untrained ordinary person does not know, as it is, the arising of
sensation...recognition...creations...the arising and cessation of
consciousness. This, Bhikkhu, is called ignorance, and in this respect
one is ignorant."

"'Knowledge' is spoken of, Bhante. What is knowledge, and in what
respect does one attain knowledge?"

"Here, Bhikkhu, a trained noble disciple knows, as it is, the arising
of the body. He knows, as it is, the cessation of the body.  He knows,
as it is, the arising and cessation of the body.

"A trained noble disciple knows, as it is, the arising of sensation...
recognition...creations...the arising and cessation of consciousness.

"This, Bhikkhu, is called knowledge, and in this respect one attains
knowledge"(35)


Ignorance is ignorance of the nature of human experience. The knowledge
of the arising and cessation of suffering occurs within the 
psycho-physical person. This echoes the Buddha's declaration that
"everything" consists of the field of the six senses (the 
psycho-physical person and its objects of sense perception), and that
the arising and cessation of the world is to be found within "this very
fathom-long body, endowed with recognition and mind".

The psycho-physical person consists of five khandhas (factors,
aggregates, or subsystems), which together make up the living being. 
These are: body (rupa); sensation (vedana); recognition (sanna);
creations (sankhara); and consciousness (vinnana). The twelvefold 
formula speaks of mind-body (nama-rupa) and consciousness (vinnana),
and these together make up the five khandhas, the living being.

While the twelvefold formula begins with ignorance, this does not mean
that ignorance is a First Cause, as God is for theists or prakrti and
purusa are for Samkhya. Ignorance is merely "a convenient starting
point to explain a series of inter-connected phenomena".(36)

The concept of a "beginning" illustrates a distinction between
conventional, linear causation and interdependent arising. Linear 
causation assumes a one-way flow of influence from the cause A to the
effect B:

          A >> B >> C >> D...(37)

Such a model assumes a first point from which causation begins: a
causeless cause. Since, however, every cause that we actually 
experience arises as an effect from a previous cause, we have no actual
experience of the original causeless cause. It remains "mere words". As
the causeless cause remains beyond experience, it is dismissed by the
Buddha.

Unthinkable (anamata) is the beginning of this continual moving along
(samsara). A time prior to the continual moving and running along of
beings bound by craving and hindered by ignorance is unknown (na
pannayati).(38)


Further, ignorance is itself interdependently arisen.

The beginning of ignorance is not seen [na pannayati], Bhikkhus, such
that one could say: "Previously there was no ignorance, and then
ignorance arose". Further, it is seen that ignorance is dependent on
something [idapaccaya]. Ignorance, I declare, is with support [ahara],
not lacking support. And what is the support of ignorance? The five
hindrances is the answer.(39)

The five hindrances (panca nivarana) are the hindrances to the
attainment of concentration. They are: sense desire; ill-will; mental
stiffness and dullness; restlessness and worry; and sceptical doubt. 
Far from being a causeless cause or origin of the cosmos, ignorance is
an existential beginning. It is the not-knowing of the confused, dull
mind of the "untrained ordinary person", one who is untrained in
meditation (bhavana). As such, it is the necessary starting point for
one who wishes to travel the noble eightfold way to the cessation of
suffering.


Creations

Sankharas arise dependent on ignorance. The meaning of sankhara remains
one of the most difficult problems in Buddhism, which is reflected in
the number of different translations suggested for the word. Rune
Johansson lists some of them: activity, habitual tendency, effort,
aspiration, accumulation, construction, kamma-formation, kammic
residue, condition, propensity, factor, thing, component thing, created
thing, complex, constituent part, element of existence, trouble(40). To
this list we can add dispositions(41), concoctions(42), and plastic
forces(43).

In the Nikayas, sankharas include possessions, both animate and
inanimate: towns, cattle, clothing, jewels, etc. The earth, rivers and
ocean are sankharas. The contents of mind during the practice of
samadhi are sankharas, as are false views. Human activities are
sankharas: breathing, initial and sustained thought, recognition and
sensation. Further, sankharas are invariably mentioned in the plural -
there always appears to be a number of them.(44)

Sankhara is a noun derived from the verb karoti (to build, make,
produce, act, perform, do) and the prefix sam (with, together). 
Sankharoti therefore means "to put together; to construct". From this
we can see the common aspect of all the things listed as sankharas;
they are all put together, constructed, compounded, created - they are
sankhata (the past participle of sankharoti). Further, they in turn put
together, construct, compound and create.

During the discussion on impermanence referred to above, the Buddha
went on to describe his life as King Mahasudassana in a previous
existence, and the power and wealth he enjoyed. All Mahasudassana's
possessions were described as sankharas. The Buddha concluded:

In this way, Bhikkhus, all of these sankharas of the past have
vanished, have changed. So impermanent are sankharas, so unfixed and
unconsoling, that one is sure to be disenchanted with all sankharas,
sure to have one's passion fade, sure to be liberated.(45)


Because these possessions are seen to be impermanent and unfixed, they
are seen to be unconsoling, ultimately futile. Hence, disenchantment
(nibbida) arises, passion fades and liberation is won. The reason why
they are impermanent is that they are sankhata - put together,
constructed, composite. They are made up of parts, so they must
ultimately break up, fall apart. Further, they are sankhara - they put
together, construct. The owner of all these possessions was King
Mahasudassana, and it was these royal possessions which made him into
King Mahasudassana. Mahasudassana's sense of himself, his self-nature
(attabhava) or sense of identity, comes from his position as king,
which in turn is produced by his immense wealth of goods, slaves and
soldiers.

Hence the Buddha's definition of sankhara:

And why, Bhikkhus, do you say "sankharas"? "They create the created"
[abhisankharonti sankhatam], therefore they are called  "creations"
[sankhara]. And what is the created that they create?

They create created form into its present state [rupam rupattaya
sankhatam abhisankharonti]; ... created sensation into its present 
state; ... created recognition into its present state; ... created
creations into its present state; ... they create created 
consciousness into its present state. Therefore they are called
"creations" [sankhara].(46)

Buddhadasa gives three meanings for sankhara:

The single word "sankhara" can mean "conditioner", the cause that
conditions; it can mean "condition", the result of the action of 
conditioning; and it can mean "conditioning", the activity or process
of conditioning. We use the same word for the subject of the 
conditioning, "the concocter", as well as the object, "the concoction".
We even use it for the activity, "the concocting", itself.(47)

Nanavira translates sankhara as "determination", as it determines other
things. He argues that sankhara, "in all contexts, means 'something
that something else depends upon'".(48)

The Buddha is attempting to provoke the insight that "I" am not an
independently existing self (attan). This insight manifests when I see
that my sense of self depends upon supports that are impermanent. If
what I depend upon is impermanent, then I must be impermanent.
Mahasudassana realised his identity depended on his possessions. With
the cessation of these possessions, the thought "I am King
Mahasudassana" ceased.(49) The possessions, therefore, are sankharas,
because they create, condition, concoct, or determine something other
than themselves.

Sankharas are interdependently arisen phenomena (paticcasamuppanna
dhamma). If we regard them as meaning some kind of "thing", then the
word covers so many meanings that it becomes meaningless. However,
sankhara does not refer to a thing, but the fact that the thing - any
thing - is constructed, put together, made, and in turn constructs,
puts together, makes. Sankhara refers to constructive processes rather
than things; the relationships between things rather than the things
themselves.

Experience is endlessly changing: things turn into other things, which
means things create other things. Like dhammas, which refer to our
relationship with things (our experience of things), sankhara refers to
the relationships between things, the fact that things create other
things, and these other things (the created - sankhata) are therefore
dependent on them (the creating - sankhara). Here I follow Johansson in
emphasising the creative aspect of sankhara, and translate it as
"creations".


Consciousness

Sankharas create consciousness; that is, consciousness is dependent on
something other than itself for its existence.

Why, Bhikkhus, does one say "consciousness" [vinnana]? One cognises
[vijanati], therefore one says consciousness [vinnana].

What does one cognise? One cognises sour, bitter, pungent, and sweet.
One cognises alkaline and non-alkaline, salty and non-salty. One
cognises [vijanati], therefore one says "consciousness" [vinnana](50).
Consciousness is defined by its action: consciousness is that which
cognises or knows an object. Here, tongue or taste consciousness is
used as an example of the cognising function of all forms of
consciousness. (Definition by example is common in the Nikayas.)
Another definition focuses on the objects that are cognised:

And what, Bhikkhus, is consciousness? There are these six
classifications of consciousness: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, 
nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness and mind
consciousness. This, Bhikkhus, is called "consciousness"(51)


Note that there is no consciousness without an object (arammana); there
is no such thing as pure consciousness. Consciousness is always
consciousness of something, consciousness arises dependent upon
something else. In turn, the object of consciousness arises dependent
upon consciousness, for without consciousness the object could not be
discerned. Consciousness is therefore both creating (sankhara) and
created (sankhata); the object of consciousness is also both creating
and created. Both that which creates and that which is created is an
interdependently arisen phenomenon (paticcasamuppanna dhamma).

Consciousness is the presence of the phenomenon, the object of
consciousness. Hence its mutually dependent relationship with mental 
and physical phenomena (nama-rupa), which constitute what is
present.(52) The phenomenon and its presence together compose the 
experience. Consciousness, having arisen dependent upon creations, in
turn gives rise to mind-body. However, the relationship is not linear,
or one-way. If consciousness depends on its object, and the discernment
of the object depends on consciousness, then we would anticipate a
relationship of mutual dependence between consciousness and mind-body,
rather than just: "depending on creations, consciousness; depending on
consciousness, mind-body." This, indeed, is what we find, as Sariputta
explains to Maha-Kotthita:

Just as, Friend, two sheaves of reeds would stand leaning against each
other, in the same way consciousness is conditioned by mind-body,
mind-body is conditioned by consciousness....

If, Friend, one should pull one of these sheaves of reeds toward
oneself, the other would fall; and if one should pull the other 
towards oneself, the first would fall. In the same way, the cessation
of consciousness comes from the cessation of mind-body; the cessation
of mind-body comes from the cessation of consciousness.(53)


Consciousness plays an integral part in the arising of suffering:

And what, Bhikkhus, is the arising of suffering?

Dependent upon eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The combination
of the three is contact. Sensation is conditioned by contact; craving
is conditioned by sensation. This, Bhikkhus, is the arising of
suffering.(54)


The same process occurs for the other senses. No matter what form
consciousness takes, it gives rise to sensation and craving, and 
therefore suffering. Consciousness is part of a process of growth and
development which creates further becoming:

What one intends, determines and has dormant in one's mind is an object
[arammana] for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is an
object, there is a support [patittha] for consciousness. When this
support for consciousness grows, further becoming is produced in the
future. When further becoming is produced in the future, there arise
together [sambhavanti] ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain,
grief and despair. Such is the arising of this entire mass of
suffering.(55)


Consciousness is intimately bound up with becoming and suffering
because of the ingrained tendency to identify with it. For untrained
ordinary people, consciousness is not just the presence or cognition of
the phenomenon, but the one who cognises. When consciousness arises
dependent on ignorance, consciousness is always regarded as self
(attan). From this comes the intimate relationship between ignorance,
intention, consciousness and suffering.

If one who is ignorant, Bhikkhus, creates a meritorious creation
[punnam sankharam abhisankharoti], consciousness is attached to merit.
If one creates an unmeritorious creation, consciousness is attached to
demerit. If one creates a motionless creation, consciousness is
attached to motionlessness.

When, Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu's ignorance is abandoned and understanding
developed, he, because of the fading of ignorance and the arising of
understanding, does not create a meritorious creation; he does not
create a demeritorious creation; he does not create a motionless
creation.

Not creating [anabhisankharonto], not planning [anabhisancetayanto], he
clings to nothing in the world. Not clinging, he is not disturbed; not
disturbed, he is completely freed [parinibbayati] within himself. He
knows: birth is exhausted; the holy life is fulfilled; duty is done;
there is no more of this.(56)


The arising of consciousness in the forward order of the twelvefold
formula is the arising of consciousness in the untrained ordinary
person, for whom "This is present" means "This is present to me"; it is
the arising of consciousness in one who assumes that "I am conscious of
this"(57). It is, for all practical purposes, simply impossible for the
ordinary, untrained person to break the power of this identification.

It may be, Bhikkhus, that an untrained ordinary person would be wearied
of this body consisting of the four great elements, detach himself from
it, and wish to be liberated from it. Why is that? The growth and
decay, the taking up and putting down of this body consisting of the
four great elements is seen....

But the untrained ordinary person is not able to be wearied of this
which is called "inner space" [citta], "inner sense" [manas] or 
"consciousness" [vinnana](58), is not able to be detached and liberated
from it. Why? For a long time, Bhikkhus, the untrained ordinary person
has hung on to, has been attached to, and has grasped it as: "This is
mine; I am this; this is myself"....

Just as a monkey going through a forest or along a mountain side takes
hold of a branch, releases it, and grasps another, just so this which
is called "inner space", "inner sense" or "consciousness" arises as one
thing and ceases as another, both by day and by night.(59)


The arising of the view, "This is mine; I am this; this is myself', is
the arising of mind-body dependent on ignorance. When I am possessed of
a sense of an independently existing self I interpret all my experience
as "This is my experience"; "This is happening to me". The supposed
independently existing self is a product of confusion: it does not
actually exist. In Chapter 2 we saw the statement "It is raining"
expresses the assumption that there is some "thing" which rains. If I
searched for the "it" out there which is raining, I would fail to find
it. There is just the process of raining. Similarly, although I say "I"
and "mine", when I investigate my own mind-body process I fail to find
the entity which is doing the existing or owning; there is just the
mind-body process.

Despite this fact I construct myself by developing a sense of being a
separate identity. The sense of identity includes both the bundle of
mental and emotional processes we call ego and a sense of
identification with the ego - the notion that "I am my ego". As an
independent entity I am necessarily concerned with my life, my career,
my security, my relationships. This process of construction and
creation is sankhara, and it in turn confirms and develops my sense of
identity, of ownership of experience: "Depending on ignorance,
creations; depending on creations, consciousness". As consciousness is
owned, so too are the objects of consciousness, mental and physical
phenomena, or mind-body: "Depending on consciousness, mind-body".


Six sense-spheres and contact

And what, Bhikkhus, are the six sense-spheres [salayatana]? The eye
sense-sphere, the ear sense-sphere, the nose sense-sphere, the tongue
sense-sphere, the body sense-sphere, and the mind sense-sphere. This,
Bhikkhus, is called the six sense-spheres.(60)

The six sense-spheres (sal-ayatana) arise dependent on mind-body. 
Ayatana is derived from a + yam, to stretch or spread out. It 
indicates the extent, reach or sphere of the senses. The six
sense-spheres are the six functioning sense organs (eye, ear, nose, 
tongue, body and mind) and their appropriate objects (forms, sounds,
scents, tastes, tangible things and mental phenomena). They arise
interdependently. A functioning sense organ, that is, a sense organ
capable of responding to sense-stimuli(61), requires an object of
sense, a source of stimulus. An object of sense is not present without
a functioning sense organ. Experience arises from the relationship
between sense organ and sense object(62). The convergence of
functioning sense organ, its appropriate sense object and its presence
to consciousness is contact or stimulus (phassa). Hence, the six
sense-spheres give rise to contact.

And what, Bhikkhus, is contact [phassa]? There are these six
classifications of contact: eye contact, ear contact; nose contact; 
tongue contact; body contact; and mind contact. This, Bhikkhus, is
called "contact"(63).

Contact is the communication between the psycho-physical person and the
inner and outer world. As such, it cannot occur without functioning
sense organs, their objects of recognition, and the appropriate
consciousness.

Just as consciousness and mind-body are inseparable because
consciousness and its objects are inseparable, so mind-body is 
inseparable from the six sense-spheres, as functioning sense organs and
their objects of recognition are inseparable. The union of sense organ
and sense object is contact. Any one of these phenomena are
unimaginable without the others. We can break up the ignorance /
creations / consciousness / mind body / six sense-spheres / contact
nexus for purposes of intellectual analysis, but not in lived
experience. They arise together as a single complex of interdependent
identity, and therefore they are interdependently arisen.

The psycho-physical person is a single unit made up of a complex of
interlinked processes. Without those processes and their 
interconnections there would be no person; and the absence of any one
of these processes changes one person into another. Someone, for
example, who is blind will develop in ways which are quite different
from how he would have developed had he possessed vision. The
experienced world of a blind person is different from that of a sighted
person. The inter-relationships between the person and his experienced
world create both the person and the world which is experienced.

The defining characteristic of the created person in the twelve fold
formula is, from the Buddha's point of view, the fact that all these
processes are based upon, and inseparable from, ignorance. The person
thus created is one who assumes his or her separate, independent
existence is standing at the centre of the experienced universe. Such
an existence is characterised by suffering. How this "untrained
ordinary person" functions is the subject of the next chapter.



4. THE PERSON IN BONDAGE

The fact that nama-rupa (mind-body) is a compound illustrates how
neither mind nor body is found alone. Mind is always supported by a
physical structure (even if a very subtle one, as for devas), and body
without mind quickly decays. In lived experience, mind-body is always
accompanied by consciousness. Mind, body and consciousness together
make up a single being, the physical, mental and emotional person. A
person is not an indivisible and solid entity, but a complex of
processes. The Buddha called the processes that constitute the person
the five khandas (panca khandha).

Usually the five factors are referred to as the five clung-to factors
(panca-upadana-khandha). This term expresses the relationship between
the untrained ordinary person and "his" mind-body. We do not simply
experience mental and physical phenomena, we claim them as our own and
identify with them as "me" and "mine". Wanting to possess, I believe
that body and mind are mine; wanting to be someone, I believe that I am
my body, I am my mind. Clinging and the five factors, while distinct,
are inseparable in lived experience.

"on what, Bhante, are these five clung-to factors based?"

"These five clung-to factors are based on desire [chanda]."

"Is clinging [upadana] the five clung-to factors, or is clinging
somewhere other than the five clung-to factors?"

"Clinging is not the five clung-to factors, nor is clinging somewhere
other than the five clung-to factors; but where there is desire and
passion [raga], there is clinging."(64)

The five clung-to factors consist of: body (rupa); sensation (vedana);
recognition (sanna); creations (sankhara); and consciousness 
(vinnana). These phenomena arise from causes. They are interdependently
arisen, and their arising can be seen by meditative insight. The Buddha
explains the causes of these five clung-to factors:

The four great elements, Bhikkhu, are the cause (hetu), the four great
elements are the condition (paccaya) for the disclosure of the body
factor (rupa-khandha). Contact (phassa) is the cause, contact is the
condition for the disclosure of the sensation factor (vedana-khandha).
Contact is the cause, contact is the condition for the disclosure of
the recognition factor (sanna-khandha). Contact is the cause, contact
is the condition for the disclosure of the creations factor
(sankhara-khandha). Mind-body (nama-rupa) is the cause, mind-body is
the condition for the disclosure of the consciousness factor
(vinnana-khandha).(65)


Body

The four great elements (mahabhuta) are: earth-element (pathavi-dhatu);
water-element (apo-dhatu); fire-element (tejo-dhatu); and air element
(vayo-dhatu). They refer to the nature of physical experience rather
than physical elements in the modern sense. Earth-element is the
experience of softness and hardness, or resistance; water-element is
the experience of fluidity and cohesion; fire-element is the experience
of temperature, whether cold or hot; and air-element is the experience
of movement, tightness and tension(66). These experiences can be
subjective or objective, but in every case they have these
characteristics. Again we encounter this fundamental aspect of the
Buddha's view of reality: the world is our experience of the world; the
physical elements are the irreducible units of our experience of the
physical world.(67)

Hence the Buddha's definition of body (rupa):

Why, Bhikkhus, do you say "body" [rupa]? One is afflicted [ruppati],
therefore it is called "body". What is one afflicted by? One is
afflicted by cold, heat, hunger, and thirst; one is afflicted by
contact [samphassa] with snakes, wind, heat, mosquitos and gadflies.
One is afflicted [ruppati], therefore it is called "body".(68)

This definition is based on a word play with the verb ruppati which,
despite its similarity, is not etymologically related to rupa. The
definition is made within the context of the Buddha's conviction that
physical experience is essentially unpleasant (dukkha). The point is
that what defines "body" is the way in which a person is affected by
the experience of physical phenomena. That is, "unless the experience
of such phenomena are available, it is meaningless to speak of material
form"(69). Or, as Johansson says:

The body is a collection of observed processes. Without vinnana there
would be no consciousness of our own body, i.e. no body-processes.(70)

All physical experiences, when closely examined, resolve into one or
more of the four elements of hardness/softness, fluidity, temperature
and movement/tension. In brief, the body is the experience of the
body.(71)



Sensation

And why, Bhikkhus, do you say "sensation" [vedana]? One senses
[vediyati], therefore it is called "sensation". What does one sense? 
One senses what is pleasant [sukha], unpleasant [dukkha] and neither
pleasant nor unpleasant [adukkhamasukha]. One senses, therefore it is
called "sensation".(72)

Vedana is the hedonic or affective aspect of experience: the automatic
discernment of experience as being either pleasant, unpleasant or
neither. It is usually translated as "feeling", but the English word
"feeling" is associated with emotion, which is not meant here. Vedana
is not emotion, but simply the registering of every experience, the
direct sensation, as either pleasant, painful, or neutral. In a
conversation with Visakha, Ayya(73) Dhammadinna explains:

Whatever physical or mental experience is pleasant [sukha] or agreeable
[sata] is pleasant sensation; whatever physical or mental experience is
unpleasant [dukkha] or disagreeable [asata] is unpleasant sensation;
whatever physical or mental experience is neither agreeable nor
disagreeable is neutral sensation.(74)

At the root of our psychological makeup is an inbuilt attraction for
the pleasant and aversion for the unpleasant. We all want happiness and
seek to avoid pain. Visakha asks Dhammadinna:

"What tendency [anusaya] lies dormant [anuseti] in pleasant sensation,
Ayya; what tendency lies dormant in unpleasant sensation; what tendency
lies dormant in neutral sensation?"

"A tendency towards passion [raga] lies dormant in pleasant sensation;
a tendency towards revulsion [patigha] lies dormant in unpleasant
sensation; and a tendency towards ignorance [avijja] lies dormant in
neutral sensation.(75)

This attraction and aversion has nothing to do with choice or
intention, just as the instant reaction of "I don't like this" when I 
accidentally burn my hand is not intentional. As sensation is a direct
response to sense stimulus, it is caused by contact.


Recognition

And why, Bhikkhus, do you say "recognition" [sanna]? One recognises
[sanjanati], therefore it is called "recognition". What does one
recognise? One recognises blue-green, yellow, red, and white. One
recognises, therefore it is called "recognition".(76)

Recognition takes the raw percept, then classifies and interprets it.
The eye sees forms, which are simply shifting patterns of colour.
Recognition takes the changing patterns of colour and, on the basis of
past experience, interprets them as "man close by", "woman further
away", "house in the distance", etc. Walpola Rahula explains:

It should be clearly understood that consciousness does not recognise
an object. It is only ... awareness of the presence of an object. When
the eye comes in contact with a colour, for instance blue, visual
consciousness arises which simply is awareness of the presence of a
colour; but it does not recognise that it is blue.... It is perception
[sanna] ... that recognises that it is blue. The term "visual
consciousness" is a philosophical expression denoting the same idea as
is conveyed by the ordinary word "seeing". Seeing does not mean
recognising.(77)

Eye consciousness sees a pattern of black symbols against a white
background; recognition recognises written words on a page. Hearing
consciousness hears random sounds; recognition recognises some of them
as words expressing meaning and some as background noise. Similarly
with the other senses: recognition takes the raw data of experience and
recognises patterns and structures based on our past experiences.
Recognition is made up of "a mixed bag of memories, concepts,
dispositions, and material elements".(78) From it "we carve out
discrete objects out of the flux of experience"(79). Like sensation,
recognition is based directly on sense experience, and is therefore
caused by contact.


Creations

We saw in the last chapter that the general term sankhara refers not to
any particular phenomenon, but to the fact that the phenomenon in
question is constructed, put together, made, and in turn constructs,
puts together, makes. Sankhara refers to constructive processes rather
than things.

Note that vedana, sanna, sankhara and vinnana are defined in terms of
their activity: sensation is sensing, recognition is recognising,
creations are creating, consciousness is cognising. There is not some
"thing" in the mind which can be labelled "recognition" or
"consciousness"; rather, there are processes of ongoing activity, and
for purposes of linear thought and analysis we abstract "things" or
"entities" from these processes. It is a different, and, for us,
unusual, standpoint - that of interdependent arising and
interdependently arisen phenomena - where instead of beginning with
entities and proceeding to their actions and the relationships between
them, we begin with the experience of interrelated processes and from
these infer the existence of entities. Even the solid, material body is
a process: one of being afflicted or affected. Hence, all these
phenomena are sankharas.

In the context of the five factors, however, sankhara has a more
specific meaning:

And what, Bhikkhus, are "creations" [sankhara]? There are these six
types of intention [sancetana]: intention regarding forms ...  sounds
... scents ... tastes ... touches ... (mental) phenomena. These are
called "creations".(80)


In the context of the five clung-to factors, sankharas are all those
mental events that involve intention or volition. Both vedana and sanna
are automatic: we do not have to intend to feel pleasure or pain as we
experience the events that make up our lives; pleasure and pain simply
manifest. We do not have to intend to recognise the sounds of our names
when we hear them; recognition simply manifests. Vedana and sanna are
beyond the realm of choice, and therefore beyond the realm of moral
responsibility. We cannot do anything about the fact that we feel
pleasure and pain, or that we understand one language and not another;
these are simply givens of experience. Although experienced as givens,
they are already the result of a complex process of interpretation
which has turned the raw data of experience into a meaningful world
populated by the everyday objects and entities our senses present to
us. Creations, however, involve choice. They constitute the higher
level processing of sense data, what we choose to do with this 
everyday world. Because creations are based on sense stimulus, they too
are caused by contact.

Creations are kamma (action), the realm of moral responsibility:

Intention [cetana], I declare, is action [kamma]: after intending one
performs action of body, speech or mind.(81)

The Buddha goes so far as to say that the body itself is simply old
kamma that has been intended [abhisancetayita] and performed 
[abhisankhata](82). My body in the condition it is today is the result
of innumerable decisions taken regarding, for example, what and how I
eat and drink, how and to what extent I exercise. A different lifestyle
will result in a different body in the future.

Kamma begins as plans and intentions, and develops into actions of body
and speech. The actions we take and the choices we make determine the
development of our bodies and minds, our lives, and our identities, in
an ongoing process of becoming. In brief, we are our actions; identity
is a verb:

One is a farmer by action, a craftsman by action, 
A merchant by action, a servant by action.

One is a thief by action, a soldier by action, 
A priest by action, a king by action.

Thus the wise see action as it is,
Seeing interdependent arising, understanding action and its result.(83)


The wise do not see people and their actions, in-dependently existing
entities and their attributes. They see an inter-dependently arisen
pattern of actions and results, and for purposes of communication use
conventional terms such as "farmer", "priest", etc. They are not
deceived by these words, however, as they do not reify the phenomena
indicated by them into separately existing selves.


Consciousness

Consciousness (vinnana) arises along with the other factors, as an
integral aspect of a wider system.

If one were to say: "I will declare the coming or going, the death or
birth, the increase, growth or full development of consciousness
somewhere other than the body, sensation, recognition and creations";
this is impossible.(84)

This is essentially a restatement of: "Depending on consciousness,
mind-body; depending on mind-body, consciousness". Consciousness, the
presence of the object, arises dependent upon the object which is
present - the sense object - and the functioning sense organ. When any
of the five factors are present to awareness, then there is
consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, is inseparable from the
experience of the five factors. Consciousness acts like a spotlight on
a dark night, bringing into the light of awareness specific aspects of
the wider functioning of the mind-body process.


Contact

Contact is the "coming together" (sangati) of consciousness with an
object through a sense faculty. Contact is the communication between
the psycho-physical person and the inner and outer world. Where there
is contact, there is sensation and recognition, as we process the raw
data of sense perception. Hence, sensation, recognition and
consciousness are interdependent, as Sariputta explains to
Maha-kotthita:

Sensation, recognition and consciousness, Friend, are united, not
separate, and it is not possible to distinguish any difference between
them, even after repeatedly sifting through them.

What one senses, one recognises; what one recognises, one cognises.
Hence these phenomena are united, not separate, and it is not possible
to distinguish any difference between them, even after repeatedly
sifting through them.(85)

The five factors are distinguished for purposes of analysis, but in
lived experience they, like the other factors of the twelvefold 
formula, arise together as a single complex of interdependently arisen
phenomena. When one is present, all are present.

In the twelvefold formula, contact is mentioned only as the condition
of sensation. However, we have seen that the Buddha also saw contact as
the condition of recognition and creations. It appears that the
twelvefold formula, in declaring "depending on contact, sensation", is
using sensation as an example of a wider process. This is another
instance of definition by example, and its use here alerts us to the
possibility that the twelvefold formula is not meant to be a complete
exposition of interdependent arising, but rather a series of examples
used to illustrate aspects of a wider structural principle.


Craving / clinging / becoming

Where there is experience there is a sense of pleasure and pain, and
therefore an automatic tendency to turn toward and cultivate what gives
pleasure, and turn away from and avoid what gives pain. As Dhammadinna
explained above, passion (raga) lies dormant in pleasant sensation,
revulsion (patigha) in unpleasant sensation, and ignorance (avijja) in
neutral sensation. These tendencies must be abandoned.(86) If they are
not, there is craving (tanha).

And what, Bhikkhus, is "craving" [tanha]? There are these six
classifications of craving: craving for forms, sounds, scents, tastes,
tangible things, and (mental) phenomena. This is called "craving"(87).

Tanha literally means "thirst". It is simple want, like the desire for
a drink when one is thirsty. We want forms, scents, tastes, tangible
things, and (mental) phenomena that provide us with pleasant
sensations. We also want to avoid or bring quickly to an end 
unpleasant sensations. Such wants are entirely natural, and are an
inherent aspect of sentient existence. However, wants do not remain
simple and natural, any more than we satisfy our thirst simply and
naturally with water. Craving tends to be cultivated, and when
cultivated develops into clinging (upadana) and becoming (bhava).

Craving develops for the one who lives contemplating the enjoyment
regarding the things that are clung to [upadana dhamma]. Clinging 
conditions becoming; becoming conditions birth; birth conditions ageing
and death; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and arise together. Such is
the arising of this whole mass of suffering.(88)

Craving is part of a continuous process of psychological development. I
realise I am thirsty and begin to think of what I would like to drink -
perhaps a cold beer. My desire is cultivated and refined, influenced by
tastes and by imagined images of satisfaction in the future that
themselves are the products of habits cultivated over a lifetime. To
satisfy my desires I make plans to gain the necessary money. I plan my
life to ensure I will always have the money necessary to satisfy this
and other desires. I feel comfortable with people who share my desires
and spend my time with them, perhaps at the local pub. At work, I find
myself looking forward to my time with my mates at the pub. Over time,
it may be I find my life revolves around the physical, emotional and 
social satisfactions that come from the neck of a beer bottle. From a
simple desire, I have constructed a life and an identity. This is the
maturing of a journey beginning with craving and proceeding through
enjoyment and clinging. Its end result is a personality defined by its
desires for specific types of sense (including mental) satisfaction. As
the Buddha says:

What one is desiring [kamayamana] gives rise to its appropriate
personality [attabhava], whether favourable or unfavourable.(89)

Upadana is one of a number of terms from the same root which contain a
complex of related meanings. Upadana is "that ... by means  of which an
active process is kept alive or going". It comes from: upa, denoting
nearness or close touch, with the idea of approach from below or rest
on top; a, "towards (oneself)"; and da, "to give". It can mean "taking
up"; or "that which is placed under, support".(90)

In terms of the first meaning, upadana means "clinging". One takes up,
clings to and develops simple wants which are rooted in pleasurable and
painful sensations. Sense experiences and personality processes are
taken up, collected and developed, and in this way a personality is
formed.(91) One "becomes" someone of specific character and identity;
clinging (upadana) conditions becoming (bhava). This development is
characteristic of consciousness, which develops by way of clinging into
the presence to me of experience, the owner of experience, the one who
experiences.

Should consciousness remain clinging to body [rupa-upaya], with body as
its object and its support in the pursuit of delight, it would undergo
increase, growth and full development.

Should consciousness remain clinging to sensation ... recognition ...
creations, with creations as its object and its support in the pursuit
of delight, it would undergo increase, growth and full development.(92)

In terms of the second meaning, upadana can mean "fuel", that which
supports a fire. The self-in-process is likened to a great fire 
(aggi-khandha), "consuming and constituted by its impressions, fuelled
by sights, sounds, touch, tastes, smells, mental objects, and driven by
the wants that they awaken ... "(93). Hence, after explaining that
"craving develops for the one who lives contemplating the enjoyment
regarding the phenomena that are clung to (upadana dhamma)", the Buddha
goes on to say:

For example, if one was to light a great fire of ten, twenty, thirty or
forty cartloads of wood, and a person was, from time to time, to throw
into it dry grass, dry cowdung and dry sticks; such a great fire, fed
[ahara] and supplied with fuel [upadana], would burn for a long
time.(94)

A fire is interdependently arisen; it arises dependent on nourishment
(ahara) and fuel (upadana), and is inseparable from these factors. Its
nature and identity is dependent on the nature of the fuel; hence, we
call it a bush-fire, house-fire, coal-fire, etc. Dependent upon the
fuel (upadana), the fire comes into existence (bhava). Like a fire, the
self is a pattern of dynamic processes which maintains a shape although
its substance constantly changes.(95) The type of personality result
that comes from clinging depends on the type of clinging cultivated.

And what, Bhikkhus, is clinging [upadana]? There are these four
classifications of clinging: clinging to sense desires [kama-upadana],
clinging to views [ditthi-upadana], clinging to morality and practices
[sila-bbata-upadana], and clinging to belief in a self
[atta-vada-upadana]. This is called clinging.(96)

Clinging to sense desires, I can become a person addicted to certain
pleasures or physical habits. Clinging to views, I can become dogmatic
and intolerant, obsessed with the correctness of my chosen ideology.
Clinging to morality and practices, I can become obsessed with specific
moral codes and spiritual practices, complacently convinced that merely
by reproducing certain traditional practices my spiritual liberation or
salvation will be assured.

However, for the Buddha, the fundamental form of clinging is atta-vada,
the belief in oneself as a separate entity; belief in in-dependently
existing things, rather than interdependently arisen phenomena. The
becoming that is conditioned by clinging blossoms into the becoming of
a supposedly separate, independent self.


Bondage

Someone who imagines oneself to be such an entity is like the king who
was entranced by the sound of a vina the first time he heard it. He
ordered that the sound be brought to him, and was disappointed by the
sight of a wooden instrument. Where was the sound? His courtiers
explained that what is called a "vina" is made up of many parts,
including the effort of the player. But the king was unconvinced, and
broke up the vina in his attempts to discover the sound.(97) Like the
king entranced by the vina's sound, we are entranced by our own
existence, but when we examine this complex mind-body we fail to find
the one who exists, the one to whom experience occurs.

We are bound to our imagined independent self like Narcissus was bound
to his reflection in the water. After speaking of the "continual moving
and running along of beings bound by craving (tanha)" which is samsara,
the Buddha says:

For example, Bhikkhus, a dog bound by a leather strap to a strong
pillar or post is closely tied up. If he goes, he goes around that
pillar or post; if he stands, he stands around that pillar or post; if
he sits, he sits around that pillar or post; if he lies down, he lies
down around that pillar or post.

In the same way, the untrained ordinary person regards the body as:
this is mine; I am this; this is myself. He regards sensation ...
recognition ... creations ... consciousness as: this is mine; I am
this; this is myself.

If he goes, he goes around these five clung-to factors; if he stands,
he stands around these five clung-to factors; if he sits, he sits
around these five clung-to factors; if he lies down, he lies down
around these five clung-to factors.(98)


No matter where we go or what we achieve in life, we are, from the
Buddha's point of view, like that dog bound to a post. No matter how
noble our ideals or exalted our thoughts, our lives are limited by the
fixed length of the strap. This bondage is the source of our suffering.

And what, Bhikkhus, is the arising of body? What is the arising of
sensation ... recognition ... creations ... consciousness?

Here one delights in, welcomes, and remains hanging on to. What does
one delight in, welcome and remain hanging on to? One delights in,
welcomes, and hangs on to body. Delight arises in the one delighting
in, welcoming and hanging on to body. That which is delight in the body
is clinging; conditioned by his clinging is becoming; conditioned by
becoming is birth; conditioned by birth is ageing and death; sorrow,
lamentation, pain, grief and despair arise together. Such is the
arising of this entire mass of suffering.

One delights in, welcomes and hangs on to sensation ... recognition ...
creations ... consciousness.... That which is delight in consciousness
is clinging; conditioned by his clinging is becoming; conditioned by
becoming is birth; conditioned by birth is ageing and death; sorrow,
lamentation, pain, grief and despair arise together. Such is the
arising of this entire mass of suffering.(99)


The five factors together constitute the person, which in turns
constitutes the world of experience. These five factors manifest 
according to natural processes, taking the raw data of sense experience
and transforming it into an intelligible world. However, something has
gone wrong; the natural tendency towards pleasure and away from pain
has resulted in the development of a separate, independently existing
entity: a self which imagines itself to be independent from the world
and other beings in the world. This independently existing self suffers
because of the open-ended nature of the desires that created him. No
matter how much he satisfies his desires he will not be finally
contented, hecause the creation of new desires goes on apace. Further,
his sense of separation creates its own anxiety. Faced with the other,
he must defend himself and his possessions from a threatening world; 
having borders, he must defend his borders.

The owner of experience is in the same situation as King Mahasudassana.
He was king because of his royal possessions, so his identity depended
upon these possessions. However, it was impossible for him to hide the
fact that these possessions, and the royal position dependent upon
them, were impermanent and subject to change and decay. The sense of
identity and security that the arising of the self provides is
inherently unstable, for it rests upon creations that are constantly
coming into and going out of existence. We search for security in our
jobs, our relationships, our income and our sense of identity,
precisely because we know deep within that there is no security. Our
hard-won identity is like a heavy person walking over thin ice. It is
only a question of time before the abyss opens.

The development from sense experience to suffering is neatly summed up
in this famous passage from the Madhupindika-sutta:

Depending on eye and forms eye consciousness arises; the union of the
three is contact; depending on contact, sensation.

What one senses, one recognises; what one recognises one reflects on;
what one reflects on one multiplies [papanceti].

Based on what one multiplies, concepts characterised by multiplied
recognitions [papanca-sanna-sankha] assault the person in regard to
forms of the past, present and future cognised by the eye.(100)


The first paragraph shows a natural process of sense perception
proceeding as nature is designed to do. The second paragraph shows the
functioning of creations, volitional actions, and the first appearance
of someone to whom experience is occurring. We have become someone
(bhava). We reflect, and these reflections proliferate and multiply.
Unwilling or unable to let them go, we build them up by clinging
(upadana) to them; they become fuel (upadana) cast onto the fire of our
thinking mind. Our thoughts multiply and become ever more fascinating,
like the characters in a soap opera whose developing fates draw us in.
In the third paragraph, we have lost all semblance of control over the
process. From being the actor who reflects on what we experience, we
become the acted upon, assaulted by a multiplicity of thoughts and
images from the past, present and future. Now we find we cannot turn
off the soap opera even if we wanted to. We are possessed by our own
rampaging mental and emotional processes.

Hence we have travelled the road from natural processes of sense
stimuli, to the ownership of experience, to the loss of control over
our own inner world because of our multiplying obsessions (papanca). We
have become the victim of forces beyond our control. We are in bondage.
How we emerge from this bondage is the subject of the next chapter.




5. INTERDEPENDENT CESSATION

But from the complete fading away and cessation of ignorance, creations
cease;
From the cessation of creations, consciousness ceases;
From the cessation of consciousness, mind-body ceases; 
From the cessation of mind-body, six sense-spheres cease; 
From the cessation of six sense-spheres, contact ceases; 
From the cessation of contact, sensation ceases; 
From the cessation of feeling, craving ceases; 
From the cessation of craving, clinging ceases; 
From the cessation of clinging, becoming ceases; 
From the cessation of becoming, birth ceases; 
From the cessation of birth, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation,
pain, grief and despair dissolve.

Such is the cessation of this entire mass of suffering(101).


Implicit in interdependent arising is interdependent cessation. What
arises, ceases, and if we understand arising - the conditions that
result in the emergence of any given phenomenon - then we can
understand cessation. If certain conditions cause a phenomenon to 
arise, then removing those conditions will cause it to cease. The
Buddha's path of practice, the noble eightfold way, is the skillful
management of conditions in order to achieve a particular result, the
cessation of suffering. Suffering, in the Buddha's view, is the
suffering implicit in birth and all those phenomena associated with
birth. In the last chapter we saw how interdependent arising describes
the arising and dynamic development of the psycho-physical person, the
living being, from the viewpoint of the yogin examining her own
existence. To understand cessation, however, we must be clear on who or
what ceases. Central to this question is the meaning of birth (jati) in
interdependent arising.


Birth

There are these two searches [pariyesana], noble [ariyal and ignoble
[anariya].

And what, Bhikkhus, is the ignoble search?

In this case someone, because he himself is subject to birth
[jati-dhamma], searches out what is subject to birth. Because he 
himself is subject to ageing, he searches out what is subject to
ageing. Because he himself is subject to disease ... dying ...  sorrow
... fixation [sankilesa] ... he searches out what is subject to disease
... dying ...  sorrow ... fixation.

And what, Bhikkhus, should you say is subject to birth? Sons and wife
are subject to birth ... male and female servants ... goats and sheep
... cocks and pigs ... elephants, cows, horses and mares ... gold and
silver are subject to birth.

Those phenomena that are subject to birth are an attachment [upadhaya],
and here, because he himself is bound to, infatuated with and clinging
to what is subject to birth, he searches out what is subject to
birth.(102)

This list is mostly unexceptional, a catalogue of living creatures who,
having been born, will one day die. But how can gold and silver be
subject to birth? And why is birth equivalent to fixation? We know that
what is born, dies; what begins, ends. What things that are "subject to
birth" have in common is a beginning and an end. They are sankhata,
constructed and complex entities, and being constructed, they are
subject to falling apart, to deconstruction. They are sankhara,
constructing entities, that create and define entities other than
themselves, as Mahasudassana was constructed and defined by his
possessions. They are upadhaya, an attachment: what is taken up and
developed, or a support, what underlies and supports a dynamic process.

Kilesa and its equivalents, sankilesa and upakkilesa, are associated
with attachment and birth. Usually translated as "defilement", kilesa
is derived from the verb kilissati, to adhere. We can compare the mind
to a white cloth. If we throw mud on the cloth, the mud sticks or
adheres. This quality of the stuckness or fixation of the mud creates a
stain or defilement on the cloth. In the same way, when the mind moves
toward an object and is stuck there, that fixation is kilesa. The mind
is fixated on a particular experience or aspect of experience. Having
moved to the desired object or away from the hated object,
consciousness is fixated in a posture of attraction or aversion.
Creations, attachment and fixation all refer to processes that give
rise to phenomena that endure, that are clung to, and that ultimately
end.

The Buddha says:

Everything, Bhikkhus, is subject to birth. And what is everything?

The eye is subject to birth; forms are subject to birth; eye
consciousness is subject to birth; the pleasant, unpleasant or neutral 
sensation that arises dependent on eye contact is subject to birth.

Tongue ... body ... mind [manas] is subject to birth. (Mental)
phenomena are subject to birth; mind consciousness is subject to birth; 
the pleasant, unpleasant or neutral sensation that arises dependent on
mind contact is subject to birth.(103)


In brief, all experience is sankhata, constructed out of parts: the
functioning sense organ, the sense object, and the appropriate sense
consciousness. All experience is subject to birth, and therefore to
ageing, disease, death, sorrow and fixation. "Everything" (sabba) is
subject to birth, the world and all it contains; in brief, the
interdependently arisen is subject to birth.

The Buddha is using the word "birth" in an unconventional way. This is
not surprising, given his unconventional view of the world. Our use of
language presupposes the existence of subject and object. There are
beings that act and entities and beings that are acted upon; there are
"things" to which words apply. That is, in our conventional world view
there are in-dependently existing entities. The Buddha, however, sees
patterns of inter-dependently arisen phenomena rather than things. His
use of language seeks to frustrate our tendency to project real
existence onto phenomena by labelling them as nouns.

Hence the Buddha used statements which are neyyattha (whose meanings
need to be drawn out) which refer to "things" and their activities; and
statements that are nitattha (having the meaning drawn out) which do
not assume the existence of "things".(104) Similarly, Theravada
Buddhism distinguishes vohara-vacana, or "conventional" everyday
language; and paramattha-vacana, the language used especially in
Abhidhamma, which speaks not of "things" but of ultimately existing
phenomena (paramattha-dhamma).(105)

Buddhadasa also maintains the distinction between these two ways of
using language, which he calls everyday language and dhamma language.
Everyday language is the language of relative truth, the purpose of
which is to teach morality to people "still befuddled with the idea of
eternalism; those who feel that they are selves ... ". Dhamma language
is the "language of ultimate truth", and therefore the language of
interdependent arising.(106) To teach morality, the Buddha speaks as if
persons exist and will receive the results of merit and demerit after
they die. Such language carries the danger that it presupposes and
therefore encourages an eternalist view, a view that there is someone
to whom words refer, someone who acts, continues in existence, and
suffers the consequences of actions. When teaching ultimate truth the
Buddha uses dhamma language, which is intended to eliminate both the 
eternalist and annihilationist points of view.(107)

There are only those interdependent events which arise for a moment and
then pass away ... called paticcasamupanna dhamma (events which arise
by reason of the law of causation) and which are called
paticcasamuppada when they are connected together in a chain or string
of events. There is no way to say "who" or "self' in any of those
moments, even the present one, so there is no one born and no one to
die and receive the results of past deeds (karma) as in the case of the
theory of eternalism.(108)

We are caught in a paradox. At the level of relative truth, of the self
and the world in our ordinary experience, there is past, present and
future, there are those who act and experience the consequences of
their actions, there is this life and a future life. At the ultimate
level, however, there is neither existence nor non-existence, there is
no doer and owner of actions and their results; there is simply the
middle way of interdependent arising:

When this is, that is; because this arises, that arises. 
When this is not, that is not; because this ceases, that ceases.

Both these views, however, are correct within their respective
domains(109); each view supplements rather than contradicts the other.
We can see something similar in contemporary science. The fixed laws of
the Newtonian universe are quite different from the probabilities of
quantum physics, yet both are correct - or rather, both work - within
their contexts. The quantum physicist knows that solid entities
dissolve into space and energy when examined, but this does not keep
him from getting out of the way of a bus when he crosses the street.

And what, Bhikkhus, is birth? That which is, regarding all beings and
classifications of beings, birth, origin, entry, becoming; the
appearance of the factors [khandhanam patubhavol and the taking up of
the sense spheres [ayatananam patilabho]: this is called birth.

And what, Bhikkhus, is ageing and death?

That which is, regarding all beings and classifications of beings,
ageing, old age, broken teeth, grey hair, wrinkled skin; the decline of
life and the decay of the faculties [indriyanam paripako]: this is
called ageing.

That which is, regarding all beings and classifications of beings,
falling away, separation, disappearance, mortality, the fulfilment of
one's time; the breaking up of the factors [khandhanam bhedo] and the
laying down of the body; this is called death.(110)


Birth is "the appearance of the factors" (khandhanam patubhavo), and
death is "the breaking up of the factors" (khandhanam bhedo). Can these
mean something other than biological birth and death?

We have seen that the Buddha is concerned with life as we experience it
rather than life as an object of abstract analysis, regarded as
separate from an objective, uninvolved observer. As a psychologist, the
Buddha's object of study is himself; the yogin is both therapist and
patient. From this focus on experience comes the Buddha's distinctive
use of words: a dhamma is not a thing but our experience-of-a-thing;
the world is not something out there but our experience-of-the-world.
Things are processes; nouns are verbs. Dhamma language is used to
describe phenomena from the intimate perspective of interdependently
arisen phenomena.

This view is inherent to the Buddha's method of investigation, the
yogic contemplation of his own mind and body. The Buddha investigated
his own mind-body processes, and in doing so investigated birth and
death(111); he gained insight into his own mind-body processes, and in
doing so gained insight into birth and death(112). Birth and death are
immediately available to yogic investigation; the Buddha did not have
to rely on memory or anticipation to know and see them, any more than
he had to rely on memory or anticipation to know and see the five
factors constituting his own person.

Here, Bhikkhus, an untrained ordinary person is unaware of the noble
ones. He is ignorant of the noble teaching and untrained in the 
teaching of the noble ones; he is ignorant of good people and untrained
in the teaching of good people. He regards body as the self, the self
as possessed by body, body in the self, the self in body.

He regards sensation ... recognition ... creations ...consciousness as
the self, the self as possessed by consciousness, consciousness in the
self, the self in consciousness.

This is how he regards it: it occurs to him, "I am".

When it occurs to him "I am", then there is the appearance of the five
senses [pancannam indriyanam avakkanti hoti]: seeing, hearing,
smelling, tasting and touching. There is mind, there are (mental)
phenomena, there is the sphere of ignorance.

To the untrained ordinary person touched by experience born of ignorant
contact [avijja-samphassa-jena vedayitena] comes "I am"; "I am this";
"they will be"; "they will not be";...

In this situation, Bhikkhus, the five senses remain. But in the case of
the trained noble disciple, ignorance is abandoned, knowledge arises.
Because of the fading of ignorance and the arising of knowledge, for
him there is no "I am"; there is no "I am not";...(113)


The ordinary untrained person identifies with the five factors and
therefore fabricates an "I" which really does not exist. The "I" is
clung to, protected and further developed. This fabrication comes from
"experience born of ignorant contact", which is: "depending on contact,
sensation" restated, with ignorance and contact linked in one compound.
This reminds us that interdependent arising in forward order is not
meant to explain the evolution of the human species or the biological
mechanisms of birth, but the arising of the unfree person, the person
in bondage. All its terms refer to phenomena that arise within this
state of bondage - phenomena that arise dependent upon ignorance.

Hence the five senses appear when we think "I am". When the Buddha
talks about the five senses he is not concerned with the senses in an
abstract, scientific sense, but with our relationship to our existing
five senses which are, for the normal healthy human, a given of
experience. The five senses "appear" when they appear to someone. They
"cease" when the someone who owns them ceases. This does not mean that
the arahant(114) no longer sees, hears, smells, tastes or touches.
Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching proceed, but they are
not claimed or owned by anyone; the arahant does not identify with his
senses or the data the senses transmit. The senses that arise in
interdependent arising are the senses "born of ignorant contact"; they
are my senses, not simply the senses. These senses cease in
interdependent cessation; in the absence of ignorant contact, they
cease to be my senses, but are simply the senses. In the same way,
"birth" in this fundamental sense is the appearance of the factors as
my factors; "death" is the breaking up of the factors as my factors.

Buddhadasa therefore declares that birth is "the birth of the I concept
... and not the physical birth from a mother's womb."(115)  He argues
that when someone decides to steal, he is born a thief at that moment;
if someone is lost in the experience of pleasure, he is born into
heavenly realms at that moment; if someone can't eat fast enough
because the food is so good, he is born a peta or hungry ghost at that
moment.(116)

In this sense the ordinary person is born very often, time and time
again. A more developed person is born less frequently; a person well
advanced in practice is born less frequently still, and ultimately
ceases being reborn altogether.... As soon as anyone thinks like an
animal, he is born as an animal that same moment. To think as a human
being is to be born a human being.(117)

In the world described by everyday language we know that where there is
birth there is ageing and death. Birth, ageing and death are painful,
suffering. The same is true of the world described by dhamma language.
The Buddha says:

The manifold and multifaceted suffering which is decay and death arises
in the world. This suffering has attachment [upadhi] as its ground
[nidana], attachment as its arising, attachment as its origin.

When there is attachment, there is ageing and death; when there is no
attachment, there is no ageing and death.(118)


Attachment (upadhi) is synonymous with clinging (upadana). Note the
structural simultaneity in the use of the locative absolute, which we
have seen in the general formula of the conditionality-of-this
(idappaccayata): when there is x there is y, and when there is no x
there is no y. The Buddha is not saying that when there is attachment,
ageing and death will occur in the future, or that when there is no
attachment, in the future there will be only one more death. He is
saying that the absence of attachment now necessitates the absence of
ageing and death, now.

There is ageing and death for one who clings to ageing and death; for
one who thinks he ages and dies, one who identifies with the natural
processes of ageing and death and says: "This is my ageing and death";
"I am ageing and dying". There is no ageing and death for one who does
not cling to ageing and death, despite the inevitable fact that his
body ages and dies.

Not creating, not planning, he clings to nothing in the world. Not
clinging, he is not disturbed; not disturbed, he is completely freed
within himself.

He knows: birth is destroyed, the holy life is fulfilled, duty is done,
there is no more of this.(119)


The destruction of birth is immediately apparent to the arahant. He is
not saying "birth will be destroyed in the future". The destruction of
birth is synonymous with being completely freed (parinibbayati), which
again is happening, now. The holy life is now fulfilled, duty is now
done.


The cessation of consciousness

Another problem associated with interdependent cessation is that of the
cessation of consciousness. This reminds us that interdependent arising
does not concern merely objective phenomena, but the mind itself;
interdependent arising assumes personal involvement.(120) The
twelvefold formula says, "From the cessation of consciousness,
mind-body ceases". If we are to regard consciousness in the
conventional sense then it would appear that the arahant is
unconscious; in fact, since mind-body ceases, he must be dead. Yet we
know that the Buddha functioned normally for 45 years after his
awakenment.

Should consciousness remain clinging to body, with body as its object
[arammana] and support [patittha], and in pursuit of delight, it would
undergo increase, growth and full development. Should consciousness
remain clinging to feeling ... perception ... creations ... it would
undergo increase, growth and full development. If a Bhikkhu abandons
passion for the earth-element, then because of the abandoning of
passion its object is cut off; there is no support for consciousness.
If a Bhikkhu abandons passion for the feeling-element ...
perception-element ... creation-element ... consciousness-element, then
because of the abandoning of passion its object is cut off; there is no
support for consciousness.

That unsupported consciousness does not grow, does not create creations
and is liberated. Because of its liberation, it is stable; because of
its stability, it is happy; because of its happiness, it is untroubled.
One who is untroubled is completely freed in his own heart. He knows:
birth is destroyed, the holy life is fulfilled, duty is done, there is
no more of this.(121)


We saw in Chapter 3 that consciousness is subject to growth and
development. This growth is produced by clinging (upadana) to the five
factors, the psycho-physical person as experienced. When clinging is
abandoned the object (arammana) of consciousness is cut off and support
(patittha) is absent. This unsupported consciousness is liberated,
stable, happy and untroubled. Again we are faced with a paradox. How
can consciousness be without an object? Consciousness arises dependent
upon a functioning sense organ and a sense object; these three together
are contact. Take away one of these factors, and none of them can
arise. Similarly, how can the cessation of consciousness also be
described as consciousness that is stable, happy and untroubled?

The paradox is resolved when we see that interdependent cessation
involves the same proeesses as those of interdependent arising, except
for the absence of ignorance. Unsupported consciousness is that of the
arahant touched by experience born of contact without ignorance.
Consciousness without an object is consciousness which does not have
passion for its object, which does not cling to any specific
object.(122) The contact, or sense stimulus, is the same; what is
different is the absenee of ignorance, and therefore the absence of
clinging.

The cessation of consciousness in the reverse order of the nidana
formula is the cessation of consciousness coloured by the assumption
that there is someone who is conscious, someone to whom this is
happening. For the arahant, nothing extra is added to the bare
experience. Rather than "This is present to me", there is simply "This
is present". There is no craving, and therefore no suffering.

In Chapter 4 we saw how intentional action (kamma) is a powerful force
in creating ourselves as independently existing entities, defining
ourselves by our habitual patterns of action. When there is no
ignorance, and therefore no clinging to the results of action or to the
identity of the actor, then again consciousness is unsupported.

And if, Bhikkhus, one does not intend, determine or have something
dormant in one's mind, there is no object for the maintenance of
consciousness. When there is no object, there is no support for
consciousness. When there is no support and growth for consciousness,
no further becoming is produced in the future. When further becoming is
not produced in the future, future birth, ageing and death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, grief and despair cease. Such is the cessation of
this entire mass of suffering.(123)

Note the connection between intention, latent tendencies and the object
of consciousness. Where there is intention fuelled by latent desire and
aversion coming to the surface of the mind, there is grasping after or
clinging to particular objects. The mind moves toward an object because
of the attraction which is latent in pleasant feeling; or it moves away
from an object because of the aversion which is latent in painful
feeling. This movement towards the object in order to grasp it or away
from the object in order to avoid it is asava.(124) Asava literally
means "that which flows", and is translated variously as canker, taint,
corruption, intoxicant and bias. Here I translate it as "movement".
When there is no desire and aversion disturbing the mind, such that 
consciousness is stable, happy and untroubled, then there is no
movement towards and away from desired or hated objects, because there
is no attraction or aversion and therefore no objects which are desired
or hated. Consciousness continues to function, but in the absence of
these movements.

Asava implies kilesa. The mind moves to an object to grasp it and
remains stuck or fixated on that object; it moves away from an object
to avoid it and remains fixated on that posture of avoidance. This
fixation is the object and support of consciousness. In the absence of
object and support, in the absence of fixation that arises from
clinging to any given object, there is the absence of becoming any
particular identity or being, which is freedom, the cessation of
suffering.

Action is free and spontaneous. The arahant is not fixated (kilesa) on
any particular outcome of action, nor on an identification with the
actor; consequently she does not intend a particular result, and
therefore does not create (sankharoti) results in the form of
constructing (sankhara) and constructed (sankhata) entities.(125) The
Buddha says:

What do you think, Bhikkhus? Would a bhikkhu who has exhausted the
movements intend a meritorious act or a demeritorious act or a 
motionless act?

Certainly not, Bhante.(126)

The arahant does not grasp after or cling to actions or results, not
because she has rejected the virtuous life but because virtue, along
with everything else, is no longer to be grasped.

What ceases in interdependent cessation is ignorance and everything
that flows from ignorance. In our ignorance we construct ourselves
along the lines of our likes and dislikes and cling to these
constructions. In the absence of ignorance, craving and clinging cease,
and therefore our sense of identity with experience ceases. The arahant
ceases to be someone, ceases to claim ownership to the experiences that
necessarily flow from the functioning of the senses. Experiences arise,
but identification with those experiences cease. The arahant, in
ceasing to cling to the notion that she is or must be someone, is free.


6. Interdependency

Many causes, one result

We saw in Chapter 3 that conventional causation - the causation assumed
by ordinary untrained people who regard themselves as separate,
independently existing entities tends to be linear. It assumes
independently existing entities that give rise to other independently
existing entities. Linear causation follows this model:

A >> B >> C >> D   ...(127)

A now causes B to arise later; B now causes C to arise later; C now
causes D to arise later. We find a different model of causation in
interdependent arising. When the Buddha asked himself how suffering
arises, he did not frame the question as: "What is the cause of
suffering?", but: "When what is present does suffering come to be?;
what is suffering dependent upon?"(128). In the twelvefold formula he
gives a list of twelve nidanas that result in suffering. This list
cannot be considered simply a linear chain of A follows B follows C. In
Chapter 3 we saw how ignorance, creations, consciousness, mind-body,
the six sense spheres and contact all presuppose each other and cannot
be separated. They are all essential aspects of the existing person.
Nor can any of the other nidanas be separated in lived experience. If
there is one, there must be all.

The interdependence of phenomena is brought out in a number of passages
dealing with the problem of suffering. In the Dvayatanupassana-sutta of
the Sutta Nipata, the Buddha explains how suffering arises and ceases:

There are, Bhikkhus, teachings that are skillful, noble, leading
beyond, leading to full awakening. Why should you listen to these 
teachings? If you are asked, this is how you could answer: "There are
two things which should be known as they are." What should you say the
two are?

The first insight is: "This is suffering; this is the arising of
suffering." The second insight is: "This is the cessation of suffering;
this is the way leading to the cessation of suffering."

Possessed of these two insights, Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who lives
watchful, ardent and resolute can expect one of these two results: 
either perfect knowledge in this life or, as long as a trace of
attachment remains, the state of non-return...

Is there another way of correctly describing the twofold insight? If
you are asked, this is how you could answer.

The first insight is: "Whatever suffering arises, all of it is based on
attachments [upadhi]." The second insight is: "Because of the
remainderless fading and cessation of these very attachments, there is
no arising of suffering."

Is there another way of correctly describing the twofold insight? If
you are asked, this is how you could answer.

The first insight is: "Whatever suffering arises, all of it is based on
ignorance [avijja]". The second insight is: "Because of the
remainderless fading and cessation of this very ignorance, there is no
arising of suffering."

.... creations [sankhara] ... consciousness [vinnana] ... contact
[phassa] ... sensation [vedana] ... craving [tanha] ... clinging 
[upadana] ... effort [arambha] ... nutrient [ahara]...

The first insight is: "Whatever suffering arises, all of it is based on
vacillation [injita]". The second insight is: "Because of the
remainderless fading and cessation of this very vacillation, there is
no arising of suffering."(129)

The model of causation outlined above can be pictured as follows:

ignorance       _
creations       |
consciousness   |
contact         |
sensation       |->>  suffering
craving         |
clinging        |
effort          |
nutrient        |
vacillation     |

For A to arise, there must be B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K. Remove
any one of these supports and A will not arise. Further, remove A and
all those supports are removed; and if any one of these supports is
removed, then the rest of them and A also is removed. If one is
missing, all are missing; if one is functioning, all are functioning. 

Joanna Macy comments:

Here the series clearly represents no linear chain: Each upadhi, in
giving rise to all pain, gives rise to the others. Occasioning and
occasioned by each other, their causality is mutual. Like a house of
cards, the constellation of factors that condition our existence can be
disrupted and collapsed at any point.(131)

We can see the same model of causation expounded by the Buddha in his
discourse on seeds:

"There are these five kinds of seeds, Bhikkhus. What five? Seeds from
roots, cuttings, shoots, buds and seeds. These are the five kinds of
seeds.

"If these five kinds of seeds were unbroken, not rotten, not spoiled by
wind or heat, fertile and well planted, but earth and water were
lacking, would these five kinds of seeds undergo increase, growth and
full development?"

"Certainly not, Bhante."

"If these five kinds of seeds were unbroken, not rotten, not spoiled by
wind or heat, fertile and well planted, and there was soil and water,
would these five kinds of seeds undergo increase, growth and full
development?"

"Certainly, Bhante. "(132)

For a seed to grow there must be a number of causal factors operating
together: the condition of the seed itself; fertile soil and adequate
water; suitable weather conditions; proper planting. If any of these
conditions are lacking the seed will not grow. If all these conditions
are available then the result - a healthy plant - will arise. No one
factor is solely determinative. Similarly, two sticks rubbed together
are needed to make fire and all the rafters, converging on the
roof-peak, are required to construct a house.(133)


When one is missing, all are missing

This structure of conditionality can be seen in terms of the path that
leads to awakenment. The Buddha shows both aspects of the path: one
aspect leads to bondage; the same process, when reversed, leads to
liberation. He begins with the fact that ignorance, the beginning of
the path, is itself contingent (idapaccaya), interdependently arisen:

The beginning of ignorance is not see, Bhikkhus, such that one could
say: "Previously there was no ignorance, then ignorance arose".
Further, it is apparent that ignorance is contingent [idapaccaya].
Ignorance, I declare, is with support [ahara], not lacking support. And
what is the support of ignorance? The five hindrances [panca-nivarana]
is the answer.

The five hindrances, I declare, are with support, not lacking support.
And what is the support of the five hindrances? The three wrong ways of
life [ducarita] is the answer...

And what is the support of the three wrong ways of life? Unrestrained
sense faculties [indriya-samvara] ...

And what is the support of unrestrained sense faculties? An absence of
awareness and understanding [sati-sampajanna]...

And what is the support of an absence of awareness and understanding?
Superficial attention [ayonisomanasikara] ...

And what is the support of superficial attention? Lack of faith
[asaddhiya] ...

And what is the support of lack of faith? Not hearing the true teaching
[asaddhammasavana] ...

And what is the support of not hearing the true teaching? Not
associating with the true people [asappurisasamseva] is the answer.

Thus, Bhikkhus, the fulfilment of not associating with true people
fulfills not hearing the true teaching; the fulfilment of not hearing
the true teaching fulfills lack of faith; the fulfilment of lack of
faith fulfills superficial attention; the fulfilment of superficial
attention fulfills the absence of awareness and understanding; the
fulfilment of the absence of awareness and understanding fulfills
unrestrained sense faculties; unrestrained sense faculties fulfills the
three wrong ways of life; the fulfilment of the three wrong ways of
life fulfills the five hindrances; the fulfilment of the five
hindrances fulfills ignorance.(134)

This teaching is a restatement of interdependent arising using nidanas
other than those found in the twelvefold formula. The factors of the
formula differ, but the structure remains the same: when x is, y is;
when x is not, y is not. The fact that we find in the texts formulas of
interdependent arising and cessation that use different factors
indicates the importance of the underlying structure compared to the
specific factors. In the example above we again have the situation
where there is not one single determining factor, and the absence of
one factor means the absence of all.

When one is fulfilled, all are fulfilled

In the same way, the fulfilment of one factor means the fulfilment of
all. The Buddha says:

I declare, Bhikkhus, that release by knowledge [vijja-vimutti] is with
support, not lacking support. And what is the support of release by
knowledge? The seven aspects of awakenment [satta bojjhanga] is the
answer.

And what is the support of the seven aspects of awakenment? The four
foundations of awareness [cattaro satipatthana] ...

And what is the support of the four foundations of awareness? The three
right ways of life ...

And what is the support of the three right ways of life? Restraint of
the sense faculties ... awareness and understanding ...  penetrating
attention ... faith ... hearing the true teaching ... associating with
good people is the answer.

Thus, Bhikkhus, the fulfilment of associating with true people fulfills
hearing the true teaching; the fulfilment of hearing the true teaching
fulfills faith; the fulfilment of faith fulfills penetrating attention;
the fulfilment of penetrating attention fulfills awareness and
understanding; the fulfilment of awareness and understanding fulfills
restraint of the sense faculties; the fulfilment of restraint of the
sense faculties fulfills the three right ways of life; the fulfilment
of the three right ways of life fulfills the four foundations of
awareness; the fulfilment of the four foundations of awareness fulfills
the seven aspects of awakenment; the fulfilment of the seven aspects of
awakenment fulfills release by knowledge.(135)

To walk this path one does not first associate with good people; then
later hear the true teaching; then later develop faith; then later
develop penetrating attention; then later develop awareness and
understanding; etc. Rather, in associating with good people one hears
the teaching, develops faith, develops penetrating attention, etc. All
these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Faith develops
penetrating attention; penetrating attention develops faith. The
fulfilment of the four foundations of awareness is the fulfilment of
penetrating attention. If any one of these factors is fulfilled, all
are fulfilled; if any one of them is absent, all are absent. These
factors are inter-dependent.

For example, awareness and understanding (nidana 5) here come before
the four foundations of awareness (8); yet the four foundations of
awareness include awareness and understanding.(136) If this were a
purely linear path, one would be faced with the absurdity of having to
fulfill awareness (5) before fulfilling awareness (8). Restraint of the
sense faculties require awareness,(137) as does penetrating attention.
Similarly, all the seven aspects of awakenment (awareness,
investigation, effort, rapture, calm, concentration and equanimity) are
inherent in and necessary to the practice of satipatthana (cultivation
of awareness) from the beginning, although they develop from weak to
strong during practice.(138) Out of the nine nidanas listed, the
cultivation of awareness is crucial to at least five of them
(penetrating attention; awareness and understanding; restraint of the
sense faculties; the four foundations of awareness; and the seven
aspects of awakenment). Indeed, awareness is a condition for all
nidanas leading to liberation, as the absence of awareness is a
condition for all nidanas leading to bondage.

Returning to Buddhaghosa's commentary, we see the model of causality
assumed by interdependence:

Further, it arises together, so it is co-arising [samuppada]; it is
dependent upon [paticca] a combination of conditions, not rejecting
any. Therefore paticca and samuppada is interdependent arising.

...Just as in the world sugar is a condition for phlegm, it is said
"sugar is phlegm"; and in the teaching the arising of buddhas is a 
condition for happiness, it is said "the arising of buddhas is
happiness".

This totality of causes, which is expounded one by one under the
heading of causes beginning with ignorance for the appearance of 
creations, etc, is called paticca... by the mutuality of its combined
factors, in that none are missing and they accomplish a common result.
It is called samuppada in that it gives rise to dhammas together, such
that each gives rise to the other and they are inseparable in their
behaviour. Therefore paticca and samuppada is paticcasamuppada.(139)

A combination of conditions together give rise to a totality of
results. Conditions arise together, as do their results. Buddhaghosa
adds:

Among the conditions explained under the heading "ignorance, etc",
those conditions that give rise to phenomena beginning with creations
are unable to give rise to them when they are not mutually dependent or
when there is a deficiency in their mutuality.

Therefore this conditionality, having depended [paticcal, gives rise to
phenomena equally and together, not one by one and in successive
order.(140)

The model of causation Buddhaghosa is outlining is as follows:

ignorance                             ignorance
creations                             creations
consciousness                         consciousness
mind-body                             mind-body
six sense bases                       six sense bases
contact            ->                 contact
sensation          <-                 sensation
craving                               craving
clinging                              clinging
becoming                              becoming
birth, ageing, death, sorrow,         birth, ageing,death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, grief and          lamentation, pain, grief and
despair                               despair


Interdependent arising asserts the arising and cessation of the entire
phenomenal world within this very mind-body. Every aspect of our
experience is contingent upon phenomena other than themselves, which
are in turn dependent upon phenomena other than themselves. Our world
is an infinitely complex web of mutually supporting conditions in which
there is no solid ground standing outside the process of interdependent
arising and cessation. It is, finally, because nothing in our existence
can be found to be separate from anything else; because the web of
interconnecting phenomena is effectively infinite, that liberation is
possible. Bondage is not fixed; it can be worked on and ultimately
overcome.

There remains, however, one final problem to be examined: how does
interdependent arising deal with the given fact of continuity over
time? In particular, how does interdependent arising deal with rebirth?


7. Causation over time

We have examined the interdependent arising and cessation of phenomena
and have seen how our ignorance of this process results in bondage, and
our understanding of it results in freedom. Interdependent arising is
our experience of phenomena under the influence of ignorance;
interdependent cessation is our experience of phenomena in the absence
of ignorance. That leaves us, however, with the problem of the three
life theory of the classical Theravada. Where does that fit in?


Rebirth

The Buddha believed in and taught rebirth, which he had directly
verified by means of his own perception.(141) The problem of rebirth is
bound up with that of personal continuity over time, which in turn is
bound up with that of identity; the entities who endure over time, who
experience the results of their actions and who are rebom from life to
life. My tendency to identify with and own experience manifests most
strongly in my determination to identify with consciousness, which is
the "unbroken stream" providing the link between one life and
another,(142) and between one moment and another. Questions of rebirth
and identity are bound up with notions of "my" consciousness.

The Buddha had great difficulty in countering his students' tendency to
identify with consciousness. For example, after a discussion on the
"food" (ahara) or support of beings, Venerable Moliya-Phagguna asked:
"Bhante, who is supported by the consciousness support?"

"The question is not relevant", the Blessed One said. "I do not say
'One is supported'; should I say 'One is supported', the question 'Who
is supported?' would be relevant. But I do not say so. Not saying so,
one could ask me: 'What does consciousness support?'; this is a
relevant question.

"The relevant answer is: 'The consciousness-support is the condition
for further becoming and birth in the future. When that comes to be,
there are the six sense bases. The six sense bases are dependent on
contact.'"

"Who contacts?"

"The question is not relevant ... contact is dependent on the six sense
bases; sensation is dependent on contact."

"Who senses?"

"The question is not relevant ... sensation is dependent on contact;
craving is dependent on sensation." ...(143)

Note that the Buddha is not denying the existence of the future: there
is "further becoming and birth in the future". What he is denying is
the one who thinks he endures from past to future. But there were many
students who could not grasp this distinction - students like Venerable
Sati:

At that time a bhikkhu called Sati, a fisherman's son, came to this
evil conclusion: "I understand the teaching taught by the Blessed One
to be this: it is this very consciousness and not any other that
continuously moves [samsarati] and runs along".

Like Moliya-Phagguna, Sati identifies with consciousness, believing
that he is the one who senses, recognises, creates and cognises, and is
ultimately reborn. "His" body will die, but "his" stream of
consciousness will go on to rebirth. When the Buddha heard of Sati's
belief he summoned and questioned him:

"What is this consciousness, Sati?"

"It is this very one who speaks and senses, Bhante, who experiences the
result of actions whether good or bad."

"You stupid man, to whom do you think I teach this teaching in such a
way? Have I not said in many ways that consciousness is 
interdependently arisen? That other than from a condition there is no
arising of consciousness? You not only slander me by your own 
misunderstanding, but you also destroy yourself and create a great deal
of demerit which will bring you harm and suffering for a long
time."(144)

The severity of the Buddha's reaction to this wrong view indicates it
must have been very common. Rebirth occurs but no-one is reborn: this
is a paradox that cannot be resolved by philosophical thought, only by
directly seeing the arising and cessation of one's own mind-body
process.(145) It was Siddhartha Gotama's full realisation of this
process that turned him into Sakyamuni Buddha, and it was Venerable
Kondanna's glimpse of it during the Buddha's first sermon that turned
him into an noble one:

While he delivered this teaching the stainless and passion-free
dhamma-eye arose for Venerable Kondanna: Whatever is of the nature to
arise, all that is of the nature to cease.(146)

Those of the Buddha's students who did not have this insight - who were
not at least stream-enterers - necessarily assumed that someone is
reborn. Lacking direct insight, they remained fixated on the ordinary,
everyday world of enduring entities indicated by conventional language.
Consequently they, like Sati, misunderstood the teaching regarding
rebirth. Assuming in-dependent existence, they thought rebirth meant
beings are reborn, and struggled with the teaching of inter-dependent
arising.


The three life theory

Interdependent arising is a theory formulated on the basis of the
direct experience of interdependently arisen phenomena; it refers to
the immediately available present.(147)  Note that for the Buddha, the
present is not a momentary "knife-edge" between past and  future, but a
"saddle-back", and includes the perception of duration.(148) Phenomena
are perceived as arising, ceasing, and "changing as they endure"
(dhammanam thitanam annathattam).(149)

When we fail to see interdependent arising and assume the existence of
an independently existing entity, we assume permanence. We  assume the
same entity extends from the past through the present to the future.
One who sees, now, the arising and cessation of phenomena no longer
assumes permanence, and is therefore no longer concerned with past and
future:

Because, Bhikkhus, this interdependent arising and these
interdependently arisen phenomena are well seen, as they are, by the 
perfect wisdom of the noble disciple, he will surely not run back to
the past:

"Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? What was I in
the past? How was I in the past? After being what, what did I then
become?"

Nor will he run after the future:

"Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? ... "

Nor will he now, at the present time, have personal doubts:

Do I exist? Do I not exist? What am I? How am I? The being that I am -
from where did he come and to where will he go?"(150)

Not owning experience, not identifying with experience, the noble
disciple lives in the pure experience of the given present. Past and
future are no longer identified with and therefore no longer constitute
a problem.

While conventional, or linear, causation assumes separate, independent
entities that give rise to other separate, independent entities over
time, interdependent arising assumes there are no separate entities to
begin with. Rather, it says that every "entity"  exists only through
its dependence on other "entities"; there is no independence, and
therefore no separation. Interdependent arising refers to the structure
of our experience of phenomena, now. From this viewpoint, past and
future are merely ideas in the mind.

Nevertheless, I remember yesterday and would be wise to plan for
tomorrow. Causation over time applies to the world of conventional 
language; interdependency applies to the world of dhamma language.
Neither denies the other; rather, each supplements the other. 
Interdependent arising includes but is not confined to causation over
time, but sees causation over time in a specific way - as the arising
over time of this totality of phenomena, rather than one phenomenon
after another.

In terms of linear causation, I can say this paper is caused by a
number of factors, including the work involved in researching and
writing it, the printing, the binding, etc. In terms of interdependent
arising, this situation, now, in which I am reading this paper is a
full and complete experience, a gestalt, within which phenomena arise
and cease. It is tathata, the just this-ness of immediate
experience.(151) Nevertheless, part of the givenness of just this is
the sense of flow within it, which comes from the arising, change while
enduring and cessation of phenomena.

Linear causation selects an individual phenomenon from this gestalt,
reifies it into an independent entity and examines the lines of cause
and effect that give rise to it. Interdependent arising is concerned
with the gestalt, and sees each individual phenomenon in terms of its
radical contingency; in terms of its context within the experienced
gestalt.

Linear causation, in focusing on individual phenomena, supports our
innate tendency to assume the existence of independently existing
entities. Interdependent arising cuts through this false assumption
from the very beginning. Therefore, any use of interdependent arising
to construct a model of causation over time runs the risk of defeating
its own purpose by encouraging the assumption of entities - by
encouraging eternalism.

Buddhists were faced with the task of explaining how rebirth occurred
without anyone being born. They used the twelvefold formula of
interdependent arising, and spoke in terms of the formula extending
over three lives:

PAST
Cause
(1) ignorance; and
(2) creations
are the "causal phase of the previous life which brought about
existence in the present

PRESENT
Result
(3) consciousness; (4) mind-body; (5) six sense bases; (6) contact; and
(7) sensation
are "their fruit, the resultant phase of the present life".

Cause
(8) craving; (9) clinging; and (10) becoming
are "renewed causal activity in the present life".

FUTURE
Result
(11) birth; and (12) ageing and death
are "the resultant phase of the future life".(152)

Why three lives? Why not two or four? The purpose of the three life
theory is to explain cause and effect over time. When we consider time,
we are faced with three times: past, present, and future. The pattern
of causation is the same whether the unit of time be a moment, a day, a
human life span, or whatever. We have seen how terms like birth and
death are used in different ways by the Buddha, depending on whether he
is speaking in conventional or dhamma language. The notion of a single
human life span assumes an entity who exists from physical birth to
physical death, but such an enduring entity is explicitly denied by
interdependent arising. Govinda points out that according to the
Abhidhamma birth and death are taking place with extraordinary rapidity
every moment.(153) "Three lifetimes" really means three consecutive
periods of time, regardless of the unit employed.

K. N. Jayatilleke points out the relativity of past, present and
future:

[T]o imply that the past and the future are not accessible to me in the
present is not correct since the present life, from the point of view
of the past, is the future, and from the point of view of the future
life, is the past. So we do not have to take the first two links or the
last two on faith since they can be experienced in this life itself. We
can be aware of our ignorance here and now, although ignorance was also
present in our past life.(154)

We are now experiencing life two, the present life. The past is life
one; and the future is life three. We are always situated at this
moment (life two), where there is consciousness, mind-body, six sense
bases, contact, sensation, craving, clinging and becoming. For these
phenomena (3 - 10) to exist now, there must have been ignorance and
creations (1 - 2) in the past; and since these phenomena (3 - 10) exist
now, there will be birth, ageing and death (11 - 12) in the future.

Life one gives rise to birth, ageing and death in the next, which is
now (life two); so birth, ageing and death are operating now. From the
viewpoint of the future time (life three) there were ignorance and
creations in the previous life, which is now (life two), so ignorance
and creations are operating now. For the three life theory to work, all
twelve nidanas must be functioning in the present.

Bhikkhu Bodhi says:

To prevent misunderstanding it has to be stressed that the distribution
of the factors into three lives is an expository device employed for
the purpose of exhibiting the inner dynamics of the round [of birth and
death]. It should not be read as implying hard and fast divisions, for
in lived experience the factors are always intertwined.(155)

In conclusion, while interdependent arising does not deny causation
over time, it is fundamentally concerned with the structure of the
experienced present. However, one aspect of the experienced present is
its flow from past to future. Interdependent arising can, therefore, be
used to explain causation over time in terms of continuity without
someone who continues. To the degree that interdependent arising can
explain continuity from one moment to the next, it can explain
continuity from one lifetime to the next. From the viewpoint of
interdependent arising, there is no qualitative distinction between the
two.


8. Conclusion

Interdependent arising is a matter of direct experience, here and now.
It is this experience, seeing into the arising and cessation of
phenomena, that produces the liberating insight that was the Buddha's
awakenment. Indeed, that all phenomena arise and pass away dependent
upon other phenomena is the content of the Buddha's awakenment.

The phenomena that arise and cease in dependence upon conditions are
our experiences of ourselves and the world. Interdependent arising is
not concerned with the purely objective realm of science, but with the
existential realm of human experience that includes both subjective and
objective. The world is our experience of the world; mind and body are
our experiences of mind and body. When examined, solid entities
dissolve into dynamic processes; nouns dissolve into verbs; being
dissolves into becoming.

Any given phenomenon that arises and ceases does so because of specific
conditions. All phenomena are contingent, and by understanding what
conditions give rise to what results we can live in a way that
maximises the appearance of favourable phenomena and minimises the
appearance of unfavourable phenomena. lnterdependent arising implies
freedom, the capacity to mould our lives according to our aspirations.
We do not have to be victims of circumstances beyond our control.

There are no exceptions to this universal law of interdependent
arising. There is no-one outside this process to whom it is happening.
There is therefore no independently existing self, no owner of
experience. Bondage is essentially the conviction that there is one who
exists independently, one who is separate from the world and other
beings within the world. This independently existing self is a product
of a process of clinging and appropriation founded on open-ended
desires that can never be satisfied. The sense of separation inherent
in independent existence involves an anxiety which results from the
need to defend one's identity and possessions. The ceaseless struggle
to satisfy the needs and desires of a non-existent independent self is
suffering.

When ignorance ceases, when we see into universal arising and
cessation, craving and clinging cease, and therefore our sense of 
identity with experience ceases. The arahant ceases to be someone, the
owner of experience; she is free from bondage.

This is not a matter of faith or philosophical reasoning, but of direct
perception. The sphere of interdependent arising is that of the
available present, and this includes a sense of flow from past to
future. Interdependent arising does not deny causation and continuity
over time, and can therefore be used to explain rebirth. Because
interdependent arising deals with dhammas, phenomena as experienced, as
distinct from independent entities, the unit of a conventional lifetime
of a being is of no more validity than that of any other unit of time.
Continuity from one moment to the next is structurally the same as
continuity from one lifetime to the next.

lnterdependent arising assumes no separate entities; consequently, it
deals with the totality of phenomena that is my experience of this
situation, now. Within this experienced gestalt, specific phenomena
arise, change and pass away. Linear causation selects an individual
phenomenon, reifies it into an independent entity and examines the
lines of cause and effect that give rise to it. The classical three
life theory adapts interdependent arising to the task of explaining the
process of rebirth without reifying an independent entity who is born.

Any attempt to explain rebirth, however, may confirm the assumption of
the ordinary untrained person that there is someone who develops,
someone who is reborn, someone who is liberated from rebirth. Clinging
to such a theory justifies a sense of separate identity and destiny,
and postpones to a more favourable time in the future one's practice of
investigating the interdependently arisen nature of the mind-body
process. Buddhadasa and Nanavira warn against this danger, for such a
view denies the fundamental purpose of the Buddha's teaching of
interdependent arising.

The Buddha's teaching aims at the cessation of suffering and bondage.
This experience of freedom is expressed in terms of finality: "birth is
destroyed, the holy life is fulfilled, duty is done, there is no more
of this". Such finality can only be experienced in this present moment
- duty is now done - without any sense of postponement or further
developments. The doctrine of interdependent arising is concerned with
the problem of freedom, and therefore it is fundamentally concerned
with the structure of our existence, now, as freedom postponed is
freedom denied.


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Philosophy East and West 29, no. 4 (October 1979): 491-499.

Silananda, Ven. U. The four foundations of mindfulness. Wisdom: Boston,
1990.

Smart, Ninian. "Action and suffering in the Theravadin tradition", in
Philosophy, East and West 34 no. 4 (October 1984): 371-378.

Streng, Frederick. "Reflections on the attention given to mental
construction in the Indian Buddhist analysis of causality", in 
Philosophy East and West 25 no. 1 (January 1975): 71-80.

Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. 2nd rev. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1980.

Watts, Jeffrey D. "Necessity and sufficiency in the Buddha's causal
scheme", in Philosophy, East and West 32 no. 4 (October 1982): 
407-423.

Wayman, Alex. "Discussion of Frederick Streng's 'Reflections on the
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in the Nikayas'", in Philosophy East and West 25 no. 1 (January 1975):
91-93.



Notes


1. M 1.190-191

2. S 3.120

3. S2.25

4. Streng, Frederick. "Reflections on the attention given to mental
construction in the Indian buddhist analysis of causality", in 
Philosophy East and West 25 no 1 (January 1975) p 77; and Jayawardhana,
Bandula "Causality", in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Volume 4  Fascicle
Govermnent of Ceylon, 1979 pp 2-3

5. English word enlightenment is not equivalent to the Sanskrit or Pali
word Bodhi.  Enlightenment comes from an 18th century European
philosophical movement and implies the supremacy of reason. A buddha is
one who has awakened, one who knows; the condition he or she has
attained is one of awakenment.

6. S 2.10

7. Vin 1.40

8. Buddhadasa, Bhikkhu. Me and mine: selected essays of Bhikkhu
Buddhadasa. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. p 2.

9. Buddhadasa, Bhikkhu. Paticcasamuppada: dependent ongination.
Bangkok: Kurusapha Ladprao Press, 1986.pp 24-25.

10. Ibid.,p49

11. Nanvira Thera. Clearing the path: writings of Nanvira Thera (1960 -
1965). Colombo: Path Press, 1987. p.21.

12. Ibid., p.432.

13. They represent the consensus among the "elders" (theras) regarding
the Buddha's teaching during the reign of Asoka (c. 268-235 B.C.).
Norman, K. R. Pali literature. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983. p 5:
(Geiger, Wilhelm. Pali literature and language. Translated by
Batakrishna Ghosh. 2nd ed. Calcutta: [University of Calcutta, 1956.
p11.

14. Vin 1.10

15. "Bhante" is a respectful form of address

16. S 2.17

17. Kalupahana, David. J. Mdlamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: the
philosopoy of the Middle Way. First Indian edition. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1991. pp 9 & 13.

18. See: Macy, Joanna. Mutual causality in Buddhism aod General Systems
Theory: the ddhamma of natural systems. Albany: State  University of
New York Press, 1991. pp29-30; and Streng. op. clt. p 73.

19. S 2.28

20. Vism p 443

21. Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. 2nd rev. ed. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1980. p 98.

22. Although this attitude shows signs of changing, due to the fall-out
from the rise of postmodern physics: McCance, Dawne. "Physics, Buddhism
and Postmodern interpretation", in Zygon 21 no. 3 (September 1986:
287-297.

23. S 4.15

24. See the discussion in Kalupahana, David J. "A Buddhist tract on
empiricism", in Philosophy East and West 19 (1969): 65-67.

25. See the discussion regarding causation and things caused in Cruise,
Henry. "Early Buddhism: some recent misconceptions",  in Philosophy
East and West 33, no. 2 (April 1983). pp 155-156; and the "first
person" aspect of dharmas in Daye, Douglas D.  "Reflexivity and
metalanguage games in Buddhist causality", in Philosophy East and West
25 no. 1 (January 1975). pp 96-97. See also  Kalupahana, David J.
"Dhamma (1)", in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Volume 4 Fascicle 3.
Government of Ceylon, 1988. pp 442 & 444; and Karunaratne, Upali.
"Dhamma (2)", in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Volume 4 Fascicle 3.
Government of Ceylon, 1988. p 454.

26. A 2.47-47.

27. D 2.328

28. Kalupahana, David J. Causality: the central philosophy of Buddhism.
Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1975. pp 86-87.

29. Vin 1.14

30. S 2.1

31. Kalupahana.  Causality. op.cit. p 144

32. S 2.4

33. S 3.144

34. S 2.33

35. S 3.171-172

36. Jayatilleke, K. N. The message of the Buddha. London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1975. p 201. 

37. Macy. op. cit. p 9.

38. S 3.151

39. A 5.113

40. Johansson, Rune E. A. The dynamic psychology of early Buddhism.
Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series  no. 37. 2nd
ed. London: Curzon Press, 1979.p 41.

41. Kalupahana, David. J. A his1ory of Buddhist philosophy:
continuities and discontinuities. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1992.p 72.

42. Buddhadasa, Bhikkhu.Anapanasati: mindfulness with breathing
Translated hy Santikaro Bhikkhu. 2nd ed. Bangkok: Dhamma Study and
Practice Group, 1989.p 37.

43. Sn p 175

44. Johansson. op.cit. p.44

45. S 3.146

46. S 3.87

47. Buddhadasa Anapanassati. op. cit. p.37

48. Nanvira. op.cit. p. 108

49. Ibid., pp 108-109

50. S 3.87

51. S 2.4

52. Nanvira. op.cit. p 103

53. S 2.114

54. S 2.72

55. S 2.65

56. S 2.82

57. Nanvira. op.cit. p. 104

58. Citta is the inner centre or space which "contains" mental
processes. Manas is the mind as sense organ: like the physical  sense
organs it perceives a particular type of object. The eye, for example,
is the organ which perceives visible forms; manas is  the organ which
perceives dhammas (mental phenomena). Vinnana is the presence of all
phenomena, whether physical or mental. Together, citta, manas and
vinnana constitute "mind".

59. S 2.94-95

60. S 2.3

61. Nyanatiloka Maha Thera. Buddhist dictionary. 3rd ed. Singapore:
Singapore Buddhist Meditation Centre, 1970. p 28.

62. Kalupahana. Causality. op. cit. p 122.

63. S 2.3

64. S 3.100-101

65. S 3.102

66. Pandita, Sayadaw. In this very life: the liberation teachings of
the Buddha. Boston: Wisdom, 1992. p 106.

67. See: Sachs, Mendel. "Comparison of the field concept of matter in
relativity physics and the Buddhist idea of nonself', in  Philosophy
East and West 33 no. 1 (October 1983). pp 395-399; for a discussion of
physical "things" resolving into process,  according to the field
concept of matter contained in the theory of general relativity.

68. S 3.86

69. Kalupahana, David J. The principles of Buddhist psychology. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1987. p 17. 70  Johansson. op. cit.
p 32.

70. Johansson.  op. cit.  p32.

71. Note that this definition embraces both the subjective (being
affected) and the objective (that which affects), denying  neither. See
Kalupahana, David J. "The Buddhist conceptions of 'subject' and
'object' and their moral implications", in Philosophy East and West 38,
no. 3 (July 1988). p 292.

72. S 3.86-87

73. "Ayya" is a respectful form of address for bhikkhunis (nuns).

74. M 1.302-303

75. M 1.303

76. S 3.87

77. Rahula, Walpola. What the Buddha taught. '2nd ed. New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1974. p 23.

78. Kalupahana. A hisfory of Buddhist philosophy. op. cit. p 71. 

79. Kalupahana. The principles of Buddhist psychology. op. cit. p 18. 

80. S 3.60

81. A 3.415

82. S 2.64-65

83. Sn 651-653

84. S 3.55

85. M 1.293

86. M 1.303

87. S 2.3

88. S 2.84

89. A 3.411

90. Rhys Davids, T. W., and William Stede (eds.) The Pali Text
Society's Pali-English dictionary. London: Pali Text Society, 1979
reprint pp 138 & 149.

91. Johansson. op.cit. p 71.

92. S 3.54-55

93. Macy. op.cit. p 110.

94. S 2.85

95. Macy. op.cit. p 111.

96. S 2.3

97. S 4.196-197

98. S 3.151

99. S 3.14

100. M 1 111-112 See Kalupahana A history of Buddhist philosophy. op
cit. p 32; and Nanananda, Bhikkhu. Concept and reality in early
Buddhist thought. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1986 pp 5-6

101. S 2.1-2

102. M 1.161-162

103. S 4.26-27

104. Streng. op.cit. p.78

105. Nyanatiloka Maha TheraGuide through tlie Abhidhamma-Pitaka. 4th
ed. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1983 p 2

106. Buddhadasa.Paticcasamuppada. op. cit. p 4.

107. Ibid., pp 7-8

108. Ibid., p.5

109. Ibid., pp. 15-16

110. S 2.2-3

111. S 2.80-82

112. S 2.56-58

113. S 3.46-47

114. Lit "worthy one". In early Buddhism, no distinction is drawn
between the liberating insight enjoyed by the Buddha and an arahant. In
regard to questions of freedom and bondage, therefore, buddha,
tathagata and arahant are synonymous.

115. Buddhadasa.  paticcasamuppada. op.cit. p.44

116. Ibid., p 32.

117. Buddhadasa. Me and mine. op.cit. p 132.

118. S 2.108

119. S 2.82

120. Streng. op.cit. pp 77-78

121. S 3.54-55

122. See Buddhadasa. Me and mine. op. cit. pp 92-94 for a discussion on
arammana; and Streng. op cit pp 75-79 for the role of "support" in
consciousness.

123. S 2.65-66

124. Hosaka, Gyokusen. "Asrava", in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Volume 2
Faccicle 2. Government of Ceylon, 1966. p 202.

125. "For the arahant there is nothing more to do..." S 3.169  See the
discussion on the distinction between phala (result) and sankhara in
Reichenbach, Bruce R "The law of karma and the principle of
causation",in Philosophy East and West 38 no 4 (October 1988) p 401

126. S 2.83

127. Macy. op.cit. p 9

128. S 2.10

129. Sn pp 172-178

130. See Kalupahana Casuality. op. cit. p 98; and Cruise, Henry "Early
Buddhism: some recent misconceptions", in Philosophy East and West 33,
no 2 (April 1983). p 153.

131. Macy. op.cit. p 55

132. S 3.54

133. Macy. op.cit. p 51

134. A 5.113-114

135. A 5.114-115

136. M 1.57; Silananda, ven U, The four foundations of mindfulness.
Wisdom: Boston, 1990 pp 50-51

137. Pandita, Sayadaw op. cit. p 172.

138. Ibid., p 98

139. Vism p 143. Emphasis added.

140. Vism p 444. Emphasis added.

141. Kalupahana. Causality. op. cit. p 115. this verification was
itself an interpretation of meditative experience: Bucknell, R. S. and
Stuart-Fox, M. "The 'three knowledges' of Buddhism: implications of
Buddhadasa's interpretation of rebirth", in Religion 13 (1983). p 106.

142. D 3.105

143. S 2.13

144. M 1.256 & 258

145. M 1.486

146. Vin. 1.11

147. Kalupahana. A history of Buddhist philosophy. op. cit. pp 53-54

148. Kalupahana. "Dhamma (1)". op. cit. p 243

149. S 3.38

150. S 2.26-27

151. Loy, David. "The paradox of causality in Madhyamika", in
International Philosophical Quarterly  25, (1985). p 69.

152. The great discourse on causation: the Mahanidana Sutta and its
commentaries. Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Kandy: Buddhist Publication
Society, 1984. p 5.

153. Govinda, Lama Anagarika. The psychological attitude of early
Buddhist philosophy. New York: Samuel Weiser, 1974. p 58.

154. Jayatilleke. op.cit. pp 204-205

155. The great discourse on causation. op. cit. p 5.



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