Many thanks for your letter of New Year's Day and calendar with Poyas etc., which crossed with mine of New Year's Day asking for Poyas etc. From the tone of your letter I think you may suspect me of suspecting that you hold that life is a muddle, in a wooly or vague sort of way. This is not at all the case; you have often before now written and spoken to me of quite definite ambiguities that you meet with in experience. These quite definite ambiguities I also meet with in my experience. But when I said, in a previous letter, that I have less taste for them than you as ultimate entities, I was expressing a difference in attitude between us towards these quite definite ambiguities. I gather from your various letters that you attach a certain importance or significance to certain particular ambiguous experiences (giddiness, for example, as well as others you mention) that I do not attach to them. This does not necessarily mean that I think you are mistaken, but rather that I prefer a different ap proach. It may be that we are boring the same tunnel from opposite ends.

Let me expand. Your approach, as it seems to me (you will no doubt correct me if I am wrong), might be expressed rather like this. "There are phenomena, and only phenomena; and any attempt to get beyond them is both futile and misleading, as the inferential arguments of logicians and scientists show only too clearly. Thus, I must investigate phenomena directly; and in so doing (since to be is to be phenomenal -- i.e. to appear or to be capable of appearing) I shall be investigating being. Now, the most striking, and perhaps essential, characteristic of phenomena is ambiguity. But certain phenomena are more plainly ambiguous than others. These particular phenomena, then, are more important for the purpose of my investigation (since they are easier to investigate) than the remainder." My approach, on the other hand, might be expressed like this. "There are phenomena, and only phenomena; and any attempt to get beyond them is both futile and misleading, as the inferential arguments of logicians and scientists show only too clearly. Is there a reason for this? If there is, then it must be a structural reason and not a causal reason; for the notion of cause is inseparable from inductive inference, and therefore both futile and misleading. But if there is a structural reason, that structure must be, that is to say, it must be phenomenal; for otherwise it would be beyond phenomena and would be both futile and misleading. So I must seek a structure of phenomena that is itself phenomenal, i.e. that is its own structure. And this will lead to an infinite hierarchy."

Now, it is clear enough that my approach cannot succeed without continual reference to phenomena directly (and my interest in the phenomena of a star or small source of light shows that I do refer to phenomena directly; and since it seemed to show structure more plainly than other phenomena it was of particular interest -- and I also have other pet phenomena). And you might be prepared to admit (if my exposé of your approach is correct) that at least some structural consi derations are necessary; for otherwise the ambiguous nature of any given phenomenon is purely fortuitous, and the next phenomenon you turn your attention to might quite well not be ambiguous in the slightest degree. So far, so good.

But it is evident that however clearly we may formulate our method of approach, in practice we may not always adhere to it. It may be, then, that you will suspect that my conclusions are arrived at, sometimes, by (concealed) inferential arguments, at least in part. And I cannot deny it. But what I do say is this: that not only are inferential arguments not necessary in my method of approach, but they are positively harmful; and to the extent that I have inadvertently made use of them my conclusions are mistaken. (Sartre is very good on the dangers of rationalizing one's images when thinking.) And it also seems to me that there is a certain danger inherent in the approach that I have taken the liberty of fathering on you. It is this. There is a certain tendency, so it seems, when one thinks a particular experience is more important (even if merely because more convenient) than others, of assuming that it is therefore more significant than others; and this leads to the attempt to a ccount for other, less significant, phenomena in terms of that particular, more significant, phenomenon. One obvious example of this is Freud. Having seen the outstanding importance of sex (important because of the attention paid to it) he concludes that it is more significant than other things, and proceeds to base his entire system of psychoanalysis on sex. And this leads, as Sartre notes, to interpretations that are "massive, pretentious, and absurd". But Dr. Klar's colours show that interpretation in terms of sex is, though no doubt possible, by no means essential. Dr. Klar, in his more megalomaniacal moments, may well think that colours are far more significant than sex or anything else and dream of a psychologywhere colour is the fundamental reality and all else secondary. It would be ridiculous to suggest that you are following Freud -- he is an extreme case of this tendency chosen simply because of its convenience. But I have noticed, occasionally, a tendency in your letters to account for a given phenomenon in terms of certain special phenomenology and to regard this as final -- the most obvious instance being your apparent unwillingness to understand the notion of swaying ("what the Ven. M does") except in terms of giddiness, and your description of standing upright as "controlled giddiness". You may be right, but it does not seem to me that this procedure is useful -- having described standing in terms of giddiness (or swaying or anything else) I am still no wiser: standing is no less familiar to me than giddiness or swaying, and not more in need of explanation.[a] I get the impression that, for you, giddiness is a kind of absolute or ultimate term (like Eliot's candle), and that when you have reduced a given experience to terms of giddiness (or of a certain limited number of other similarly privileged ambiguities) you are satisfied, or at least consider that you can go no further. Why? Perhaps because you th ink that by going beyond such particular phenomena you would be going beyond all phenomena and into the realms of inference; but, as I think, you can go beyond particular phenomena to the phenomenon of the structure, and beyond this to the phenomenon of its structure, and so on, as far as you please, and this is ultimate because the phenomenon of structure is always the same however far you go.

Now you may say, with justice, that this interpretation of your supposed attitude is mere speculation, and quite mistaken to boot. Very likely; but all I am trying to do is to convey the impression that I get from your letters, and to show that my earlier remark about dislike of ambiguities as ultimate entities does not come from any supposition of mine that your view of existence is that it is vague-and-wooly -- though it may well come from a mistaken supposition about what is, in fact, your view.

As you point out, the question of viññána "becoming" námarúpa (or rather náma) depends on what is meant by "becoming". The point is that viññána does not "become" náma in any sense at all, and the question of a self-identity does not arise (though if you like, viññána is the presence of náma and náma is the presence of rúpa, and "presence" is the self-identity common to both). The situation of two (or more) viññánas, one of which is the object of (or "present to") the other, while itself is the subject (or "presence") of its object (which will include yet another viññána) is quite fundamental and must be grasped directly if it is grasped at all. There is no parallel in our "normal" experience and no exact analogy is possible. And further, every attempt at description must deal first with viññána as it is in itself ans second with the object of the superior viññána, whence we inevitably get the notion of "becoming", i.e. as a kind of succession in time parallel to the succession in time of the description. But since it is all, in fact, given at once, there is no "becoming" at all -- all that is seen upon direct inspection is a kind of transparency with separate layers, rather like looking down into a showcase with a glass top and a number of glass shelves. Each of these shelves represents one additional layer of presence. Rúpa is present, and the presence of rúpa is náma; náma is present, and the presence of náma (or the double presence of rúpa) is viññána. But the presence of náma is also present (otherwise there would be no presence of náma), and this means another viññána, for which that náma (being doubly present) "becomes" rúpa (rúpa can be defined as 'double presence'), and the presence of that náma (being singly present) -- i.e. the first viññána -- "becomes" náma. But it is clearly ridiculous to say that one glass shelf "becomes" the one next layer down simply because it is looked at through an additional glass shelf at the top -- yet how else can it be described? The ambiguity is in the description, not in the fact. This difficulty is more obviously seen with reflexive consciousness. (Can one be certain that reflexion sees the 'same' self as the self that is the subject of the contemporary immediate experience?" Answer -- yes, because there can only be probability on the basis of a given [present] certainty; and this is that certainty, simply b ecause there is nothing more fundamental to serve as a certain basis for it were it probability.)

I cannot agree that in oscillation the point (or rather area) that is not "seen" with the eye is "remembered" with the mind. Both are seen, or present to eye-consciousness, but the one that is past is present within the later one (it turns out that to be within the present one -- as the centre of what is central -- is to be over-determined and therefore past -- either it is seen as the central detail of the present, or it is seen as being the same size as the present, but past; this may be incomprehesible to you, but that is how I find it); and furthermore, since the whole of the past is present in this way, the question of remembering or forgetting does not arise. But I am speaking of the most fundamental level -- pure immediacy -- and your description, so I take it, is on a certain reflexive level, where, of course, remembering and forgetting (and horizons) have their natural habitation. But unless the whole of the past is somehow basically given it cannot be "there" (as it were) "to be either forgotten or remembered", it cannot be available.

In my last letter I spoke enthusiastically about the three Laws of Thought -- Either/Or (exclusively), Either/Or (alternatively -- i.e. not excluding Both); and Either/Or (disjunctively -- i.e. not Both, not excluding Neither) -- together with a graphical description of the structure. Though the graphical description was, I fear, not at all clear, and would need thorough overhauling, the enthusiasm remains. The structure may be interpreted at different levels (starting from the most fundamental) as follows: --

1. A exists: A is the invariant of a transformation from being to not-being.

2. A is present until supplanted by not-A.

3. A's existence is a transition from assertion of A to denial of A.

4. A must be given as idea or essence in order that it should be either asserted or denied.

5. If assertion of A is given (or true), the denial of A is not given (or false).

...In my last letter but one I discriminated unfairly against Kummer's actual surface, saying that it was only the generator that is relevant. This is wrong. The six points in each conic are to the fifteen lines they define (by joining them) as the six conics through each point are to the fifteen surfaces they define: or, the sixteen points are to the hundred and twenty lines they define as the sixteen conics are to the hundred and twenty surfaces they define. No wonder the surface looks puddingy!

I have just thought of an illustration of the remark I made earlier about the past being a detail of the present. Consider this set of squares: --

This can be seen in either of two mutually exclusive ways: (i) as a set of progressively smaller squares each enclosed within a larger one, the whole being a flat figure; or (ii) as a receding 'corridor' of equal sized squares one behind the other, the whole being a solid figure. The relation of each smaller square to the larger one enclosing it is thus either 'smaller, but equally here' or 'equal, but further away'. If you read present for here and past for further away you will perhaps get some idea of what I am trying to say.[b] This illustration, of course, does not prove anything; nor is it the basis of an 'argument by analogy', since I had already worked out the present-past structure before thinking of this illustration.[c] The illustration also serves (not accidentally) to represent Whitehead's definition of a point by enclosure-volumes (or areas), or (or rat her and) his definition of a moment by enclosure-durations. (I say and rather than or because the two are inseparable -- the figure represents the structure of here-now.[d] [The exact representation is, of course, Kummer; but that cannot be drawn because the successive enclosures, starting with the smallest, are points (cones), planes (conics), four-dimensional 'volumes' (or 'conics'), eight-dimensional 'volumes' (or 'conics'), and so on.]) Unfortunately, what is apparently the easiest sort of object to 'see' the structure in, namely a visual object, is really, in some ways, the most difficult because of the superposition of many different structures (a previous letter refers).

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[142.a] If you prefer to say that standing is a function (in the mathematical sense) of giddiness rather than of swaying I shall not necessarily disagree. But the point is not what it is a function of (giddiness or swaying), but what is the nature of this function. [Back to text]

[142.b] "Smaller but equally present" is the reflexive view, whereas "Equal but past" is the immediate view. These two views are always superposed. [Back to text]

[142.c] Note, however, that an ambiguous illustration is needed to convey the structure of the ambiguous situation expressed in the words "the past is present". The ambiguity is due to superposition (cf. glass showcase). [Back to text]

[142.d] Each smaller area is more particularly here and more particularly now than the one that encloses it. [Back to text]