I expect this letter will be a little dull and prosy since I propose to talk about the cittavíthi and the Abhidhamma Pitaka. My purpose is rather to put you in a position to answer questions that may be raised about the rough treatment that these things receive in the Notes.

I have been refreshing my mind about the cittavíthi and its origins in the Abhidhamma Pitaka in order to make sure that CITTA is all in order. I find, to begin with, that I have given a wrong reference -- it should be Chapter XIV, and not XXII, of the Visuddhimagga. This is not of much importance, and can easily be corrected; and, anyway, Ch. XXII is the correct reference for the second part of the note. Next, I see that the whole question of the origins of the cittavíthi is dealt with in the Ven. Ñánamoli Thera's translation, The Path of Purification, Ch. IV note 13 (p. 131).[1] The relevant passages from the Vibhanga and Patthána are given in full, and it can be seen how the Sutta material is there interpreted (or, rather, misinterpreted) for the first time as a temporal 'succession of items each coming to an end before the next appears' (to quote my own words from CITTA). If, therefore, anyone asks why these two particular books are singled out for criticism and on what grounds they are criticized, it is necessary only to point to this footnote in The Path of Purification. Turning to Ch. XIV of that book (which chapter contains the principal account of the cittavíthi), I find the following footnote (no. 47, p. 515):

'For those who do not admit the cognitive series beginning with receiving, just as they do not admit the heart basis [don't worry about this -- it has no connexion with the cognitive series], the Pali has been handed down in various places, in the way beginning "For the eye-consciousness-element as receiving (sampaticchanáya cakkhuviññánadhátuyá)"; for the Pali cannot be contradicted.' (Paramatthamañjúsa -- Vis. Mag. Sub Commentary) The quotation as it stands is not traced to the Pitakas.

Objective thinking...imparts itself without further ado, and, at the most, takes refuge in assurances respecting its own truth, in recommendations as to its trustworthiness, and in promises that all men will some time accept it -- it is so certain. Or perhaps rather so uncertain; for the assurances and the recommendations and the promises, which are presumably for the sake of the others who are asked to accept it, may also be for the sake of the teacher, who feels the need of the security and dependability afforded by being in a majority. (CUP, pp. 70-1)

In my last letter I sent you a translation of Anguttara V,viii,9, which contains this passage: '...they, being undeveloped in body, virtue, mind, and understanding, when discussing the advanced teaching and engaging in cross-questioning, falling into a dark teaching will not awaken.' I added a footnote to say that the word abhidhamma that occurs in this passage does not refer to the Abhidhamma Pitaka. This needs some further discussion.

In the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera's Commentary (Atthasáliní) to the first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (Dhammasanganí), he gives the traditional account of the origin of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. This is to the effect that, during the three months of one vassána[2] season, the Buddha stayed in the Távatimsa heaven (or perhaps Tusita, I forget) teaching abhidhamma to the assembled devatá. At the end of each day he repeated the day's instruction to the Ven. Sáriputta Thera, who handed it on to the other bhikkhus. This instruction was gathered together and now forms the books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. According to the tradition, then, the matter contained in the present Abhidhamma Pitaka was in existence before the Buddha's final extinction at Kusinára.

In accordance with this tradition, all the other Commentaries of the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera insist that wherever the word abhidhamma occurs in the Suttas it refers to the books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. Moreover, the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera, in the Atthasáliní, utters anathema -- perhaps this is too strong, but I don't recall the actual words -- against people who doubt that the Abhidhamma Pitaka is really the Buddha's ipsissimum verbum. (As above, with the cittavíthi, this circumstance points to a solid body of scepticism about the authenticity of the A.P., and to the commentator's subconscious uneasiness about the soundness of his position, requiring him to have the majority on his side.)

The word abhidhamma occurs in the Suttas, sometimes alone, and sometimes together with the word abhivinaya, just as the simple word dhamma is sometimes linked with the simple word vinaya. This leads at once to the question: If the word abhidhamma refers to the Abhidhamma Pitaka, in distinction from the word dhamma, which refers to the Dhamma (i.e. Sutta) Pitaka, are we not entitled to look for an Abhivinaya Pitaka as well as a Vinaya Pitaka? But there is no trace of such a thing; and it is quite clear that abhivinaya means something like 'advanced discipline', which is part and parcel of the Vinaya Pitaka. (We can ignore here the possibility that vinaya, as well as abhivinaya, means something more than just the rules. Literally, it means 'leading out', and as vineti it occurs in the Anguttara Sutta that I translated for you, where it is rendered as 'to direct' -- 'they are unable to direct them in higher virtue, higher mind, and higher understanding'.)

Similarly, we have no a priori reason for supposing that abhidhamma means more than 'advanced teaching', understood as the more difficult and essential parts of the Sutta teaching. It is a constant feature of Indian philosophical or religious texts that they are attributed to some ancient and famous teacher in order to give them authority (in the West, on the contrary, the more modern the text the better); and this holds true even of the obviously later Pali books (the Ven. Mahákaccána Thera is credited with the Nettipakarana and with a grammar, while the Ven. Sáriputta Thera has the Patisambhidámagga and, possibly, the Niddesas attributed to him). It is thus wholly to be expected that attempts should be made to secure the authority of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (assuming that it is, in fact, a later production) by identifying it with the abhidhamma of the Suttas. Add to this the fact that the Atthasáliní and the other commentarial works of the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera are perhaps nine hundred years later than the Abhidhamma Pitaka that they set out to defend, and you will see that if we find internal reason for rejecting the books of the A.P. as not authoritative (i.e. if we find that the texts of these books cannot be reconciled with our understanding of the Sutta texts) there is nothing very much to compel us to accept them as the Buddha's own Teaching.

My teacher, the late Ven. Náyaka Thera, said in private that nobody had ever become arahat through listening to the books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. He did not, however, say that they were wrong. But if you refer to the passage from the Anguttara Sutta that I have quoted above, you will see that a teaching that does not lead to awakening (or enlightenment) -- that is, if it sets out to do so -- can be called a kanha dhamma, a 'dark teaching'. This prompts the thought that the books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka originated, not as tradition describes, but as the kanha dhamma resulting from mistaken abhidhamma discussion by monks undeveloped in body, virtue, mind, and understanding.

Be all this as it may, the Notes refer to the A.P. only in connexion with two specific things -- the cittavíthi and the paticcasamuppáda -- and there is no indiscriminate criticism of the A.P. as a whole.




[L. 80]   31 December 1963

The Notes seem to have struck Mrs. Quittner[1] with considerable impact, and her immediate reaction is all that could be desired. What disturbs her is the fact that statements are made throughout the Notes 'without any reasons' being given for them, on the 'take it or leave it' principle. What the self-respecting reader wants is to have his opinion consulted by the author, who is expected to allow him to make up his own mind about the points at issue, and thus either to agree or to disagree with what is said in the book. If the author does not do this (by failing to give his reasons) he insults the reader (and particularly the feminine reader) by seeming to assume that he (or she) has no opinion worth consulting.

But the one thing I want to avoid is to have readers make up their own mind about the book; for once they have objectively decided whether they agree or disagree with the author's arguments they will shut the book, forget it, and pass on to the next one. No, the Notes are designed to be an invitation, a provocation, a challenge, to the reader to come and share the author's point of view; and if the book starts off by democratically assuming that the reader's opinion is as good as the author's, it will simply defeat its own purpose. At all costs the reader must be prevented from fraternizing with the author.

Consider, for example, Mrs. Quittner's complaint that with a few strokes of the author's pen 'we are reduced from three to two baskets and this without giving any reasons for his statement'. (The reference is evidently to note (a) of the Preface.) If I had provided a discussion of my reasons for doubting the authenticity of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (on the lines, perhaps, of what I said in my last letter to you), at once people would have had something positive to seize hold of, and learned controversy might have started up leading more and more passionately away from the point at issue. As Kierkegaard says,

In general, all that is needed to make the question simple and easy is the exercise of a certain dietetic circumspection, the renunciation of every learned interpolation or subordinate consideration, which in a trice might degenerate into a century-long parenthesis. (CUP, pp. 29-30)

Mrs. Quittner's 'arrogant, scathing, and condescending' is a clear indication that she has been provoked by the Notes, and the fact that she has already read the NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA no less than five times seems to confirm it. If people are going to take this much interest in the Notes they are welcome to use whatever strong language about them as they please. I shall only start worrying when people begin calling them 'insipid, flatulent, and platitudinous'.

Her remark on the difficulties of NÁMA is probably justified. I am well aware that too much is said in too short a space, and that a longer discussion would be desirable. But (i) there is some amplification of what is said here in certain other notes, (ii) to do it justice a whole book would be necessary (as suggested recently by you), and I do not feel inclined to write it, or even capable of doing so, and (iii) there is no harm in letting people make the effort of expanding it (and perhaps correcting it) on their own account -- they must not rely wholly on parato ghoso, but must exercise themselves also in yoniso manasikáro.[2] In any case, there is more said here than is found in the Suttas, so it is already something of a concession to mental laziness (though that applies, I suppose, to the whole book). Time will perhaps make it clearer.




[L. 81]   1 January 1964

Thank you for Huxley's article. Generally speaking, a concept, an idea, and a thought, are much the same thing, and can be described as an imaginary picture representing some real state of affairs. But this 'representation' is not simply a photographic reproduction (in the mind) of the real state of affairs in question. In a very simple case, if I now imagine or think of some absent object, the image that I have bears some sort of resemblance to the absent object.

But suppose I want to think about something like 'the British Constitution'. I cannot simply produce an imaginary picture 'looking like' the British Constitution, because the B.C. does not 'look like' anything. What happens is that, over the years, I have built up a complex image, partly visual, partly verbal, and perhaps also with elements from other senses; and this complex image has an internal structure that corresponds to that of the B.C., at least in so far as I have correctly understood it. If, in my studies of the British Constitution I have consulted faulty authorities, or omitted part of it, these faults or omissions will be represented in this complex image. Whenever I wish to think about the B.C. (or even whenever anybody mentions it) this complex image comes to my mind, and it is with reference to it that I (for example) answer questions about the B.C. This complex image is a concept -- it is my concept of the B.C. With luck, it may correspond fairly closely with the original thing, but most probably it is a very misleading representation. (Note that, since the essence of the concept is in the structure of the complex image, and not in the individual images that make up the complex image, it is quite possible to have a number of different complex images, but all with the same structure, to represent the real state of affairs in question. Here, the concept remains the same, though the image is different. Thus, in the world of art, it is possible to express the same idea either in music or in painting.)

Now all conceptual thinking is abstract; that is to say, the thought or concept is entirely divorced from reality, it is removed from existence and is (in Kierkegaard's phrase) sub specie aeterni. Concrete thinking, on the other hand, thinks the object while the object is present, and this, in the strict sense of the words, is reflexion or mindfulness. One is mindful of what one is doing, of what one is seeing, while one is actually doing (or seeing) it. This, naturally, is very much more difficult than abstract thinking; but it has a very obvious advantage: if one is thinking (or being mindful) of something while it is actually present, no mistake is possible, and one is directly in touch with reality; but in abstract thinking there is every chance of a mistake, since, as I pointed out above, the concepts with which we think are composite affairs, built up of an arbitrary lot of individual experiences (books, conversations, past observations, and so on).

What Huxley is getting at, then, is simply this. As a result of our education, our books, radios, cinemas, televisions, and so on, we tend to build up artificial concepts of what life is, and these concepts are grossly misleading and are no satisfactory guide at all to real life. (How many people, especially in the West, derive all their ideas about love from the cinema or T.V. -- no wonder they run into difficulties when they begin to meet it as it is in reality!) Huxley is advocating a training in mindfulness (or awareness), satisampajañña -- in thinking about life as it is actually taking place -- instead of (or, at least, as well as) the present training in purely abstract thinking. In this way, so he maintains -- and of course he is quite right --, people will be better fitted for dealing with life as it really is. Does this answer your question?




[L. 82]   3 January 1964

I cannot say what the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera's authority is for his statements in the Atthasáliní and elsewhere about the A.P. It was certainly the generally believed tradition at that time that the Buddha himself had taught it to the devatás; and I seem to remember that the Chinese pilgrims to India (I forget their dates[1]) were shown the place where the foot of the triple staircase rested down which the Buddha was said to have descended after the Vas season in question.

But though the tradition is certainly earlier than the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera's time, there is a further complicating element. Each of the early Hínayána schools (let alone the Maháyána) seems to have had its own particular Abhidhamma Pitaka, though the Suttas and (for the most part) the Vinaya were held in common (I speak from memory of past readings). In consequence, the question might have arisen (though I don't know that it actually did), which of the various A.P.s the Buddha taught to the devatás. There may be earlier books than the present Commentaries reporting the tradition, but I do not know of them. And I do not recall whether the Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera quotes his authority, but I think not. (If you are interested, the Atthasáliní is in English translation as The Expositor.)

The Suttas themselves record the earlier part of the Buddha's ministry in some detail, and also the last few months; but there is no connected narrative of his movements and actions in between. But in any case I am not aware that any Sutta says that the Buddha taught the Abhidhamma Pitaka, or even abhidhamma, to the devatás, or that he spent a Vas season in Távatimsa. Upon occasion the Buddha did visit various heavens (e.g. Brahmanimantanika Sutta, M. 49: i,326) but for the most part, so it seems, the devatás came and listened to the Buddha teaching human beings (and attended in great numbers), e.g. Cúlaráhulováda Sutta, M. 147: iii,278-80; Pátika Suttanta, D. 24: iii, 31-35. There seems to be no reason to suppose that the devatás are superior to human beings in intelligence (in whatever other way they may be superior). The actual teaching given by the Buddha to Sakka, chief of the Távatimsa deities, is recorded in the Sakkapañha Suttanta, D. 21: ii,263-80; also Cúlatanhásankhaya Sutta, M. 37: i,251-56.




[L. 83]   4 January 1964

More about the Abhidhamma Pitaka. I think I said in my last letter that 'I do not know of any Sutta where it is said that the Buddha taught the A.P., or even abhidhamma, to the devatás'. The words 'or even abhidhamma' should be deleted, since, if abhidhamma in the Sutta sense means 'advanced dhamma', then the Buddha did teach abhidhamma to the devatás -- though not more than to the bhikkhus, and not in a Vas season spent in Távatimsa.[1]

Another point. The Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera and the other Commentators maintain (as I said earlier) that the material contained in the present A.P. was in existence before the Buddha's final extinction. They also maintain, consistently with this opinion, that the A.P. was recited at the First Council (of Rájagaha) after the Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas. But in the account of the First Council (which is contained in the Cúlavagga of the Vinaya Pitaka, and is certainly authentic), the word abhidhamma does not occur at all. The arahat theras debated which should be recited first, Dhamma or Vinaya. They concluded that, since there is no practice of the Dhamma without observance of the Vinaya, the Vinaya should have precedence. Accordingly, the Ven. Upáli Thera was questioned about Vinaya, and answered, beginning with an account of the First Párájika. When he had finished, the Ven. Ánanda Thera was questioned about Dhamma, and answered, beginning with a recitation of the Brahmajála Sutta, which is the first Sutta of the Dígha Nikáya. When he had finished, certain other business was disposed of and the Council dispersed. The statement by the Commentators that the A.P. was recited on this occasion is purely gratuitous -- one can accept it if one wishes, but there is nothing in the account of the First Council to support it.

One of the books of the A.P. (the Kathá Vatthu) consists of a detailed account of the refutation of a number of heretical views about the Dhamma. This is supposed to have taken place at the Third Council (of Pátaliputta or Patna) during the reign of Asoka. (I forget the authority for this statement but there seems to be no reason to doubt it.)[2] The question has arisen how it was that the text of a debate with members of heretical sects at the time of Asoka had already been taught by the Buddha to devatás some two-and-a-half centuries earlier. The answer that is given by the Commentators is that the Buddha, foreseeing that such a debate would take place on a future occasion, gave the outline of the correct answers (but not the full text), in advance, to guide the orthodox party when the time came. Once again, one can accept this account, if one wishes. But with whom is the onus probandi?




[L. 84]   12 January 1964

I decided to give Mrs. Quittner the opportunity (if she wants it) of communicating direct with me about clarifications of the Notes. I do not think she is in the least worried about losing the Abhidhamma Pitaka, nor do I think she is particularly interested in knowing the reasons for doing so; but what disturbs her is the fact she has not even been offered any reasons, good or bad. In my letter to her I have tried to make it clear why I have deliberately refrained from giving reasons (namely, because it is not in accordance with the purpose of the book to put emphasis on objective critical considerations -- it is assumed that all this is over and done with before the book starts).

I am glad that you will be having the satisfaction of knowing that one person at least seems to find the book of absorbing interest, and that all the trouble you have taken about producing it has not been entirely wasted.

On the other hand, I fear that, even without the references to the A.P., bhikkhus of the traditional school -- the majority, naturally -- cannot be expected to like the book if they read it; and it is vain to hope that it is going to win general approval. I do not for a moment imagine that the general atmosphere of Buddhist studies is going to be in the least affected by the Notes; but I do allow myself to hope that a few individuals (of whom Mrs. Quittner may be one) will have private transformations of their way of thinking as a result of reading them. The question is, how to reach these individuals.

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Editorial notes:

[79.1] Path of Purification, p. 131, note 13: This long note begins:

Bhavanga (life-continuum, lit. Constituent of becoming) and javana (impulsion) are first mentioned in this work at Ch. I §57 (see n. 16); this is the second mention. The 'cognitive series (citta-víthi)' so extensively used here is unknown as such in the Pitakas... [Back to text]

[80.1] Mrs. Quittner: Section II, L. 3-5. [Back to text]

[80.2] parato ghoso; yoniso manasikáro: See the opening quotation to Notes on Dhamma. [Back to text]

[82.1] Chinese pilgrims: Fa Hien (Fa Hsien) travelled from 399 to 413 A.D. Translations of his report are available as A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms (London: Oxford University Press, 1886, tr. James Legge) and as A Record of the Buddhist Countries (Peking: The Chinese Buddhist Association, 1957, tr. unidentified). The account by Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang) of his travels has been translated by Samuel Beal in Buddhist Records of the Western World(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., n.d.). Hiuen, who was in India between 629 and 645 A.D., was primarily concerned with differences in points of Vinaya practice: he returned to China with hundred of texts. [Back to text]

[83.1] abhidhamma: Although various disciples are sometimes said to discuss abhidhamma and abhivinaya amongst themselves, in fact the Suttas nowhere describe the Buddha himself as teaching either abhidhamma or abhivinaya to either humans or deities. This suggests that perhaps the prefix abhi- might best be taken in this instance not as 'higher' or 'advanced' but as 'extended', and to understand that the monks sometimes discussed dhamma and vinaya in their own terminology rather than in the terminology used by the Buddha. See in particular A. VI,60: iii,392f. [Back to text]

[83.2] Third Council: Traditional views on the Kathá Vatthu are set forth at Mahávamsa v,278 and Dípavamsa vii,41, 56-8. Source material on the Third Council is also to be found in the Samantapásádiká (i,57ff.) and Papañca Súdaní (vv. 240ff.) [Back to text]