[L. 146]   21 November 1961

Dear Upásiká,[1]

Your argument as I understand it assumes that the anágámí is liable to phassa, and concludes that, since all phassa is sa-ásava sa-upádána therefore the anágámí has upádána. I shall do my best to do as you ask and refute you.

1. I shall take your second question first. 'Is there phassa apart from being sa-ásava sa-upádána?' The answer is: no, there is not.

2. 'Is the anágámí liable to phassa or not?' It is evident that your argument depends upon an affirmative answer to this question, and that this, in turn, depends upon the absurdities of a negative answer -- i.e. that the anágámí is not liable to phassa, which can be truly said only of the arahat. It follows from this that your argument is dependent upon the assumption that the question is one that can be answered categorically -- if the answer 'no' is absurd, then the answer 'yes' must be correct.

In the Anguttara (III, 67: i,197; IV,42: ii,46) the Buddha speaks of four kinds of questions: those that can be answered categorically, those that require a discriminating answer, those that require a counter question, and those that must be put aside. Perhaps the question, 'Is the anágámí liable to phassa or not?' cannot be answered categorically and is one that must be set aside.

We know that the puthujjana is liable to phassa, and that the arahat is not. But your question asks about the anágámí, who is neither puthujjana nor arahat. It is quite true that if I deny that the anágámí is liable to phassa I confound him with the arahat; but it is no less true that if I allow that he is liable to phassa I fail to distinguish him from the puthujjana. Thus the question cannot be answered.

To this it can be objected that since both puthujjana and anágámí are liable to re-birth, that since neither of them has reached the goal and become arahat, in this respect at least, they are indistinguishable, and consequently that the question can in fact be answered affirmatively. It will be noticed, however, that we are now no longer debating whether or not the anágámí is liable to phassa, but whether or not your question 'Is the anágámí liable to phassa?' is answerable. And whether we decide that it is answerable or not depends upon whether we regard the paticcasamuppáda formulation as a Universal Law (which will include the sekha) or as a pedagogical device (which treats the sekha as irrelevant). In this way we establish that your argument does not in any way invalidate my view of paticcasamuppáda; at most it represents a rival point of view; and we are free to choose between them.

3. Can we go further and show that the 'Universal Law' point of view, with its positive assertion that the anágámí has upádána, may be at variance with the Suttas? Consider this passage: Evam eva kho...pahíyetha; api ca te evam assa, Dígharattam vata bho aham iminá cittena nikato vañcito paladdho; aham hi rúpam yeva upádiyamáno upádiyim... .[2] We know (M. 44: i,299) that yo pañcas'upádánakkhandhesu chandarágo[3] is upádána; and cakkhuppáda is the arising of the dhammacakkhu of the sotápanna: yam kiñci samudayadhammam sabbam tam nirodhadhammanti.[4] If, then, we adopt the 'Universal Law' point of view and press the question 'Does the anágámí have upádána?' we meet with the answer that upádána (including, presumably, kám'upádána) is put aside even by the sotápanna; and from this we arrive at the inconvenient conclusion that the sotápanna is an arahat. If, on the other hand, we adopt the 'pedagogical device' point of view, we regard the question 'Does the sotápanna, does the anágámí, have upádána?' as thapaniya, and we refrain from asking it; and in this way these difficulties do not arise. When a puthujjana obtains the dhammacakkhu he there and then ceases to be a puthujjana and (in due course) becomes arahat.

4. Is sammáditthi to be reckoned as ditthupádána? If the foregoing discussion is accepted this question will not arise; for we are no longer called upon to decide whether or not the ditthisampanna (sotápanna) or anágámí possesses upádána. If not, the following remarks may be relevant.

Though I do not know of any Sutta where ditthupádána is specified in detail, reference to Majjhima 11: i,66 shows that whereas samanabráhmaná other than the Buddha may be capable of teaching pariññá of the first three upádána, it is only the Buddha who can teach pariññá of attavádupádána. But if ditthupádána includes sammáditthi then it is beyond the scope of outside samanabráhmaná to teach pariññá of ditthupádána, since sammáditthi is found only within the Buddha's Teaching. From this one might conclude that sammáditthi is not to be reckoned as ditthupádána.

5. Saupádisesá. Majjhima 10: i,63 and other Suttas say sati vá upádisese anágámitá.[5] This, obviously, refers to the anágámí. But Itivuttaka 44: 38 speaks of saupádisesá nibbánadhátu and anupádisesá nibbánadhátu. It is clear enough that upádisesá cannot refer to the same thing in these two different contexts; for in the first the upádisesá of the anágámí is what distinguishes him from the arahat (i.e. some impurity) and in the second upádisesá is what distinguishes the 'living' arahat from the 'dead' arahat. (N.B. It is, strictly, no less improper to apply the word 'life' to an arahat than it is the word 'death'.) It is perhaps tempting to look for some significant connexion between the word upádisesá and the word upádána, and to attempt to explain these contexts in terms of upádána (possibly also with reference to the phrases catunnam mahábhútánam upádáya rúpam[6] and tanhupádinna káye[7] of Majjhima 28: i,185); but as the Ven. Ñánamoli Thera pointed out to me the words saupádisesá and anupádisesá occur in Majjhima 105: ii,257 & 259, where they can hardly mean more than 'with something remaining' and 'without something remaining' or 'with/without residue'. This seems to indicate that we are not entitled to deduce from sati vá upádisese anágámitá that the anágámí is sa-upádána -- all that it implies is that the anágámí still has something (i.e. some infection) left that the arahat does not.




[L. 147]   (undated[1])

I do not say that rúpa is appearance. I say, rather, that rúpa is what appears. Rúpa, on its own, cannot appear (and therefore does not exist): in order to appear (or to exist) rúpa requires náma; that is to say, it requires feeling and perception. Similarly, rúpa, on its own, is not significant; for a thing is significant, has an intention, only when it appears from a certain point of view; and without náma (and viññána) rúpa is without a point of view (or orientation). Thus cetaná (intention) is náma (see M. 9: i,53, where náma is defined as vedaná saññá cetaná phassa manasikára [attention = point of view; my present point of view is what I am at present attending to]). Without náma we cannot speak of rúpa: there is no adhivacana. But without rúpa there is nothing to speak of: there is no patigha.

Though purpose is a form of intention, it is rather a crude and obvious form (though useful as a starting-point) -- there is intention of a much more subtle nature (which, however, we need not discuss here). The varieties of intention are infinite. I agree, of course, that there is no purpose in existence, as such. There is no reason why I or anything else should exist. But when something exists it is always (negatively) related to other things, i.e. it is significant.




[L. 148]   27 December 1961

I have indicated the points of difference between us on this question of the ariyapuggalá, and I do not have any doubt that I am right. But if you can give me a Sutta text that clearly shows that I am mistaken I shall not be greatly worried. It is not within my powers to check for myself that all four (or eight) stages are necessarily gone through by all who eventually attain arahattá, nor can I know for myself that there are just four (or eight) stages, no more and no less. And whether or not a sotápanna is or is not to be called káyasakkhi, ditthipatto, or saddhávimutto is, after all, a question of terminology rather than anything else. For all these matters I rely on the Buddha (or the Suttas), since I cannot know them for myself; and if it is pointed out to me that I have misunderstood the Suttas, I am prepared to reconsider my views on this matter. Nothing of any great importance depends upon a person's knowing about the various kinds of ariyasávaká: what is of importance is that he should become one of them -- the rest will follow as a matter of course.

By way of contrast, I remember that a few years ago (at the Hermitage) the question arose whether or not viññána is included in náma, and at that time I said in public that if anyone were to show me a Sutta where viññána definitely was included in náma I should be extremely upset. (Fortunately nobody did.) The reason for my statement was that as a result of an examination of my own experience (guided also by certain outside philosophers) I had come to the conclusion that it was quite wrong to include viññána in náma; this was (and is) a matter wherein I could (by reflexive experience) know for myself what was right and what was wrong; and a Sutta in direct contradiction to my own experience would have been most disturbing.

Perhaps you will see from this distinction that I have made (between what I can know for myself at the present time and what I can not know) why it is that I am unable to make any useful comment on your 'tidy chart' of rúpa. Nearly all of it is quite beyond my present experience and nothing I could say would be anything more valuable than a discussion of certain words. And the same applies, generally, to any argument based upon etymology and Sutta usage. At best I can only indicate Suttas to complete or to correct your scheme. (Thus, I can say that you may find the answer to your question 'Where do the four jhánas belong?' in A. IV,123 & 124.)




[L. 149]   10 January 1962

1. It is going too far to say that, to me, the sekha is essentially arahat, and that, rigorously, I exclude him from paticcasamuppáda anuloma. Where paticcasamuppáda is concerned, we are dealing with the difference between the puthujjana and the arahat, and the question of the sekha simply does not arise. He is in between. The sekha, like the two-faced Roman god Janus (whose month this is), is looking both ways, to the past and to the future. The past is anuloma, and the future is patiloma, and if it is too late to include the sekha in anuloma it is too early to include him in patiloma. Or if you wish he is something of both.

2. There is no 'but' and 'when' about the arahat's being paticcasamuppáda patiloma -- he is paticcasamuppáda patiloma entirely, and in no way anuloma. Anuloma is avijjápaccayá, and patiloma is avijjánirodha, and there is not the smallest trace of avijjá where the arahat is concerned. It is not possible to put 'him' back to anuloma, since, with cessation of avijjá, there is cessation of 'him' (attaváda, asmimána) -- ditth'eva dhamme saccato thetato Tathágato anupalabbhamáne (S. iv,384).[1] There is certainly no 'outside the paticcasamuppáda context' as far as persons are concerned, since patiloma is cessation of the person. Thus it is only if we think of the arahat therí Soná as a person, as somebody (sakkáya), that she seems to be putting herself back to anuloma when she says: pañcakkhandhá pariññátá titthanti chinnamúlaká (Therígáthá 106).[2]

You suggest that when I describe the arahat I do so in terms other than negative to pañc'upádánakkhandhá; but when I describe him 'as such' I do not say he is saupádána, any more than Soná Therí when she describes herself 'as such'. But the fact is that no one, not even the Buddha, can describe an arahat in such a way as to be intelligible to a puthujjana; and the reason is, as you point out, that the whole of the puthujjana's experience is saupádána, including his experience of the anupádána arahat (whether he sees him, thinks about him, visualizes or imagines him, or hears him described). Your account of the difficulties that you encounter when you consider the arahat and his robe, as far as it goes, is quite correct. (I say 'as far as it goes' since to you the arahat's robe is to be worn 'by him', whereas to him it is to-be-worn, not 'by me' but 'on this body'.)

For a puthujjana even the terms khínásava, akataññú, and so on, to the extent that they are intelligible to him, are all saupádána. In other words, it is impossible for a puthujjana to 'see' (= understand) an arahat -- as soon as he does 'see' him he ceases to be a puthujjana. But this does not in the least mean that a puthujjana should not try to understand an arahat -- he might succeed and then he would cease to be a puthujjana.

3. (i) Áneñja (na iñjatí ti áneñjam), which literally means 'not shaking', seems to have two quite distinct connotations in the Suttas. In the first place it refers either (as in A. IV,190: ii,184) to the four arúpa attainments or more strictly (as in M. 106) to the fourth jhána and ákásánañcáyatana and viññánañcáyatana -- note that the second and third áneñjasappáya refer to both these last two; and these are attainable by the puthujjana, the sekha, and the arahat alike, provided, of course, that they make the effort. See, for example, A. IV,172 (which should be a continuation of 171: ii,159), where certain devá, having been nevasaññánásaññáyatanúpagá are liable to return to this world (which cannot happen to an ariyasávaka in the same position). And see A. III,114: i,267 for the same of the first three of the arúpa devá. In the second place it refers to arahattá. Anejo anupádáno sato bhikkhu paribbaje (Sn. 751). In both cases there is 'not shaking', but in two different senses. There is nothing mysterious about this; it is merely a question of Sutta usage.

(ii) As regards the passage you quoted from Majjhima 106: ii,264, I understand it in this way. When a puthujjana attains nevasaññánásaññáyatana that is clearly enough saupádána, that is, sakkáya. When a sekha attains this, he sees that it is saupádána, that it is sakkáya. Now the condition for upádána is avijjá, that is to say, not seeing -- not seeing upádána as upádána. But the sekha, unlike the puthujjana, does see this, so his upádána is seen and is also, therefore, an-upádána. (As I have said before, all one can say of the sekha is má upádiyi.) Similar remarks apply to the frequent passages in the Suttas where the sekha sees or considers or is urged to consider the pañc'upádánakkhandhá as anicca and so on. The puthujjana cannot see pañc'upádánakkhandhá as anicca or anything else, since he does not see them at all.

4. About saláyatana and phassa. Within limits I follow your argument (except that I have no experience of the dibbacakkhu and cannot therefore usefully comment upon it), but I note that you seem to regard the cakkhundriya as 'subject'. The question remains, 'What do you mean by "subject"?'

In visual experience (considered alone) the eye does not appear (na pátubhavati) at all, either as cakkhundriya or as mamsacakkhu, since vision itself is not visible, and the eye does not see itself. Since visual experience alone neither reveals cakkhundriya nor mamsacakkhu there is (or should be) no justification for calling either of them subject. When other faculties (or a looking glass) are used the mamsacakkhu appears (pátubhavati), but it appears as a phenomenon (to avoid using the word 'object' for the moment) amongst other phenomena, and, as such, has no claim to be called subject. In neither case is there any subject to be found. This being so, when these two experiences, visual and the other, occur together (as is usual), although there is the constriction you speak of (I would rather call it a superposition) there is no reason whatsoever for any 'discrepancy between subject and object'; for we have not found any subject. And in the arahat (do I disconcert you?) no discrepancy is, in fact, experienced, and no dukkha. It is only in the puthujjana, for whom an apparent self is manifest, and who necessarily divides things into subject and object, that the discrepancy you speak of can arise. But it seems to me that perhaps you do not find the approach by way of the saláyatana as congenial to you as the approach by way of pañcakkhandhá, and I shall not pursue the question any further.

5. In my early days in Ceylon I myself was something of a 'tidy-chart' maker, and I hoped and believed that it was possible to include all that the Suttas said in a single system -- preferably portrayed diagrammatically on one very large sheet of paper. In those innocent days -- which however did not last very long -- I believed that the Commentaries knew what they were talking about. And I had the idea that everything that happened to me was vipáka and everything that I did about it (my reaction, that is, to the vipáka) was fresh kamma, which in turn produced fresh vipáka, and so on ad inf. And this is as tidy as anyone could wish.

Then I came across the Sutta that I transcribe below. This, as you will see, was enough to shatter my illusions, and it came as a bit of a shock (though also as a bit of a relief). In due course after asking people about it and getting no satisfactory explanation, I decided that my 'tidy idea' could be true only in a general sense, and that, in any case, it could not possibly be of any vital importance in the essential part of the Dhamma. Since then I have stopped thinking about it. Here is the Sutta (Vedaná Samy. 21: iv,229-31):[3]

     Once the Auspicious One was staying near Rájagaha, at the Squirrel's feeding-ground in the Bamboo Grove.
     Now at that time the Wanderer Sívaka of the top knot approached the Auspicious One. Having approached, he exchanged courtesies and, having done so, sat down at one side. Sitting at one side the Wanderer Sívaka of the top knot said this to the Auspicious One:
     -- There are some recluses and divines, Master Gotama, of such a belief, of such a view: 'Whatever this individual experiences, be it pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, all that is due to former actions.' Herein what does Master Gotama say?
     -- Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (1) with bile as their source. That can be known by oneself, Sívaka, how some feelings arise here with bile as their source; and that is reckoned by the world as truth, Sívaka, how some feelings arise here with bile as their source. Therein, Sívaka, the recluses and divines who are of such a belief, of such a view: 'Whatever this individual experiences, be it pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, all that is due to former actions', they both go beyond what is known by themselves and go beyond what is reckoned as truth in the world. Therefore I say that these recluses and divines are in the wrong.
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (2) with phlegm as their source....
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (3) with wind as their source....
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (4) due to confluence of humours....
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (5) born from seasonal change....
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (6) born from improper care....
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (7) due to exertion....
     Some feelings, Sívaka, arise here (8) born from the ripening of action.... Therefore I say that these recluses and divines are in the wrong.

In your case, however, though you do tend to make tidy charts (it is an attitude of mind), there is also another aspect. You seem to be well aware that there is a discrepancy in your present position in that you are disconcerted when the arahat is described 'as such', and you are perhaps prepared to allow my statement that this is due to failure to see that things can be significant without being 'mine', that they can be teleological without being appropriated. And I think, also, that you are aware that this, in fact, is the central problem and that all else (including the tidy charts) is secondary and unimportant. This attitude is not sterile; and from the first it has been my principal concern, directly or indirectly, to encourage it and make it stand out decisively. As you have noted I have consistently underlined this matter (in whatever terms it has been stated) and rejected any possibility of arriving at a compromise solution. It is because you have been prepared to listen to this one thing that I have continued the correspondence. The other things we have discussed, except in so far as they have a bearing in this, are of little importance. But it is one thing for me to insist on this matter and quite another for you to see it. Even bhikkhus who heard the Dhamma from the Buddha's own mouth had sometimes to go away and work it out for themselves. Tassa me Bhagavá...so kho ahan...patiladdho (Bojjhanga Samy. 30: v,89-90).[4]

Afternote: You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat's experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.

The puthujjana's experience, however, is still more complex, since there is also avijjá, and there is thus appropriation as well as teleology. But this, too, functions automatically, without any self or agent to direct it. On account of the appropriation, however, it appears to be directed by a self, agent, or master. Avijjá functions automatically, but conceals this fact from itself. Avijjá is an automatically functioning blindness to its automatic functioning. Removal of the blindness removes the appropriation but not the teleology.






· Newly-found letter to Sister Vajirá (29 January 1962)

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Editorial notes:

[146.1] upásiká: See the P.S. to L. 100. This Section has been edited from rough drafts of letters to Sister Vajirá, the final copies having been burnt by their recipient. See L. 99-101. On the verso of one page of Sister Vajirá's letters to him the Ven. Ñánavíra had drafted a paragraph, apparently in response to her request for additional notes (in the same letter which she began 'That I burnt your letters and notes was the most dangerous act that I ever committed' -- see note 3 to L. 100). This fragmentary reply is reproduced, reduced from foolscap, on pp. 489-490. 'The last sentence of para II' seems to refer to the second paragraph of L. 149 (which predates Sister Vajirá's request by about ten days) and which itself seems to refer to PHASSA [d]. It will be noticed that most of the draft reproduced here is, in the event, an early version of the third paragraph of ATTÁ. In fact, a considerable part of the Shorter Notes in Notes on Dhamma seems to be material reworked from those letters to Sister Vajirá which 'perished in the great flames'. [Back to text]

[146.2] Evam eva kho...: See PARAMATTHA SACCA §4. [Back to text]

[146.3] Yo pañcas'...: See PARAMATTHA SACCA §3. [Back to text]

[146.4] Yam kiñci...: See L. 1 and L. 38. [Back to text]

[146.5] sati vá: 'Or, if there is a remainder, non-returning'. [Back to text]

[146.6] catunnam...: See Additional Texts 1. [Back to text]

[146.7] tanhupádinna...: 'the body, taken up by craving'. [Back to text]

[147.1] (undated): But apparently in response to a letter dated 20 November 1961. [Back to text]

[149.1] S. iv,384: See PARAMATTHA SACCA §4 [a]. [Back to text]

[149.2] Thig. 106: See L. 36 and editorial note thereto. [Back to text]

[149.3] Sívaka Sutta: The draft did not include a translation of this Sutta, which is provided here by the editors. See L. 107 and note. [Back to text]

[149.4] Tassa me...: It is likely that the letter sent to Sister Vajirá contained a more extensive extract from this discourse, wherein Ven. Udáyi tells the Buddha that his strong reverence for the Buddha has done much for him. 'The Auspicious One taught Dhamma to me: "This is matter, this is the arising of matter, this is the ceasing of matter...".' Ven. Udáyi relates how he then went into solitude and, reflecting on the fluctuations and vicissitudes of the five aggregates, he came to realize as it really is suffering, suffering's arising, suffering's ceasing, and the path leading to the ceasing of suffering. 'Then, lord, I fully understood Dhamma and attained the Path.' Having become sotápanna, Ven. Udáyi then understood the way which would lead him to extinction. [Back to text]