The fundamental upádána or 'holding' is attaváda (see Majjhima ii,1 <M.i,67>), which is holding a belief in 'self'. The puthujjana takes what appears to be his 'self' at its face value; and so long as this goes on he continues to be a 'self', at least in his own eyes (and in those of others like him). This is bhava or 'being'. The puthujjana knows that people are born and die; and since he thinks 'my self exists' so he also thinks 'my self was born' and 'my self will die'. The puthujjana sees a 'self' to whom the words birth and death apply.[d] In contrast to the puthujjana, the arahat has altogether got rid of asmimána (not to speak of attaváda -- see MAMA), and does not even think 'I am'. This is bhavanirodha, cessation of being. And since he does not think 'I am' he also does not think 'I was born' or 'I shall die'. In other words, he sees no 'self' or even 'I' for the words birth and death to apply to. This is játinirodha and jarámarananirodha. (See, in Kosala Samy. i,3 <S.i,71>, how the words birth and death are avoided when the arahat is spoken of.

Atthi nu kho bhante játassa aññatra jarámaraná ti. N'atthi kho mahárája játassa aññatrá jarámaraná. Ye pi te mahárája khattiyamahásálá... bráhmanamahásálá... gahapatimahásálá..., tesam pi játánam n'atthi aññatra jarámaraná. Ye pi te mahárája bhikkhu arahanto khínásavá..., tesam páyam káyo bhedanadhammo nikkhepanadhammo ti.)

-- For one who is born, lord, is there anything other than ageing-&-death? -- For one who is born, great king, there is nothing other than ageing-&-death. Those, great king, who are wealthy warriors... wealthy divines... wealthy householders..., -- for them, too, being born, there is nothing other than ageing-&-death. Those monks, great king, who are worthy ones, destroyers of the cankers..., -- for them, too, it is the nature of this body to break up, to be laid down.

The puthujjana, taking his apparent 'self' at face value, does not see that he is a victim of upádána; he does not see that 'being a self' depends upon 'holding a belief in self' (upádánapaccayá bhavo); and he does not see that birth and death depend upon his 'being a self' (bhavapaccayá játi, and so on). The ariyasávaka, on the other hand, does see these things, and he sees also their cessation (even though he may not yet have fully realized it); and his seeing of these things is direct. Quite clearly, the idea of re-birth is totally irrelevant here.

11. Let us now turn to the beginning of the paticcasamuppáda formulation and consider the word sankhára. The passage from the Cúlavedallasutta quoted in §5 evidently uses sankhára to mean a thing from which some other thing is inseparable -- in other words, a necessary condition. This definition is perfectly simple and quite general, and we shall find that it is all that we need. (If a sankhára is something upon which something else depends, we can say that the 'something else' is determined by the first thing, i.e. by the sankhára, which is therefore a 'determination' or a 'determinant'. It will be convenient to use the word determination when we need to translate sankhára.)

12. Some discussion will be necessary if we are to see that sankhára, whenever it occurs, always has this meaning in one form or another. We may start with the fundamental triad:

Sabbe sankhárá aniccá; Sabbe sankhárá dukkhá;       Sabbe dhammá anattá.

All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self.

(Dhammapada xx,5-7 <Dh. 277-9>) A puthujjana accepts what appears to be his 'self' at face value. When he asks himself 'What is my self?' he seeks to identify it in some way with one thing or another, and specifically with the pañc'upádánakkhandhá or one of them (see Khandha Samy. v,5 <S.iii,46manent, indirect methods are necessary: he must first see that this thing is dependent upon, or determined by, some other thing, and he must then see that this other thing, this determination or sankhára, is impermanent. When he sees that the other thing, the sankhára on which this thing depends, is impermanent, he sees that this thing, too, must be impermanent, and he no longer regards it as 'self'. (See SANKHÁRA.) Thus, when sabbe sankhárá aniccá is seen, sabbe dhammá anattá is seen. And similarly with sabbe sankhárá dukkhá. We may therefore understand sabbe sankhárá aniccá as 'All things upon which other things (dhammá) depend -- i.e. all determinations (sankhárá) -- are impermanent' with a tacit corollary 'All things dependent upon other things (sankhárá) -- i.e. all determined things (sankhatá dhammá) -- are impermanent'. After this, sabbe dhammá anattá, 'All things are not-self', follows as a matter of course.[e]

13. Every thing (dhamma) must, of necessity, be (or be somehow included within) one or more of the pañc('upádán)akkhandhá, either generally -- e.g. feeling in general, feeling as opposed to what is not feeling -- or particularly -- e.g. this present painful feeling as opposed to the previous pleasant feeling (present as a past feeling). In the same way, every determination (sankhára) must also be one or more of the pañc('upádán)akkhandhá. Thus the pañc('upádán)akkhandhá can be regarded either as sankhárá or as dhammá according as they are seen as 'things-that-other-things-depend-on' or simply as 'things themselves'. See Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,228>.[5]

14. Sankhárá are one of the pañc'upádánakkhandhá (or, in the case of the arahat, one of the pañcakkhandhá -- see Khandha Samy. v,6 <S.iii,47>). The Sutta mentioned in §5 (Khandha Samy. vi,4)[3] says explicitly, in this context, that sankhárá are cetaná. If this is so, cetaná must be something that other things depend on. What are these things? The answer is given at once by the Khajjaniyasutta (Khandha Samy. viii,7 <S.iii,87>[6]): they are the pañc('upádán)akkhandhá themselves.[f]

15. This leads us to the puññábhisankhára, apuññábhisankhára, and áneñjábhisankhára, of §6. These determinations are clearly cetaná of some kind -- indeed the Sutta itself (Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. vi,1) associates the words abhisankharoti and abhisañcetayati. A brief discussion is needed. The Sutta says:

Avijjágato'yam bhikkhave purisapuggalo puññañ ce sankháram abhisankharoti, puññúpagam hoti viññánam.

If, monks, this individual man, who is involved in nescience, is determining a meritorious determination, consciousness has arrived at merit.

The word puñña is commonly associated with kamma, and the traditional interpretation supposes that puññúpaga viññána is puññakammavipáka in the following existence. Puñña is certainly kamma, but nothing in the Sutta suggests that puññúpaga viññána is anything other than the meritorious consciousness of one who is determining or intending merit. (When merit is intended by an individual he is conscious of his world as 'world-for-doing-merit-in', and consciousness has thus 'arrived at merit'.) In §14 we saw that cetaná (or intentions) of all kinds are sankhárá, and these are no exception. As we see from the Sutta, however, they are of a particular kind; for they are not found in the arahat. They are intentions in which belief in 'self' is implicitly involved. We saw in §10 that belief in 'self' is the condition for birth, and that when all trace of such belief is eradicated the word birth no longer applies. Belief in 'self', in exactly the same way, is the condition for consciousness, and when it altogether ceases the word consciousness no longer applies. Thus, with cessation of these particular intentions there is cessation of consciousness. The arahat, however, still lives, and he has both intentions (or, more generally, determinations) and consciousness; but this consciousness is niruddha, and the intentions (or determinations) must similarly be accounted as 'ceased'. (This matter is further discussed in §22. See also VIÑÑÁNA.) Sankhárapaccayá viññánam, which means 'so long as there are determinations there is consciousness', is therefore also to be understood as meaning 'so long as there are puthujjana's determinations there is puthujjana's consciousness'. Even though the Khajjaniyasutta (§14) tells us that determinations are so called since 'they determine the determined' (which includes consciousness), we must not conclude that the determinations in 'determinations are a condition for consciousness' (sankhárapaccayá viññánam) are determinations because they are a condition for consciousness: on the contrary, they are a condition for consciousness because they are determinations. Thus, vitakkavicárá determine vací, which is why they are called vacísankhára; and it is as a sankhára that they are a condition for viññána. In particular, puññábhisankhára, apuññábhisankhára, and áneñjábhisankhára, are cetaná that determine viññána as puññúpaga, apuññúpaga, and áneñjúpaga, respectively. They are certain intentions determining certain consciousnesses. Since they determine something (no matter what), these intentions are determinations (as stated in the Khajjaniyasutta). As determinations they are a condition for consciousness. And as puthujjana's determinations they are a condition for puthujjana's consciousness (which is always puññúpaga, apuññúpaga, or áneñjúpaga). Exactly why determinations are a condition for consciousness will be discussed later.

16. There is nothing to add to what was said about káyasankhára, vacísankhára, and cittasankhára, in §5, except to note that we occasionally encounter in the Suttas the terms káyasankhára, vacísankhára, and manosankhára (not cittasankhára). These are to be understood (see Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. iii,5 <S.ii,40>) as káyasañcetaná, vacísañcetaná, and manosañcetaná, and should not be confused with the former triad.[g] Other varieties of sankhárá met with in the Suttas (e.g. áyusankhárá, 'what life depends on', in Majjhima v,3 <M.i,295>), do not raise any particular difficulty. we shall henceforth take it for granted that the essential meaning of sankhára is as defined in §11.

17. Consider now this phrase:

Tisso imá bhikkhave vedaná aniccá sankhatá paticcasamuppanná...

There are, monks, these three feelings, which are impermanent, determined, dependently arisen...

(Vedaná Samy. i,9 <S.iv,214>). We see in the first place that what is sankhata is anicca; this we already know from the discussion in §12. In the second place we see that to be sankhata and to be paticcasamuppanna are the same thing. This at once tells us the purpose of paticcasamuppáda formulations, namely to show, by the indirect method of §12, that all the items mentioned therein are impermanent, since each depends upon the preceding item. The question may now arise, 'What about the first item -- since there is no item preceding it, is it therefore permanent?'. In several Suttas (Dígha ii,1 <D.ii,32>; Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. vii,5 <S.ii,104>; ibid. vii,7 <S.ii,112-5>) the series runs back to

námarúpapaccayá saláyatanam, viññánapaccayá námarúpam, and then forward again with námarúpapaccayá viññánam.

with name-&-matter as condition, six bases; with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter; ...with name-&-matter as condition, consciousness.

This is remarked upon by the Buddha (Dígha ii,1 & Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. vii,5) as follows:

Paccudávattati kho idam viññánam námarúpamhá náparam gacchati; ettávatá jáyetha vá jíyetha vá míyetha vá cavetha vá uppajjetha vá yadidam námarúpapaccayá viññánam, viññánapaccayá námarúpam, námarúpapaccayá saláyatanam,

This consciousness turns back from name-&-matter, it does not go further; thus far may one be born or age or die or fall or arise; that is to say, with name-&-matter as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter; with name-&-matter as condition, six bases;...

and so on. In this formulation it is clear that there is no 'first item with no item preceding it' -- námarúpa depends upon viññána, and viññána depends upon námarúpa, each being determined by the other. If the puthujjana decides upon viññána as 'self', he finds its permanence undermined by the impermanence of námarúpa; and if he decides upon námarúpa as 'self', its permanence is undermined by the impermanence of viññána. (We may note in passing that the traditional interpretation of námarúpa as 'mind-&-matter' -- see Visuddhimagga Ch. XVIII -- is quite mistaken. Rúpa is certainly 'matter' [or perhaps 'substance'], but náma is not 'mind'. Further discussion is out of place here, but see NÁMA. We may, provisionally, translate as 'name-&-matter'.)

18. Since to be sankhata and to be paticcasamuppanna are one and the same thing, we see that each item in the series of §17 is preceded by a sankhára upon which it depends, and that therefore the total collection of items in the series depends upon the total collection of their respective sankhárá. In this sense we might say that the total collection of items is sankhárapaccayá. But since this statement means only that each and every particular item of the series depends upon a particular sankhára, it does not say anything fresh. Sankhárapaccayá, however, can be understood in a different way: instead of 'dependent upon a collection of particular sankhárá', we can take it as meaning 'dependent upon the fact that there are such things as sankhárá'. In the first sense sankhárapaccayá is the equivalent of paticcasamuppanna ('dependently arisen'), and applies to a given series as a collection of particular items; in the second sense sankhárapaccayá is the equivalent of paticcasamuppáda ('dependent arising'), and applies to a given series as the exemplification of a structural principle. In the second sense it is true quite generally of all formulations of paticcasamuppáda, and not merely of this formulation (since any other formulation will consist of some other set of particular items). Paticcasamuppáda is, in fact, a structural principle (formally stated in the first Sutta passage at the head of this Note), and not one or another specific chain of sankhárá. It is thus an over-simplification to regard any one given formulation in particular terms as paticcasamuppáda. Every such formulation exemplifies the principle: none states it. Any paticcasamuppáda series, purely in virtue of its being an exemplification of paticcasamuppáda, depends upon the fact that there are such things as sankhárá; and a fortiori the series of §17 depends upon the fact of the existence of sankhárá: if there were no such things as sankhárá there would be no such thing as paticcasamuppáda at all, and therefore no such thing as this individual formulation of it.

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Footnotes:

[d] While maintaining the necessary reservations (see Preface) about his views, we may observe that Heidegger, in his Sein und Zeit (Halle 1927, p. 374), subordinates the ideas of birth and death to that of being, within the unity of our existential structure. I exist, I am, as born; and, as born, I am as liable at every moment to die. (This book, in English translation [by J. Macquarrie & E. S. Robinson, Being and Time, SCM Press, London 1962], has only lately [1965] become available to me: I find that, where they disagree, Heidegger, as against Sartre, is generally in the right.) [Back to text]

[e] It may seem, upon occasion, that sankhára and dhamma coincide. Thus the pañc'upádánakkhandhá are what attavád'upádána depends on, and they are therefore sankhárá. But also it is with them that attá is identified, and they are thus dhammá. This situation, however, is telescoped; for in attavád'upádána, which is a complex affair, what is primarily (though implicitly) identified as attá is upádána, and the pañc'upádánakkhandhá are involved only in the second place. See PARAMATTHA SACCA §§3&4. (This, of course, is not the only way in which they are sankhárá, though §3 might give that impression. The reciprocal dependence of viññána and námarúpa -- with or without upádána -- is another. And see also what follows.) The word upádána (lit. 'taking up') has a certain ambiguity about it. As well as 'holding' (seizing, grasping), which is eminently a characteristic of fire no less than of passion (the upádána of pañc'upádánakkhandhá is chandarága, 'desire-&-lust'), the word can also mean the fuel of a fire (Majjhima viii,2 <M.i,487>; Avyákata Samy. 9 <S.iv,399-400>). The burning fuel, being held by the 'holding' fire, is itself the fire's 'holding'. The fire is burning, the fuel is burning: two aspects of the same thing. [Back to text]

[f] This Sutta shows that sankhárá -- here cetaná -- determine not only rúpa, vedaná, saññá, and viññána, but also sankhárá: Sankháre sankhárattáya sankhatam abhisankharonti.... Sankhatam abhisankharontí ti kho bhikkhave tasmá Sankhárá ti vuccanti.[6] The question might arise whether these determinations that are determined by determinations do themselves determine (other) things or not. Are there determinations that do not, in fact, determine anything? The answer is that there cannot be. A determination is essentially negative -- 'Omnis determinatio est negatio' said Spinoza --, and a negative, a negation, only exists as a denial of something positive. The positive thing's existence is asserted by the negative in the very act of denying it (just as atheism, which exists as a denial of theism, is evidence that theism exists); and its essence (or nature) is defined by the negative in stating what it is not (if we know what atheism is we shall know at once what theism is). A negative thus determines both the existence and the essence of a positive.

In what way is cetaná negative? A sheet of paper lying on a table is determined as a sheet of paper by its potentialities or possibilities -- i.e. by what it is for. It can be used for writing on, for drawing on, for wrapping up something, for wiping up a mess, for covering another sheet, for burning, and so on. But though it can be used for these things, it is not actually being used for any of them. Thus these potentialities deny the object lying on the table as it actually is (which is why they are potentialities and not actualities); nevertheless if it were not for the fact that these particular potentialities are associated with the object on the table we should not see the object as a 'sheet of paper'. These potentialities, which are not the object, determine it for what it is. We know what a thing is when we know what it is for. Thus these potentialities can also be understood as the significance or purpose of the object, and therefore as its intention(s). (This account is necessarily restricted to the crudely utilitarian level, but will serve to give an indication.) One of these intentions, though of a special kind (present only when there is avijjá), is that the object is for me -- it is mine, etam mama. And all these intentions are nothing more nor less than cetaná. (See also CETANÁ & ATTÁ.) Determinations generally, whether they are cetaná or not, have two essential characteristics: (i) they are bound up with what they determine and (ii) they are not what they determine (or not wholly). And, of course, determinations in their turn require other determinations to determine them; which is why sankhárá are themselves sankhatá. Thus, a sheet of paper is for wiping up a mess, which is for having my room clean, which is for my personal comfort, which is for attending to my concerns, which is for my future comfort. Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 63 et seq. [Back to text]

[g] So far are the expressions cittasankhára and manosankhára from being interchangeable that their respective definitions actually seem to be mutually exclusive. Cittasankhára is saññá ca vedaná ca; manosankhára is manosañcetaná; and the passage from the Saláyatana Samyutta (ix,10) quoted in §5 makes an explicit distinction between vedaná, cetaná, and saññá. But the two expressions are really quite different in kind, and are not to be directly opposed to each other at all. (i) The citta of cittasankhára is not synonymous with the mano of manosankhára: citta, here, means (conscious) experience generally, whereas mano distinguishes thought from word and deed. (ii) The word sankhára has a different sense in the two cases: in the first it means 'determination' in a quite general sense (§11); in the second it is a particular kind of determination, viz intention or volition. (iii) The two compounds are grammatically different: cittasankhára is a dutiya (accusative) tappurisa, cittam + sankháro, 'that which determines mind (citta)'; manosankhára is a tatiya (instrumentive) tappurisa, manasá + sankháro, 'determination (intention or volition) by mind (mano)', i.e. mental action (as opposed to verbal and bodily action) -- cf. Majjhima vi,7 <M.i,389>. Clearly enough (ii) and (iii) will apply mutatis mutandis to the two senses of the expressions káyasankhára and vacísankhára. [Back to text]