Flyleaf:  N.B. All marginal notes by me (Ñánavíra) were made after 8th March 1960, which is the date of Ven. Ñánamoli Thera's death.

MEMORIAM: but we agreed that history and fact should be our sterling coins and measure, and that we should not interpret a word in the sense of later commentators, but get its unadulterated meaning, as it was in the mind of the oldest Theras and the near followers of Gotama himself: See ARIYA.

[We shall have a great many critics, and they will all be only too ready and glad to find fault -- and they will find slips and unsolved problems -- yet you and I know better, and we can feel satisfied, for we really solved a great many cruxes.][1] : The reason for many mistakes is simply failure to read the context of the word. This is inexcusable carelessness.

p. 16 / ATTHAMAKA [Hence the eighth is he who stands on the lowest step of the Path and is called a sotápanna] : NO. He is sotápattiphalasacchikiriyáya patipanno.

p. 22 / ATTA (1) [The Arahant...keeps an open mind on all speculative theories.] : He does nothing of the sort. The ditthisampanna (sotápanna) sees them as based on avijjá and has no more to do with them; for the arahat, who has no avijjá, they do not even present themselves. It is possible (etymologically, that is to say) that this derivation of atta/niratta is justified, that the meaning is 'assumed/rejected' and not 'self/denial of self'; nevertheless this article is unobtrusively misleading. For the 'speculative theories' in question are precisely the existence or non-existence of self (or the soul -- see Notes, Preface (b), ATTÁ & CETANÁ), atthi attá ti or natthi attá ti (S. iv,400).
   Assumption of (the existence of) self is then attam (Sn. 787) whether it means 'assumed' or 'self', and likewise rejection of (the existence of of) self is nirattam, whether it means 'rejected' or 'denial of self'. (And consequently -- etymology apart -- atta means both 'assumed' and 'self' and niratta means both 'rejected' and 'denial of self'.) It is not possible to 'keep an open mind' on the existence or not of self (since the question of 'who is it that keeps an open mind?' incessantly undermines the stability of the neutral position), but it is possible to vacillate between the two extremes (in church on Sundays atthi attá ti; in laboratory on weekdays natthi attá ti) or to ignore the whole question by plunging into distraction or going to sleep. The escape from both attam and nirattam is through anattasaññá.

p. 22 / ATTAN (Meanings. 1.) : For Abhidhánappadípiká[2] definition of attá see PARAMATTÁ. This article cleverly evades the issue by supposing that attá is either a phenomenon of purely historical interest known as a 'soul', or else the reflexive 'self', apparently of purely grammatical interest. All suggestion that there might be some connexion (of purely vital interest -- see Notes, SAKKÁYA) between 'soul' and 'self' is (with the exception of the artless little remark about conscience) discreetly avoided. Cf. Notes, CETANÁ.

[A 'soul' according to general belief was some thing permanent, unchangeable, not affected by sorrow] 'was' u/l: Was?

p. 23 / ATTHA (1) #2 [attho ca dhammo ca] : Dhamma = rule or teaching; attha = its purpose or advantage or benefit.

p. 24 / ATTHA (2) [attha-gámin, in the phrase uday'atthagámin leading to birth and death (of paññá)] : NO -- it is understanding of arising and cessation. What sort of paññá leads to birth and death?

p. 31 / ANABHÁVA [In the supplement to the Dígha (D III.326)] : ?

p. 31 / ANAMATAGGA [Ep. of Samsára 'whose beginning and end are alike unthinkable'] 'end' u/l: Why? Arahatta is the end of samsára. Anamatagga: pubbakoti na paññáyati.[3]

p. 31 / ANÁGÁMIN : Confusion!

p. 63 / ABHIJÁNÁTI [to recognise] u/l: Abhijánáti is to know a thing for oneself, or to recognize a thing for what it is, and is used in particular for the ariyapuggala's right view of things. Parijánáti is used specifically for the absolute knowledge of things occuring at the moment of realization. Naturally enough, there is no exact English equivalent. (To intuit?) See use in Múlapariyáya Sutta (M. 1). See also M. i,251.

p. 76 / ARAHATTA (1) [A III.451 gives the names of more than a score of lay Arahants] : NO, they were sekha.

p. 77 / ARIYA [in accord with the customs and ideals of the Aryan clans, held in esteem by Aryans, generally approved] : NO. It is what is opposed to puthujjana, i.e. those on the four paths and those who have attained the four fruitions. Common/Noble: A commoner/A Noble. This article is a misleading (and perhaps not entirely ingenuous) application of the Historical Method. The tacit assumption is that the entire Teaching of the Buddha can be accounted for by reference to historical facts. It is a method of sterilizing ancient texts before touching them. However -- no scholar no dictionary, so one mustn't complain. If you are personally concerned to know what the Buddha taught, you must not use the scientific (or historical) method, which rests upon the assumption that you, the enquirer, are not personally concerned in the matter. And, in fact, the Buddha's Teaching is strictly paccattam veditabbo viññúhi; and impersonal 'scientific' study is necessarily incapable of a clear formulation.

[-dhamma, the national customs of the Aryans] : Nonsense! A particularly ridiculous translation.

[-sacca, a standard truth, an established fact] : 'Standard' or 'established' only amongst the Noble Ones.

[-sávaka, a disciple of the noble ones] : NO. A Noble Disciple.

#3 (concerning the commentators) [They sometimes therefore erroneously identify the two words and explain Aryans as meaning Arahants. In other ways also they mis-represented the old texts....] : The misrepresentation is not all on one side. The commentators certainly misrepresented the Suttas, but not as imagined by the author of this article. Eastern and Western scholarship -- anurodha and pativirodha.[4]

p. 79 / ALLA [allavattha, with clean clothes (in an ablution; often as a sign of mourning)] : When not in mourning does one wear dirty clothes?

p. 89 / ASURA [pl. asurá, the Titans, a class of mythological beings] 'mythological' u/l: How can one be reborn as a mythological being?

p. 89 / ASEKHA [very often meaning an Arahant] 'very often' c/o: always

p. 92 / AHOSI-KAMMA [an act or thought whose kamma has no longer any potential force] u/l: What is the meaning of 'an act whose kamma...'? An act is kamma; the meaning of kamma is action. But ahosikamma is highly commentarial in any case.

p. 120 / IDDHI [There is no valid evidence that any one of the ten Iddhis in the above list actually took place. A few instances are given, but all are in texts more than a century later than the recorded wonder. And now for nearly two thousand years we have no further instances.] : What should you regard as 'valid evidence'? 'Nearly two thousand years' would seem to take us back to the time of Jesus Christ, would it not? Somebody's Protestant conscience is showing.

p. 121 / INDRIYA [often wrongly interpreted as 'organ'] u/l

p. 134 / UDÁNA : This is all rather pompous; the word hardly means more than an exclamation. Cf. A. iii,76.

p. 149 / UPÁDINNA [laid hold of] : (Matter) that has been laid hold of (by craving), i.e. the body.

p. 167 / OPAKKAMIKA [characterising a sensation of pain: attacking suddenly, spasmodic, acute] : NO. It means 'due to effort or exertion' -- often 'self-inflicted'.

p. 192 / KAMMA (B. in objective relation: universal karma) : It is useless to translate a Pali word by a Sanskrit word. Kamma is action.[5]

p. 204 / KÁMA #2 [equivalent to abrahmacariyá] u/l: NO. Kámesumicchácárin is one who indulges in sexual misconduct (i.e. takes women belonging to others); abrahmacárin is one who engages in any sexual activity at all.

#3 ['one who is above the stream'] c/o: one who goes upstream.

p. 209 / KÁYA [-sankhára, the material aggregate, substratum of body] c/o: káyasankhára is either assásapassásá (with vacísankhára and cittasankhára -- M. i,301-2) OR káyasañcetaná (with vacísankhára and manosankhára -- A. ii,158). See note to CITTASANKHÁRA. Káyasankhára is clearly a different grammatical compound in the two cases (so also vacísankhára). Sankhára in both cases means that which something depends on; but in the first case it is what the body depends on, namely, the in and out breath, and in the second case it is what the pañcakkhandhá depend on, that is to say, intention. In the second case, then, káyasankhára is intention associated with the body, that is to say, bodily action. See Notes, SANKHÁRA. There is no particular connexion between these two meanings.

p. 227 / KESIKA [hairy, of mangoes] : A mango is not hairy (like a gooseberry), though it may be fibrous.

p. 232 / KHANTI [anulomikáya khantiyá samannágata (being of gentle and forbearing dispositon)] : 'being...disposition' c/o: 'persuaded/acquiescing in conformity (scil. with the Dhamma), i.e. not of contrary opinion though not yet seeing for oneself'. See Notes, SAKKÁYA (b).

p. 233 / KHANDHA II.B. [khandhá (pl.) the elements or substrata of sensory existence, sensorial aggregates which condition the appearance of life in any form. Their character according to quality and value of life and body is evanescent, fraught with ills & leading to rebirth.] : They are simply the constituent parts of every experience.

p. 241 / GANDIN : Not (f.) at the second reference (J V.202), but (m.). A case of mistaken identity. The lexicographer has (again) paid no attention to the context.

p. 252 / GUNA (1) [pañca kámaguná, the 5 strands of káma, or 5-fold craving] : NO. At A. iii,411 it is said that the kámaguná are not káma.

p. 255 / GO [-rakkhá ...given as a superior profession] : The origin of the name Gurkha.

p. 255 / GOTRABHÚ [a supplementary Sutta in the Majjhima (Vol. III.256)] : What is a 'supplementary Sutta'?

p. 266 / CITTA (2) : There seems to be no entirely satisfactory English equivalent. Mindedness?

p. 268 -- after -sankilesa add:

-sankhára, saññá and vedaná (M. i,301-2). See KÁYASANKHÁRA. Cittasankhára appears to have this meaning only, whereas manosankhára (A. ii,158) appears to mean only manosañcetaná (or manokamma -- M. i,389). Cittasankhára and manosankhára should not, therefore, be confused. This distinction clearly indicates the difference in meaning between citta and mano. (Though mano, like the English 'mind', is a rather protean word, and sometimes approximates to citta, e.g. dummano (D. ii,148), whence domanassa, and manopavicára at A. i,176. And citta may sometimes approximate to mano:

Citte rakkhite káyakammam pi rakkhitam hoti vacíkammam pi rakkhitam hoti manokammam pi rakkhitam hoti. (A. i,262)

But see S. iv,112:

Rakkhitena káyena rakkhitáya vácáya rakkhitena cittena.

We cannot substitute 'cittasañcetaná' for cittasankhára, since 'cittasañcetaná' simply repeats itself -- it is 'intention associated with volitional consciousness'; if we compare:

Saññá ca vedaná ca ete dhammá cittapatibaddhá, tasmá saññá ca vedaná ca cittasankhároti

with

Phuttho bhikkhave vedeti phuttho ceteti phuttho sañjánáti

(S. iv,68) both at NP #5, we see that, in the definition of cittasankhára, cetaná is conspicuous by its absence. And, conversely, we cannot say that saññá and vedaná are particularly 'bound up with' mano (as they are with citta), since imagining or reflexion does not exhaust the whole of volitional consciousness (as citta does) -- see 'Citte rakkhite...rakkhitena cittena' above. Cittasankhára is 'that which is bound up with volitional consciousness', 'that upon which volitional consciousness depends'. Manosankhára is manosañcetaná which is 'intention associated with thought' or 'mental action'. See Notes, MANO & PTSD MANO. It is thus a mistake to equate the triad káyasankhára vacísankhára cittasankhára with káyasankhára vacísankhára manosankhára, bodily, verbal, and mental intention or action. M. i,54, 301-2, A. ii,158; iii,82 seq., M. i,389.

p. 274 / CHANDA [The commentaries follow the canonical usage of the word without adding any precision to its connotation.] : Quite rightly. Chanda has no more precise connotation than the word 'desire', which is almost exactly its English equivalent.

p. 287 / ÑÁNA [Perception (saññá) is necessary to the forming of ñána, it precedes it] 'it precedes it' u/l: This is structural precedence as much as temporal. See Notes, SAÑÑÁ, and D. i,185.

p. 290 / THITA [-dhamma (adj.) everlasting, eternal] : No -- 'invariant' is the meaning.

p. 294 / TANHÁ [Chain of Causation] : 'Dependent Co-Origination', not 'Chain of Causation'.

[Just as physical thirst arises of itself, and must be assuaged, got rid of, or the body dies; so the mental 'thirst', arising from without, becomes a craving that must be rooted out, quite got rid of, or there can be no Nibbána. The figure is a strong one...] : Curious simile! It seems to suggest that craving must be got rid of by satisfying it (like physical thirst).

[...charged with religious emotion.] : ! 'arising from without'?

p. 309 / THÁVARA [vegetable world] : No! How does one practice mettá towards vegetables?

p. 310 / THERA [-váda, the doctrine of the Theras, the original Buddhist doctrine M I.164] : NO. This was before the Enlightenment!! Meaning is 'declaration of being well grounded in (Álára Káláma's) doctrine'.

p. 313 / DANTA (1) [as one of the taca-pañcaka, or 5 dermatic constituents of the body] 'dermatic' u/l: The skin of one's teeth?

p. 321 / DITTHI [-patta, one who has formed (a right or wrong) view] : NO -- one who has attained through right-view. Opp. to saddhávimutta, one released through faith.

p. 325 / DUKKHA III. [ (c) dukkha as 'feeling of pain' forms one of the three dukkhatá or painful states, viz. d.-dukkhatá (painful sensation caused by bodily pain), sankhára-dukkhatá having its origin in the sankhárá, viparináma-dukkhatá being caused by change] 'd.-dukkhatá, sankhára, & viparináma' u/l: These are the unpleasure of unpleasant feeling, neutral feeling, and pleasant feeling, respectively. See M. i,303.

[adukkham-asukham, indifference (indifferent sens.), the last of which is the ideal state of the emotional habitus to be gained by the Arahant] : This suggests that the arahat does not feel pain.

[one's whole life-experience is caused by one's former kamma] : This is the Nigantha's view.

p. 333 / DVI III. [Stonehenge] : It is something of an achievement to have got Stonehenge into a Pali Dictionary.

p. 336 / DHAMMA [Freq. in formula sabbe dhammá aniccá] u/l: Where?

p. 348 / NAVA (2) [Gotamo navo pabbajjáya 'a novice in the Wanderer's life'] 'Wanderer's' u/l: NO -- homeless (confusion with paribbajati).

p. 348 / NAVUTI [number ninety VvA 345 & in compn. eka- 91 D II.2 (i.e. 92 minus 1)] '92 minus 1' u/l: Or 97 minus 6? Or 104 minus 13?

p. 350 / NÁMA : This article merely reflects the traditional commentarial failure to understand námarúpa. Nowhere in the Suttas is viññána included in náma. Námarúpa is not 'mind and matter' as the Visuddhimagga describes it. Muddle.

[Synonymous with námarúpa is námakáya] : NO -- námakáya is the body or whole collection of náma, i.e. of námarúpa without rúpa (as in arúpabhava). See also marginal notes to D. ii,62-3 (my copy). The four mahábhútá are matter in its simplest modes. See Notes, RÚPA. Rigidity, cohesiveness, metabolism, stress (compressiveness).

p. 360 / NIPPAPAÑCA [-áráma, not fond of delay] : NO. It means loving non-diversification (see M. 18).

p. 362 / NIBBÁNA II. [Nibbána is purely and solely an ethical state] : A specious over-simplification. The English word 'ethical' does not cover right and wrong view, for example. And it turns out (see M. 9) that only the ariyasávaka sees the foundation of ethics, so ethics have a transcendental (lokuttara) origin and justification. Besides, nibbána is, precisely, the end of ethics. All personal existence ('I am') is ethical, since all action is either good or evil. Nibbána is beyond good and evil.

[The first and most important way to reach N. is by means of the eightfold Path] : Is there any other way?

[N. is the untranslatable expression of the Unspeakable] 'untranslatable' u/l: Why? The translation is 'extinction'.

[cp. the simile of extinction of the flame which may be said to pass from a visible state into a state which cannot be defined] 'state...defined' u/l: Nonsense -- the flame is extinguished, and so is the arahat.

p. 364 [árogya paramá lábhá nibbánam paramam sukham... 'N. is a higher bliss than the acquisition of perfect health...] : No. Árogya here is a synonym for nibbána, and does not refer to bodily health. '(Mental) health is the highest gain, extinction is the highest bliss, etc.'

p. 367 / NIMITTA [animitta] : Animitta cetosamádhi is possibly equivalent to saññávedayitanirodha. M. iii,107-8; A. iii,397; iv,78; S. iv,268. (A. iv,78 restricts it to ariyas. A. iii,397 allows it to sotápannas and sakadágámís -- who can still be a prey to rága. S. iv,268 and M. iii,107 put it after nevasaññánásaññá.) This identification is perhaps doubtful -- will not cetosamádhi also have ceased? The usual interpretation, that it is equivalent to phalasamápatti (not, I think, a Sutta expression), may be correct.

p. 369 / NIRATTA (1) [soulless; view of soullessness or unsubstantiality] : NO -- denial of self or soul, i.e. ucchedaditthi, is not the same as anattá.

p. 384 / PACCAYA [I.e. paccaya became synonymous with our 'relation', understood in a causal sense, hetu meaning condition, causal antecedent, and 23 other relations being added as special modes of causality. Later still these 24 were held as reducible to 4] : A wholly misc(h)ievous and misleading development.

[-ákára] : Structure of conditions.

p. 388 / PAÑCA [When Gotama said that his 'religion' would last 500 years he meant that it would last a very long time, practically for ever.] : NO! Now that women were admitted, it would last only 500 years, and not 1000. Cf. 'Na dáni brahmacariyam ciratthitikam bhavissati, pañc'eva dáni vassasatáni saddhammo thassati.' (A. iv,278). See also Vinaya Cúlavagga I,i. The author of this article has been too clever by half. This sort of blunder is what comes of inventing the meaning instead of consulting the texts.

p. 394 / PATICCASAMUPPANNA [evolved by reason of the law of causation] c/o: Dependently (co-)arisen.

p. 394 / PATICCASAMUPPÁDA #1 [a preceding cause] u/l: NO. A co-commitant condition.

#2 [The oldest account is found in the Mahápadána Suttanta of the Dígha Nikáya] : ?

p. 411 / PADHÁNIYA [-anga, a quality to be striven after] : NO! A quality necessary for striving or exertion.

p. 462 / PÍTI [classed under sankhárakkhandha, not vedaná] : Not in the Suttas. See M. iii,84 (vedanánupassaná).

p. 468 / PUBBE [pubbe-nivás' ánussati (-ñána), (knowledge of) remembrance of one's former state of existence, one of the faculties of an Arahant] 'of an Arahant' u/l: Not only and not always.

p. 482 / BALA (1) : As powers they make up the strength of the ariyasávaka, who is thereby better equipped than the puthujjana. The puthujjana, in comparison, is a weakling.

p. 489 / BUDDHA [He is said to be the 25th of the series of former Buddhas (pubbá buddhá) S I.109,140; IV.52] : Not in these texts.

p. 494 / BRAHMA [-vihára] : 1. Amity 2. Compassion 3. Congratulation 4. Equanimity

p. 509 / BHO [a familiar term of address] : Why 'familiar'? It was the normal Brahmanical mode of polite address. Brahmans (bhovádins) were certainly proud, but they did not use bho to express their superiority (for which other words were available -- Ud. 28). Bho is also used to address oneself -- Ud. 15; M. i,168; M. iii,120. Used by a Brahman pupil to address his Brahman teacher -- D. i,88.

p. 520 / MANO & MANA(S) [Both sides are an inseparable unity: the mind fits the world as the eye fits the light, or in other words: mano is the counterpart of dhammá, the subjective dh. Dhamma in this sense is the rationality or lawfulness of the Universe (see dhamma B. 1), Cosmic Order, Natural Law.]

and

[Dhamma as counterpart of mano is rather an abstract (pluralistic) representation of the world, i.e. the phenomena as such with a certain inherent rationality; manas is the receiver of these phenomena in their abstract meaning.] : This is quite good. See Notes, MANO, DHAMMA.

p. 523 / MANDA : An infant is manda, so the meaning is rather 'simple' than 'foolish'. I have heard it said in praise of scientists that they are very simple people; but this is not altogether a matter for congratulation. (Their simplicity does not afford them protection from dogmatism. There comes a point when their open mind shuts, and when it shuts, it shuts tight. It is hard for them to understand that things do not always obey the Laws of Science.) The scientific attitude of methodical doubt, or denial-of-all-attitude, has a certain restricted practical usefulness; but it cannot deal with problems of existence since it does not admit that there are any. Scientists, however, do not often understand this; and their simplicity, natural or artificial, is allowed to take charge. --

'...idh'ekacco satthá mando hoti momúho, so mandattá momúhattá tathá tathá pañham puttho samáno vácávikkhepam ápajjati amarávikkhepam: evam pi me no, tathá pi me no, aññathá pi me no, no ti pi me no, no no ti pi me no ti.' (M. 76: i,520-1).[6]

p. 618 / VIÑÑÁNA [It is difficult to give any one word for v., because there is much difference between the old Buddhist and our modern points of view.] : This is pure mystification.

p. 664 / SANKHÁRA : The traditional interpretation (Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII) that sankhára is kamma, and viññána to vedaná kammavipáka in the next life, is to be entirely ignored. There are no two ways about this. See also Sutta at A. i,173-77. (From this Sutta it can be seen (p. 176, #8 & #9) that vedaná in the paticcasamuppáda formulation includes cetasiká vedaná as well as káyiká (and even káyiká vedaná is not necessarily kammavipákajá -- see S. iv,230. The Commentator (Manorathapúraní), who relies on the traditional interpretation, speaks (as far as I remember) of 'vipákacetaná' -- what else can he do? But he has to turn a blind eye to cetanáham bhikkhave kammam vadámi (A. iii,415), and he has altogether failed to observe that he has fallen into one of the three views denounced in this very Sutta:

Yam kiñcáyam purisapuggalo patisamvedeti sukham vá dukkham vá adukkhamasukham vá sabbam tam pubbekatahetúti (p. 173-74).)

p. 673 / SATTA (4) [It is a collective and concluding (serial) number; its application has been spread from the week of 7 days (or nights), and is based on astronomical conception (Babylon!), this science being regarded as mystic, it invests the number with a peculiar magic nimbus.] : Are we to gather from this that the number 7 was discovered by the Babylonians? If so, insert the following: 'From the week of 7 days its application has so far spread that, in modern times at least, it applies to practically anything with the property of being seven in number.'

p. 712 / SÍLA : Since the expression dasa-síla does not seem to appear in the Suttas at all, it is futile to discuss which set of ten items really are (or are not) the 'ten sílas'. But it is simply perverse to maintain that kammapathas (which lie partly outside the province of síla) are more properly sílas than sikkhápadas (which lie wholly within the province of síla).

p. 737 / footnote 3 [We have material enough to treat philosophical terms (like citta, dhamma, mano, viññána, sankhára) historically] 'to treat...historically' u/l: The surest way of failing to discover what they mean.

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Footnotes:

[1] This section has been omitted from more recent reprintings of the Dictionary. [Back to text]

[2] Abhidhánappadípiká is a Pali dictionary written in the Twelfth Century by Moggallána Thera of Ceylon. [Back to text]

[3] Anamatagga: an earliest point is not manifest. [Back to text]

[4] Submissiveness and belligerence. [Back to text]

[5] A note found among the papers left by the author:

Cf. the Vinaya passage where the bhikkhus Yamalo and Tekula asked the Buddha:

Etarahi bhante bhikkhú nánánámá nánágottá ... te sakáya niruttiyá buddhavacanam dúsenti. Handa mayam buddhavacanam chandaso áropemá ti.

'Nowadays, lord, monks of many names, from many clans ... are corrupting the Buddha's word in its own language. Why should we not formulate the Buddha's word in Sanskrit verses?'

-- which the Buddha forbade and made the rule:

Na bhikkave buddhavacanam chandaso áropetabbam. Yo áropeyya ápatti dukkatassa. Anujánámi bhikkhave sakáya niruttiyá buddhavacanam pariyápunitun ti. (Vin. Cúlavagga V, 33.139)

'The Buddha's word, monks, is not to be formulated in Sanskrit verses. Whoever so formulates it commits an offence of wrongdoing. I enjoin that the Buddha's word primarily be studied in its own language.'

[6] '...here a certain teacher is simple and dull. Because he is simple and dull, when he is asked such and such a question he starts verbal wriggling, eel-wriggling: "I don't say it is like this. And I don't say it is like that. And I don't say it is otherwise. And I don't say it is not so. And I don't say it is not not so."' [Back to text]