Consciousness (viññána) can be thought of as the presence of a phenomenon, which consists of náma and rúpa. Námarúpa and viññána together constitute the phenomenon 'in person' -- i.e. an experience (in German: Erlebnis). The phenomenon is the support (árammana -- see first reference in [c] below) of consciousness, and all consciousness is consciousness of something (viz, of a phenomenon). Just as there cannot be presence without something that is present, so there cannot be something without its being to that extent present -- thus viññána and námarúpa depend on each other (see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §17). 'To be' and 'to be present' are the same thing.[a] But note that 'being' as bhava, involves the existence of the (illusory) subject, and with cessation of the conceit (concept) '(I) am', asmimána, there is cessation of being, bhavanirodha. With the arahat, there is just presence of the phenomenon ('This is present'), instead of the presence (or existence) of an apparent 'subject' to whom there is present an 'object' ('I am, and this is present to [or for] me', i.e. [what appears to be] the subject is present ['I am'], the object is present ['this is'], and the object concerns or 'belongs to' the subject [the object is 'for me' or 'mine'] -- see PHASSA & ATTÁ); and consciousness is then said to be anidassana, 'non-indicative' (i.e. not pointing to the presence of a 'subject'), or niruddha, 'ceased' (see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §22). Viññánanirodha refers indifferently to anidassana viññána (saupádisesa nibbánadhátu, which refers to the living arahat: Itivuttaka II,ii,7 <Iti.38>[12]) and to cessation, at the arahat's death, of all consciousness whatsoever (anupádisesa nibbánadhátu).[b] Viññánanirodha, strictly speaking, is cessation of viññán'upádánakkhandha as bhavanirodha is cessation of pañc'upádánakkhandhá (i.e. sakkáyanirodha), but it is extended to cover the final cessation of viññánakkhandha (and therefore of pañcakkhandhá) at the breaking up of the arahat's body.
Consciousness, it must be noted, is emphatically no more
'subjective' than are the other four
upádánakkhandhá (i.e. than
námarúpa). (This should be clear from what
has gone before; but it is a commonly held view that
consciousness is essentially subjective, and a slight discussion
will be in place.) It is quite wrong to regard
viññána as the subject to whom the
phenomenon (námarúpa), now regarded as
object, is present (in which case we should have to say, with
Sartre, that consciousness as subjectivity is presence to
the object). Viññána is negative as
regards essence (or 'what-ness'): it is not part of the
phenomenon, of what is present, but is simply the presence of the
phenomenon.[c] Consequently, in visual
experience (for example), phenomena are seen,
eye-consciousness is not seen (being negative as regards
essence), yet there is eye-consciousness
(eye-consciousness is present reflexively).[d] In this way consciousness comes to be
associated with the body (saviññánaka
káya), and is frequently identified as the subject, or
at least as subjectivity (e.g. by Husserl [see CETANÁ [b]] and Sartre
[op. cit., p. 27]). (To follow this discussion
reference should be made to PHASSA,
particularly [c], where it is shown
that there is a natural tendency for subjectivity to be
associated with the body. Three distinct pairs of complementaries
are thus seen to be superimposed: eye & forms (or, generally:
six-based body & externals); consciousness & phenomena;
subject & objects. To identify consciousness and the subject
is only too easy. With attainment of arahattá all
trace of the subject-&-objects duality vanishes. Cf. also ATTÁ [c].)
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Footnotes:
[a] A distinction must be made. 'To be' and 'being' are (in English) ambiguous. On the one hand they may refer to the existence of a phenomenon as opposed to what it is that exists (namely, the phenomenon). This is viññána (though it does not follow that viññána should be translated as 'being' or 'existence'). On the other hand they may refer to the existing thing, the phenomenon as existing; in other words, to the entity. But a further distinction must be made. The entity that the Buddha's Teaching is concerned with is not the thing but the person -- but not the person as opposed to the thing, as subject in distinction from object. Personal existence is a synthetic relationship, dependent upon upádána, and consisting of a subject and his objects. Being or existence in this pregnant sense is bhava, at least as it occurs in the paticcasamuppáda context, and the 'entity' in question is sakkáya (q.v.) or pañc'upádánakkhandhá. (It must be noted that the 'existence' of the living arahat is, properly speaking, not bhava but bhavanirodha, since the conceit '(I) am' has ceased. Strictly, there is no arahat to be found. See [b].) Bhava is to be translated as 'being' (or 'existence'). [Back to text]
[b] Strictly, we cannot speak of the 'living arahat' or of the 'arahat's death' -- see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §§10 & 22. The terms saupádisesa and anupádisesa nibbánadhátu, which sometimes give trouble, may be rendered 'extinction-element with/without residue'. Saupádisesa and anupádisesa occur at Majjhima xi,5 <M.ii,257&259>, where they can hardly mean more than 'with/without something (stuff, material) left'. At Majjhima i,10 <M.i,62> the presence of upádisesa is what distinguishes the anágámí from the arahat, which is clearly not the same thing as what distinguishes the two extinction-elements. Upádisesa must therefore be unspecified residue. [Back to text]
[c] See Khandha Samy. vi,2 <S.iii,54>. Viññána is positively differentiated only by what it arises in dependence upon. E.g., that dependent upon eye and visible forms is eye-consciousness, and so with the rest. Cf. Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,259>. That none of the five upádánakkhandhá is to be regarded as 'subjective' can be seen from the following passage:
| So yad eva tattha hoti rúpagatam vedanágatam saññágatam sankháragatam viññánagatam te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gandato sallato aghato ábádhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassati. | Whatever herein there is of matter, of feeling, of perception, of determinations, of consciousness, these things he regards as impermanent, as suffering, as sickness, as a boil, as a dart, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as wasting, as void, as not-self. |
Majjhima vii,4 <M.i,435> (This formula, which is applied in turn to each of the ascending jhána attainments, should be enough to dispel any idea that jhána is a mystical experience, in the sense -- see Preface (m) -- of being intuition of, or union with, some Transcendental Being or Absolute Principle.) [Back to text]
[d] In reflexion, different degrees of consciousness, of
presence, will be apparent. Distinction should be made between
immediate presence and reflexive presence:
Immediate presence: 'a pain is', or 'consciousness of
a pain'.
Reflexive presence: 'there is an existing pain', or 'there is
consciousness of a pain'.
We can say 'there is consciousness', which means 'there is
immediate presence' ('of a pain', of course, being understood or
'in brackets'), and this is reflexive evidence. But we cannot say
'consciousness is', or 'consciousness of consciousness' (i.e.
immediate presence of immediate presence), since presence cannot
be immediately present as a pain can. In French, the verbal
distinction is more marked: être/y avoir ('ceci
est'/'il y a ceci'). In Pali, the distinction is:
ruppati/atthi rúpam; vediyati/atthi vedaná;
sañjánáti/atthi saññá;
abhisankharonti/atthi sankhárá;
vijánáti/atthi viññánam.
(The reflexive reduplication of experience is, of course,
reduplication of all five khandhá, not of
viññána alone.)
[Back to text]