[L. 39]   3 March 1963

Dear Mr. Samaratunga,

Many thanks for your letter, which gives me the opportunity of clarifying certain things about Notes on Dhamma.

I quite see that the sentence referring to the Milindapañha as a misleading book is likely to provoke criticism. But you will find that I have made uncomplimentary remarks not only about the Milinda (see PARAMATTHA SACCA, final paragraphs, NA CA SO, ANICCA [c], and PATICCASAMUPPÁDA [c]) but also about the Patisambhidámagga of the Suttapitaka (see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §§1&2 and PATICCASAMUPPÁDA), about the Vibhanga and Patthána of the Abhidhammapitaka (see CITTA), about the Visuddhimagga (see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §§1&2, CITTA, and PATICCASAMUPPÁDA), about the Abhidhammatthasangaha (see CITTA), and finally about all Pali books en bloc with the exception of the twelve or thirteen of the Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas (see Preface [a]). Of these, the Patisambhidá, the Vibhanga, and the Patthána, which belong to the Tipitaka (whereas the Milinda does not, except in Burma), are regarded with still greater veneration than the Milinda; and the Visuddhimagga, having been written in Ceylon, is very dear to nationalist sentiment (it is part of the cultural heritage of Ceylon). Furthermore, the views that I have set forth are, I think, without exception, contrary to the accepted traditional interpretation of the Dhamma.[1] It is precisely for this reason that I have thought it necessary to put them down in writing, and to indicate as misleading the exegetical books that are responsible for the current misinterpretations of the Suttas. Thus it is part and parcel of my purpose to denounce the Milinda, which in my view is a particularly guilty offender (because it is so popular). (Incidentally, it is not my purpose to demonstrate the unreliability of the Milinda as a whole by inference from one or two isolated instances, but to state categorically and on my own authority that it is in fact a generally misleading book. The same applies to my adverse remarks on other books.)

Perhaps I may have given you the impression that these various notes of mine were not originally intended for publication (on account of excessive difficulty). But this needs some qualification. I certainly wrote these notes with a view to their eventual publication, and in their present form (with the uncomplimentary remarks about the Milinda and all); but not necessarily in my lifetime. I wished to leave these views on record for the benefit of anyone who might later come across them. I was not so much concerned whether anyone would want to publish them after my death, as to leave them in the form in which I wanted them published (if they were to be published at all).

When you first asked me if I was going to have the notes published, I hesitated for two reasons. First, as I told you, I was doubtful whether the average intelligent layman, who cannot devote much time to private thinking, would derive any benefit from them. Secondly, I was well aware that, if published, they might stir up a hornet's nest on account of their outspoken disagreement with traditional ideas, and this might have unpleasant consequences for the author or for the publisher. However, having read them, you told me that you did find them of interest and that you thought that others might too. So the first objection was removed. The second objection is more complex. Let us consider the kinds of people to whom these notes might give offence.

(i) The self-appointed guardians of Sinhala cultural traditions. Since these notes are in English and their author is a non-Sinhala (who cannot be expected to know any better) they can hardly be taken seriously; though the publisher might come in for some abuse.

(ii) The sincere traditionalists, who have spent all their lives studying and teaching the traditional commentarial interpretation. These will be mostly the elderly and learned Mahátheras who, for the most part, do not read English and who, in any case, are unlikely to pay much attention to what is written by a junior bhikkhu.

(iii) Those with vested interests in Buddhism. Writers of textbooks, school-teachers, self-appointed Buddhist leaders, and all those whose position requires them to be authorities on the Dhamma. Their interests will be best served by ignoring the Notes altogether, certainly not by drawing attention to them by criticizing them.

(iv) Professional scholars -- university professors, etc. These are more likely to object to my criticisms of themselves as sterile scholars than to my adverse comments on the Milinda or on other books. If they write serious criticisms of the Notes, there is no difficulty in replying to them (and perhaps even with profit).

(v) Popular writers on Buddhism. These are the people who are likely to write irresponsible and emotionally charged criticisms in the various Buddhist journals. Such articles, however, are ephemeral, and satisfy only those who have no more intelligence than themselves. There is so much of this sort of thing already that a little more will not make much difference; and an intelligent person is quite likely to consider that adverse criticism by such writers is in fact a commendation. It is usually not necessary to reply to such criticisms.

(vi) Finally, it is quite possible that the appearance of the Notes in print will be greeted with complete indifference and absence of all criticism whatsoever.

As far as I am concerned, if my health were good enough to allow me to devote all my time to practice, I should find the business of preparing these Notes for publication and of answering possible criticisms of them an intolerable disturbance; as it is, however, my general condition seems to be deteriorating, and a certain amount of literary activity may actually be welcome to help me pass the time. That it is possible that I may make myself an unpopular figure by having these notes published is not a prospect that worries me in the least. Though, as I said earlier, the notes were primarily intended for posthumous publication, I see two possible advantages in having them published before my death. The first is that an authoritative unmutilated edition can be assured, and the second is that serious objections and criticisms can be answered and possible obscurities can be cleared up.

So much having been said, perhaps you will be in a better position to see how you stand in this matter. I can only agree to your publishing the Notes if you yourself consider that they should be published; that is to say, in spite of the facts that they go against the accepted traditional interpretation of the Dhamma, and that they may therefore possibly provoke adverse criticism.

Of course, if you do still decide to publish, much unnecessary criticism can be avoided by judicious distribution of the book. As far as I gathered, it was your idea to have the book distributed privately (and presumably free of charge) to suitable individuals and to selected libraries (and possibly societies), and not to have it exposed for public sale. My own view is that the book should be as widely dispersed as possible in places where it is likely to be preserved.




[L. 40]   8 March 1963

I am glad to see that we are in complete agreement regarding the manner and purpose of publication of the book. I am particularly glad to know that you do not regard the Dhamma as something for sale -- it is so utterly beyond price that it can only be communicated as a gift. Unfortunately, however, the world (particularly in these days) is so mercenary that anything given free is looked upon with suspicion; and for this reason I feel that we should take particular care to avoid all impression that we are distributing propaganda. A small, well-printed, and attractively presented 'private edition' is what we should aim at, rather than a perhaps larger number of 'booklets for free distribution'.




[L. 41]   9 March 1963

Thank you for your letter asking whether you should prepare an index. I had already considered this matter and had decided that an index was not needed for the following reasons:

(i) The book is sufficiently short for anyone who is interested to learn his way about it fairly quickly. (And the last part, FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE, has really nothing very much in it to be indexed except noughts and crosses.)

(ii) I have provided a considerable amount of cross-references in the text itself, so that a reader interested in one particular subject can without difficulty locate different passages dealing with that subject.

(iii) The third part itself, SHORTER NOTES, is already arranged under subject headings in the Pali alphabetical order, and a glance at the Table of Contents is enough to locate the article that is sought.

(iv) I have something of a feeling that an index would not be entirely in keeping with the character of the book. What I mean is this. Although the book is largely in the form of notes, and might therefore seem to be in the nature of a work of reference, it is actually intended to be read and digested as a single whole, with each separate note simply presenting a different facet of the same central theme. A person using the book as it is intended to be used would come, in the course of time, to regard it as an organic whole, with each part related to every other part, and would thus find an index an irrelevance. The presence of an index, on the other hand, might encourage a casual reader simply to refer to the word or subject of immediate interest to him and to neglect its essential relationship to every other part of the book. In a word, an index might make the book too easy. To find the meaning of any one single word in the book it is necessary to read the whole book.

This is as I see the question; but if you have a strong view that an index would be an advantage, I am open to persuasion.




[L. 42]   22 March 1963

There is a certain matter about which I am in doubt, and which you may be able to clarify. I have quoted various short passages from books that are copyrighted, and I do not know whether it is necessary to obtain permission if they are to be printed. I believe that a certain latitude in this matter is allowed (by the Berne Convention, is it not?), and that reasonably short quotations may be made under certain circumstances without infringing copyright; but I do not know whether the passages I have quoted go beyond this. It is perhaps unlikely that anyone would actually want to prosecute in this particular case (especially if the book is not to be sold), but I do not want to find myself in the position of having taken what I was not entitled to take. Would you be able to make sure that we are in order about this?

Perhaps you have seen the latest BPS publication, 'Knowledge and Conduct' (Wheel 50), by three university professors? In odd moments I have been browsing in Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which is a sustained polemic against objective speculative philosophy, and the three professors could hardly have chosen a more unfortunate time to arrive here in print. It is perhaps a little ironical that these three professors writing of Buddhism, of whom two at least[1] would, I presume, profess to call themselves Buddhists,[a] should compare so unfavourably with the Christian Kierkegaard. But Kierkegaard at least existed as an individual human being (even though his Christianity makes him a distorted figure), whereas these professors seem to be under the impression that such a thing is not really necessary, and this puts them in a slightly ridiculous light as individuals and tends to stultify whatever there might be of value in their thinking and writing.

Prof. Wijesekera starts off by calling witnesses to testify to the Buddha's competence as an ethicist. This detestable practice (which nevertheless is remarkably common) of bringing forward unsolicited testimonials by distinguished personages to the Buddha's good character reveals not only a complete lack of sense of proportion, but also (as I suspect) something of an inferiority complex -- rather as if one found it necessary to prove to the world at large that being a follower of the Buddha is not something to be ashamed of. But if one must do this sort of thing, it is as well not to mix up witnesses for the prosecution with those for the defence. Prof. Wijesekera quotes Albert Schweitzer in praise of the Buddha. But Schweitzer's philosophy is 'Reverence for Life', whereas the Buddha has said that just as even the smallest piece of excrement has a foul smell so even the smallest piece of existence is not to be commended. So if Schweitzer praises the Buddha he is labouring under a misapprehension. Schweitzer has certainly misunderstood the Buddha's Teaching, and possibly his own philosophy as well. (In the Buddha's day people thought twice before presuming to speak his praises, understanding very well that they lacked the qualifications to do so. See the opening to the Cúlahatthipadopama Sutta -- Majjhima 27: i,175-8.[2])

Prof. Wijesekera then quotes Rhys Davids, who speaks of 'the historical perspective of ethical evolution' and declares that 'the only true method of ethical inquiry is surely the historical method'. What does Kierkegaard say?

For study of the ethical, every man is assigned to himself. His own self is as material for this study more than sufficient; aye, this is the only place where he can study it with any assurance of certainty. Even another human being with whom he lives can reveal himself to his observation only through the external; and in so far the interpretation is necessarily affected with ambiguities. But the more complicated the externality in which the ethical inwardness is reflected, the more difficult becomes the problem of observation, until it finally loses its way in something quite different, namely, in the aesthetic. The apprehension of the historical process therefore readily becomes a half poetic contemplative astonishment, rather than a sober ethical perspicuity.... The more simplified the ethical, the more perspicuous does it become. It is therefore not the case, as men deceitfully try to delude themselves into believing, that the ethical is more clearly evident in human history, where millions are involved, than in one's own poor little life. On the contrary, precisely the reverse is true, and it is more clearly apparent in one's own life, precisely because one does not here so easily mistake the meaning of the material and quantitative embodiment. The ethical is the inwardness of the spirit, and hence the smaller the circumstances in which it is apprehended, provided it really is apprehended in its infinitude, the more clearly is it perceived; while whoever needs the world-historical accessories in order, as he thinks, the better to see it, proves thereby precisely that he is ethically immature. (CUP, pp. 127-8)

Rhys Davids, however, is not content even to look for the ethical in history; he seeks to examine history in order to see there the perspective of ethical evolution. Naturally this assumes that a certain pattern of ethical change is historically visible. But history is the record (limited and somewhat arbitrary) of the deeds man has done and the thoughts he has expressed; and the pattern of ethical change recorded by history must therefore be either the pattern (in space and time) of man's actual behaviour or the pattern (in space and time) of his thoughts about how he should behave. What it cannot be is the pattern (in space and time) of how man should have behaved (unless, of course, this is identical either with how he has behaved or with how he has thought he should behave -- which, however, cannot be decided by history). In other words, if history is made the basis for the study of ethics, the emphasis is shifted from the question 'What should I do?' to the question, either 'What does man do?' or 'What does man think he should do?'.

The view that ethics are identical with man's actual behaviour is self-destructive (for if a man cannot help doing what he should do, the word ethics loses its meaning altogether); but it is certainly true (as Prof. Wijesekera himself says) that the majority of scientific and materialistic thinkers hold the view that ethics are relative -- i.e. are concerned with the question 'What does man think he should do?', which receives different answers in different times and places.

And what about Prof. W. himself -- does he remain faithful to the authority he has quoted and follow the historical method, which must lead him to ethical relativity, or does he call to mind that he is an existing human being and a Buddhist to boot, and arrive at the conclusion that ethics are absolute and the same for all beings at all times and in all places? The answer seems to be that he starts out historically ('...it is essential to discuss as briefly as possible the development of the moral consciousness during the pre-Buddhist Upanishads', etc. etc.) and then changes horses in mid-stream; for when he comes to Buddhist ethics he quietly drops the idea of ethical evolution and arrives unhistorically, as a thinly disguised Buddhist, at the quite correct conclusion that the Buddha's ethics are universally valid.

Perhaps it is too much to say that he actually arrives at this conclusion, but at least he gets as far as advocating it as worthy of serious consideration by an 'unbiased student of Buddhism'. Prof. W. does not seem to be quite clear what ethics are or what he himself is (the two problems are intimately related); and to the extent that he professes to be a Buddhist while at the same time regarding Buddhism objectively he becomes for Kierkegaard a figure of comedy:

If...he says that he bases his eternal happiness on his speculation, he contradicts himself and becomes comical, because philosophy in its objectivity is wholly indifferent to his and my and your eternal happiness. (CUP, p. 53)

But things are significant; that is to say, they are imperatives, they call for action (like the bottle in Alice in Wonderland labelled 'Drink Me!'). Heidegger, and Sartre after him, describe the world as a world of tasks to be performed, and say that a man at every moment of his life is engaged in performing tasks (whether he specifically pays attention to them or not). Seen in this light the Four Noble Truths are the ultimate tasks for a man's performance -- Suffering commands 'Know me absolutely!', Arising commands 'Abandon me!', Cessation commands 'Realize me!', and the Path commands 'Develop me!'.

But by transforming things into facts (and the Four Noble Truths, which are descriptions of things, into propositions) I automatically transform myself into logic -- that is to say, I destroy my situation as an existing individual engaged in performing tasks in the world, I cease to be in concreto (in Kierkegaard's terminology) and become sub specie aeterni. (By regarding the Four Noble Truths as propositions, not as instructions, I automatically exempt myself from doing anything about them.) The world (if it can still be called a world) becomes a logician's world -- quite static and totally uninhabited. (It is significant that Wittgenstein, in his celebrated Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which helped to establish modern logical positivism, starts off by declaring: '1. The world is everything that is the case. 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.' Compare, in this connexion, the note in the Preface to Notes where it is said 'Things, not facts, make up my world'.)

Kierkegaard would be more severe on Dr. Jayatilleke than on Professor Wijesekera:

It is not denied that objective thought has validity; but in connection with all thinking where subjectivity must be accentuated, it is a misunderstanding. If a man occupied himself, all his life through, solely with logic, he would nevertheless not become logic; he must therefore himself exist in different categories. Now if he finds that this is not worth thinking about, the choice must be his responsibility. But it will scarcely be pleasant for him to learn, that existence itself mocks everyone who is engaged in becoming purely objective. (CUP, pp. 85-6)

achieve a broad perspective on the history of thought, in the West and in the East, and...adequately assess the long-run significance of Buddhism with its various schools when viewed in such a perspective. (p. 42)

This means that instead of starting from where he is, Prof. Burtt is proposing to become sub specie aeterni and start from everywhere at once, or, since this is the same as becoming so totally objective that he vanishes from himself and becomes identified with speculative philosophy in the abstract, from nowhere at all. This itself is comic enough, since, as Kierkegaard points out, he is in the process of forgetting, in a sort of world-historical absent-mindedness, what it means to be a human being. But he becomes doubly comic when, having performed this comical feat of forgetting that he is an existing individual, he solemnly issues a warning to philosophers against doing any such thing. For Prof. Burtt, Kierkegaard prescribes drastic treatment:

In this connection it will perhaps again appear how necessary it is to take special precautions before entering into discussion with a philosophy of this sort: first to separate the philosopher from the philosophy, and then, as in cases of black magic, witchcraft, and possession by the devil, to use a powerful formula of incantation to get the bewitched philosopher transformed into a particular existing human being, and thus restored back to his true state. (CUP, p. 324)

Incidentally, this business of 'starting from where we are' is really the theme of FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE, which you found puzzling. The point is that abstract or objective or scientific thought abolishes the distinction between 'here' and 'elsewhere', between 'this' and 'other things' -- in short, the negative or the principle of contradiction --, and is consequently unable to start from anywhere in particular, and starts from everywhere (or, what is the same thing, from nowhere). But an existing individual is always somewhere in particular, here and not elsewhere; and what is needed is to show the structure of existence without losing sight of this fact -- nay, understanding that the entire structure of existence rests upon this fact. Since nobody else, so far as I know, has undertaken this task, I have had to do it myself (in order to clarify my own thinking -- to see how I can think existence without ceasing to exist,[b] i.e. to make plain the structure of reflexive thinking). But provided the principle of 'starting from where we are' presents no difficulty and is not forgotten, there is no need at all for anyone to attempt to follow the formal discussion of FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE. And in any case, as I have remarked elsewhere, this is only indirectly connected with the Buddha's Teaching proper. (You are the only person who has seen it, and I was a little curious to know what you would make of it. But perhaps it will not be readily comprehensible to anyone who does not have Kierkegaard's difficulty -- see note (b) --, or some allied problem, on his mind. It has been of the greatest value to me.)

With regard to any of my past writings that you may come across (I do not think there is very much), I would ask you to treat with great reserve anything dated before 1960, about which time certain of my views underwent a modification. If this is forgotten you may be puzzled by inconsistencies between earlier and later writings. If, on the other hand, you should encounter inconsistencies in what I have written since 1960, I should be very glad if you would point them out to me, as I am not aware that my views have undergone any further modification and such inconsistencies are probably attributable to carelessness of expression or hasty thinking.

Next section

Back to Clearing the Path - Contents

Back to Ñánavíra Thera Dhamma Page

Footnotes:

[42.a] The terms 'Buddhism' and 'Buddhist' have for me a slightly displeasing air about them -- they are too much like labels that one sticks on the outside of packages regardless of what the packages happen to contain. I do not, for example, think of myself or yourself or anyone else to whom the Buddha's Teaching is a matter of personal concern as a 'Buddhist'; but I am quite content to allow the census authorities to speak of so many million 'Buddhists' in Ceylon, and to let disinterested ('unbiased') scholars take 'Buddhism' as their field of study. Prof. Malalasekera's Encyclopedia of Buddhism does in fact deal with 'Buddhism'; but whether it has very much connexion with the Buddha's Teaching is another question. [Back to text]

[42.b]

To think existence sub specie aeterni and in abstract terms is essentially to abrogate it, and the merit of the proceeding is like the much trumpeted merit of abrogating the principle of contradiction. It is impossible to conceive existence without movement, and movement cannot be conceived sub specie aeterni. To leave movement out is not precisely a distinguished achievement.... It might therefore seem to be the proper thing to say that there is something that cannot be thought, namely existence. But the difficulty persists, in that existence itself combines thinking and existence, in so far as the thinker exists. (CUP, pp. 273-4) [Back to text]

Editorial notes:

[39.1] without exception: This statement, though true in the main, certainly goes too far. The Notes also discuss some wrong views that have arisen independent of the traditional interpretation. [Back to text]

[42.1] call themselves Buddhists: In fact, all three authors have called themselves Buddhists. [Back to text]

[42.2] Cúlahatthipadopama Sutta: The introductory section includes the following passage:
     'How does Master Vaccháyana conceive the monk Gotama's ability of understanding? He is wise, is he not?'
     'Sir, who am I to know the monk Gotama's ability of understanding? One would surely have to be his equal to know the monk Gotama's ability of understanding.'
     'Master Vaccháyana praises the monk Gotama with high praise indeed.'
     'Sir, who am I to praise the monk Gotama? The monk Gotama is praised by the praised -- as best among gods and men.' (translation by the Ven. Ñánamoli) [Back to text]