1. In Bhikkhuní Samyutta 10 <S.i,135> we find these
verses.
| Máro pápimá: | |
| Kenáyam
pakato satto, kuvam sattassa kárako, Kuvam satto samuppanno, kuvam satto nirujjhatí ti. | 1 2 |
| Vajirá bhikkhuní: | |
| Kin nu Sattoti paccesi, Mára,
ditthigatam nu te, Suddhasankhárapuñjo'yam, nayidha sattúpalabbhati; Yathá hi angasambhárá hoti saddo Ratho iti, Evam khandhesu santesu hoti Satto ti sammuti. Dukkham eva hi sambhoti, dukkham titthati veti ca, Náññatra dukkhá sambhoti, náññam dukkhá nirujjhatí ti. | 3 4 5 6 7 8 |
Let us consider them in some detail.
2. The speculative questions in the first two lines are of the same order as those of the assutavá puthujjana in the Sabbásavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) ending with:
| Etarahi vá paccuppannam addhánam ajjhattam kathamkathí hoti Ahan nu kho'smi, no nu kho'smi, kin nu kho'smi, kathan nu kho'smi, ayan nu kho satto kuti ágato, so kuhimgámí bhavissatí ti. | Or he is a self-questioner about the present period: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This creature -- whence has it come? Whither is it bound?' |
The word satta is found in both, and clearly with the same meaning. The puthujjana is speculating about himself, and satta in this context is himself considered, with a certain detachment, as a creature; it is a creature regarded, in one way or another, as a 'self'; for the puthujjana takes what appears to be his 'self' at face value -- he regards himself as a 'self' (see ATTÁ). It is the puthujjana's concept of a creature. The third line (the first of the reply to Mára) confirms this; for Mára is asked, a little rhetorically perhaps, why he refers to 'the creature', why he has this involvement in (wrong) view. 'The creature' is an involvement in (wrong) view, ditthigata, precisely when the creature is regarded in some way as 'self'; for this is sakkáyaditthi or 'personality-view', the view that one is, in essence, somebody (see SAKKÁYA). And the following passage:
| Kim pana tvam Potthápada attánam paccesí ti. Olárikam kho aham bhante attánam paccemi.... Manomayam kho aham bhante attánam paccemi.... Arúpim kho aham bhante attánam paccemi.... | -- But to what self, Potthápada, do you refer? -- To a coarse self, lord, I refer.... To a made-of-mind self, lord, I refer.... To an immaterial self, lord, I refer.... |
(Dígha i,9 <D.i,185>) allows us to understand Satto ti paccesi, reference to 'the creature', in exactly the same way, namely, the taking of the creature as 'self'.
3. Suddhasankhárapuñjo'yam follows at once; for if the regarding of the creature as 'self' is sakkáyaditthi, then the creature so regarded is sakkáya, which is the pañc'upádánakkhandhá (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>). And the pañc'upádánakkhandhá are sankhárá if they are what something else depends upon. What depends upon them?
| Na kho ávuso Visákha taññeva upádánam te pañc'upádánakkhandhá, na pi aññatra pañcah'upádánakkhandhehi upádánam. Yo kho ávuso Visákha pañcas'upádánakkhandhesu chandarágo tam tattha upádánan ti. | The five holding aggregates, friend Visákha, are not just holding; but neither is there holding apart from the five holding aggregates. That, friend Visákha, in the five holding aggregates which is desire-&-lust, that therein is holding. |
(Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>) Upádána, therefore, depends upon the pañc'upádánakkhandhá (as we may also see from the usual paticcasamuppáda formulation). And the fundamental upádána is attaváda, belief in 'self'. (See A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §§10, 12, & 13. Compare also Khandha Samy. ix,1 <S.iii,105>:
| Rúpam upádáya Asmí ti hoti no anupádáya; vedanam...; saññam...; sankháre...; viññánam upádáya Asmí ti hoti no anupádáya.) | Holding matter there is '(I) am', not not holding; holding feeling...; holding perception...; holding determinations...; holding consciousness there is '(I) am', not not holding. |
4. Nayidha sattúpalabbhati now presents no difficulty. The puthujjana takes his apparent 'self' at face value and identifies it with the creature: the creature, for him, is 'self' -- Satto ti pacceti. He does not see, however, that this identification is dependent upon his holding a belief in 'self', attavád'upádána, and that this, too, is anicca sankhata paticcasamuppanna; for were he to see it, upádána would vanish, and the deception would become clear --
| Evam eva kho Mágandiya ahañ c'eva te dhammam deseyyam, Idan tam árogyam idan tam nibbánan ti, so tvam árogyam jáneyyási nibbánam passeyyási, tassa te saha cakkhuppádá yo pañcas'upádánakkhandhesu chandarágo so pahíyetha; api ca te evam assa, Dígharattam vata bho aham iminá cittena nikato vañcito paladdho; aham hi rúpam yeva upádiyamáno upádiyim, vedanam yeva..., saññam yeva..., sankháre yeva..., viññánam yeva upádiyamáno upádiyim. | Just so, Mágandiya, if I were to set you forth the Teaching, 'This is that good health, this is that extinction', you might know good health, you might see extinction; with the arising of the eye, that in the five holding aggregates which is desire-&-lust would be eliminated for you; moreover it would occur to you, 'For a long time, indeed, have I been cheated and deceived and defrauded by this mind (or heart -- citta): I was holding just matter, holding just feeling, holding just perception, holding just determinations, holding just consciousness'. |
(Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>). With the vanishing of belief in 'self' the identification would cease. The ariyasávaka, on the other hand, sees the creature as pañc'upádánakkhandhá; he sees that upádána is dependent upon these pañc'upádánakkhandhá; and he sees that the puthujjana is a victim of upádána and is making a mistaken identification. He sees that since the creature is pañc'upádánakkhandhá it cannot in any way be identified as 'self'; for if it could, 'self' would be impermanent, determined, dependently arisen; and the ariyasávaka knows direct from his own experience, as the puthujjana does not, that perception of selfhood, of an inherent mastery over things, and perception of impermanence are incompatible. Thus nayidha sattúpalabbhati, 'there is, here, no "creature" to be found', means simply 'there is, in this pile of pure determinations, no creature to be found such as conceived by the puthujjana, as a "self"'. The Alagaddúpamasutta (Majjhima iii,2 <M.i,138>) has
| Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamáne..., | Since both self, monks, and what belongs to self actually and in truth are not to be found... |
and the meaning is no different. The words saccato thetato, 'in truth, actually', mean 'in the (right) view of the ariyasávaka, who sees paticcasamuppáda and its cessation'.[a]
5. The next two lines (5 & 6) contain the simile of the chariot. Just as the word 'chariot' is the name given to an assemblage of parts, so when the khandhá are present common usage speaks of a 'creature'. What is the purpose of this simile? In view of what has been said above the answer is not difficult. The assutavá puthujjana sees clearly enough that a chariot is an assemblage of parts: what he does not see is that the creature is an assemblage of khandhá (suddhasankhárapuñja), and this for the reason that he regards it as 'self'. For the puthujjana the creature exists as a 'self' exists, that is to say, as an extra-temporal monolithic whole ('self' could never be either a thing of parts or part of a thing).[b] The simile shows him his mistake by pointing out that a creature exists as a chariot exists, that is to say, as a temporal complex of parts. When he sees this he no longer regards the creature as 'self', and, with the giving up of sakkáyaditthi, he ceases to be a puthujjana.
6. The final two lines (7 & 8) may be discussed briefly. It is in the nature of the pañc'upádánakkhandhá to press for recognition, in one way or another, as 'self'; but the ariyasávaka, with his perception of impermanence, can no longer heed their persistent solicitation; for a mastery over things (which is what selfhood would claim to be; cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Samy. vi,7 <S.iii,66> [7]) -- a mastery over things that is seen to be undermined by impermanence is at once also seen to be no mastery at all, but a false security, for ever ending in betrayal. And this is dukkha. (See DHAMMA.) Thus, when attavád'upádána has been removed, there supervenes the right view that it is only dukkha that arises and dukkha that ceases.
|
Upáy'upádánábhinivesavinibaddho
khváyam Kaccáyana loko yebhuyyena; tañ
cáyam upáy'upádánam cetaso
adhitthánábhinivesánusayam na upeti na
upádiyati nádhittháti, Attá me ti.
Dukkham eva uppajjamánam uppajjati, dukkham
nirujjhamánam nirujjhatí ti na kankhati na
vicikicchati, aparapaccayá ñánam ev'assa
ettha hoti. Ettávatá kho Kaccáyana
sammáditthi hoti. Nidána/Abhisamaya Samy. ii,5 <S.ii,17> | This world for the most part, Kaccáyana, is bound by engaging, holding, and adherence; and this one [i.e. this individual] does not engage or hold or resolve that engaging or holding, that mental resolving adherence and tendency: 'My self'. 'It is just suffering that arises, suffering that ceases' -- about this he does not hesitate or doubt, his knowledge herein is independent of others. So far, Kaccáyana, is there right view. |
7. The question now arises whether the word satta, which we have been translating as 'creature', can be used to denote an arahat. Once it is clear that, in a right view, nothing is to be found that can be identified as 'self', the application of the word satta becomes a question of usage. Is satta simply pañc'upádánakkhandhá -- in which case it is equivalent to sakkáya --, or can it be applied also to pañcakkhandhá, as the sixth line might seem to suggest? If the latter, then (at least as applied to deities and human beings) it is equivalent to puggala, which is certainly used in the Suttas to refer to an arahat (who is the first of the atthapurisapuggalá),[c] and which can be understood in the obvious sense of one set of pañcakkhandhá as distinct from all other sets -- an arahat is an 'individual' in the sense that one arahat can be distinguished from another. It is not a matter of great importance to settle this question (which is simply a matter of finding Sutta passages -- e.g. Khandha Samy. iii,7 <S.iii,30>; Rádha Samy. 2 <S.iii,190>; Anguttara V,iv,2 <A.iii,35> -- that illustrate and fix the actual usage of the word). It is of infinitely more importance to understand that the puthujjana will misapprehend any word of this nature that is used (attá, 'self'; bhúta, 'being'; pána, 'animal'; sakkáya, 'person, somebody'; purisa, 'man'; manussa, 'human being'; and so on), and that the ariyasávaka will not.
8. It is quite possible that the notion of paramattha
sacca, 'truth in the highest, or ultimate, or absolute,
sense' was in existence before the time of the
Milindapañha; but its use there (Pt. II, Ch. 1)
is so clear and unambiguous that that book is the obvious point
of departure for any discussion about it. The passage quotes the
two lines (5 & 6) containing the simile
of the chariot. They
are used to justify the following argument. The word 'chariot' is
the conventional name given to an assemblage of parts; but if
each part is examined individually it cannot be said of any one
of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find any chariot in the
parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot outside the parts.
Therefore, 'in the highest sense', there exists no
chariot. Similarly, an 'individual' (the word puggala
is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of
parts (parts of the body, as well as khandhá), and,
'in the highest sense', there exists no individual. That
is all.
9. Let us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with the question 'Is this a chariot?', it is obvious that he will always say no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If, finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will undoubtedly assert that there is a chariot, that the chariot exists. According to the argument, the man was speaking in the conventional sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the highest sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot and on the others he was not. If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a vehicle, and a heap of components is not a vehicle -- it is a heap of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked 'Is this a heap of components?', he will say yes.) In other words, a chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an assemblage of parts in a particular functional arrangement, and to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot in working order and says 'In the highest sense there is no chariot; for it is a mere assemblage of parts', all he is saying is 'It is possible to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when this is done there will no longer be a chariot'. The argument, then, does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is applied to an individual (i.e. a set of pañcakkhandhá) it is even less valid; for not only does it not show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the pañcakkhandhá cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility, that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to say of an individual 'In the highest sense there is no individual; for it is a mere asemblage of khandhá' is to be unintelligible.
10. What, now, is the reason for this argument? Why has
this notion of 'truth in the highest sense' been invented? We
find the clue in the Visuddhimagga. This work (Ch. XVIII)
quotes the last four lines (5, 6, 7, & 8) and then
repeats in essence the argument of the Milindapañha, using
the word satta as well as puggala. It goes on,
however, to make clear what was only implicit in the
Milindapañha, namely that the purpose of the argument is
to remove the conceit '(I) am' (asmimána): if
it is seen that 'in the highest sense', paramatthato, no
creature exists, there will be no ground for conceiving that
I exist. This allows us to understand why the argument was
felt to be necessary. The assutavá puthujjana
identifies himself with the individual or the creature, which he
proceeds to regard as 'self'. He learns, however, that the Buddha
has said that 'actually and in truth neither self nor what
belongs to self are to be found' (see the second Sutta passage in
§4). Since he cannot conceive of the
individual except in terms of 'self', he finds that in order to abolish 'self'
he must abolish the individual; and he does it by this device. But the
device, as we have seen, abolishes nothing. It is noteworthy that
the passage in the Milindapañha makes no mention at all of
'self': the identification of 'self' with the individual is so
much taken for granted that once it is established that 'in the
highest sense there is no individual' no further discussion is
thought to be necessary. Not the least of the dangers of the
facile and fallacious notion 'truth in the highest sense' is its
power to lull the unreflecting mind into a false sense of
security. The unwary thinker comes to believe that he understands
what, in fact, he does not understand, and thereby effectively
blocks his own progress.
Back to Clearing the Path - Contents
Back to Ñánavíra Thera Dhamma Page
Footnotes:
[a] The question discussed here, whether saccato thetato a 'self' is to be found, must be kept clearly distinct from another question, discussed in A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §22, viz whether saccato thetato the Tathágata (or an arahat) is to be found
| (ditth'eva dhamme saccato thetato Tathágate anupalabbhamáne... | since here and now the Tathágata actually and in truth is not to be found... |
Avyákata Samy. 2 <S.iv,384>). The reason why the Tathágata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rúpa-, vedaná-, saññá-, sankhára-, and viññána-sankháya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found. [Back to text]
[b] Cf. 'La nature même de notre être répugne à ce qui a des parties et des successions.' --- J. Grenier, Absolu et Choix, P.U.F., Paris 1961, p. 44. ('What has parts and successions is repugnant to the very nature of our being.') [Back to text]
[c] The ditthisampanna (or sotápanna) is the
sattama puggala or 'seventh individual'.
Anguttara VI,v,12 <A.iii,373>
[Back to text]