Sakkáya is pañc'upádánakkhandhá (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>), and may conveniently be translated as 'somebody' or 'person' or, abstractly, 'personality'. See PARAMATTHA SACCA, also for what follows.
An arahat (while alive -- that is, if we can speak of a 'living arahat') continues to be individual in the sense that 'he' is a sequence of states (Theragáthá v. 716)[13] distinguishable from other arahanto (and a fortiori from individuals other than arahanto). Every set of pañcakkhandhá[a] -- not pañc'upádánakkhandhá in the arahat's case -- is unique, and individuality in this sense ceases only with the final cessation of the pañcakkhandhá at the breaking up of the arahat's body. But a living arahat is no longer somebody or a person, since the notion or conceit '(I) am' has already ceased. Individuality must therefore be carefully distinguished from personality,[b] which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom objects are present), selfhood, the mirage 'I am', and so on. The puthujjana is not able to distinguish them -- for him individuality is not conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood. The sotápanna is able to distinguish them -- he sees that personality or 'selfhood' is a deception dependent upon avijjá, a deception dependent upon not seeing the deception, which is not the case with individuality --, though he is not yet free from an aroma of subjectivity, asmimána. The arahat not only distinguishes them but also has entirely got rid of all taint of subjectivity -- 'he' is individual but in no way personal. For lack of suitable expressions (which in any case would puzzle the puthujjana) 'he' is obliged to go on saying 'I' and 'me' and 'mine' (cf. Dígha i,9 <D.i,202>; Devatá Samy. iii,5 <S.i,14>[14]). Individuality where the arahat is concerned still involves the perspective or orientation that things necessarily adopt when they exist, or are present, or are cognized; and for each individual the perspective is different. Loss of upádána is not loss of point of view. See RÚPA and remarks on manasikára in NÁMA.
Sakkáyaditthi (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,300>) is
sometimes explained as the view or belief (often attributed to
a purely verbal misunderstanding)[c]
that in one or other of the khandhá there is
a permanent entity, a 'self'. These rationalized accounts
entirely miss the point, which is the distinction (Khandha
Samy. v,6 <S.iii,47>) between
pañc'upádánakkhandhá (which is
sakkáya) and pañcakkhandhá
(which is sakkáyanirodha). To have ditthi
about sakkáya is not an optional matter (as if one
could regard sakkáya from the outside and form
ditthi about it or not, as one pleased):
sakkáya contains sakkáyaditthi (in a latent
form at least) as a necessary part of its structure.[d] If there is sakkáya there is
sakkáyaditthi, and with the giving up of
sakkáyaditthi there comes to be cessation of
sakkáya. To give up sakkáyaditthi,
sakkáya must be seen (i.e. as
pañc'upádánakkhandhá), and
this means that the puthujjana does not see
pañc'upádánakkhandhá as such
(i.e. he does not recognize them -- see MAMA [a] and cf. Majjhima viii,5
<M.i,511>). A puthujjana (especially one who puts
his trust in the Commentaries) sometimes comes to believe that he
does see
pañc'upádánakkhandhá as such,
thereby blocking his own progress and meeting with frustration:
he cannot see what further task is to be done, and yet remains
a puthujjana.
Back to Clearing the Path - Contents
Back to Ñánavíra Thera Dhamma Page
Footnotes:
[a] Past, future, and present, 'five aggregates': matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, and consciousness. [Back to text]
[b] Taken in conjunction with what follows it, this evidently means 'A puthujjana must take good care to become a sotápanna'. In other words, a purely intellectual distinction (i.e. without direct experience) is not possible. (This statement perhaps requires some modification to allow for the anulomikáya khantiyá samannágato. One who is anulomikáya khantiyá samannágato, though a puthujjana, is not at that time assutavá (through hearing the Dhamma he has some understanding, but he can still lose this and return to his former state). But to be anulomikáya khantiyá samannágato it is by no manner of means enough to have studied the Suttas and to profess oneself a follower of the Buddha. See Anguttara VI,x,3-6 <A.iii,441-3> & CITTA. Anulomikáya khantiyá samannágato may be translated 'endowed with acquiescence in conformity (scil. with the Dhamma)'; such an individual is not of contrary view to the Teaching, but does not actually see it for himself.) [Back to text]
[c] If avijjá were simply a matter of verbal misunderstanding, a maggot would be an arahat. [Back to text]
[d] The reader is referred to the passage (d) in the Preface, quoted from
Blackham. It is not possible to lay too much stress on this
point. See also DHAMMA [c], NIBBÁNA [a], & A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA
§§24 & 25.
[Back to text]