19. But though it is an over-simplification to regard any one series as paticcasamuppáda, it is not entirely wrong. For we find a certain definite set of items (viññána, námarúpa, saláyatana, phassa, and so on) recurring, with little variation (Dígha ii,2 <D.ii,56>,[9] for example, omits saláyatana), in almost every formulation of paticcasamuppáda in particular terms. The reason for this recurrence is that, though paticcasamuppáda is a structural principle, the Buddha's Teaching is concerned with a particular problem, and therefore with a particular application of this principle. The problem is suffering and its cessation; the sphere in which this problem arises is the sphere of experience, of sentient existence or being; and the particular items, viññána, námarúpa, and the rest, are the fundamental categories of this sphere. In consequence of this, the series, námarúpapaccayá viññánam, viññánapaccayá námarúpam, námarúpapaccayá saláyatanam, saláyatanapaccayá phasso, and so forth, is the fundamental exemplification of paticcasamuppáda in the Buddha's Teaching, and the particular items are the basic sankhárá. (See KAMMA for a Sutta passage where the paticcasamuppáda is exemplified on an entirely different level. Failure to understand that paticcasamuppáda is essentially a structural principle with widely different applications leads to confusion.) These particular items, then, being the fundamental categories in terms of which experience is described, are present in all experience; and this basic formulation of paticcasamuppáda tells us that they are all dependent, ultimately, upon viññána (this is obviously so, since without consciousness there is no experience).[h] But since all these items, including viññána, are dependent upon sankhárá, the series as a whole is sankhárapaccayá. (Though this is true in both the senses discussed in §18, the first sense yields us merely a tautology, and it is only the second sense of sankhárapaccayá that interests us.) If, therefore, we wish to express this fact, all we have to say is sankhárapaccayá viññánam. Since sankhárapaccayá (in the sense that interests us) is the equivalent of paticcasamuppáda, sankhárapaccayá viññánam presumably means 'viññána is paticcasamuppáda'. Let us try to expand this phrase.

20. Any given experience involves paticcasamuppáda, but it may do so in a number of different ways at once, each of which cuts across the others. Thus (experience of) the body is inseparable from (experience of) breathing, and (experience of) speaking is inseparable from (experience of) thinking; and both (experience of) breathing and (experience of) thinking are therefore sankhárá. But in all experience, as its fundamental categories and basic sankhárá, there are viññána, námarúpa, and so on. Thus whenever there is breathing (káyasankhára), or thinking (vacísankhára), or, of course, perception and feeling (cittasankhára), there are viññána, námarúpa, and so on, which also are sankhárá. Similarly, all experience is intentional: it is inseparable (except for the arahat) from puññábhisankhára, apuññábhisankhára, and áneñjábhisankhára. But in all experience, once again, there are viññána, námarúpa, and so on, its fundamental categories and basic sankhárá.[i] In other words, any exemplification of paticcasamuppáda in the sphere of experience can be re-stated in the form of the fundamental exemplification of paticcasamuppáda in the sphere of experience, which is, as it must be, that beginning with viññána. Thus viññána and paticcasamupáda are one. This, then, is the meaning of sankhárapaccayá viññánam; this is why 'with determinations as condition there is consciousness'.

21. This discussion may perhaps have made it clear why sankhárá in the usual twelve-factored paticcasamuppáda series can include such a mixed collection of things as intentions of merit, demerit, and imperturbability, in-&-out-breaths, thinking-&-pondering, and perception and feeling. These things, one and all, are things that other things depend on, and as such are sankhárá of one kind or another; and so long as there are sankhárá of any kind at all there is viññána and everything dependent upon viññána, in other words there is paticcasamuppáda. (We may ignore the irrelevant exception of áyusankhára and saññávedayitanirodha, lying outside the sphere of experience. See Majjhima v,3 <M.i,295>.) Conversely, viññána (and therefore paticcasamuppáda) ceases to exist when sankhárá of all kinds have ceased. (It might be asked why káyasankhára and the other two are singled out for special mention as sankhárá. The answer seems to be that it is in order to show progressive cessation of sankhárá in the attainment of saññávedayitanirodha -- see Majjhima v,4 <M.i,301> and Vedaná Samy. ii,1 <S.iv,216> -- or, more simply, to show that so long as there is paticcasamuppáda there is body, speech, or [at least] mind.)

22. It should be borne in mind that paticcasamuppáda anulomam ('with the grain' -- the samudaya sacca) always refers to the puthujjana, and patilomam ('against the grain' -- the nirodha sacca) to the arahat. Avijjápaccayá sankhárá is true of the puthujjana, and avijjánirodhá sankháranirodho is true of the arahat. This might provoke the objection that so long as the arahat is living he breathes, thinks-&-ponders, and perceives and feels; and consequently that cessation of avijjá does not bring about general cessation of sankhárá. It is right to say that with a living arahat there is still consciousness, name-&-matter, six bases, contact, and feeling, but only in a certain sense. Actually and in truth (saccato thetato, which incidentally has nothing to do with paramattha sacca, 'truth in the highest [or absolute] sense', a fallacious notion much used in the traditional exegesis -- see PARAMATTHA SACCA) there is, even in this very life, no arahat to be found (e.g. Avyákata Samy. 2 <S.iv,384> -- see PARAMATTHA SACCA §4 [a]); and though there is certainly consciousness and so on, there is no apparent 'self' for whom there is consciousness.

Yena viññánena Tathágatam paññápayamáno paññápeyya, tam viññánam Tathágatassa pahínam ucchinnamúlam tálávatthukatam anabhávakatam áyatim anuppádadhammam; viññánasankháya vimutto kho mahárája Tathágato... That consciousness by which the Tathágata might be manifested has been eliminated by the Tathágata, cut off at the root, dug up, made non-existent, it is incapable of future arising; the Tathágata, great king, is free from reckoning as consciousness....

(Avyákata Samy. 1 <S.iv,379>). There is no longer any consciousness pointing (with feeling and the rest) to an existing 'self' and with which that 'self' might be identified. And in the Kevaddhasutta (Dígha i,11 <D.i,223>), viññánam anidassanam,[j] which is the arahat's 'non-indicative consciousness', is also viññánassa nirodho. While the arahat yet lives, his consciousness is niruddha, or 'ceased', for the reason that it is ananuruddha-appativiruddha (Majjhima ii,1 <M.i,65>). In the same way, when there is no longer any apparent 'self' to be contacted, contact (phassa) is said to have ceased:

Phusanti phassá upadhim paticca
Nirúpadhim kena phuseyyum phassá.     		Contacts contact dependent on ground --
How should contacts contact a groundless one?

(Udána ii,4 <Ud.12> This matter has already been touched upon in §§10 & 15. (See also VIÑÑÁNA & PHASSA.)

23. Sankhárapaccayá viññánam, as we now see, can be taken to mean that any specific series of sankhára-sankhatadhamma pairs (one or more) of which the first contains viññána is dependent upon the very fact that there are sankhárá at all. Avijjápaccayá sankhárá will then mean that the very fact that there are sankhárá at all is dependent upon avijjá; and with cessation of avijjá -- avijjánirodhá -- all sankhárá whatsoever will cease -- sankháranirodho. This is perhaps most simply stated in the lines from the Vinaya Mahávagga:

Ye dhammá hetuppabhavá
Tesam hetum Tathágato áha    
Tesañ ca yo nirodho
Evamvádí mahásamano. 		    Of things originating with conditions,
The Tathágata has told the condition,
And what their cessation is.
The Great Recluse speaks thus.

Here, Ye dhammá hetuppabhavá are all things whatsoever that depend upon hetú ('conditions' -- synonymous with paccayá). Since each of these things depends upon its respective hetu (as in any paticcasamuppáda formulation), it shares the same fate as its hetu -- it is present when the hetu is present, and absent when the hetu is absent. Thus the hetu of them taken as a whole (all things that are hetuppabhavá) is no different from the hetu of their individual hetú taken as a whole. When there are hetú at all there are hetuppabhavá dhammá, when there are no hetú there are no hetuppabhavá dhammá; and hetú, being nothing else than sankhárá, have avijjá as condition. Tesam hetum ('their condition'), therefore, is avijjá. To see the Dhamma is to see paticcasamuppáda (as noted in §7), and avijjá is therefore non-seeing of paticcasamuppáda. Avijjápaccayá sankhárá will thus mean 'paticcasamuppáda depends upon non-seeing of paticcasamuppáda'. Conversely, seeing of paticcasamuppáda is cessation of avijjá, and when paticcasamuppáda is seen it loses its condition ('non-seeing of paticcasamuppáda') and ceases. And this is cessation of all hetuppabhavá dhammá. Thus tesam yo nirodho is cessation of avijjá.

24. We must now again ask the question of §17: 'What about the first item of the paticcasamuppáda formulation -- since there is no item preceding it, is it therefore permanent?'. The first item is now avijjá, and the Buddha himself answers the question in a Sutta of the Anguttara Nikáya (X,vii,1 <A.v,113>). This answer is to the effect that avijjá depends upon not hearing and not practising the Dhamma. It is not, however, the only way of answering the question, as we may see from the Sammáditthisutta (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>). Here we find that avijjá depends upon ásavá, and ásavá depend upon avijjá. But one of the ásavá is, precisely, avijj'ásava, which seems to indicate that avijjá depends upon avijjá.[k] Let us see if this is so. We know that sankhárá depend upon avijjá -- avijjápaccayá sankhárá. But since something that something else depends upon is a sankhára, it is evident that avijjá is a sankhára. And, as before, sankhárá depend upon avijjá. Thus avijjá depends upon avijjá. Far from being a logical trick, this result reflects a structural feature of the first importance.[l] Before discussing it, however, we must note that this result leads us to expect that any condition upon which avijjá depends will itself involve avijjá implicitly or explicitly. (In terms of §23 the foregoing argument runs thus. Avijjápaccayá sankhárá may be taken as 'with non-seeing of paticcasamuppáda as condition there is paticcasamuppáda'. But this itself is seen only when paticcasamuppáda is seen; for paticcasamuppáda cannot be seen as paticcasamuppanna before paticcasamuppáda is seen. To see avijjá or non-seeing, avijjá or non-seeing must cease. Avijjá therefore comes first; for, being its own condition, it can have no anterior term that does not itself involve avijjá.)

25. The faculty of self-observation or reflexion is inherent in the structure of our experience. Some degree of reflexion is almost never entirely absent in our waking life, and in the practice of mindfulness it is deliberately cultivated. To describe it simply, we may say that one part of our experience is immediately concerned with the world as its object, while at the same time another part of our experience is concerned with the immediate experience as its object. This second part we may call reflexive experience. (Reflexion is discussed in greater detail in Shorter Notes & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.) It will be clear that when there is avijjá there is avijjá in both parts of our experience, the immediate and the reflexive; for though, in reflexion, experience is divided within itself, it is still one single, even if complex, structure. The effect of this may be seen from the Sabbásavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) wherein certain wrong views are spoken of. Three of them are:

Attaná va attánam sañjánámí ti;
Attaná va anattánam sañjánámí ti;
and Anattaná va attánam sañjánámí ti.     		With self I perceive self;
With self I perceive not-self;
With not-self I perceive self.

A man with avijjá, practising reflexion, may identify 'self' with both reflexive and immediate experience, or with reflexive experience alone, or with immediate experience alone. He does not conclude that neither is 'self', and the reason is clear: it is not possible to get outside avijjá by means of reflexion alone; for however much a man may 'step back' from himself to observe himself he cannot help taking avijjá with him. There is just as much avijjá in the self-observer as there is in the self-observed. (See CETANÁ [b].) And this is the very reason why avijjá is so stable in spite of its being sankhatá.[m] Simply by reflexion the puthujjana can never observe avijjá and at the same time recognize it as avijjá; for in reflexion avijjá is the Judge as well as the Accused, and the verdict is always 'Not Guilty'. In order to put an end to avijjá, which is a matter of recognizing avijjá as avijjá, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the puthujjana's reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is patisotagámí (Majjhima iii,6 <M.i,168>), or 'going against the stream'. The Dhamma gives the puthujjana the outside view of avijjá, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the ariyasávaka this view has, as it were, 'taken' like a graft, and is perpetually available). Thus it will be seen that avijjá in reflexive experience (actual or potential) is the condition for avijjá in immediate experience. It is possible, also, to take a second step back and reflect upon reflexion; but there is still avijjá in this self-observation of self-observation, and we have a third layer of avijjá protecting the first two. And there is no reason in theory why we should stop here; but however far we go we shall not get beyond avijjá. The hierarchy of avijjá can also be seen from the Suttas in the following way.

Katamá pan'ávuso avijjá....
     Yam kho ávuso dukkhe aññánam,
                           dukkhasamudaye aññánam,
                           dukkhanirodhe aññánam,
                           dukkhanirodhagáminípatipadáya aññánam,
     ayam vuccat'ávuso avijjá.
                                                           (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>)

  Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkham ariyasaccam...
  Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhasamudayam ariyasaccam...
  Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodham ariyasaccam...
  Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodhagáminípatipadá ariyasaccam.

     Ayam eva ariyo atthangiko maggo,
                seyyathídam sammáditthi...
     Katamá ca bhikkhave sammáditthi...
                Yam kho bhikkhave dukkhe ñánam,
                                             dukkhasamudaye ñánam,
                                             dukkhanirodhe ñánam,
                                             dukkhanirodhagáminípatipadáya ñánam,
                ayam vuccati bhikkhave sammáditthi.
                                                           (Dígha ii,9 <D.ii,305-12>)

But which, friends, is nescience?...
     That which is non-knowledge of suffering,
                         non-knowledge of arising of suffering,
                         non-knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
                         non-knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
     this, friends, is called nescience.

  And which, monks, is the noble truth of suffering...
  And which, monks, is the noble truth of arising of suffering...
  And which, monks, is the noble truth of ceasing of suffering...
  And which, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering?

     Just this noble eight-factored path,
               that is to say: right view...
     And which, monks, is right view?...
                         That which is knowledge of suffering,
                                             knowledge of arising of suffering,
                                             knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
                                             knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
                         this, monks, is called right view.

Avijjá is non-knowledge of the four noble truths. Sammáditthi is knowledge of the four noble truths. But sammáditthi is part of the four noble truths. Thus avijjá is non-knowledge of sammáditthi; that is to say, non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. But since sammáditthi, which is knowledge of the four noble truths, is part of the four noble truths, so avijjá is non-knowledge of knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. And so we can go on indefinitely. But the point to be noted is that each of these successive stages represents an additional layer of (potentially) reflexive avijjá. Non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths is non-knowledge of vijjá, and non-knowledge of vijjá is failure to recognize avijjá as avijjá. Conversely, it is evident that when avijjá is once recognized anywhere in this structure it must vanish everywhere; for knowledge of the four noble truths entails knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths, and vijjá ('science') replaces avijjá ('nescience') throughout.[n]






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Footnotes:

[h] Viññána, being the presence of the phenomenon, of what is present, is negative as regards essence. Other things can be described directly by way of their positive essence as this or that, but not consciousness. Consciousness, however, is necessary before any other thing can be described; for if something is to be described it must first be present in experience (real or imaginary), and its presence is consciousness. Since consciousness can described only as that upon which other things depend, it is the existential determination and nothing else. This will explain also what follows. (Note that the word existential is used here in the simple sense of a thing's existence as opposed to its essence, and not in the pregnant sense of bhava. See VIÑÑÁNA.) [Back to text]

[i] See also the heterogeneous series of items (pariyesaná, lábha, and so on) appearing in the middle of the paticcasamuppáda formulation of Dígha ii,2 <D.ii,58>. [Back to text]

[j] In the line

Viññánam anidassanam anantam sabbatopaham,     Non-indicative consciousness, limitless, wholly non-originating.

the compound sabbatopaham (in Majjhima v,9 <M.i,329>, sabbatopabham) is probably sabbato + apaham (or apabham) from apahoti, a + pahoti (or apabhavati [apabhoti]). (Note that in the Majjhima passage preceding this line there is a Burmese v.l., nápahosi for náhosi.) [Back to text]

[k] Cf. Avijjá kho bhikkhu eko dhammo yassa paháná bhikkhuno avijjá pahíyati vijjá uppajjatí ti.
Saláyatana Samy. viii,7 <S.iv,50> 		Nescience, monk, is the one thing with a monk's elimination of which nescience is eliminated and science arises.
[Back to text]

[l] On the charge of 'circularity' that common sense may like to bring here, see Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 314-6. [Back to text]

[m] The Anguttara Sutta (X,vii,1) referred to in §24 begins thus:

Purimá bhikkhave koti na paññáyati avijjáya, Ito pubbe avijjá náhosi, atha pacchá sambhaví ti. Evañ ce tam bhikkhave vuccati, atha ca pana paññáyati, Idapaccayá avijjá ti. Avijjam p'aham bhikkhave sáháram vadámi, no anáháram. An earliest point of nescience, monks, is not manifest: 'Before this, nescience was not; then afterwards it came into being'. Even if that is said thus, monks, nevertheless it is manifest: 'With this as condition, nescience'. I say, monks, that nescience, too, is with sustenance, not without sustenance.

(In the P.T.S. edition, for c'etam read ce tam and adjust punctuation.) [Back to text]

[n] Compare also the following:

Rúpá [Saddá... Dhammá] loke piyarúpam sátarúpam, etth'esá tanhá uppajjamáná uppajjati ettha nivisamáná nivisati...
Rúpatanhá [Saddatanhá... Dhammatanhá] loke piyarúpam sátarúpam, etth'esá tanhá uppajjamáná uppajjati ettha nivisamáná nivisati. 		Visible forms [Sounds... Images (Ideas)] are dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres...
Craving-for-visible-forms [Craving-for-sounds... Craving-for-images (-ideas)] is dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres.

And the converse:

...etth'esá tanhá pahíyamáná pahíyati ettha nirujjhamáná nirujjhati.
Dígha ii,9 <D.ii,308-11> 		...herein this craving is eliminated, herein it ceases.

Not only is there craving, but there is craving for craving as a condition for craving: indifference to craving destroys it. (Tanhá, be it noted, is not the coarse hankering after what we do not have [which is abhijjhá or covetousness], but the subtle craving for more of what we have. In particular, I am because I crave to be, and with cessation of craving-for-being [bhavatanhá, which is itself dependent on avijjá and, like it, without first beginning -- Anguttara X,vii,2 <A.v,116>], 'I am' ceases. Bhavatanhá, in fact, is the craving for more craving on which craving depends.) [Back to text]