The word dhamma, in its most general sense, is equivalent to 'thing' -- i.e. whatever is distinct from anything else (see ANICCA). More precisely it is what a thing is in itself, as opposed to how it is;[a] it is the essence or nature of a thing -- that is, a thing as a particular essence or nature distinct from all other essences or natures. Thus, if a thing is a solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I now see, its nature is, precisely, that it is solid, that it is pleasant, that it is shady, that it is a tree for lying under, and that it is visible to me. The solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see is a thing, a nature, a dhamma. Furthermore, each item severally -- the solidity, the pleasantness, the shadiness, and so on -- is a thing, a nature, a dhamma, in that each is distinct from the others, even though here they may not be independent of one another. These dhammá, in the immediate experience, are all particular. When, however, the reflexive[b] attitude is adopted (as it is in satisampajañña, the normal state of one practising the Dhamma), the particular nature -- the solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see -- is, as it were, 'put in brackets' (Husserl's expression, though not quite his meaning of it), and we arrive at the nature of the particular nature. Instead of solid, pleasant, shady, tree for lying under, visible to me, and so on, we have matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness, and all the various 'things' that the Suttas speak of. These things are of universal application -- i.e. common to all particular natures (e.g. eye-consciousness is common to all things that have ever been, or are, or will be, visible to me) -- and are the dhammá that make up the Dhamma. The Dhamma is thus the Nature of Things. And since this is what the Buddha teaches, it comes to mean also the Teaching, and dhammá are particular teachings. The word matter -- 'I will bear this matter in mind' -- sometimes expresses the meaning of dhamma (though it will not do as a normal rendering).
|
Sabbe sankhárá aniccá; Sabbe sankhárá dukkhá; Sabbe dhammá anattá. |
All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self. |
Attá, 'self', is fundamentally a notion of
mastery over things (cf. Majjhima iv,5
<M.i,231-2> & Khandha Samy. vi,7
<S.iii,66>[7]). But this
notion is entertained only if it is pleasurable,[c] and it is only pleasurable provided the mastery
is assumed to be permanent; for a mastery -- which is essentially
a kind of absolute timelessness, an unmoved moving of
things -- that is undermined by impermanence is no mastery at
all, but a mockery. Thus the regarding of a thing,
a dhamma, as attá or 'self' can survive for
only so long as the notion gives pleasure, and it only gives
pleasure for so long as that dhamma can be considered as
permanent (for the regarding of a thing as 'self' endows it with
the illusion of a kind of super-stability in time). In itself,
as a dhamma regarded as attá, its
impermanence is not manifest (for it is pleasant to consider it
as permanent); but when it is seen to be dependent upon other
dhammá not considered to be permanent, its
impermanence does then become manifest. To see impermanence in
what is regarded as attá, one must emerge from the
confines of the individual dhamma itself and see that
it depends on what is impermanent. Thus sabbe
sankhárá (not dhammá)
aniccá is said, meaning 'All things that things
(dhammá) depend on are impermanent'. A given
dhamma, as a dhamma regarded as
attá, is, on account of being so regarded,
considered to be pleasant; but when it is seen to be dependent
upon some other dhamma that, not being regarded as
attá, is manifestly unpleasurable (owing to the
invariable false perception of permanence, of super-stability, in
one not free from asmimána), then its own
unpleasurableness becomes manifest. Thus sabbe
sankhárá (not dhammá)
dukkhá is said. When this is seen -- i.e. when
perception of permanence and pleasure is understood to be
false --, the notion 'This dhamma is my
attá' comes to an end, and is replaced by sabbe
dhammá anattá. Note that it is the
sotápanna who, knowing and seeing that his
perception of permanence and pleasure is false, is free from this
notion of 'self', though not from the more subtle conceit
'(I) am' (asmimána);[d] but it is only the arahat who is
entirely free from the (false) perception of permanence and
pleasure, and 'for him' perception of impermanence is no longer
unpleasurable. (See also A NOTE ON
PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §12 & PARAMATTHA SACCA.)
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Footnotes:
[a] How a thing is, is a matter of structure, that is to say, of intentions (cetaná) or determinations (sankhárá). See CETANÁ. These are essentially negative, whereas dhamma is positive. [Back to text]
[b] This word is neither quite right nor quite wrong, but it is as good as any. See CETANÁ, MANO, and ATTÁ, and also FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE (where, in Part I, the possibility of reflexion is shown to be structurally justified). The possibility of reflexion depends upon the fact that all experience (the five khandhá or aggregates) is hierarchically ordered in different levels of generality (or particularity), going to infinity in both directions. This supports another hierarchy, as it were 'at right angles' to the original hierarchy. In immediacy, attention rests on the world. This requires no effort. In reflexion, attention moves back one step from the world in this second hierarchy. It does not, however, move back spontaneously: it requires to be pulled back by an intention that embraces both the ground level and the first step. This pulling back of attention is reflexive intention. A deliberate entering upon reflexion requires a further reflexive intention; for deliberate intention is intention to intend (or volition). Double attention is involved. But though, in immediacy, attention rests at ground level, the entire reflexive hierarchy remains 'potential' (it is there, but not attended to), and immediacy is always under potential reflexive observation (i.e. it is seen but not noticed). Another way of saying this is that the 'potential' reflexive hierarchy -- which we might call pre-reflexive -- is a hierarchy of consciousness (viññána), not of awareness (sampajañña). For awareness, reflexive intention is necessary. [Back to text]
[c] This notion is pleasurable only if it is itself taken as permanent (it is my notion); thus it does not escape sankháradukkha. But unless this notion is brought to an end there is no escape from sankháradukkha. The linchpin is carried by the wheel as it turns; but so long as it carries the linchpin the wheel will turn. (That 'self' is spoken of here as a notion should not mislead the reader into supposing that a purely abstract idea, based upon faulty reasoning, is what is referred to. The puthujjana does not by any means experience his 'self' as an abstraction, and this because it is not rationally that notions of subjectivity are bound up with nescience (avijjá), but affectively. Reason comes in (when it comes in at all) only in the second place, to make what it can of a fait accompli.
| Avijjásamphassajena bhikhave vedayitena phutthassa assutavato puthujjanassa, Asmí ti pi'ssa hoti, Ayam aham asmí ti pi'ssa hoti, Bhavissan ti pi'ssa hoti,... | To the uninstructed commoner, monks, contacted by feeling born of nescience-contact, it occurs '(I) am', it occurs 'It is this that I am', it occurs 'I shall be',... |
Khandha Samy. v,5 <S.iii,46>. And in Dígha ii,2 <D.ii,66-8> it is in relation to feeling that the possible ways of regarding 'self' are discussed:
| Vedaná me attá ti; Na h'eva kho me vedaná attá, appatisamvedano me attá ti; Na h'eva kho me vedaná attá, no pi appatisamvedano me attá, attá me vediyati vedanádhammo hi me attá ti. | My self is feeling; My self is not in fact feeling, my self is devoid of feeling; My self is not in fact feeling, but neither is my self devoid of feeling, my self feels, to feel is the nature of my self. |
[d] Manifest impermanence and unpleasurableness at
a coarse level does not exclude (false) perception of permanence
and pleasure at a fine level (indeed, manifest unpleasurableness
requires false perception of permanence, as remarked above
[this refers, of course, only to sankháradukkha]).
But the coarse notion of 'self' must be removed before the subtle
conceit '(I) am' can go. What is not regarded as 'self' is
more manifestly impermanent and unpleasurable (and, of course,
not-'self') than what is so regarded. Therefore the indirect
approach to dhammá by way of
sankhárá. Avijjá cannot be
pulled out like a nail: it must be unscrewed. See MAMA & SANKHÁRA.
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