p. 6 / 7-10 [Early Buddhism...was an order of monks held together
by certain rules of discipline (Vinaya) and reverence for a human
teacher.] noted
p. 10 / 25-27 [Everything is in flux. Existence...is
discontinuous, discrete and devoid of complexity.] : If it is
discontinuous how can it be in flux?
p. 17 / 28-30 [Denial of Satkáya...is the very
pivot of the Buddhist metaphysics and doctrine of salvation.] :
Where does the Buddha deny sakkáya?
p. 18 / 13 [...denial of the self is the basic tenet of
Buddhism.] : Denial of the self -- natthi attáti --
is ucchedaváda.
p. 19 / 25-26 [For the Upanishads, the self is a reality;
for the Buddha, it is a primordial wrong notion, not real.] : Why
is a wrong notion 'not real'?
p. 45 / 23-25 [If he had answered the questions, yes, or
no, i.e. accepted one of the alternatives propounded, he would
have been guilty of that very dogmatism (ditthi) which he
had so vehemently condemned in others.] : What about
sammáditthi, 'right dogmatism'?
p. 125 / 17-19 [Though innocently stated as a description of
facts, every philosophical system is an evaluation of things or a
prescription to view them in a particular way.] noted
p. 171 / 19-20 [Vijñána contains within itself the
ingredients of the subject-object relation.] noted
p. 208 / 8-11 [Rejection of all thought-categories and views is
the rejection of the competence of Reason to apprehend Reality. The
Real is transcendent to thought, it is non-dual (súnya), free from
the duality of 'is' and 'not is'.] noted
p. 272 / 32-35 [The Vaibhasikas or any school of Buddhism never took Nirvána as nothing, but as an asamskrta dharma, some sort of noumenal unconditioned reality behind the play of phenomena.] : !
Presence du Bouddhisme, France-Asie (Saigon, 1959)
p. 225 / 28-34 'Liminaire' by René de Berval [Yet it
is to be found, in spite of a vitality certainly increased during the
past few decades, that the participation of the Sangha in the social
scene, even politically, and that the 'modernization' of the religious
teaching realized here and there, will in the end be seriously
prejudicial to the meditative -- and therefore the essential -- aspect
of the Buddhist life.] : noted
p. 304 / 28-32 'The Meaning of Orthodoxy in Buddhism' by
Bhikshu Sangharashita [Broadly speaking, the doctrine of
anattá denies that in the absolute sense there
exists in any object, whether transcendental or mundane, an
eternal unchanging principle of individuality or selfhood.
Logically it amounts to a repudiation of the ultimate validity of
the principle of self identity.] last sentence noted: It does not.
p. 539 / 4-13 'Face aux Troix Refuges' by Sramaneri
Dharmarakshitá [One who refuses the mystery refuses to be
freed from it. This experience is more urgent for the
Maháyánist adept than for the Theravádin.
The latter in fact may cling to the realism of all
dharmas and protect himself from seeing the abyss.
Conversely, one who accepts the ultimate process of the
Maháyána, i.e. the
Prajñápáramitá development
through Nágárjuna's school, finds himself
'detached' and successively throws off each one of its holds.
Whatever is nameable, whatever is makeable, is for him
a conventional truth (samvrtti satya). There is nothing,
external or mental, which does not belong to this sphere of
artificial denomination.] : This is how adoption of wrong views
creates unnecessary difficulties.
p. 541 / 10-12 'La Bouddha et l'Intuition de l'Universel'
by Dr. Hubert Benoit [It is interesting to realize that the
Buddha's entire search evolved not in the objective
perspective of a duty to fulfil, but rather with the
subjective idea of an individual happiness to be
found.] : This is no difference.
p. 557 / 25-30 'La Bouddha et l'Avenir du Bouddhism'
by B. R. Ambedkar [On no account can a religion claim to sanctify
or ennoble poverty. The renunciation of wealth by those who possess
it may be a blessed state; never poverty. To declare nobility intrinsic
to poverty is to desire to corrupt religion, for it is to consent to
transform earth into a living hell and, at the same time, to perpetuate
crimes and vices which are generated by misery.] noted and
checked
p. 575 / 26-28 'Le Bouddhisme d'Apres les Textes Pális' by S. Bernard Thierry [However, the priority of the Pali canon is not definitely established, and we are striving to compare impartially other documents, whether they be Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, or other languages.] : S'efforcer est bien dit. ('Striving' is well said.)
L'Historie des Idees Theosophique dans l'Inde, by Paul Oltramare (Paris: Geuthner, 1923)
p. 60 / fn. 4 [Dhammadharo vinayadharo
mátikadharo. The last term is interesting, for it
obviously refers to the third basket.] : No,
mátiká is the bhikkhu-bhikkhuní
pátimokkha.
p. 118 / 8-12 [Among all the causes of weakness that
paralyse man, the most disastrous is desire for sensual pleasure.
Thus sensuality comes under various names, among them, klesa,
ásava, nívarana, and samyojana. It is
the original sin with which evil made its appearance in the
world.] : No, miccháditthi is the original
sin.
p. 160 / fn. 2 [However, dharmá exist momentarily, and consequently they have the three characteristics of all existence: they are born, they are, they cease (utpáda, sthiti, bhanga). Does this mean that they pass through three successive stages? No, for if it were a matter of stages each of them would also have a beginning, a duration, and an end, and so on infinitely. But they are characteristics, not moments. And does not one of these three sthiti (stations) include within itself the idea of duration? In order to get rid of this objection sthiti has been replaced by sthityanyathátva, 'alteration in the station', or else it has been stated that these laksana, these characteristics, do not concern the phenomena themselves, but rather the series.] : This is inside out. Sthityanyathátva (thitassa aññathattam) is canonical (A. and S.), whereas utpáda sthiti bhanga is later.
L'Homme Révolté, by Albert Camus (Paris:
Gallimard, 1951), translated as The Rebel
p. 170 / 25-27 [There is in Hegel, as in all great thought, something
with which to correct Hegel.] : Il y a donc dans toute grande
pensée de quoi corriger Hegel? (Therefore there is in all great
thought something with which to correct Hegel?)
p. 210 / 11-12 [I would curse you if I came too late to the comrades.] :
Prig!
Pour Une Morale de l'Ambiguite, by S. de Beauvoir (Paris:
Gallimard, 1947), translated as The Ethics of Ambiguity by
B. Frechtmann (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948)
p. 16 / 13-22 [Hegel tells us in the last part of the phenomenology
of the mind that moral consciousness may persist only insofar as there
is disagreement between nature and morality. It would disappear if the
law of morality became the law of nature. Thus, by a paradoxical 'shifting',
if moral action is the absolute aim, the absolute aim is also that moral
action be not present.] last sentence noted: Correct.
p. 17 / 17-20 [His passion is not inflicted on him from the outside.
He chooses it. It is its very being and as such no longer implies the idea
of unhappiness.] : 'The being of human reality is suffering.... Human
reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility
of surpassing its unhappy state.' L'Être et le Néant, p.
134. Can't you read, my good woman?
p. 18 / 11-17 [And in fact, Sartre tells us that man makes himself lack
being in order that there is being; the term 'in order to' clearly indicates
intentionality....] : If there is malheur (p. 17) how can there be
intentionality?
p. 22 / 24-26 [Declaring from outside that existence is
unjustified is not to condemn it.] : If not, then why try to
justify it? The point is that the word 'unjustified' would never
be used at all if my existence were not essentially suffering.
But Simone de Beauvoir denies this (on p. 17) in direct
contradiction to Sartre. Sartre is right (though for the wrong
reason), and S. de B., in rejecting this, is wrong for the right
reason. But if she rejects it, this book is pointless.
p. 24 / 14-16 [So in the earthly field a life which does
not try to found itself will be mere contingency.] : It will be
in any case. See p. 34.
p. 34 / 15- 35 / -15 [But also, man wants to be an unveiling of being;
and, if he coincides with this will, he wins because the fact is that with his
presence to the world the world becomes present. But the unveiling
implicates a constant tension to maintain being at a distance. To tear oneself
away from the world and affirm oneself as liberty: to want the unveiling of the
world, to want to be free; these are one and the same movement. Liberty is
the source from which spring all significations and all values. It is the original
condition of all existential justifications. The man who seeks to justify his life
must want before all and absolutely the realization of liberty itself; at the same
time as it requires concrete ends and singular projects it requires itself
universally. It is not a wholly constituted value which would offer itself from the
outside to my abstract adhesion, but it appears (not on the level of facticity but
on the moral plane) as cause of self. It is necessarily called by the values that
it poses as and through it reposes. It cannot found a refusal of itself because
by refusing itself it would refuse the possibility of any foundation. To want to be
moral, to want to be free, is one and the same decision.] : This is no more
than making the best of a bad job. It cannot justify my existence, which is
contingent (p. 22), unless it abolishes the contingency either by making
my existence necessary or by bringing it to an end; and it does neither.
p. 41 / 9-10 [However, there are few virtues that are sadder than
resignation.] : This is simply prejudice, not a philosophical objection. If
I have a taste for resignation there is nothing more to be said -- except that it
becomes my duty to wish it for everybody.
p. 43 / 27- 44/ -9 [However, such a salvation is only possible if, in spite
of obstacles and failures, a man retains the disposition of his future, if the
situation still opens possibilities to him. If his transcendence is cut off from his
aims, if he does not have any more hold of the objects which could give him a
content of value, his spontaneity disperses without founding anything. It is then
forbidden for him to positively justify his existence, and he feels the contingency
of this with a desolate disgust.] : Can one not live authentically in prison?
This arbitrary assumption is necessary in order to justify the doctrine of (political)
action that follows.
p. 44 / 26-29 [Freedom can only be willed as indefinite
movement; it must absolutely refuse the limits which stop its
movement towards itself.] : What exactly does this mean? It seems
that the freedom that I have (or am) is not, after all, the
freedom that I have to will (p. 35 seq.): the former is
absolute and totally unaffected by any constraint, whereas the
latter can be opposed and frustrated. The passage from the one to
the other is carried out by abusing the former as 'abstract' and
praising the latter as 'concrete' (p. 37). But the former freedom
is concrete in that I am always found with a concrete choice, and
willing this consists in recognizing at every moment that I am
totally responsible for whatever I choose, that my choice is
perpetually revocable. But this is not enough for S.
de B., who carries a gun. She interprets her freedom to choose as
freedom to choose freely, i.e. without outside inference,
and then wills this instead. At once it becomes a duty to
fight opposition to our projects and, by extension, to
everybody else's projects as well. This is tub-thumping, not
philosophy.
p. 115 / 14-18 [Even his death is not a bad thing, since
he is a man only as a mortal: he must assume it as the natural
end of his life, like the implicated risk for all living
processes.] : To say that death is simply a risk is just
mauvaise foi.
p. 120 / 29- 121 / -9 [What has to be done is to furnish to the
ignorant slave the possibility to transcend his situation through revolt,
and to dispel his ignorance. We know that the problem of the socialists
in the XIXth century has been precisely to develop class-consciousness
in the proletariat. One sees in the life of Flora Tristan, for example, how
such work was unappreciated. What she wanted for the workers she had
first to want without them.] : Oui, en effet il est peu de vertu plus
triste que le socialisme. (Yes indeed, there are few virtues that are
sadder than socialism.)
p. 121 / 26-27 [for every abstention is complicity] u/l: What are the
dialectics of this assertion? Are not the grapes sour because S. de B. ne
sait demeurer en repos dana une chambre (cannot stay quietly in a
room)?
p. 190 / 2-5 [If we don't love life for ourselves and
through others, it is futile to try to justify it in any way.] :
This seems to imply that one cannot live authentically unless
one is fond of life. S. de Beauvoir seems herself to be just
a little sérieuse. If life is to be justified at
all (which can only be done by abolishing its contingency) the
first step, certainly, is to become authentic; but the second
step is to refuse what is thus revealed, not to accept it.
p. 196 / 12-14 ['Franchise for women is very well in principle;
but if you give franchise to women, they will vote red.'] : This
delicious bit of candour has got Miss Pankhurst de Beauvoir hopping
mad.
p. 221 / 3-11 [It is possible that a man refuses to love
anything on earth. He will test this refusal and he will
demostrate it by committing suicide. If he lives it is because,
whatever he says, there remains in him some attachement to
existence. His life will be shaped according to this attachement.
It will justify itself in so far as it will authentically justify
the world.] : Much too simple! One does not have to be in love
with Life to pause before embracing Death.
p. 223 / bottom : This book has too much rhetoric and too
little philosophy.
Introduction A l'Ontologie, by Louis Lavelle (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1951)
p. 18 / 8-10 [And this affirmation of any object is nothing but an
objectification of the very act of affirming.] : This resembles Sartre's
reflet-reflétant, which is an illegitimate device for avoiding
an infinite regression. Pure cowardice.
p. 99 / fn. [...The choice that is left to him is only a choice between
his own welfare, which is nothing but the appearance of welfare, and the
common good, which is alone able to assure him his own welfare.] :
Noble sentiments.
A Modern Introduction to Logic, by L. Susan Stebbing
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. (1930) 5th ed., 1946)
p. 17 / 22-25 [Mr. I. A. Richards has suggested the
convenient terminology 'The scientific use of language' and 'the
emotive use of language'. When language is used simply in order
to refer to a referend its use is scientific.] : Nonsense!
This suggests that any exact statement is scientific,
i.e. impersonal or objective. A subjective statement can be no
less precise.
p. 121 / 2-5 [As Prof. Whitehead puts it: 'Operations of
thought are like cavalry charges in a battle -- they are strictly
limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be
made at decisive moments.'] : No wonder science is such an
unintelligent pastime!
p. 140 / 1-5 [a Chinese philosopher...is reported to have
said that if there is a dun cow and a bay horse, then there are
three things; for the dun cow is one thing, and the bay horse is
another thing, and the two together are a third. We must inquire
wherein precisely lies the absurdity of this statement.] : Far
from being absurd, this statement is of fundamental ontological
importance. (If there is a bowl and a stem, is the
pipe that comes of taking the two together simply a class?
If so, then the bowl and stem are also classes, since different
parts of them can be distinguished.)
p. 159 / 34-38 : How can you say there certainly
are no unicorns? How can you tell? The whole point is that if
they can can be thought of they might exist -- their
existence would not involve contradiction. In other words to be
thought of is to be possible. But it does not follow that
unicorns exist as possibilities apart from the act of
thinking about them. And it does not follow from the fact that to
be seen is to be certain that horses exist as certainties
apart from the act of seeing them.
p. 160 / 3-5 [As Professor Moore points out, 'unreal' does
not stand for any conception at all. We use the
expression 'are unreal' to express the denial of
existence, not to assert a special mode of
existence.] : Ass! Unreal = Imaginary.
p. 160 / 27-35 [There is no doubt that properties
may be present to mind in a way analogous to, but different in
important respects from, the way in which an individual object
may be present to mind. But properties are not individual
objects, and can be thought of even if there are no objects which
possess these properties.] : A property is a thing. I.e.
it is distinct from other properties. What distinction is there
between a thing and an individual object?
p. 160 / 36-40 : 'This lion exists' = 'this lion is
certain' (not to be confused with 'this is certainly a lion').
'Lions exist' = 'this lion is possible' (not to be confused with
'this is possibly a lion'). (Cf. Russell: '"it is a lion" is
sometimes true.') In other words, 'Lions exist' = 'I am thinking
of a lion'.
p. 161 / 1-2 [...Mr. Russell puts this point by saying
that 'it is of propositional functions that you can assert or
deny existence'...] : Ergo; I am a propositional function.
p. 161 / 8 [he says that 'Lions exist' means '"x is
a lion" is sometimes true'.] : Therefore 'we exist' means
'"x is I" is sometimes true'.
p. 166 / 22-25 [From the common sense point of view we may
say that if it is true that A is red, then A can be
regarded as possessing the quality of being red
independently of any reference to any other object.] : This is
a mistake. A red thing implies not-red things. If red is
present, it is so absolutely and alone: not-red is
absent and plural -- i.e. not-reds.
Red is related to -- i.e. is not -- each
not-red individually; and when all these relations or
negatives are taken together we have singular (or present)
red related to plural (or absent) not-red. This is
simply the Principle of Identity -- A must be given before
not-A can appear. But this does not make A independent of
not-A, it simply states that 'an irreducible multiple relation'
cannot be given (or exist) without a point of view (or
orientation). This is an ontological necessity, hidden from the
eye of the non-existing logician. (A is A = A or not-A
exclusively).
p. 174 / 31-33 [Self-evidence is a relative notion. What we
are able to doubt depends upon our previous knowledge and our
mental capacity.] : Rubbish!
p. 176 / 33-36 [The necessity of logical principles is
nothing but the necessity of constructing systems. The
construction of such systems may be the expression of the
thinking of rational beings. But this would not establish
the necessity.] : This assumes that 'the thinking of rational
beings' is a fortuitous and arbitrary quality of certain beings,
like having blue eyes, or red hair: man + blue eyes = blue-eyed
man; being + thinking = thinking (or rational) being. But
cogito ergo sum: thinking implies being.
p. 176 / 36-39 [We...deny that any significance can be
attributed to the notion of absolutely necessary
principles and absolutely indemonstrable propositions.] :
Wrong. Absolute principles are those that cannot be
conceived without being tacitly assumed in the act of
conception.
p. 183 / 6-7 [There is a class of all possible individuals,
called the 'universe'.] : This assumption is unjustified.
p. 197 / 37-38 [If by 'the world' we mean 'everything that
is the case', then it may be doubted whether the world is
a system.] : The expression 'is the case' applies only to
propositions (we cannot, for example, say 'a lion is the case'),
and 'everything that is the case' means 'all true propositions'.
A world of propositions is truly a logician's world.
p. 232 / 1-2 [A mathematical proposition is independent of
what happens to exist.] : Even of the existing
mathematician?
p. 232 / 35-37 [Owing to its independence of empirical facts
mathematics is a wholly deductive science; hence it employs a method
of exact demonstration.] : If mathematical propositions are, as
you say, independent of what exists, then they are not concerned with
matters of fact -- they do not depend upon inductive verification. And
if this is so, mathematics is neither deductive nor demonstrative. I rather
fancy that the contradictory statements on pages 192 and 193 are due to
a wish to avoid this conclusion. (From p. 415 it is clear that mathematical
propositions -- e.g. 2 + 2 = 4 -- cannot be asserted as true in the
same way as propositions about matters of fact (e.g. 'all crows are black').
The Principle of Deduction does not therefore apply to mathematics: this
seems to be as good as admitted at the top of p. 489, and footnote 1.)
p. 246 / 4-6 [In order that a proposition should be scientific it must
relate to something other than the immediate experience of an individual.]
noted
p. 285 / 29-33 [there seems not the slightest
justification for the view that, for example, the causal law
Sugar dissolves in water must hold in all possible worlds,
in the sense in which 'must' means 'could not be
otherwise'.] : If it did not hold, could we still speak of
sugar and water? It must hold in every world where
there is sugar and water. The question is: will this still
be sugar in all possible worlds?
p. 287 / 2-3 [the property being on this table is
an external relational property of this book.] : It is
not a property of this book. It is a property of the
situation book-on-a-table.
p. 287 / 37-39 [This is equivalent to the assertion that every
property of A is an internal property. There is no reason to suppose
that this assertion is true.] : On the contrary.
p. 401 / 2-8 [Professor Whitehead goes so far as to say that
'the incredible labours of the scientist would be without hope' were it
not for 'the inexpungable belief that every detailed occurrence can be
correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner exemplifying
general principles'. This is perhaps an overstatement. The scientist is
quite ready to leave out of account a number of details which do not fit
into his scheme.] : Whitehead is justified: the scientist does
not merely 'leave out of account' what does not fit his scheme,
he denies its existence. Thus only what fits his scheme is an
occurrence.
p. 401 / 25-26 [But if nature exhibited a type of order of
unimaginable complexity, finite minds could not discover it.] :
What, pray, is a 'finite mind'?
p. 405 / 5-10 [The demand for continuity is closely bound
up with the demand for persistence and identity. There must be no
sudden breaks, no arbitrary discontinuities. The
appearance of such discontinuities presents a problem; the
discovery that, in spite of appearances, something identical or
conserved is felt to be an acceptable solution.] :
Confusion! There cannot be identities without
discontinuity. It is continuity that presents a problem.
p. 443 / 1-3 ['the paradox is now fully established that
the utmost abstractions are the true weapon with which to control
our thought of concrete fact.' -- A. N. Whitehead.] : This simply
boils down to the observation that things endure, which is
only a paradox if one starts from the scientific assumption that
there are no such things as things. The paradox is in the
presupposition. Whitehead mistakenly assumes that the concrete is
instantaneous, and then proclaims a paradox when he discovers it
is not. Concrete things are transcendent, but this does not make
them abstract.
p. 443 / 23-24 ['To be abstract', says Professor
Whitehead, 'is to transcend particular concrete occasions of
actual happenings'.] 'transcend' u/l: No, it is to
ignore them. the full sentence noted: A rock is therefore
abstract if, by its remaining unchanged (as the same
rock), it transcends the successive particular concrete states
of the advance of the tide.
p. 444 / 4-19 [...Thus the man watching the sea-gull may
notice a second sea-gull, and it is possible that he should be
sensibly aware of the same specific shade of whiteness in the
throat of each of them, although he cannot name this shade. The
particular occasion, then, is irrelevant to what is meant by the
'absolute specific shade of white', since it can be within more
than one particular occasion. It is in this sense that the
absolutely specific shade of white is abstract.] :
From this argument it follows that my
cousin Bill is abstract, since he is independent of the
particular occasions in which he is present. Cousin Bill is
transcendent in that he is the invariant of
a number of different situations, but he only becomes
abstract if he is thought of apart from any
situation. But as a concrete existing transcendent he is
always in some situation.
p. 448 / 1-2 [But as the plain man would admit, there are
an infinite number of points in a line.] : Only if adjacent
points are separated by a line. If not, there is no way of
getting beyond one point.
Ethics, by P. H. Nowell-Smith (London: Penguin Books,
1954)
p. 265 / 28-31 [his vicious condition is one to be remedied by
education, medical treatment, psycho-analysis or whatever means the
wit of man can devise; it does not call for moral condemnation.] :
Certainly it does call for moral condemnation.
p. 283 / 4-9 [There would be no incompatibility between an action's
being 'self-determined' and its being predictable or characteristic of the
agent; for 'self-determined' would mean 'determined by his motives
and character', as opposed to 'forced on him by circumstances or other
people'.] : This assumes that 'character' remains unchanged. Choice
is certainly determined by character; but is character predictable?
p. 302 / 30-33 [...two lists, the one of moral traits, the other of non-moral.
Cowardice, avarice, cruelty, selfishness, idleness would go into the first list;
clumsiness, physical weakness, stupidity, and anaemia into the second.] :
Rága and dosa go into the first list, but moha
(stupidity) is put in the second. Why?
p. 305 / 15-18 [Even when it is known that a certain type of conduct, for
example homosexuality, is not amenable to penal sanctions or moral
disapproval, it is difficult to persuade people that it is not morally wrong.] :
Is this simply a matter of language? The majority of people regard queers with
emotional horror.
p. 306 / 13-16 [A wicked character can be improved by moral censure and
punishment; and if we really thought that a man was so bad as to be irremediable
we should, I think, cease to blame him.] : Therefore a bad man is more
to be blamed than a very bad man.
p. 306 / 24-26 [But both he and the wicked man differ from the addict or
compulsive in that the latter will respond neither to threats nor to
encouragement.] : This is simply a matter of degree.
p. 307 / 27-30 [Now since a moral principle is a disposition to choose,
a man cannot be said to have a certain moral principle if he regularly breaks
it, and we discover what a man's moral principles are mainly by seeing how
he in fact conducts himself.] : This is a muddle. A man cannot be said
to 'break' a moral principle.
p. 312 / 26-28 [Moreover the logic of practical language is adapted to the
practice of ordinary men, not to that of mental paralytics.] : Practical
language, then, has its philosophical limitations.
p. 313 / 37- 314 / -2 [But the one thing he cannot do is to try to
alter his conception of the Good Life; for it is ultimately by reference to this
conception that all his choices are made.] : If you define the
conception of the Good Life as the conception by ultimate reference to which
all choices are made, it is a mere tautology to say that one cannot choose to
alter this conception. But it does not follow that there is such a conception:
all that is implied is that upon any occasion of chioce the degree of reflexion
or self-criticism involved is limited. If there really was the conception of the
Good Life we should have to conclude that the limit of the degree of self-criticism
was fixed at a certain point. But this is evidently not so. A limit is only reached
when successive reflexive regressions reveal no fresh attitude. This will tell
us something about the nature of pro and con attitudes, but not about the Good
Life. The ethical limit is reflexion for its own sake.
p. 315 / 12-19 [We may ask what 'we' mean by a certain
word; but we do not all mean the same thing and, if we did, it
would be impossible to understand why it is that, in
a philosophical dispute, which is concerned with the meanings of
words that are the common property of everybody, the points made
by the protagonists on each side seem to their opponents so
absurd, and far-fetched.] 'in a philosophical...everybody' noted:
This excludes from philosophy any concept for which there is no
adequate word.
Principles of Literary Criticism, by I. A. Richards
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1947)
p. 82 / 35 [An unconscious mind is a fairly evident
fiction.] : No, it is just a mistaken idea.
p. 83 / 11 [the mind is the nervous system] u/l:
A perverse statement.
p. 84 / 32-33 [if mental events are recognized as
identical with certain neural events] 'identical' u/l: ? If an
act of 'recognition' is necessary to establish the identity of
two things, it is clear that they are two and not
one -- i.e. that they are not identical.
p. 85 / 7-8 [a mental event, such as a toothache, and
a non-mental event, such as a sunspot] : Why is a toothache
a mental event? A toothache corresponds to
káyaviññána, a sunspot to
cakkhuviññána. Neither corresponds to
manoviññána.
p. 85 / 9-11 [when we have identified the mental event
with a neural change...it loses none of its observable
peculiarities, only certain alleged unstable and ineffable
attributes are removed.] 'it loses...peculiarities' u/l:
A toothache is private, a neural change is public. On this
account pain is an 'ineffable attribute' -- regard a toothache as
a neural change and pain is removed!
p. 85 / 22-26 [the identification of the mind with a part
of the working of the nervous system, need involve, theology
apart, no disturbance of anyone's attitude to the world, his
fellow-men, or to himself.] : All right, if you are going to take
the external observer's point of view -- but then you have no
business to speak of 'conscious' or 'unconscious'.
p. 86 / 2-3 [but in many cases nothing is felt, the mental event
is unconscious] u/l: Here, Conscious Mental Event = Neural Event
accompanied by Consciousness (i.e. feeling, etc.). Unconscious
Mental Event = Neural Event not accompanied by Consciousness
(feeling, etc.). They differ in that one is, and the other is not, accompanied
by consciousness. They are alike in that they are both mental events. The
question would then be, 'Other than by introspection can they be
distinguished?' But is this quite what is intended here? A different
question is assumed in the following pages.
p. 86 / 14-17 [The process in the course of which a mental
event may occur, a process apparently beginning in a stimulus and
ending in an act, is what we have called an impulse.] : On p.
83, 'the mind is a system of impulses'. It follows that 'mental
events' may occur in the course of the processes called
'mind'. There is therefore more to 'mind' than 'mental events'.
All this account is unsound. Matter may be described ultimately
in terms of perception, but perception cannot be ultimately
described in terms of matter. How can blue be described in
terms of neural changes? A more satisfactory hypothesis, at least
for purposes of this chapter, is that mental (= conscious) events
(better, 'occurrences') and neural events have a one to one
correspondence (less misleading than 'are parallel') -- but this
statement needs considerable expansion (a mental event is only
known introspectively, for example, and a neural event
extrospectively).
p. 87 / 14-15 [Stimuli are only received if they serve
some need of the organism] u/l: Does the accidental sight of
e.g. a cow serve a need of mine?
p. 88 / 17-19 [the conscious characters of the mental event,
include evidently both sensations and feelings] after 'sensations':
saññá
p. 89 / 3-4 [Every mental event has, in varying degrees, all
three characteristics.] (the three are cognition, feeling, and conation)
u/l: Even unconscious mental events? These, by definition (p.
86), are without feeling. The cat is out of the bag.
p. 89 / 10-16 [The advantage of substituting the causation, the
character and the consequences of a mental event as its fundamental
aspects in place of its knowing, feeling and willing aspects is that instead
of a trio of incomprehensible ultimates we have a set of aspects which
not only mental events but all events share.] 'incomprehensible ultimates'
u/l: Why not? You must stop somewhere: you cannot describe
everything in terms of something else; for if you do, you are simply
playing with words. Finally you must say, 'By "X" I mean
that'.
p. 90 / 9-13 [To say that the mental (neural) event so caused is aware
of the black marks is to say that it is caused by them, and here 'aware of' =
'caused by'. The two statements are merely alternative formulations.] :
All right, but there is no need to identify mind and matter.
p. 96 / 13-16 [Instructed by experience man and animal alike place
themselves in circumstances which will arouse desire and so through
satisfaction lead to pleasure.] : vicious circle of tanhá
p. 148 / 31-35 [If we say that we see a picture we may
mean either that we see the pigment-covered surface, or that we
see the image on the retina cast by this surface...] 'or
that...surface' u/l: How do we see this? With the mind's eye?
The Discourse on the Snake Simile, translated by Nyanaponika
Thera (Kandy: BPS, 1962)
p. 38 / n. 49 [When they
(dhammánusárí and
saddhánusárí) actually reach the Path
of Stream-entry (sotápattimagga) they are called
'Mature in Dhamma' and 'Mature in Faith'.] noted: They have
reached it. See M. 70.
p. 39 / n. 50 [They (those who have simply faith in me)
are said to be of assured destiny (niyatagatika), i.e., of
the final attainment of...Nibbána. The Elder Monks
of old say that such Bhikkhus are Lesser Stream-enterers
(cúla- or bala-sotápanna; Vis.M.
703).] noted: No! If these were so, the Buddha would have
said so in this Sutta, as he has of the D and S.
The Personality of Man, by G. N. M. Tyrrell (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1954)
p. 37 [MYSTICISM: The highest level of human
personality.] noted: Rubbish!
p. 205 / 13-16 [One of the chief grounds of objection to survival
is the view that all conscious and mental processes are exactly correlated
with nervous processes.] noted: This is why emphasis is put on
interactionalism (p. 157). There is exact correlation, but it is
two-way.
p. 253 / 9-11 [They are not 'white elephants' -- scandalous interlopers
into law and order which it is superstition even to contemplate.] :
A white elephant is a costly and useless possession, not a scandalous
interloper.
p. 259 / 34-35 ['That great philosopher Bacon', writes
Professor Macneile Dixon, 'could not to the last believe that the
earth revolved round the sun.'] : If he was standing on the earth
he was right in his opinion. The earth goes round the sun if you
stand on the sun.
The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), by
Bhadantácariya Buddhaghosa, translated by
Ñánamoli Thera (Colombo: A. Semage, 1956)
Ñánavíra
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p. 126 / 17-20 [Breton's thinking, besides, presents the curious
spectacle of a western thinking where the principle of analogy is constantly
favoured to the detriment of the principles of identity and contradiction.] :
But read Dirac's Quantum Mechanics.
p. 12 / 24-27 [Or they denied life, considering it like
a veil of illusion under which is hidden the truth of
Nirvána.] : Maháyána.
p. 10 / 15-16 [For being to be said of everything in the
same way it must not say anything about any thing.] : Precisely,
and therefore l'être ne se peut pas se dire de toute chose de
la même manière (being cannot be said of every
thing in the same way). For example: any part of a given object, and that
object as a whole, both are; but they have a different order of being.
The object as a whole is itself a part of a more general object.
x / 29-33 [Neither Bradley, nor Bosanquet, nor any of this
school of Idealist logicians, has ever succeeded in making clear
what exactly is meant by the principle of identity-in-difference
upon which the metaphysical logic of the Idealists is based.] :
Invariance under transformation? This cannot be made clear
to a mathematical logician, since he does not know what it is to
exist.
p. 131 / 5-11 [Nevertheless, although a man cannot see or hear
or in any way 'witness' his own seeing or hearing, he can observe his
own listening; for 'observe' here means 'attend to'. ...This sort of observing
is not analogous to seeing and is not infallible, and it therefore gives no
support to the searchlight theory of introspection.] 'not infallible' u/l: How
can you tell?
p. 21 / 26 [...things outside the mind...] : But what is
'the mind'? The proper distinction is not 'inside/outside the
mind', or even 'mental/material'; it is 'imaginary/real' or
'absent/present'.
p. 28 / n. 19 ['The Universe is the Self', lit.:
'This (is) the world, this (is) the self' (so loko so
attá). That, in fact, an identification of the two
terms is intended here, will be shown in the following comments.
The best explanation of the passage is furnished in the
Brahmajála Sutta (D. 1) where a similar phraseology
is used: 'There are, monks, some ascetics and brahmans who are
eternalists and who proclaim self and world to be
eternal'...subsequently the theorist is introduced as stating his
view in similar terms: 'Eternal are self and the world... they
exist as eternally the same'.... The last term appears likewise
in our text.... From this we may safely conclude that it is the
identity, or unity, of the Self (or soul; mahátman,
paramátman) with the universe (or the Universal
Spirit, Brahman) which is conveyed by our text.] 'From this we
may...by our text.' noted: No! Self and the world are
complementary -- attá and
attaníya.
p. 13 / 13-16 [Possibly intelligence and morality have
reached higher standards for limited times in special places; the
first, perhaps, in ancient Greece; the second, it might be
suggested, in the Britain of to-day.] 'the second...today.'
noted: Indeed?
This book provides an explanation of the Buddha's Teaching that
satisfies the immature thinker, who, thinking that he understands
what he does not understand, remains a puthujjana. Unless
one first understands that, in spite of the Visuddhimagga, in
spite of the Commentaries, in spite of all that is not Sutta, one
does not understand the Buddha's Teaching, no progress towards
understanding the Buddha's Teaching is possible.
Anaññáte aññátamání
sunanto pi saddhammam abhabbo niyámam okkamitum
kusalesu dhammesu sammattam. (Anguttara Nikáya V,152:
iii,175) Cf. also ibid. p. 107, §§ 4&5.
7 September 1960