§14. -- What the Venerable Sáriputta said just now we comprehend thus: Not, friend Kotthita, 'Name-&-matter is made by oneself'. Not, friend Kotthita, 'Name-&-matter is made by another'. Not, friend Kotthita, 'Name-&-matter is made both by oneself and by another'. Not, friend Kotthita, 'Name-&-matter is made neither by oneself nor by another but arises by chance'; but with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter.

But also what the Venerable Sáriputta said just now we comprehend thus: Not, friend Kotthita, 'Consciousness is made by oneself'. Not, friend Kotthita, 'Consciousness is made by another'. Not, friend Kotthita, 'Consciousness is made both by oneself and by another'. Not, friend Kotthita, 'Consciousness is made neither by oneself nor by another but arises by chance'; but with name-&-matter as condition, consciousness.

How, friend Sáriputta, should the meaning of these sayings be seen?

-- Then, friend, I shall give you a simile; for through a simile some intelligent men comprehend the meaning of a saying. Suppose, friend, there were two bundles of reeds standing leaning against each other; just so, friend, with name-&-matter as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter; with name-&-matter as condition, six bases... thus is the arising of this whole mass of unpleasure (suffering).
Nidána Samy. 67 (ii, 114)

§15. What, monks, one intends and what one projects and what one tends to, that is the support for the standing of consciousness; when there is increase of consciousness supported thereby, there is descent of name-&-matter; with name-&-matter as condition, six bases... this whole mass of unpleasure (suffering).
Nidána Samy. 39 (ii, 66)

§16. What, monks, one intends and what one projects and what one tends to, that is the support for the standing of consciousness; when there is increase of consciousness supported thereby, there is inclination; when there is inclination there is coming and going; when there is coming and going there is falling away and arising; when there is falling away and arising, further birth, ageing-&-death... this whole mass of unpleasure (suffering).
Nidána Samy, 40 (ii, 67) [26]

§17. By means of matter, monks, consciousness will stand; supported by matter, established in matter, pursuing delight, it will come to increase, growth, and fullness. Supported by feeling... Supported by perception... Supported by determinations, established in determinations, pursuing delight, it will come to increase, growth, and fullness.

That anyone should (truly) say 'Apart from matter, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from determinations, I shall show the coming or the going or the falling away or the arising or the increase or the growth or the fullness of consciousness' -- that is not possible.[27]
Khandha Samy. 53 (iii, 53)

§18. Action, monks, I say is intention; intending one does action by body, by speech, by mind.[28]
A. VI,59 (iii, 415)

§19. And which, monks, is matter? ...And which, monks, is feeling? ...And which, monks, is perception? There are, monks, these six bodies of perception: perception of visible forms, perception of sounds, perception of smells, perception of tastes, perception of tangibles, perception of images/ideas. This, monks, is called perception. And which, monks, are determinations? ...And which, monks, is consciousness?
Khandha Samy. 56 (iii, 59-61)

§20. And what, monks, do you say is matter?... And what, monks, do you say is feeling?... And what, monks, do you say is perception?... And what, monks, do you say are determinations? 'They determine the determined': that, monks, is why they are called 'determinations'. And what is the determined that they determine? Matter as matter is the determined that they determine, feeling as feeling is the determined that they determine, perception as perception is the determined that they determine, determinations as determinations are the determined that they determine, consciousness as consciousness is the determined that they determine. 'They determine the determined': that indeed, monks, is why they are called 'determinations'. And what, monks, do you say is consciousness?...[29]
Khandha Samy. 79 (iii, 87)

§21. Matter, monks, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, determinations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent; matter, monks, is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, determinations are not-self, consciousness is not-self; all determinations are impermanent, all things are not-self. (dhammá: ideas (of things) --> (ideas of) things)
M. 44 (i, 301)

§22. That, friend, which is feeling, that which is perception, that which is consciousness, -- these things are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to show the distinction between these things having separated them one from another. For what, friend, one feels that one perceives, what one perceives that one cognizes, -- that is why these things are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to show the distinction between these things having separated them one from another.
M. 43 (i, 293)

§23. A stupid/intelligent man, monks, constrained by nescience and attached by craving, has thus acquired this body. So there is just this body and name-&-matter externally: in that way there is a dyad. Dependent upon this dyad, contact -- just six bases, contacted by which, or by one of which, the stupid/intelligent man experiences pleasure and unpleasure.[30]
Nidána Samy. 19 (ii, 24)

§24. 'Not by going, monks, do I say that the end of the world is to be known or seen or reached; but neither, monks, do I say that without reaching the end of the world there is a making an end of suffering.' The expanded meaning, friends, of this brief indication and outline of the Auspicious One's, whose expanded meaning he did not explain, I comprehend thus.

That by which, friend, in the world, one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world, that, in the Noble discipline, is called the world. And by what, friends, in the world, is one a perceiver and conceiver of the world? By the eye (ear, nose, tongue, body, mind), friends, in the world, is one a perceiver and conceiver of the world. That by which, friends, one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world, that, in the Noble discipline, is called the world.[31]
Saláyatana Samy. 116 (iv, 95)

§25. 'With entire fading out and cessation, friend, of the six contact-bases, there is something else' -- saying thus, one diversifies non-diversification. 'With entire fading out and cessation, friend, of the six contact-bases, there is not something else ... there both is and is not something else ... there neither is nor is not something else' -- saying thus, one diversifies non-diversification. So long, friend, as the six contact-bases continue, so long diversification continues; so long as diversification continues, so long the six contact-bases continue. With entire fading out and cessation of the six contact-bases, ceasing and subsidence of diversification.[32]
A. IV,174 (ii, 161-2)

§26. Dependent upon eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three is contact; with contact as condition, feeling... this whole mass of unpleasure (suffering). This is the arising of the world. Dependent upon ear and sounds... Dependent upon nose and smells.... Dependent upon tongue and tastes... Dependent upon mind and images/ideas... the arising of the world.[33]
Saláyatana Samy. 107 (iv, 87)

§27. There are, friend, these five faculties with various provinces and various pastures, and they do not enjoy (éprouver) one another's pasture and province; that is to say, eye-faculty, ear-faculty, nose-faculty, tongue-faculty, body-faculty. These five faculties with various provinces and pastures, that do not enjoy one another's pasture and province, mind is the association, mind enjoys their pasture and province.[34]
M. 43 (i, 295)

§28. What is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering is not-self.
Saláyatana Samy. 4 (iv, 3)

§29. All determinations are impermanent. All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering). All things are not-self.[35]
Dhammapada xx,5-7 (Dh. 277-9)

§30. There are, monks, these three determined-characteristics of what is determined, Which are the three? Arising (appearance) is manifest; disappearance is manifest; change while standing is manifest. These, monks, are the three determined-characteristics of what is determined.

There are, monks, these three undetermined-characteristics of what is undetermined, Which are the three? Arising (appearance) is not manifest; disappearance is not manifest; change while standing is not manifest. These, monks, are the three undetermined-characteristics of what is undetermined.[36]
A. III,47 (i, 152)

§31. Attention to the foul should be developed to put away lust; amity should be developed to put away anger; mindfulness of breathing should be developed for the cutting off of thoughts; perception of impermanence should be developed to remove the conceit 'I am'. In one who perceives impermanence, Meghiya, perception of not-self becomes steady (santháti); one who perceives not-self reaches removal of the conceit 'I am' and extinction (nibbána) here and now.
Udána 31 (Ud. 37)

§32. But when 'I am' is not done away with, then there is descent of the five faculties: of the eye-faculty, of the ear-faculty, of the nose-faculty, of the tongue-faculty, of the body-faculty. There is mind, monks, there are images/ideas, there is the nescience element. To the uninstructed commoner, monks, contacted by feeling born of nescience-contact, it occurs '(I) am', it occurs 'It is this that I am', it occurs 'I shall be', it occurs 'I shall not be'....[37]
Khandha Samy. 45 (iii, 46)

§33. Suppose, friends, there was a fragrant lotus, blue or red or white. Were one to say 'The fragrance belongs to the petals or the colour or the filaments', would one be speaking rightly?

-- No indeed, friend.

-- But how, friends, would one be speaking rightly?

-- 'The fragrance belongs to the flower', thus indeed, friend, would one be speaking rightly.

-- Just so, friends, I do not say 'I am matter (feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness)', nor do I say 'I am other than matter (feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness)'. And yet, friends, with regard to the five holding aggregates, 'I am' occurs to me, but I do not consider 'This am I'. Although, friends, the five lower fetters may be put away in a noble disciple, yet there is still a remnant for him, regarding the five holding aggregates, of the desire 'I am', of the aroma 'I am', that is not removed. At a later time he dwells contemplating arising and dissolution of the five holding aggregates: 'Thus matter (feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness), thus arising of matter (...consciousness), thus passing away of matter (...consciousness). For him, contemplating arising and dissolution of these five holding aggregates, the remnant regarding the five holding aggregates, of the desire 'I am', of the aroma 'I am', that was not removed, comes to be removed.[38]
Khandha Samy. 89 (iii, 130-1)

§34. At present, indeed, I am devoured by matter (...consciousness); in the past too I was devoured by matter (...consciousness), just as I am at present devoured by presently arisen matter (...consciousness); and indeed, if I were to delight in future matter (...consciousness), in the future too I should be devoured by matter (...consciousness), just as I am at present devoured by presently arisen matter (...consciousness).[39]
Khandha Samy. 79 (iii, 87-8)

§35. Matter (...consciousness), monks, is not-self. For if, monks, matter (...consciousness) were self, then matter (...consciousness) would not lead to affliction, and one would obtain of matter (...consciousness) 'Let my matter be thus, let my matter not be thus'. As indeed, monks, matter (...consciousness) is not-self, so matter (...consciousness) leads to affliction, and it is not obtained of matter (...consciousness) 'Let my matter be thus, let my matter not be thus'.[40]
Khandha Samy. 59 (iii, 66)

§36. Might there be anxiety about subjective absence, lord?

-- There might be, monk, the Auspicious One said. Here, monk, someone holds this view: 'The world is self; and when I have departed I shall be permanent, enduring, eternal, not having the nature of change; and like this shall I remain for ever and ever'. He listens to the Tathágata or his disciple setting forth the Teaching for the destroying of all tendencies to views, assertions, obsessions, and insistencies, for the calming of all determinations, for the relinquishing of all foundations, for the destroying of craving, for fading out, for ceasing, for extinction. It occurs to him 'I shall surely be annihilated! I shall surely perish! I shall surely be no more!' He sorrows, is distressed, and laments, and, beating his breast and bewailing, he falls into confusion. Thus indeed, monks, there is anxiety about subjective absence.[41]
M. 22 (i, 136-7)

§37. There is, monks, a non-born, non-become, non-made, non-determined; for if, monks, there were not that non-born, non-become, non-made, non-determined, an escape here from the born, become, made, determined, would not be manifest.
Udána viii,3 (Ud. 80)

§38. There is, morks, that base where there is neither earth nor water nor fire nor air nor the base of endless space nor the base of endless consciousness nor the base of nothingness nor the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception nor this world nor another world, neither sun nor moon; there, monks, I say that there is neither coming nor going nor standing nor falling away nor arising; that is without establishment, without procedure, without basis; that is just the ending of unpleasure (suffering).
Udána viii,1 (Ud. 80)

§39. Since herein for you (i.e, as, within, or without any or all of the five aggregates), friend Yamaka, here and now the Tathágata actually and in truth is not to be found, is that explanation of yours proper: 'As I comprehend the Teaching set forth by the Tathágata, at the breaking up of the body of a monk whose cankers are destroyed, he is annihilated, he perishes, after death he is not'?[42]
Khandha Samy. 85 (iii, 112)

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Footnotes:

[25] '...it is the very nature of consciousness to exist "in a circle".' B&N, p. liii, Cf. also A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §17. [Back to text]

[26] 'The project of being or desire of being or drive towards being ... in fact ... is not distinguished from the being of the for-itself.' B&N, pp. 564-5. [Back to text]

[27] Thus it seems that the first four aggregates -- matter, feeling, perception, determinations -- are equivalent to name-&-matter, though the Suttas never say so specifically -- a fact that is unusually significant. See 12. [Back to text]

[28] 'Besides, if the act is not pure movement, it must be defined by an intention.' B&N, p. 477. Cf. A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §4. [Back to text]

[29] Note that in this passage the description of matter, feeling, perception, and consciousness are not as in 9 and 19: 'Matter' is afflicted by heat, cold, hunger, thirst, insects, etc.; 'feeling' is pleasant, unpleasant, and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant; 'perception' is of blue, yellow, red, etc.; 'consciousness' is of sour, bitter, etc. Cf. A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §14, 14. [Back to text]

[30] 'All that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the table; all my judgments or practical activities, all my present inclinations transcend themselves; they aim at the table and are absorbed in it.' B&N, pp. li-lii. 'What the world makes known to me is only "worldly".' B&N, p. 200. 'It is the instrumental-things which in their original appearance indicate our body to us. The body is not a secret between things and ourselves; it manifests only the individuality and the contingency in our original relation to instrumental-things.' B&N, p. 325. 'It would be useless to look there (in the body for-me) for traces of a physiological organ, of an anatomical and spatial constitution. Either it is the center of reference indicated emptily by the instrumental-objects of the world or else it is the contingency which the for-itself exists. More exactly, these two modes of being are complementary.' B&N, p. 339. Cf. NÁMA. [Back to text]

[31] 'Thus it is the upsurge of the for-itself in the world by which the same stroke causes the world to exist as the totality of things and causes senses to exist as the objective mode in which the qualities of things are presented.' B&N, p. 319. 'In this sense we defined the senses and the sense organs in general as our being-in-the-world in so far as we have to be it in the form of being-in-the-midst-of-the-world.' B&N, p. 325. Cf. MANO. [Back to text]

[32] 'It is through human reality that multiplicity comes into the world...' B&N, p. 137. [Back to text]

[33] 'If the situation is neither subjective nor objective, this is because it does not constitute a knowledge nor even an affective comprehension of the state of the world by a subject. The situation is a relation of being between a for-itself and the in-itself which the for-itself nihilates. The situation is the whole subject (he is nothing but his situation) and it is also the whole "thing"...' B&N, p. 549. 'Six internal/external (subjective/objective) bases' are sometimes spoken of (e.g. Dígha 22 (ii, 292-304)). The external bases -- visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, images/ideas -- are existence brut and appear to correspond to the 'matter' of name-&-matter or rather, the 'matter' of name-&-matter is (at any level) the discrepancy between the external bases and the internal bases as (bodily) adaptation ('...the glass-drunk-from haunts the full glass as its possible and constitutes it as a glass to be drunk from' B&N, p. 104). The internal bases -- eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind -- have name-&-matter as condition; and they may perhaps be thought of as a field (in the mathematical sense) defined by name-&-matter (cf. 'The "this" always appears on a ground; that is, on the undifferentiated totality of being inasmuch as the For-itself is the radical and syncretic negation of it.' B&N, p. 182). But since every name-&-matter, every ceci, that is to say, is itself a project to change a ceci of lower order ('But at the same time that freedom is a surpassing of this given, it chooses itself as this surpassing of the given. Freedom is not just any kind of surpassing of any kind of given. By assuming the brute given and by conferring meaning on it, freedom has suddenly chosen itself; its end is exactly to change this given, just as the given appears as this given in the light of the end chosen.' B&N, p. 508), every field (of whatever order) is a field of field-changes. It is perhaps significant that there is a Sutta passage (A. IV,171 (ii, 158) where 'field (khetta) and 'ground' (vatthu) are synonyms for 'base'(áyatana). [Back to text]

[34] 'In fact the lemon is extended throughout its qualities and each of its qualities is extended throughout each of the others.' B&N, p. 186. '...it is this total inter-penetration which we call the this.' B&N, p. 186. The word 'faculty' (indriya) aprears to be used when the senses are spoken of without reference to the situation, and may refer either to one's own senses (as here) or to the sensee d'autrui, sometimes in the same passage. The word 'six bases' (saláyataná) is never, it seems, used of other' senses. [Back to text]

[35] 'The revelation of the table as table requires a permanence of table which comes to it from the future and which is not a purely established given, but a potentiality.' B&N, p. 193. 'The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it; precisely because it could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself.' B&N, p. 90. Why is this of necessity a condition for suffering? 'The possible is that which a For-itself lacks in order to be itself or, if you prefer, the appearance of what I am -- at a distance.' B&N, p. 125. 'The eternity which man is seeking is not the infinity of duration, of that vain pursuit after the self for which I am myself responsible; man seeks a repose in self, the atemporality of the absolute coincidence with himself.' B&N, p. 141-2. Cf. A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPÁDA §12 et seq. [Back to text]

[36] 'The "thing" exists straightway as a "form"; that is, a whole which is not affected by any of the superficial parasitic variations which we can see on it. Each this is revealed with a law of being which determines its threshold, its level of change where it will cease to be what it is in order simply not to be.' B&N, pp. 205-6. [Back to text]

[37] 'In order for value to become the object of a thesis, the for-itself which it haunts must also appear before the regard of reflection.' B&N, p. 95. Cf. DHAMMA (b). [Back to text]

[38] 'Pure reflection is never anything but a quasi-knowledge....' B&N, p. 162. '...everywhere and in whatever manner it affects itself, the for-itself is condemned to be-for-itself. In fact, it is here that pure reflection is discovered.' B&N, p. 160. [Back to text]

[39] 'My attitude ... is ... a pure mode ... of causing myself to be drunk in by things as ink is by a blotter...' B&N, p. 259. [Back to text]

[40] '...a being which would be its own foundation could not suffer the slightest discrepancy between what it is and what it conceives, for it would produce itself in conformance with its comprehension of being and could conceive only of what it is.' B&N, p. 80. Cf. PARAMATTHA SACCA §6, DHAMMA. [Back to text]

[41] 'Yet at each moment I apprehend this initial choice as contingent and unjustifiable; at each moment therefore I am on the site suddenly to consider it objectively and consequently to surpass it and to make-it-past by causing the liberating instant to arise. Hence my anguish, the fear which I have of being suddenly exorcized (i.e., of becoming radically other); but hence also the frequent upsurge of "conversions" which cause me totally to metamorphose my original project.' B&N, p. 475. Cf. SAÑÑÁ. [Back to text]

[42] 'It is impossible to conceive of a consciousness which would not exist in these three dimensions.' B&N, p. 137. It is clear from the Suttas that extinction is attained in this very lifetime and that this does not entail immediate death. The question might be asked how it is that an arahat (the Buddha himself, for example) while he still lives can walk and talk and eat and drink, even though consciousness (Pour-soi) has ceased. But since a living arahat cannot actually and in truth be said to exist, except by another who is not himself an arahat, it seems hardly reasonable to look to ontology for an answer. The question, however, is invalid, since it assumes the arahat's existence: where name-&-matter and consciousness have ceased, what conceivable mode of designation, expression, or description can there be? In 37 and 38 the Buddha asserts that release is possible. I see no way of showing that assertion to be false, but without individually attaining release, I see no way of showing it to be true. Cf. PARAMATTHA SACCA §4. [Back to text]